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5VOORWOORd
het gebed zonder einde is tot een einde gekomen. dat wil echter niet 
zeggen dat het klaar is. dat is namelijk een status die onderzoek naar zich 
immer ontwikkelende onderwerpen zoals (grensoverschrijdende) collectieve 
arbeidsovereenkomsten zich niet kan aanmeten.
Ik lees graag voorwoorden. Als één ding duidelijk wordt bij het lezen van 
voorwoorden, dan is het wel dat schrijven een solitaire aangelegenheid is. 
dat kan ik inmiddels beamen. Gedurende mijn schrijftijd heb ik te weinig 
aandacht besteed aan de wereld om mij heen, aan familie en vrienden. die tijd 
hoop ik in te halen. Voor nu is een excuus op zijn plaats aan al die mensen. 
daarnaast blijkt uit de door mij gelezen voorwoorden dat het voorwoord een 
geschikte plaats wordt bevonden om mensen te bedanken. Bij het zodoende 
ontstane gebruik sluit ik mij graag aan. 
Voorop wil ik graag mijn promotor, Cees Loonstra, bedanken. hij begreep 
als geen ander dat de combinatie advocatuur en onderzoek eigensoortige 
problemen met zich bracht. hij voelde precies aan wanneer de teugels 
strakker aan te trekken en wanneer deze te laten vieren. Maar waar ik het 
meeste bewondering voor heb is zijn gave om in enkele dagen een uit de 
kluiten gewassen manuscript van zinvol commentaar te voorzien, ook als het 
onderwerp zo onalledaags is als het onderhavige. Ik ben onder de indruk.
Verder ben ik veel dank verschuldigd aan mijn patroon (eens een patroon, 
altijd een patroon) Vincent disselkoen. Van hem heb ik veel geleerd. Onze 
discussies over het recht, veelal over onderwerpen enkele decimalen achter 
de komma, zullen mij altijd bijblijven. Vincent heeft mij voor de volle 100% 
gesteund in mijn plan om te promoveren. Ook anderszins is hij “schuldig” aan 
mijn wetenschappelijke aspiraties. Zijn enthousiasme voor het recht werkt 
aanstekelijk en heeft mij zonder meer geïnfecteerd. hij geldt voor mij als een 
grootheid in het arbeidsrecht.
Een aantal kantoorgenoten heeft ook een bijzondere rol gespeeld. Alexander 
Steensma heeft net als Vincent zich hard gemaakt voor mijn promotie. Na het 
vertrek van Vincent ben ik steeds meer met hem gaan werken en dat beschouw 
ik als een voorrecht. Op en buiten kantoor was Cathérine jakimowicz een 
rots in de branding. Ik heb haar tot vervelens toe gedachten voorgehouden 
over grensoverschrijdende collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten die zij telkens 
geduldig overwoog en besprak. Als ik in een “promotiedip” raakte trok zij mij 
eruit. Bartje Schaberg stond mij altijd met raad en daad terzijde. daarnaast 
heeft vrijwel de gehele secretariële ondersteuning van de praktijkgroep 
Employment & Benefits mij geholpen bij het opstellen van het manuscript. 
Lisette, Petra, Nel, Wilma en henny hebben hierbij een hoofdrol gespeeld. 
Ontzettend bedankt!
Koen, het beklimmen van de Mont Blanc is al weer te lang geleden dus laten 
wij snel weer een nieuwe uitdaging aangaan. jeroen, Chris, johan, André en 
Niek: weer een wintersport? Suzanne, jij hebt mij altijd gesteund bij alles wat 
ik deed en wilde doen. dankjewel daarvoor. Marta: voor, tijdens en na het 
delen van een kamer op kantoor was jij altijd even enthousiast en dat werkt 
bijzonder aanstekelijk. Sem, mocht jij in de toekomst willen promoveren, dan 
zal ik op dat punt mijn belofte geschreven op het kompas kunnen inlossen. 
Familie jakimowicz, het is mij nog steeds niet duidelijk of ik jullie zou moeten 
bedanken voor het ter beschikking stellen van jullie woning voor een week 
“rustig” schrijven. jullie bedanken voor jullie gastvrijheid kan ik echter zonder 
meer. jos, ik ken weinig mensen zo krachtig en wijs als jij. Op Ans en op jou 
kan ik altijd terug vallen. Niek, waar wij vroeger eigenlijk alles samen deden, 
doen wij dat nu misschien te weinig, want wij lijden allebei aan de eigenschap 
onze tijd vol te stoppen met te veel (vooral werkgerelateerde) zaken. Ondanks 
dit is onze band onverminderd hecht.
Tot slot een woord aan Annemarie. jij hebt de afgelopen periode een prestatie 
geleverd die het schrijven van welk proefschrift dan ook doet verbleken. jouw 
kracht en doorzettingsvermogen lijken geen grenzen te kennen en bewonder 
ik. 
het onderzoek naar grensoverschrijdende collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten 
heb ik in juni 2008 afgerond. 
Rotterdam, augustus 2008
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ChAPTER 1
INTROdUCTION 
1. Research subject 
In many European countries collective labour agreements play a crucial role 
in organising industrial relations. A research of the European Industrial 
Relations Observatory (“EIRO”) established that in the year 2002 more than 
70% of the employees within the member states of the European Union 
(“Member States”) at that time, excluding Greece, were, on average, covered 
by a collective labour agreement.1 These collective labour agreements are all 
concluded regionally or nationally and are therefore limited by the rules and 
the jurisdiction of the country to which they apply. Clearly, as the integration 
of the Member States develops further and as globalisation is a fact nowadays, 
labour relations are becoming more and more international. As is, or at least 
should be, (collective) labour law.2 Social partners, the key figures in collective 
labour law, could take advantage of the international opportunities presented 
to them. They could, for instance, enter into transnational collective labour 
agreements that apply within the entire European Union (“EU”) or within 
a number of Member States. This brings us to this thesis’ research subject: 
transnational collective labour agreements having force in the EU. Two 
preliminary questions will be answered before moving on towards the main 
matter of this research. 
The first preliminary question is rather straightforward: is there a need or 
demand for transnational collective labour agreements? There are several 
angles to approach that question. A first angle could be to analyse the challenges 
for and the role of the European social partners from a historical point of 
view. It should be established whether their role has changed in time enabling 
1  Reference is made to the EIRO publication from M. Carley, Industrial relations in 
the EU, Japan and USA, 2002, 24 February 2004, page 18.
2  Or, as the Commission has put it: “European integration is gaining ground and 
because of the integration of our economies the social partners are increasingly 
having to take this development into account.” Commission Communication COM 
(1998) 322, final, Adapting and promoting the Social Dialogue at Community level, 
page 4.
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and possibly even stimulating them to conclude transnational (European) 
collective agreements. The position of other European stakeholders, most 
notably the Commission of the European Communities, plays a role in this 
as well. A second angle is to analyse whether collective bargaining becomes 
more international and whether transnational collective labour agreements 
already have been concluded. “Europeanisation” of collective bargaining and 
especially the conclusion of transnational collective labour agreements might 
indicate a market for transnational collective labour agreements. A last angle 
is to list the potential advantages and disadvantages of transnational collective 
labour agreements and balance these. If  the possible advantages outweigh the 
possible disadvantages, this would indicate a need for transnational collective 
labour agreements. 
Should transnational collective bargaining prove interesting for the social 
partners, the second preliminary question is whether there is a need for a 
new legal framework on transnational collective labour agreements. The word 
“new” is used deliberately. At EU level the European social partners have 
already been given the chance to conclude European collective agreements 
within the so-called European social dialogue.3 Pursuant to article 139 of 
the EC Treaty these agreements can either be implemented by a Council 
decision or in accordance with the normal procedures and practices specific 
to management and labour and the Member State. This method of European 
collective bargaining should be analysed. It should be established whether 
this institutionalised type of European collective bargaining, laid out in the 
EC Treaty, forms a proper basis for transnational collective bargaining. If  
this existing legal framework does not seem to suffice, it should be established 
whether there is a need for another legal framework for transnational collective 
labour agreements.
Only once it is established that (i) there is a need or demand for transnational 
collective labour agreements, while (ii) there is a need for a new legal framework 
on transnational collective labour agreements, the last question becomes 
relevant: how should such a new legal framework be shaped? That in fact is 
to the main goal, the actual research subject of this thesis: an attempt will be 
3  The “European social dialogue” covers two aspects: (i) the negotiation and 
conclusion of agreements at Community level between European social partners 
and (ii) the cooperation between the Community institutions and the European 
social partners. The European social dialogue is often viewed within the context 
of articles 136 – 139 of the EC Treaty, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 
5. See: E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, Intersentia, 
Antwerp – Oxford – New York, 2002, page 3.
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made to formulate possible criteria and suggestions for realising European 
legislation on concluding transnational collective agreements.
2. Demarcation of the boundaries
Given the above, this thesis ultimately concerns European legislation 
on transnational collective agreements. Exactly what is considered a 
“transnational collective labour agreement” referred to in this thesis is therefore 
relevant. In order to explain that term a distinction should be made between 
(i) a “European” transnational collective labour agreement and a national 
collective labour agreement having an international force and (ii) collective 
bargaining with trade unions and with others employee representatives. 
2.1 “European” transnational collective labour agreements v. 
“national” transnational collective labour agreements
Transnational collective labour agreements could be regarded as collective 
labour agreements that cover (have force in) more than one jurisdiction. Such 
agreements already exist, as will be explained in chapter 4, section 3. Still there 
are important differences between these existing transnational collective labour 
agreements and the ones proposed in this thesis.4 Transnational collective labour 
agreements proposed in this thesis are embedded in European legislation. 
Pursuant to this suggested European legislation, these agreements have to 
be equally recognised and applied in the jurisdictions of all Member States. 
These “European” transnational collective labour agreements therefore have 
Community effects and not merely national effects. The existing transnational 
collective labour agreements do not have such Community effects, but only 
national effects: they are “national” transnational collective labour agreements. 
National transnational collective labour agreements are agreements that 
satisfy the national requirements that collective labour agreements need to 
satisfy for the country concerned, having a scope of application covering 
several jurisdictions. This is, however, a practical definition of a national 
transnational collective labour agreement. From a purely legal stance, there is 
no such thing (yet) as a “transnational collective labour agreement”.5 There 
4  In chapter 14, section 7 I will propose a definition for “transnational collective 
labour agreement” for the purposes of European legislation. 
5  From a comparative law perspective, a “collective labour agreement” is simply not 
an unambiguous phenomenon. See A.A.h. van hoek, Internationale mobiliteit 
van werknemers. Een onderzoek naar de interactie tussen arbeidsrecht, EG-recht en 
IPR aan de hand van de Detacheringsrichtlijn [International mobility of employees. 
A research to the interaction between employment law, EC-law and PIL in connection 
with the Posted Workers Directive], SdU, The hague, 2000, page 487.
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are no specific rules on subjects like the procedure, the negotiating agents 
and the binding powers of a transnational collective labour agreement:6 a 
transnational collective labour agreement simply has no specific legal status, 
and certainly no Community status.7 Its actual (national) status and effects 
must, in consequence, be determined by national law on a case-by-case basis, 
in accordance with the principles of private international law.8 This may bring 
about specific (and undesired) difficulties, as set out in chapter 6, section 
6.3. National transnational collective labour agreements are therefore not a 
suitable alternative for European transnational collective labour agreements. 
Consequently, this thesis focuses on European transnational collective 
labour agreements, being collective labour agreements based on European 
legislation, having force in more than one Member State. This is not to say 
that national transnational collective labour agreements are entirely without 
relevance for this thesis. The mere existence of these agreements shows that 
there is a demand for transnational collective labour agreements. however, 
the exact legal implications of these national transnational collective labour 
agreements are not the subject of this thesis.
6  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, report for the 
European Commission, February 2006, page 27.
7  A possible exception to this statement, depending on how transnational collective 
labour agreements are defined, constitutes the agreement between the Special 
Negotiating Body and the company on the basis of the European Works Council 
directive (Council directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment 
of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings 
and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing 
and consulting employees Oj L 254, 30 September 1994, pages 64 – 72) and 
the directive on the SE (Council directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 
supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement 
of employees, Oj L 294, 10 November 2001, pages 22 – 32). These types of 
agreements are, however, not concluded with trade unions, and are therefore in my 
view not to be regarded as (transnational) collectivive labour agreements. 
8  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 21.
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2.2 Collective labour agreements v. employee 
representation at the workplace
Closely related to collective bargaining is employee representation or 
participation at the workplace. Workplace representation in the EU is 
normally organised by Works Councils and/or trade union representatives.9 
It is promoted by European legislation, including the 1994 European Works 
Council directive.10 In practice some transnational collective bargaining takes 
place between multinational companies and their European Works Councils.11 
Furthermore, employee representation or participation at the workplace is of 
great relevance for many industries in Europe and has a close link in many 
Member States to trade unions and even collective bargaining. Nevertheless, 
this representation and participation should be distinguished from collective 
bargaining and the conclusion of collective labour agreements. After all, 
in the collective bargaining process trade unions serve as management’s 
countervailing power to negotiate wages and working conditions.12 This is 
normally not the case when it comes to employee representation or participation 
at the workplace; Works Councils are not entitled to conclude collective labour 
agreements in many Member States, while trade unions are allowed to do this 
in all Member States.13 There are more arguments against an overly active role 
of the European Works Council (the most logical counterparty besides trade 
unions) in transnational collective bargaining. Bargaining with the European 
Works Council raises many questions, including: (i) the bargaining topics 
(which with regard to the European Works Council should logically be limited 
to issues on employee representation), (ii) the legitimacy of the European 
Works Council to go beyond mere information and consultation, (iii) the lack 
of independence of the European Works Council towards the company, (iv) 
the European Works Council’s relation towards trade unions and (v) the legal 
status of such agreements.14 From the outset, European Works Councils (or 
9  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, june 2006, page 57. 
See for this document: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/
reports_en.htm.
10  Council directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a 
European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and 
Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and 
consulting employees Oj L 254, 30 September 1994, pages 64 – 72.
11  See chapter 4, section 3.
12  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 58.
13  See chapter 13, section 5.1.
14  See also: E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak,  
F. Valdés dal-Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, 
page 20.
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other similar employee representative bodies) do not seem the most suitable 
parties in transnational collective bargaining. As this thesis focuses on such 
bargaining, employee representation or participation falls outside the scope 
of this thesis. Only occasionally will this topic be touched upon when it is 
relevant to the actual topic: transnational collective labour agreements.
2.3 Further limitations
It is common in many Member States that employees and civil servants are 
distinguished. Moreover, civil servants are frequently excluded from the scope 
of European directives.15 This thesis focuses solely on employment relations 
between the employer and employee; it does not deal with civil servants. 
Possible administrative procedures relating to civil servants are therefore 
excluded from the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, this thesis mainly focuses 
on bipartite collective labour agreements, which are agreements concluded 
between both sides of the industry (management and labour). Tripartite 
collective labour agreements, which are agreements involving the government 
as well, will only occasionally be mentioned.
3. Research method
The above defines the research subject. This section focuses on the research 
method. This entire thesis is based on research of literature, legislation 
(including treaties) and jurisprudence. An important tool for this kind of 
international research is comparative law. There is a broad consensus that 
comparative law can be a useful research tool and has many functions and 
benefits.16 Two generally recognised benefits relevant for the underlying thesis 
are: (i) comparative law can be used as an aid to the legislator;17 and (ii) 
comparative law can be used to unify law.18 
Since this thesis ultimately aims to suggest possible criteria for realising 
European legislation (unified law) on the conclusion of transnational collective 
labour agreements, it is logical to use comparative law as a research tool. 
15  See for example Council directive 98/59/EC on Employee Information and 
Consultation in case of Collective Redundancies (Oj L 225, 12 August 1998, pages 
16 – 21).
16  d. Kokkini-Iatridou et all, Een inleiding tot het rechtsvergelijkende onderzoek [An 
introduction to the comparative law research], Kluwer, deventer, 1988, page 15 ff 
and pages 26 ff.
17  K. Zweigert and h. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, translated by T. Weir, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, pages 15 – 17.
18  K. Zweigert and h. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, pages 23 – 27.
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however, whether this tool may be used when attempting to formulate new 
European legislation on concluding collective labour agreements is not beyond 
discussion. This discussion takes place on two levels: (i) is comparative law in 
general permitted when suggesting new European law and (ii) is comparative 
law useful within the specific field of collective bargaining, given the different 
basis on which collective bargaining takes place in the individual Member 
States on one hand and in the EU on the other?
3.1 Is comparative law permitted as a tool in order 
to draft European legislation?
According to some scholars, comparing law (or policies) of the different 
Member States in order to try to find important similarities on which basis 
European legislation can be recommended serves no goal. According to 
them, a totally new system should be pursued, separate from the laws of the 
Member States, that does justice to the standards, values and dynamics within 
the EU.19 According to Tromm, for example, it is impossible to formulate 
European policy (in the field of transportation) based on national policies.20 
Every national policy, including harmonised European policy based on 
national law, is deemed to fail. European policy should according to Tromm 
necessarily be a “thirteenth” policy (currently a “twenty-eighth” policy) that 
should end all national policies. Although Pieters also pursued a “thirteenth” 
system in order to draft European legislation with regard to social security, he 
did analyse common mutual principles of the Member States, which he used 
as a basis for European law.21
Others take opposite views and argue that solely on the basis of comparative 
law, future European legislation should be designed. According to Martin, 
comparing different law models in national legislation could lead to the 
conclusion that one of those models, that fits best the aim of the European 
Community, should be used as a basis for European legislation. Such 
comparison could also lead to a new model, based on processes that exist 
19  For a clear overview of this discussion reference is made to L. van herk, 
Arbeidsvoorwaardenvorming op Europees niveau [Constituting employment conditions 
on European level], Utrecht, 1988, pages 11 ff.
20  j.j.M. Tromm, Juridische aspecten van het communautair vervoersbeleid [Legal 
aspects of Community policy on transportation], T.M.C. Asserinstituut, The hague, 
1990, page 423.
21  d. Pieters, Sociale Zekerheid na 1992; één over twaalf [Social Security after 1992; 
one passed twelve], Reeks sociale zekerheidswetenschap studies, KUB, 1989.
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in most of the countries, or a model that applies best to all countries.22 Kötz 
argues that the best method to draft common European law is to assess and 
compare different national laws, to find a solution for a certain problem 
in those laws, and to translate that solution into a concrete regulation.23 
According to him, one should, on a broad scale, identify a “common law” 
within the different countries involved, which is a more or less virtual law that 
thus does not actually exist in any one of those countries.24 
Undeniably, it is true that the EU cannot be compared with any single Member 
State. Moreover, it cannot be reduced to the sum of all Member States together. 
After all, the EU has a system of its own with its own rules and dynamics.25 
however, these observations do not make a thorough research of the laws of 
the Member States superfluous. If  by means of comparative law research it 
can be concluded that certain aspects with regard to the researched subject are 
viewed crucial in many or all Member States, it makes sense to include these 
aspects in proposals for European legislation. Moreover, the introduction of 
such a new European law will presumably proceed more smoothly if  that law 
fits within the legal system of the Member States. A proper fit will more likely 
be the case if  that European law contains parts or values of the law of the 
Member State involved.
Furthermore, comparing the legal systems of the different Member States 
could contribute to a better understanding of different visions and procedures 
in the separate countries. Such understanding might improve better acceptance 
of possible new rules. Assessing Member States’ laws could also locate possible 
obstacles in national laws for implementing European law, which obstacles 
could subsequently be addressed. Moreover, comparative law could identify 
possible flaws and strengths in national laws that might help to clarify the 
needs of the Member States with regard to certain legal matters.26
22  P. Martin, Le droit social communautaire: droit commun des Etats membres de la 
communauté européenne en matière sociale?, RTd eur. 30 (4) 1994, pages 610 – 618, 
as referred to by: L. van herk, Arbeidsvoorwaardenvorming op Europees niveau, 
page 12.
23  h. Kötz, Gemeineuropaïschen Zivilrecht, in: Festschrift für Konrad Zweigert, 
Tübingen, 1981, page 497.
24  h. Kötz, Gemeineuropaïschen Zivilrecht, page 499.
25  Reference is made to the ruling of the European Court of justice of 5 February 
1963, case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos vs. the Netherlands, in which the Court ruled: 
“(…) the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law (…)” 
(emphasis added by author). This ruling has been confirmed several times. 
26  L. van herk, Arbeidsvoorwaardenvorming op Europees niveau, page 12.
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It should not be forgotten that on occasion the European Court of justice 
applies the “comparative method of Community law” too.27 Although the 
Court views Community law autonomously and denies a decisive influence 
of a single national legal concept, it tends to take into account national 
traditions, which it interprets and elevates to Community principles of law.28 
Finally, it is no coincidence that one of Europe’s most well known comparative 
scholars, david, stated that comparative law plays an important role in the 
development of law as a science, and in the development of new international 
law that fits the conditions of the modern world.29
For these reasons, comparative law can and must play an important role when 
suggesting new European legislation.
3.2 Is comparative law useful with regard to collective bargaining?
Although, as set out above, comparative law can be an important tool in 
order to formulate possible new European legislation in general, there is an 
additional obstacle to surmount when it comes to using comparative law 
in the specific field of European collective law. There seem to be important 
differences between collective bargaining on national level and on European 
level. These differences may stand in the way of using comparative law in this 
specific area of the law. 
In most Member States, three classical rights are of crucial importance in 
their respective laws on concluding collective agreements: (i) the freedom of 
27  d. Schiek, Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in European 
Labour Law: How to read Article 139 EC, Industrial Law journal, Volume 34, 
Number 1, March 2005, page 28.
28  This can be witnessed, for example, with regard to the classical right associated 
with collective bargaining. Reference is made to chapter 8 of this thesis.
29  R. david (C. jauffret-Spinosi), Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains, edition 
11, 2002, pages 8 and 9. 
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association, (ii) the right to collective bargaining and (iii) the right to strike.30 
For this reason, it would appear logical that European collective bargaining 
could not exist without these rights. 
According to Franssen, these rights are indeed preconditions for the 
development of a European social dialogue.31 Although she concludes that 
said rights are recognised on a European level, and takes these rights as a 
basis when discussing the European social dialogue, she also observes that 
there is a difference between the conclusion of collective agreements on a 
European level and a national level.32
Lo Faro, however, denies that the above-mentioned triptych of rights is 
respected under European law. Basically, he argues that the social partners 
lack autonomy and freedom of association on a European level.33 Moreover, 
he points out that the right to strike is excluded from the Community 
competences.34 Consequently, Lo Faro argues that said classical rights cannot 
form a basis for analysing European collective bargaining.35
Lo Faro’s and Franssen’s arguments that today’s European collective 
bargaining can not really be compared with national collective bargaining are 
persuasive, as are Lo Faro’s arguments that the social partners lack autonomy 
(his arguments will be discussed in depth in chapter 6 of this thesis). Therefore, 
one should be careful when applying national laws of Member States to 
collective agreements concluded on a European level. Although Lo Faro’s 
30  Or, as dorssemont puts it: ”Collective agreements constitute a spontaneous and 
natural outcome of the recognition of three fundamental workers’ rights: (a) the 
freedom of association, the right to form and join trade unions, (b) the right to 
strike and (c) the right to or freedom of collective bargaining.” F. dorssemont, 
Some Reflections on the Origin, Problems and Perspectives of the European Social 
Dialogue, page 9, in: M. de Vos (ed.), A Decade Beyond Maastricht: The European 
Social Dialogue Revisited, Kluwer Law International, The hague, 2003. See also 
A.T.j.M. jacobs, Het recht op collectief onderhandelen in rechtsvergelijkend en 
Europees perspectief [The right to collective bargaining in comparative and European 
perspective], Samson h.d. Tjeenk Willink, Alphen aan den Rijn/Brussel, 1986, 
page 65.
31  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, pages 8 ff.
32  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 78.
33  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2000, page 106 respectively pages 92 ff.
34  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
pages 101 ff.
35  See also F. dorssemont, review of E. Franssen’s Legal aspects of the European 
Social Dialogue, SMA 2003-6, page 277.
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observation that at present the three classical rights that form the basis of 
concluding collective agreements in Member States cannot be used to analyse 
the current European social dialogue might be correct,36 that does not mean 
that future European collective bargaining should not be based on these 
classical rights. On the contrary, Lo Faro’s analysis on European collective 
bargaining at present adds fuel to the argument to draft European legislation 
ensuring these three basic rights in order to conclude “proper” transnational 
collective agreements in a European context. he argues that:
once decided, the attention to draw collective bargaining into the sphere of 
legal relevance of the Community system (…) surely implied the need to adjust 
the principles prevailing in the legal order within which collective bargaining is 
destined to operate, with the consequent provision of the principles of freedom 
of association and the right to strike, without which collective autonomy cannot 
properly be regarded as such.37
(….)
In the context of the legal regulation of employment, procedural social rights 
consist, in essence, in the right to bargain together with, as their indispensable 
corollary, the right to strike. Only their express constitutional recognition within 
the Community system can prevent European collective bargaining from being 
reduced to the status of a mere regulatory technique (…).38
And that gives sufficient reason to thoroughly assess the laws in the different 
Member States where these rights are long since recognised. I feel strengthened 
in this conclusion by the words of Kahn-Freund stated on occasion of a 
meeting of an elitist group of labour lawyers that gathered in the sixties and 
discussed, amongst others, the topic “Collective bargaining and the Law”. On 
that occasion, he stated that “comparative analysis must precede the study of 
harmonizing processes under EC law and ILO conventions, even when there 
is pressure to respond to supranational goals”.39
36  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
chapter 4.
37  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 102.
38  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 153.
39  This quote derives from: S. Sciarra, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining 
in Europe 1990 – 2004; Draft General Report, page 9. The report can be found on: 
http://www.unifi.it/polo-universitario-europeo/ricerche/collective_bargaining.html.
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3.3 Conclusion and way to proceed
For the above-mentioned reasons, comparative law will play an important 
role in this thesis. The laws on collective agreements in four Member States 
will be analysed. The similarities and differences between these laws will be 
assessed and, to the extent possible, put in an EU-perspective. Taking these 
similarities and differences into consideration, an attempt will be made to 
formulate possible criteria and suggestions for realising European legislation 
on concluding transnational collective labour agreements. Obviously, the own 
nature and dynamics of the EU will not be disregarded in that research. In 
this respect I agree with the statement of Keller that “any attempt or any 
search for a homogeneous model of European industrial relations which is 
too closely tied to a national model is and will remain fruitless”.40 
The real challenge is to develop a system that is neither too closely related to 
the law of one singular Member State, nor forgets to take into account the 
experience and know how concerning industrial relations already present in 
the Member States, and furthers the Community interests.41 Striking in this 
respect is the relatively old but in my view still valid opinion of Advocate-
General Lagrange in a case unrelated to employment law:42
(…) the case law of the Court, in so far as it invokes national laws (as it does to a 
large extent) to define the rules of law relating to the application of the Treaty, is 
not content to draw on more or less arithmetical ‘common denominators’ between 
the different national solutions, but chooses from each of the Member States those 
solutions which, having regard to the objects of the Treaty, appear to it to be the 
best or, if  one may use the expression, the most progressive. This is the spirit, 
moreover, which has guided the Court hitherto.
The relevant Member States whose laws are scrutinised are (i) the Netherlands, 
(ii) Germany, (iii) Belgium, and (iv) the United Kingdom. There are a number 
of reasons for choosing these countries. For one, they are chosen because they 
include two major players in Europe (Germany and the United Kingdom), 
including the country that cradled modern collective bargaining (the United 
40  B. Keller, National industrial relations and the prospects for European collective 
bargaining  – The view from a German standpoint, in W. E. Lecher and h. W. 
Platzer, European Union – European Industrial Relations? Global challenges, national 
developments and transnational dynamics, Routledge, London, 1998, page 57.
41  See also d. Schiek, Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in 
European Labour Law: How to read Article 139 EC, pages 28 and 29.
42  Opinion of Advocate-General Lagrange of 4 june 1962 in C-14/61, Hoogovens/
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.
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Kingdom).43 Furthermore, by researching a common law country (the United 
Kingdom) and civil law countries (the others), the research will be balanced 
better. The same balance is sought when it comes to the nature of the different 
national systems on collective labour agreements.44 The United Kingdom on 
the one hand has a system that is primarily based on contract, as only those 
employers and employees that, by agreement, have incorporated a collective 
labour agreement need to apply that collective labour agreement. The system 
in Belgium, on the other hand, is predominantly an institutional system. If  a 
collective labour agreement applies to an employer, all employment agreements 
between that employer and its employees are automatically governed by that 
collective labour agreement. The systems in the Netherlands and Germany 
are situated somewhere in the middle. A collective labour agreement in these 
countries automatically applies to the employment agreements between the 
employer who is bound by that collective labour agreement and its employees 
who are member of the contracting trade union(s), but does not automatically 
apply to employment agreements between this bound employer and its 
employees who are not member of the contracting trade union(s). The laws 
of the aforementioned four countries therefore cover much ground and are, 
to some extent, representative for Europe. A final consideration for choosing 
these countries is a pragmatic one, as I am able to understand the language of 
these four countries. Obviously, it must be admitted that researching the laws 
of “merely” these four countries cannot replace a full research on the laws on 
collective labour agreements in all Member States. Therefore, the results of 
the assessment of the laws of these four countries are compared with relevant 
parts of the laws of other Member States. This makes the research as complete 
as possible, while still being workable. 
4. Research angle
The topic “transnational collective labour agreement” can be approached 
from many different angles. There are, for instance, political, sociological, 
economical and legal considerations. This research primarily focuses on the 
legal aspects of transnational collective bargaining. I realise that, in particular 
with regard to the question whether there is a need or demand for transnational 
collective labour agreements, this constitutes a limitation. The answer to this 
question, as given in this thesis, is therefore not entirely complete. Although 
that may be disappointing, this is in my view to be favoured over a thesis 
integrating different scientific angles, drafted by an author who is foremost a 
43  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Het recht op collectief onderhandelen in rechtsvergelijkend en 
Europees perspectief, pages 26 and 27.
44  This is an important element which will receive ample attention in chapter 15.
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lawyer. This is not to say that this thesis fully disregards other disciplines than 
law, as a number of socio-political arguments will be submitted as well. These 
arguments are, however, limited in number and primarily based on research 
done by others. 
5. Structure of the thesis
This thesis is divided into three general parts. Part I gives necessary 
“background information” on transnational (European) collective bargaining, 
and tries to answer the two preliminary questions. Part II deals with important 
international legal concepts concerning collective bargaining, sets out the 
national collective bargaining systems of the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium 
and Great Britain,45 and compares and analyses these systems, putting the 
results in a broader, European perspective. Part III draws conclusions and 
puts forward recommendations for establishing European legislation on 
concluding transnational collective agreements. 
5.1 Part I: Necessary background information / 
answering the preliminary questions
In order to place the subject of transnational collective bargaining in a proper 
setting, chapter 2 provides a brief  introduction of the institutions of the 
European Community, the manner how Community legislation is drafted and 
the most important cross-industry social partners involved in the European 
social dialogue. The aim of this chapter is not to be all inclusive, but merely to 
give brief  background information. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the history 
of the European social dialogue, the changed challenges for and the role of 
the European social partners, and their subsequent repositioning. It includes 
a description of the view on the European social dialogue from a number of 
European institutions. Chapter 4 deals with the Europeanisation of national 
collective bargaining in Member States and the achievements of the social 
partners in the field of transnational collective bargaining in Europe. Chapter 
5 scrutinises the institutional framework of the European social dialogue, as 
laid out in the articles 136 – 139 of the EC Treaty. Chapter 6 will set out flaws 
and limitations attached to the current European bargaining system. These 
are unwanted, as will be set out in chapter 7, since transnational collective 
bargaining may indeed prove valuable for several reasons. In the same chapter, 
it will be argued that there is a need or demand for transnational collective 
45  To be more precise, the laws of England and Wales, and to a certain extent also 
Scotland (there are some minor differences in Scottish law) are scrutinised. 
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labour agreements, and that a new legal framework on transnational collective 
agreements is required.
5.2 Part II: Essential supranational legal concepts on 
collective bargaining and national laws
Part II presents in chapter 8 an overview of the “classical rights” on the 
conclusion of collective agreements from a supranational perspective: (i) the 
freedom of association, (ii) the right to collective bargaining and (iii) the right 
to strike. It also sets out the reach that the European social partners have in 
transnational (European) collective bargaining. Chapters 9 up to and including 
12 will respectively set out the legal national systems on collective bargaining 
in the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, and Great Britain. These chapters 
are helpful for a better understanding of the proposal for new legislation on 
concluding European collective labour agreements that follows in part III, 
but are not a necessity to read. Chapter 13 brings these four chapters together 
as it analyses and compares the aforementioned four different legal systems. 
Chapter 13 is written in such a manner that it can also be understood without 
having perused the previous four chapters. The chapter does not only assess 
the laws of the four countries that were subject to research, but it also gives 
a broader view on collective labour agreements in Europe, including other 
Member States.
5.3 Part III: Evaluation and suggestions for new legislation 
on concluding European collective agreements
Part III draws the principal lessons from parts I and II and gives suggestions 
for realising European legislation on concluding transnational collective 
agreements. Chapter 14 proposes the legal basis on which European legislation 
on transnational collective bargaining can be based, explains its relation with 
the European social dialogue, sets out the most feasible bargaining levels, and 
explains the principles upon which transnational collective bargaining should 
be based. Finally, it suggests a definition for transnational collective labour 
agreements. Chapter 15 proposes the binding powers a transnational collective 
labour agreement should have. It also sets out which parties are to be involved 
in transnational bargaining under the proposed European system. Chapter 
16 deals with important “technicalities” of the transnational collective labour 
agreement, such as its enforcement, its term and termination, possible after-
effects that its provisions may have and the reach of the social partners when 
concluding transnational collective labour agreements. Chapter 17 summarises 
this thesis.
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ChAPTER 2
EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, LEGISLATION 
PROCESS ANd SOCIAL PARTNERS
1. Introduction
In order to place the subject “European legislation on transnational collective 
bargaining” in a proper setting, a brief  introduction of (i) the institutions 
of the European Community, (ii) Community legislation and (iii) the 
European social partners is required. This chapter should not be considered 
as a thorough elucidation of these subjects, but it merely gives general and 
compact background information.
As will be set out in this thesis, the institutions of the Community – and 
most notably: the Commission of the European Communities – have played 
an important role in the development of the European social dialogue. This 
makes sense, since one of the Commission’s official tasks is to promote the 
consultation of management and labour at Community level and to take 
any relevant measure to facilitate their dialogue. Furthermore, Community 
institutions are capable of transferring agreements concluded by the social 
partners into European legislation. This is a crucial aspect of the current 
European social dialogue and will be discussed in depth in chapter 5. Given 
the above, a basic understanding of the Community’s institutions is, if  not a 
necessity, at least very helpful to understand the European social dialogue. 
For that reason, said institutions will be introduced in section 2.
 
Given the fact that, as just mentioned, agreements entered into by the social 
partners may be implemented by a Council decision, a basic knowledge of the 
Community’s legislative process is also necessary. Consequently, said process 
will be briefly introduced in section 3.
For obvious reasons the social partners themselves play a crucial role in the 
European social dialogue. Section 4 therefore briefly sets out exactly which 
parties are considered social partners. Furthermore, the most important and 
generally recognised cross-sectoral social partners will be introduced in the 
same section.
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Section 5 will summarize the contents of this chapter.
2. Institutions of the European Community
The five most relevant institutions of the Community that are of importance 
for this thesis, in the sequence in which they are set out in part five of the EC 
Treaty (“Institutions of the Community”), are: (i) the European Parliament, 
(ii) the Council of the European Union (the “Council”), (iii) the Commission 
of the European Communities (the “Commission”), (iv) the Court of justice 
and (v) the European Council.46 The role and powers of these institutions, 
based on the EC Treaty as currently in force will be described. On occasion, 
reference will be made to the changes that will take place should the Treaty of 
Lisbon enter into force. 47 
2.1 The European Parliament
The European Parliament consists of representatives of the people of the 
Member States (article 189 EC Treaty). These representatives are elected 
for a period of five years, each Member State having a fixed number of 
representatives (article 190 EC Treaty). The European Parliament elects its 
President and its officers from among its members (article 197 EC Treaty). 
The members of the European Parliament are divided into political groupings 
rather than nationality. There are currently 8 political groups, the three largest 
46  Strictly spoken, institutions of the European Community are the five bodies 
mentioned on article 7 of the EC Treaty. That does not include the European 
Council, which in fact is solely an organ of the European Union. Reference is made 
to P.j.G. Kapteyn and P. VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the 
European Communities, Kluwer Law International, London-The hague-Boston, 
third edition 1998, page 181. Consequently, the European Council is not mentioned 
in part five of the EC Treaty. The reference to “institutions” used in this chapter, 
which reference includes the European Council, is therefore not entirely correct but 
practical nevertheless.
47  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, 13 december 2007, Oj C 306, 17 december 
2007, pages 1 ff. In this thesis, reference will be made to the Consolidated versions 
of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, Oj C 115, 9 May 2008, pages 1 ff. Given the outcome of the 
referendum held in Ireland on the Treaty of Lisbon – a “no” – it is not clear 
whether the Treaty will enter into force (without amendments being made). The 
European Council needed time to analyse the situation. Reference is made to 
the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 19/20 june 2008, 
11018/08, page 1.
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ones being the European’s People’s Party, the Party of European Socialists 
and the Group of the European Liberal, democrat and Reform Party.48 
The European Parliament used to have merely an important budgetary role 
within the European Community. Its powers have grown considerably over 
time. Today it has – in addition to its budgetary role49 – important decision-
making and supervisory roles. 
The European Parliament co-decides on many European acts, gives its assent 
or delivers advisory opinions (articles 192, 251 and 252 EC Treaty). The 
European Parliament furthermore may request the Commission to submit 
appropriate proposals on matters on which it considers that a Community act 
is required (article 192 EC Treaty). Pursuant to the Framework Agreement on 
relations between the European Parliament and the Commission, the latter 
is required to provide “a prompt and sufficiently detailed reply” to such a 
request.50
The European Parliament furthermore supervises the activities of the other 
Community institutions, in particular the Commission. At the request of a 
quarter of its Members, the European Parliament may set up a temporary 
Committee of Inquiry to investigate contraventions or maladministration of 
Community law (article 193 EC Treaty). Moreover, the Commission must 
reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the European Parliament 
or its members (article 197 EC Treaty). The European Parliament may bring 
about a motion of censure on the activities of the Commission; if  this motion 
is carried by a two-third majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of 
the members of the European Parliament, the members of the Commission 
must resign as a body (article 201 EC Treaty). Furthermore, the European 
Parliament appoints an Ombudsman empowered to receive complaints from 
any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State concerning instances of maladministration 
in the activities of the Community institutions or bodies, with the exception 
of the Court of justice and the Court of First Instance acting in their judicial 
role (article 195 EC Treaty). Finally, the European Parliament may initiate 
48  Reference is made to P. Craig and d. de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, 
University Press, Oxford, 2003, page 78.
49  Reference is made to the First and Second Budgetary Treaty, as described in 
Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, chapter V.
50  Agreement of 26 May 2005 (2005/2076 (ACI)), Oj C117E, 18 May 2006, pages 123 
– 133.
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proceedings before the Court of justice challenging the legality of an act 
where necessary to protect its prerogatives (article 230 EC Treaty).
The Treaty of Lisbon will further enhance the role of the European Parliament. 
Should that Treaty enter into force, the European Parliament will see new 
powers emerge over the EU legislation, in particular due to the increase of the 
co-decision procedure. Its budgetary powers will expand, and it will receive 
a concurrent right of initiative for revision of the Treaties. The number of 
members of the European Parliament will be limited to 751.51
2.2 The Commission of the European Communities
The Commission, together with the Council the most important actor within 
the European Community,52 currently consists of 27 members (article 213 EC 
Treaty).53 This will be different from the date on which the first Commission 
following the date of accession of the 27th Member State of the Union takes 
up its duties (i.e. in principle as of November 2009). The number of members 
of the Commission shall from that moment on be less than the number of 
Member States. The actual number will then be set by the Council, acting 
unanimously.54 The members of the Commission are chosen on grounds 
of their general competence and must be fully independent (article 213 EC 
Treaty). Also due to this, the Commission as a body has its own political 
responsibility, political task and accountability (to the European Parliament).55 
The members of the Commission are chosen for a five-year period (article 
214.1 EC Treaty). The manner in which said members are chosen is laid out 
in article 214.2 EC Treaty and is basically the following:
The Council, meeting in the composition of the heads of State or Government, 
nominates by a qualified majority of votes the person it intends to appoint as 
51  For an overview of the changed role of the European Parliament under the Treaty 
of Lisbon, reference is made to: European Parliament, Report on the Treaty of 
Lisbon, 2007/2286(INI), 29 january 2008, pages 27 – 29.
52  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 181.
53  As amended by article 4 of the Protocol on the Enlargement of the European 
Union, which Protocol is annexed as number 10 to the EC Treaty.
54  Article 4 of the Protocol on the Enlargement of the European Union. This 
downsizing of the European Commission is confirmed on the occasion of 
concluding the Treaty of Lisbon, and the number is set on 2/3 of the number of 
Member States. however, the moment of downsizing is delayed until November 
2014. European Parliament, Report on the Treaty of Lisbon, page 32.
55  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 201.
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President of the Commission. The European Parliament must approve this 
nomination.56 Subsequently, the Council adopts the list of other persons it 
intends to appoint as members of the Commission, and said list is drawn up 
in accordance with the proposals made by each Member State. This list is to 
be adopted by a qualified majority of votes of the Council and with common 
accord of the nominee for President. The President and other members of 
the Commission nominated in accordance of the above, must as a body be 
approved by the European Parliament. After such approval, the Council 
appoints them, acting by a qualified majority.
Pursuant to article 211 of the EC Treaty, the Commission shall:
•	 ensure	that	the	provisions	of	the	EC	Treaty	and	the	measures	taken	by	
the institutions thereto are applied;
•	 formulate	recommendations	or	deliver	opinions	on	matters	dealt	within	
the EC Treaty, if  it expressly so provides or if  the Commission considers 
it necessary;
•	 have	its	own	power	of	decision	and	participate	in	the	shaping	of	measu-
res taken by the Council and by the European Parliament in the manner 
provided for in the EC Treaty;
•	 exercise	the	powers	conferred	on	it	by	the	Council	for	the	implementa-
tion of the rules laid out by the latter.
The above-mentioned does not do full justice to the real powers of the 
Commission. In particular it does not emphasise the crucial part the 
Commission plays in the legislative process. The commission has, among 
other rights, the important right of legal initiative.57 This has enabled the 
Commission to act as the “motor of integration”.58 What is furthermore 
helpful to this integration purpose is the fact that the Commission develops 
56  This will change when the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force. The President of 
the Commission is in the future to be elected by the European Parliament on a 
proposal from the European Council. Reference is made to article 17.7 of the new 
Treaty on European Union. 
57  It has this right since the common format within the relevant European Treaties is 
to stipulate that the Council and the European Parliament will act on a proposal 
from the Commission when making legislation. Reference is made to Craig de 
Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 59 – 60 and to Kapteyn and 
VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities, page 
202.
58  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 60. Craig and de 
Búrca describe the Commission furthermore as “the single most important political 
force for integration, ever seeking to press forward to attain the Community’s 
objectives”; Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 64.
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the Community’s overall legislative plan for any year and its general policy 
strategies.59 Finally the Commission exercises delegated legislative powers 
(article 202 and 211 EC Treaty).
Apart from having important rights with regard to legislation, the Commission 
also acts as a watchdog, basically in two manners. First, in certain specific areas 
the Commission investigates and even judges Treaty violations committed 
by Member States or private parties.60 The Commission’s decisions will be 
reviewed by the Community’s court (normally the Court of first Instance).61 
Second, if  the Commission considers a Member State in breach of fulfilling 
an obligation under the EC Treaty, it delivers a reasoned opinion and gives 
the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If  the State 
does not comply with the Commission’s opinion within a time-frame set by 
the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of justice 
(article 226 EC Treaty).
Apart from the above, the Commission has a very specific and important role 
when it comes to the European social dialogue. The Commission has the task 
of promoting the consultation of management and labour at Community 
level and must facilitate their dialogue by ensuring balanced support for the 
parties (article 138.1 EC Treaty). Within the Commission, the directorate-
General (“dG”) for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities 
is responsible for the European social dialogue. Within the dG, directorate 
d1 is responsible for the cross-industry social dialogue and directorate d2 is 
responsible for the sectoral social dialogue.62 As will appear from this thesis, 
the Commission has acted as an important force in stimulating the European 
social dialogue.
2.3 The Council of the European Union
The Council consists of a representative of each Member State at ministerial 
level, who is authorised to commit the government of that Member State 
59  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 60.
60  The two most important areas are competition policy and state aids (article 85 and 
86 EC Treaty). Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 62 
and Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 207.
61  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 62.
62  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
Development, Sectoral Variation and Prospects, Report to the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment, december 2002, page 31.
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(article 203 EC Treaty).63 It depends per subject to be discussed which ministers 
attend the Council meeting; if  there is, for example, a general meeting, the 
ministers for foreign affairs will be present, if  agriculture is on the agenda, the 
ministers of that area of expertise attend. The Council is the institution in the 
Community in which the Member Sates are represented as such; the members 
of the Council are representatives of their Member States.64
The presidency of the Council is held in turn by each Member State for a 
term of 6 months. The position of President of the Council has become more 
important during recent years and is today vital for the proper functioning 
of the Council.65 The votes of the members of the Council are weighted, in a 
manner as laid out in article 205 EC Treaty.66
Pursuant to article 202 EC Treaty, the Council shall:
•	 ensure	co-ordination	of	 the	general	economic	policies	of	 the	Member	
States;
•	 have	power	to	take	decisions;
•	 confer	on	the	Commission,	in	the	acts	which	the	Council	adopts,	powers	
for the implementation of the rules which the Council lays down. 
The above-mentioned statutory description of the powers of the Council is 
rather vague. It does not make it clear that the Council exercises an important 
role in the legislative process. It does so in 4 different ways.67 First, the Council 
must approve the Commission legislative initiative by vote in order for it to 
become law. Second, the Council may request the Commission to undertake 
studies and to submit proposals on subjects the Council considers desirable for 
the attainment of common objectives (article 208 EC Treaty). Consequently, the 
Council can pressurise the Commission into generating legislative proposals.68 
Third, the Council can delegate power to the Commission enabling the latter 
63  The Council of the European Union has given itself  this name in 1993 (Oj 1993 L 
281, page 18). It is better known simply as the Council, which is also the name used 
in the EC Treaty.
64  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 187. 
65  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 67.
66  As amended at each time of accession of a new Member State. Reference is made 
to article 3 of the Protocol on the Enlargement of the European Union. The 
manner of weighing the votes will change should the Treaty of Lisbon enter into 
force. European Parliament, Report on the Treaty of Lisbon, pages 29 – 31.
67  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 69.
68  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 69.
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to pass further regulations within a particular area. Last, due to the increasing 
complexity of the decision-making process within the Community, there is a 
further developed inter-institutional cooperation between the Commission, 
the European Parliament and the Council, enabling said institutions to enter 
into agreements concerning, among others, new legislative initiatives.69 
2.4 The European Court of Justice
The judicial supervision in the Community is exercised by one institution 
– the Court of justice – comprised of two bodies, the original Court of justice 
of the European Communities (Court of justice) and the Court of First 
Instance.70 The Court of justice consists of one judge per Member State and 
the Court of First Instance of at least one judge per Member State (article 
221 and article 224 EC Treaty respectively). The Court of justice is assisted by 
8 Advocates-General, who make reasoned submissions on cases that require 
their involvement (article 222 EC Treaty). The Court of First Instance has 
no separate Advocates-General, although any judge may be called upon to 
perform the task of an Advocate-General.71 The judges of the Court of justice 
and the Advocates-General are chosen from persons whose independence is 
beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to 
the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults 
of recognised competence; they are to be appointed by common accord of 
the governments of the Member States for a term of six years (article 223 
EC Treaty). Roughly the same applies to the members of the Court of First 
Instance (article 224 EC Treaty). The judges from both the Court of justice 
and the Court of First Instance elect their President from among their midst 
for a three-year term (article 223 and article 224 respectively EC Treaty).
The Court of First Instance has, among others, jurisdiction to hear and 
determine at first instance actions or proceedings as set out in a number of 
articles in the EC Treaty (article 225 EC Treaty). decisions given by the Court 
of First Instance may be subject to a right to appeal to the Court of justice 
on points of law only (article 225 EC Treaty). 
The Court of justice has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning 
i.a. the interpretation of the EC Treaty and the validity and interpretation of 
69  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 70.
70  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 249.
71  Reference is made to article 49 of the Statute of the Court of First Instance.  
A judge only rarely acts as an Advocate-General and only then in cases of legal 
difficulty. See Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 91.
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acts of the institutions of the Community. The court of each Member State is 
allowed to request the Court of justice to give a ruling on the aforementioned 
subjects; the highest court of a Member State is even required to do so (article 
234 EC Treaty). The Court of justice more or less shaped its own jurisdiction 
by broadly interpreting article 220 EC Treaty, an article which stipulates that 
the Court of justice and the Court of First Instance are to ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the EC Treaty the law is observed. By doing 
so, the Court of justice assumed competency in matters that were not listed 
in the EC Treaty.72 It furthermore extended its role by developing principles of 
a constitutional nature as part of Community law, to which it then holds the 
Community institutions and Member States bound.73 The Court of justice’s 
active role has furthered legal integration in the European Community and 
has given “flesh and substance to an ‘outline’ treaty”.74 
Should the Treaty of Lisbon enter into force, it will not bring about major 
changes in the composition and organisation of the Court of justice. The 
most notable change is that the institution will be renamed into “Court of 
justice of the European Union”, comprising the “Court of justice”, the 
“General Court” (Court of First Instance) and possible “specialised courts”, 
instituted by a regulation.
2.5 The European Council
Pursuant to article 4 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Council 
exists of “the heads of State or Government of the Member States and the 
President of the Commission”. The ministers for foreign affairs and a member 
of the Commission assist them. The European Council meets at least twice 
a year, under the chairmanship of the head of State or Government of the 
Member State which holds the Presidency of the Council (of the European 
Union). Since the European Council consists of the heads of State or 
Government, it can take “top-level” decisions.75
The institution “European Council” has existed for quite some time. during 
the 1960s the heads of Government came together on a regular basis, but is 
72  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 97.
73  The first case being: European Court of justice, 12 November 1969, C-29/69, 
Stauder v. City of Ulm.
74  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 87.
75  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 185.
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was only in 1974 at the Paris summit that it was institutionalised.76 The first 
mention in a Treaty followed in 1986, in the Single European Act.77 Today the 
European Council is mentioned on several occasions in the EC Treaty, but 
remains outside its main framework.78 
The statutory defined role of the European Council is that it is to provide the 
Union with the necessary impetus for its development and that it is to define 
the general political guidelines thereof (article 4 of the Treaty on European 
Union). however, more roles are to be distinguished, including (i) discussing 
the development of the Community and Union itself, (ii) confirming important 
changes in the institutional structure of the Community, (iii) focusing on 
significant constitutional initiatives, (iv) focusing on the state of the European 
economy, (v) conflict resolution, (vi), initiating or developing particular 
policy strategies, (vii) focusing on external relations and (viii) considering 
new accessions to the Community.79 Article 15.1 of the Treaty on European 
Union, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, makes clear that the European 
Council shall not exercise legislative functions.
3. Community legislation
There are three relevant aspects as to Community legislation for a better 
understanding of this thesis. First, it is important to establish in general 
terms when and to what extent the institutions of the Community are entitled 
to exercise their powers. Second, it should be summarised how Community 
legislation is drafted. Third, the different types of Community legislation are 
to be distinguished.
3.1 Community powers to legislate
The European Community has not received a carte blanche to exercise powers. 
It can only act within the limits of the powers conferred to it by the EC Treaty 
(article 5 EC Treaty); there must, in other words, be conferred or attributed 
powers. There is not a general stipulation that confers powers to Community 
institutions, but this is done “by the grant of a plurality of specific powers 
of decision (attributed powers) which are defined as accurately as possible 
76  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 71.
77  Oj 1987 L 169, pages 1 – 17.
78  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 183.
79  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, pages 73 – 74.
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in the various Treaty articles according to their nature and subject-matter”.80 
Attribution of powers thus occurs on an article-by-article basis. As a result, 
Community Acts must be properly based on a suitable article of the EC Treaty 
giving specific competence to draft such Acts.81
Moreover, the Community institutions must refrain from taking action if  
such an action could just as well be taken by the Member States. This is the 
so-called principle of subsidiarity. Furthermore, the Community may not go 
further than what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the EC Treaty. This 
concerns the so-called principle of proportionality. These two principles, as 
well as the principle of conferred or attributed powers, follow from article 5 
of the EC Treaty, which reads as follows:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if  and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the objectives of this Treaty.
This stipulation, in particular with regard to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, requires further explanation. Subsequently, its importance 
with regard to European (collective) employment law will be explained. 
The fact that the Community must act within the limits of its powers is 
rather self-explanatory. Such is not the case with regard to the principle of 
subsidiarity. All proposed actions in areas that do not fall within the exclusive 
competence of the Community must pass the subsidiarity test. It is highly 
debatable exactly which areas fall within the exclusive competence of the 
Community.82 however, the answer to this question, if  such an answer could 
be given at all, is not of material importance to this thesis and will therefore 
80  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 234.
81  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 122.
82 For a summary of this debate reference is made to Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, 
Text, Cases and Materials, page 133.
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not be dealt with. More relevant to this thesis is the principle of subsidiarity 
itself  and particularly its implication on European (collective) employment 
law.
Given article 5 above, three (intertwined) subjects are relevant:83 (i) the 
Community can only take action if  the objectives of that action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, (ii) the Community can better 
achieve the action and (iii) if  the Community does act, it should not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the EC Treaty. 
The first two subjects are jointly referred to as the test of comparative 
efficiency; is it better for the action to be taken by the Community or the 
Member States?84 Whether proposed action passes the comparative efficiency 
test should be determined by the following guidelines:85
•	 the	issue	under	consideration	has	transnational	aspects	which	cannot	be	
satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States;
•	 actions	by	Member	States	alone	or	 lack	of	Community	action	would	
conflict with the requirements of the EC Treaty (such as the need to cor-
rect distortion of competition or avoid disguised restrictions on trade 
or strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would otherwise signifi-
cantly damage Member States’ interests;
•	 action	at	Community	 level	would	produce	clear	benefits	by	 reason	of	
its scale or effects, compared with action at the level of the Member 
States.
The last (third) test regards proportionality, the Community should only 
legislate to the extent necessary and, if  necessary, as simply as possible.86 
directives are preferred to regulations and framework agreements to detailed 
measures. Community should moreover leave as much scope for national 
decision as possible.87
83  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 135.
84  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 135.
85  Article 5 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, as annexed as number 30 to the EC Treaty.
86  Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.
87  Article 7 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.
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Questions on subsidiarity can be judged by the European Court of justice. 
Logically, the outcome of litigation on this topic depends very much on 
the level of scrutiny applied by the Court of justice: does it, for instance, 
strictly apply the test of comparative efficiency? Strictly applying that test 
will not always be easy, as the answer to the question whether is it better for 
the action to be taken by the Community or the Member States generally 
involves complex socio-economic analyses. The indications are that the Court 
of justice uses a relatively “light” test when assessing whether the Community 
institutions comply with the subsidiarity test.88 
Should the Treaty of Lisbon enter into force, the requirement for the Union 
to strictly comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will 
strengthen. In particular, the national Parliaments will be entitled to monitor 
compliance with these principles (article 12(b) of the amended Treaty on 
European Union). They gain the right to be informed in good time of all 
legislative proposals of the Commission (or another institution if  appropriate), 
which must substantiate that said principles are complied with. Subsequently, 
the national Parliaments may, within eight weeks following the forwarding of 
the proposal at hand, send directly to the Union institutions opinions setting 
out the reasons why they view that the proposal does not comply with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Should at least one-third of the 
national Parliaments consider that the proposal violates the aforementioned 
principles, the Commission must reconsider its proposal. Subsequently, the 
Commission may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft, giving 
reasons for this decision. If  the number of negative opinions of the national 
Parliaments represents at least a simple majority of the votes allocated to 
the national Parliaments, the proposal should also be reviewed. Upon 
continuation by the Commission of that legislative proposal, the legislator 
(the European Parliament and the Council) need to consider whether it is 
compatible with the principle of subsidiarity. If, by a majority of 55% of 
the members of the Council or a majority of the votes cast in the European 
Parliament, the legislator is of the opinion that the proposal is not compatible 
with the principle of subsidiarity, the legislative proposal shall not be given 
further consideration.89 These changes lead to more influence of the Member 
States on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.90
88  See, including references to case law, Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases 
and Materials, page 137. See also R. Barents, Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel en 
het Hervormingsverdrag, [The pinciple of subsidiarity and the Reform Treaty], 
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht, 2007/11, page 256.
89  Reference is made to the protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, as annexed as number 2 to the Treaty of Lisbon.
90  R. Barents, Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel en het Hervormingsverdrag, page 261.
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The above makes it clear (at least on a theoretical level) if  and, if  so, to what 
extent Community action is allowed. how does this relate to the field of 
European (collective) employment law?
Given the rules of subsidiarity, prior to any action being taken in the 
aforementioned field, the question should be answered who should act: 
Community institutions, the State or other governmental bodies on the one 
hand or – as the case may be – social partners on the other hand?91 This 
question became in particular relevant upon the introduction of the 1992 
Protocol on Social Policy, which enabled social partners to (indirectly) “draft 
legislation”.92 It is an issue often referred to as “horizontal subsidiarity”. 
Whereas “vertical subsidiarity” governs relations between the Community’s 
public law institutions and those of Member States, horizontal subsidiarity 
refers to a division of governance between actors of a different nature acting 
at same geographical level; either public (governments) or private law actors 
(social partners) at the same geographical level should act.93 If  a certain issue 
can be equally well or better dealt with by the social partners, as opposed to 
public authorities, the social partners should be given the opportunity to act 
on the basis of horizontal subsidiarity.94 This is in line with the Commission’s 
point of view, as stated in the following:95
In certain sectors for which the Amsterdam Treaty introduces new responsibilities 
(e.g. for creating a European area of freedom, security and justice, and in the 
fields of social policy and discrimination), there is a need for “active subsidiarity” 
as a means of achieving the new objectives set out in the Amsterdam Treaty. In 
other sectors, the Commission is seeking greater cooperation with the Member 
States, the local and regional authorities and civil society, with a view to the 
shared application of Community and national instruments in order to achieve 
a common goal.
91  R. Blanpain, European Labour law, Kluwer Law International, The hague/
London/New York, ninth revised edition 2003, page 44 and pages 571 – 572.
92  See chapter 3, section 2.3.2. See also B. Bercusson, European Labour Law, 
Buttersworth, London/Charlottesville/dublin/durban/Edinburgh/Kuala Lumpur/
Singapore/Sydney/Toronto/ Wellington, 1996, page 532.
93  F. dorssemont, Contractual governance by management and labour in EC labour 
law, in: A.A.h. van hoek, T. hol, O. jansen, P. Rijpkema, R. Widdershoven (eds.), 
Multilevel Governance in enforcement and Adjudication, Intersentia, Antwerpen – 
Oxford, 2006, pages 288 and 289.
94  R. Blanpain, European Labour law, page 45.
95  Commission Report to the European Council, COM (2000) 772, final, Better 
lawmaking 2000, page 3.
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That still does not answer the question exactly when – if  on the basis of 
vertical subsidiarity a matter should be dealt with on Community level rather 
than on Member State level – the social partners should, on the basis of 
horizontal subsidiarity, take precedence over the legislative institutions of 
the Community. here, it should be emphasised that the subsidiarity test is 
a relative test, aiming to answer the question which level is better equipped 
to take an action. That may sometimes be the legislative institutions of the 
Community, as they have swift, efficient and legally certain tools at their 
disposal. Sometimes, however, the track-record of the social partners may 
indicate that they are better equipped to deal with a specific topic. An 
original first choice for the social partners is not necessarily a final choice. 
If  the social partners are unable to reach an agreement within a reasonable 
period of time on a specific topic which needs to be addressed on Community 
level, the conclusion must be that the social partners are apparently not 
best equipped to deal with this specific topic after all, and the matter can 
be referred to the legislative institutions of the Community. There is no real 
necessity to interpret the (horizontal) subsidiary principle in such a manner 
that either a higher or a lower level receives the allocation of powers. The test 
of comparative sufficiency already implies that it is not a question of exclusive 
allocation, but a question of better allocation.96 In fact, this system is applied 
in the European social dialogue as set out in chapter 5. The European social 
partners may take over a legislative proposal from the Commission in order 
to reach an agreement on the subject at hand. If  they fail to reach such an 
agreement (in good time), the Commission retakes the initiative and may 
continue with its proposal. It is no coincidence that the Economic and Social 
Committee (ECOSOC) argued that the (current) articles 136 – 139 EC Treaty 
may be viewed as “an indication of the application of horizontal subsidiarity 
at EC level”.97 
96  B. Bercusson, European Labour Law, page 534. This applies in particular to 
horizontal subsidiarity, as it is questionable whether the rules of article 5 of the EC 
Treaty (strictly) apply to horizontal subsidiarity. Bercusson takes the view that they 
do not. That would entail that there is more room to manoeuvre when it concerns 
horizontal subsidiarity, when compared to vertical subsidiarity. See B. Bercusson, 
European Labour Law, pages 556 and 557.
97  See the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Communication 
concerning the application of the Agreement on Social Policy presented by 
the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament Oj C 397, 31 
december 1994, pages 40 ff, paragraph 1.3.6. ECOSOC considers horizontal 
subsidiarity as “the division of responsibilities between the social partners and the 
authorities”. See paragraph 1.3.1.
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From the above, including the Commission’s quote stated above, it can be 
derived that the Commission investigates what the most appropriate level will 
be for the adoption of rules.98 This could well be the social partners’ level. 
To summarise, there are reasons to argue that the principle of subsidiarity 
illustrates that certain problems are better addressed by the social partners, 
rather than state authorities, as these social partners are the most appropriate 
parties for taking action.
3.2 Drafting of Community legislation
Now the (complex) process by which the Community enacts legislation will 
be briefly discussed. There are 6 different procedures for drafting Community 
legislation: (i) the Commission acting alone, (ii) the Council and Commission 
acting alone, (iii) the Council and Commission acting after having consulted 
the European Parliament, (iv) the Council and Commission acting in 
cooperation with the European Parliament, (v) the Council and Commission 
acting in co-decision with the European Parliament and (vi) the Council, 
Commission and European Parliament acting in assent.99
It is rather unusual that (i) the Commission enacts legislation on its own.100 An 
example of this can be found in article 86.3 of the EC Treaty, which delegates 
powers to the Commission to address appropriate directives or decisions to 
Member States regarding their involvement in public undertakings.
In a few instances (ii) the Council can draft legislation on the initiative of the 
Commission. Examples of this include articles 26 (The Customs Union), 45 
and 47 (Right of Establishment), 49 (Services) and 101 and 103 (Economic 
Policy) of the EC Treaty.
In other instances (iii) the Council can enact legislation upon the Commission’s 
proposal, after the European Parliament has been consulted thereon. If  the 
European Parliament is not consulted, the measures can be annulled.101 
The Council is not, however, bound to the European Parliament’s opinion. 
Examples of this manner of drafting Community legislation include articles 
19 and 22 EC Treaty (Citizenship of the Union), 89 (Aids granted by States), 
93 (Tax Provisions) of the EC Treaty.
98  COM (2000) 772, page 4.
99  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 140 and further.
100  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 140.
101  Graig and de Búrca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials, page 141. Reference is 
also made to the case-law mentioned in footnote 7 on said page.
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After time has passed since the setting up of the Community, the European 
Parliament has gained influence. This also has been the case in the legislative 
process. Article 252 EC Treaty sets out the manner in which (iv) the Council, 
Commission and European Parliament can draft Community legislation in 
mutual cooperation. This procedure must be followed anywhere where the 
EC Treaty refers to article 252 EC Treaty (article 251.1 EC Treaty). Examples 
include articles 99 and 102 of the EC Treaty (Economic Policy). The procedure 
as set out in article 252 EC Treaty basically works as follows:102
a. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Com-
mission and after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament, 
will adopt a common position.
b. The Council’s common position will be communicated to the European 
Parliament. If, within three months of such communication, the Euro-
pean Parliament approves this common position or has not yet taken a 
decision, the Council shall definitively adopt the act in question in ac-
cordance with the common position.
c. The European Parliament may, within the period of three months re-
ferred to above, by an absolute majority of its component members, 
propose amendments to the Council’s common position. The European 
Parliament may also, by the same majority, reject the Council’s common 
position. If  the European Parliament has rejected the Council’s common 
position, unanimity shall be required for the Council to act on a second 
reading.
d. The Commission shall, within a period of one month, re-examine the 
proposal on the basis of which the Council adopted its common posi-
tion, by taking into account the amendments proposed by the European 
Parliament.
 The Commission shall forward to the Council, at the same time as its re-
examined proposal, the amendments of the European Parliament which 
it has not accepted, and shall express its opinion on them. The Council 
may adopt these amendments unanimously.
e. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt the proposal as 
re-examined by the Commission. Unanimity shall be required for the 
Council to amend the proposal as re-examined by the Commission.
102  The procedure is fully set out in article 252 of the EC Treaty.
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f. In the cases referred to in points (c), (d) and (e), the Council shall be 
required to act within a period of three months. If  no decision is ta-
ken within this period, the Commission proposal shall be deemed not to 
have been adopted.
Article 251 of the EC Treaty confers yet more powers to the European 
Parliament in the legislative process. This article deals with the “co-decision” 
procedure of (v) the Council, Commission and European Parliament. It 
applies to the adoption of any act under the EC Treaty where reference is 
made to article 251 of the EC Treaty (article 251.1 EC Treaty). Examples can 
be found in articles 12 (discrimination), 18 (Right to Move) and 137 (Social 
Policy) of the EC Treaty. The procedure set out in article 251 of the EC Treaty 
has become the main method for drafting Community legislation,103 and will 
even gain further dominance should the Treaty of Lisbon enter into force.104 
The co-decision procedure basically works as follows:105
a. The Commission will submit a proposal to the European Parliament 
and the Council. 
b. The Council, acting by a qualified majority after obtaining the opinion 
of the European Parliament: (i) if  it approves all the amendments con-
tained in the European Parliament’s opinion, may adopt the proposed 
act as amended, (ii) if  the European Parliament does not propose any 
amendments, may adopt the proposed act, or (iii) will otherwise adopt a 
common position and communicate it to the European Parliament.
c. If, within three months of the above-mentioned communication, the Eu-
ropean Parliament: (i) approves the common position or has not taken 
a decision, the act in question shall be deemed to have been adopted in 
accordance with that common position, (ii) rejects by an absolute ma-
jority of its component members the common position, the proposed 
act shall be deemed not to have been adopted, or (iii) proposes amend-
ments to the common position by an absolute majority of its component 
members, the amended text shall be forwarded to the Council and to the 
Commission, which shall deliver an opinion on those amendments.
d. If, within three months after the matter being referred to it, the Coun-
cil, acting by a qualified majority, approves all the amendments of the 
103  Graig and de Búrca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials, page 145.
104  European Parliament, Report on the Treaty of Lisbon, page 37.
105  The procedure is fully set out in article 251 EC Treaty.
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European Parliament, the act in question shall be deemed to have been 
adopted in the form of the common position thus amended; however, 
the Council shall act unanimously on the amendments on which the 
Commission has delivered a negative opinion. If  the Council does not 
approve all the amendments, the President of the Council, in agreement 
with the President of the European Parliament, shall within six weeks 
convene a meeting of the Conciliation Committee. 
e. The Conciliation Committee shall have the task of reaching agreement 
on a joint text, by a qualified majority of the members of the Council or 
their representatives and by a majority of the representatives of the Eu-
ropean Parliament. The Commission shall take part in the Conciliation 
Committee’s proceedings and shall take all the necessary initiatives with 
a view to reconciling the positions of the European Parliament and the 
Council. In fulfilling this task, the Conciliation Committee shall address 
the common position on the basis of the amendments proposed by the 
European Parliament.
f. If, within six weeks of it being convened, The Conciliation Committee 
approves a joint text, the European Parliament, acting by an absolute 
majority of the votes cast, and the Council, acting by a qualified majo-
rity, shall each have a period of six weeks from that approval in which to 
adopt the act in question in accordance with the joint text. If  either of 
the two institutions fails to approve the proposed act within that period, 
it shall be deemed not to have been adopted.
g. Where the Conciliation Committee does not approve a joint text, the 
proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted.
 
The final manner to enact Community legislation, is (vi) by mutual consent 
of the Council and European Parliament on an initiative of the Commission. 
The assent procedure can be found in several articles of the EC Treaty, such 
as article 105.6 and 107.5 (Monetary Policy) and article 161 (Economic and 
Social Cohesion) of the EC Treaty.
3.3 Types of Community regulations
There are different types of Community instruments. These are set out in 
article 249 of the EC Treaty:
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, 
the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council and the Commission shall 
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make regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations and 
deliver opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member 
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice 
of form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
The EC Treaty only rarely prescribes exactly in which of the aforementioned 
ways a measure has to be implemented. This is normally at the discretion of 
the Community’s institutions.106
Regulations are (i) binding upon all Member States and (ii) generally and 
(iii) directly applicable within these Member States. The general application 
concerns the impersonal, non-individual character of the regulations.107 
“directly applicable” means that they automatically apply; there is no need 
for separate national legal action in order to implement the regulations.108 
Regulations have to be executed by the President of the European Parliament 
and by the President of the Council and published in the Official journal 
of the European Union. They shall enter into force on the date specified in 
them or, in absence thereof, on the 20th day following that of their publication 
(article 254 EC Treaty).
directives do, in deviance from regulations, not have to be directed to all 
Member States and require a form of implementation by the Member States 
in order to apply within that Member State.109 The directive is therefore only 
binding as to the result to be achieved.110 The exact form of implementation is 
at the choice of the Member State involved; the implementation must however 
106  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 112.
107  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 324.
108  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 113.
109  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 114.
110  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 324.
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be clear and legally certain.111 directives which are addressed to all Member 
States must be published in the Official journal of the European Union and 
shall be effective on the date specified in them or, in absence thereof, on the 
20th day following that of their publication (article 254 EC Treaty).
decisions are fully binding on those to whom they are addressed. They 
must be properly notified to its addressee(s) and shall take effect upon such 
notification (article 254 EC Treaty). decisions that are adopted pursuant to 
article 251 of the EC Treaty shall be published in the Official journal of the 
European Union and shall come into force on the date specified in them or, in 
absence thereof, on the 20th day following that of their publication (article 254 
EC Treaty). Any natural or legal person to whom the decision is addressed 
may institute proceedings against it before the Court of justice and have its 
legality assessed (article 230 EC Treaty).
Recommendations and opinions have no binding force. Article 211 of the EC 
Treaty renders the Commission the right to formulate recommendations and 
deliver opinions on matters dealt with in the EC Treaty. 
Although the Lisbon Treaty essentially leaves the typology of instruments 
unchanged, it makes a distinction between legislative acts (drafted by the 
legislative authority, i.e. the European Parliament and the Council) and 
implementing acts (implementing the aforementioned legislative acts by the 
executive). Legislative acts will have supremacy over executive acts.112
4. (Cross-sectoral) social partners
4.1 Social partners
Social partners are to be divided into employees’ representative organisations 
(trade unions) on the one hand and employers’ representative organisations on 
the other.113 Social partners are different in nature from other organisations, 
111  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 330.
112  European Parliament, Report on the Treaty of Lisbon, pages 35 and 36.
113  Although not entirely correct, in this thesis the concept “social partners” may also 
be used to indicate the parties that are capable of entering into collective labour 
agreements. In that situation it not only refers to organisations of employers and 
employees, but also to individual employers, as the latter may also validly conclude 
collective labour agreements. The context in which the concept “social partners” 
will be used will make clear whether or not it also includes employers.
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like pressure groups or interest groups, because of their ability to take part in 
the collective bargaining process.114
In order for the social partners to be able to participate in the (institutionalised) 
European social dialogue, the organisation involved should:115 
(i) be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or categories and be orga-
nised at European level;
(ii) consist of organisations which are themselves an integral and recognised 
part of Member State social partner structures, have the capacity to ne-
gotiate agreements and are representative of all Member States, as far as 
possible;
(iii) have adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the 
consultation process. 
According to the Commission, in a European context the social partners’ 
organisations continue to evolve. National affiliates continue to join and new 
groups are set up.116
Since there are many sectoral social partners, hereinafter only the cross-
industry social partners will be introduced. In chapter 4, section 4 – in which 
the achievements of the sectoral social partners will be discussed – a general 
overview will be given of the sectoral social partners. 
4.2 The cross-industry employees’ organisations
By far the most important cross-industry European trade union is the 
European Trade Union Confederation (“ETUC”). Besides ETUC, however, 
there are two other cross-industry trade unions, the Council of European 
professional and managerial staff  EUROCAdRES (“EUROCAdRES”) and 
the European Confederation of Executives and Managerial Staff  (“CEC”). 
These three organisations jointly form “labour” in the cross-industry social 
dialogue. Before introducing the three parties further, it is good to note that 
the three organisations work closely together. 
In the year 2000 ETUC signed a cooperation agreement with EUROCAdRES 
and CEC. In this agreement, CEC and EUROCAdRES affirm the importance 
114  COM (1998) 322, page 4.
115  Commission Communication, COM (1993) 600, final, Concerning the application 
of the Agreement on social policy, page 2. See for further details chapter 5, section 
2.2.
116  COM (1998) 322, page 4.
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of the social dialogue process and the involvement therein for professionals, 
managers and executives. CEC and EUROCAdRES acknowledge ETUC’s 
key role in this dialogue. They also accept ETUC’s proposal for them to 
establish a liaison committee on behalf  of managerial and executive staff. 
This liaison committee facilitates cooperation between the organisations 
involved in, among other things, negotiating with employers’ organisations. 
In negotiations, one representative from EUROCAdRES and one from CEC 
may participate. The aim of the agreement is basically to adopt a joint trade 
union approach. If  there are any disagreements between the parties involved 
in negotiations these will be resolved internally, so as not to block progress in 
negotiations. It is also provided that, outside the negotiating process and the 
issues they decide to pursue together, EUROCAdRES and CEC retain their 
autonomy of expression and activity.117
4.2.1 The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)118
 
ETUC was founded on 8 February 1973 by seventeen national organisations 
in order to counterbalance, as a trade union, the economic forces of European 
integration.119 ETUC aspires to be “a unified and pluralistic organisation 
representing all working people at European level”.120 Currently,121 82 national 
trade union confederations from 36 European countries are members of 
ETUC, as well as 12 European Industry Federations. This amounts to a 
total of approximately 60 million members, which constitutes approximately 
90% of all union members in Europe.122 ETUC represents organisations of 
different ideological, religious and organisational backgrounds.123
ETUC seeks to (i) influence European legislation and policies by, among others, 
making direct representations to the Community institutions (including the 
Council, Parliament and Commission) and (ii) establish industrial relations 
with the employers at European level by means of the European social 
117  The above information is based in the EIRO publication of T. Weber, Managerial 
and professional unions agree to cooperate in European social dialogue, 28 August 
1999, page 1.
118  The information hereunder has been derived from ETUC’s website (www.etuc.org), 
unless otherwise stipulated.
119  Reference is made to page 7 of ETUC’s Constitution and ETUC’s website.
120  Reference is made to page 7 of ETUC’s Constitution.
121  That is: june 2008. 
122  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
Development, Sectoral Variation and Prospects, page 28.
123 Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
Development, Sectoral Variation and Prospects, page 28.
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dialogue. ETUC is recognised by the European Community as a representative 
cross-sectoral trade union organisation at European level.124 
ETUC’s members confirmed the primacy of national-level collective 
bargaining; ETUC still receives a case-by-case negotiation mandate from its 
members.125 The manner in which ETUC decides whether or not to adopt 
European collective agreements concluded in the European social dialogue 
is based on a complicated double procedure. In brief, a majority of all 
member organisations must agree and, of those, a qualified majority must 
be organisations established in Member States.126 Consequently, there is no 
requirement of unanimity. 
4.2.2 The Council of  European professional and 
managerial staff  (EUROCADRES)127
EUROCAdRES is the European representative organisation of employees 
holding professional or managerial posts. EUROCAdRES has more than 
5 million professionals and managers in membership throughout Europe. 
They work in all branches of industry, both manufacturing and service, 
and in the civil and public services. EUROCAdRES acts on the behalf  of 
European professional and managerial staff  to: (i) develop employment in 
Europe; (ii) secure fair conditions on mobility; (iii) guarantee recognition of 
qualifications and diplomas; (iv) improve education and life long learning; 
(v) realise equal opportunities; (vi) monitor working conditions and working 
time; (vii) enhance collective bargaining at all levels; and (viii) promote 
Responsible European Management and Corporate Social Responsibility. It 
is an organisation associated to ETUC. EUROCAdRES is recognised by the 
Commission as a European social partner and it participates at European 
level in the social dialogue and collective bargaining.
Pursuant to article 26 of EUROCAdRES’ statutes, its organs shall endeavour 
to achieve the widest possible measure of agreement when making decisions. 
When voting is necessary, the decisions require a majority of two-thirds of the 
votes cast (except for certain “constitutional” decisions). EUROCAdRES 
did not provide any information on the voting mechanism in place in case 
124  Reference is made to chapter 5, section 2.2 of this thesis.
125  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
Development, Sectoral Variation and Prospects, page 29.
126  L. Betten, The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community Social 
Policy, European Law Review, February 1998, page 32.
127  The information hereunder has been derived from EUROCAdRE’s website (www.
eurocadres.org), unless otherwise stipulated.
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of adoption of European collective agreements concluded in the European 
social dialogue. 
4.2.3 The European Confederation of Executives and Managerial Staff  (CEC)128
CEC was established in 1989. CEC promotes and defends the interests of 
managers in Europe. It represents the specific views of managers towards 
the Community institutions and other stakeholders. Through its national 
member organisations and professional federations CEC represents 1.5 
million managers in Europe. CEC is an independent social partner in the 
European social dialogue. 
With regard to the adoption of a European collective agreement, CEC 
does not have a specific voting procedure in place. As already mentioned, 
CEC is part of the negotiation group in the frame of the liaison committee 
CEC-EUROCAdRES. It consults and reports to its member organisations 
on the negotiation process. As a consequence, the final agreed text is 
supported by the negotiator and the officers, and communicated to CEC 
member organisations. Unless the agreement is contrary to the interests of 
the member organisations (which, according to CEC never happened in 
practice) the text is approved.129
4.3 The cross-industry employers’ organisations
Also on the side of employers, there are three organisations that are involved 
in the cross-industry European social dialogue.
4.3.1 The Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation 
(UNICE) / BUSINESSEUROPE130
The Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation (UNICE) was 
founded in 1958 by 8 national organisations from 6 different European 
countries in order to track the political consequences created by the Treaty 
of Rome.131 UNICE changed its name into BUSINESSEUROPE as of 23 
128   The information hereunder has been derived from CEC’s website  
(www.cec-managers.org), unless otherwise stipulated.
129  This information derives from CEC, as kindly sent to me by Mrs. A. Guillemin of 
CEC.
130  The information hereunder has been derived from BUSINESSEUROPE’s website 
(www.businesseurope.eu), unless otherwise stipulated. 
131  The referred to “Treaty of Rome” is the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, as amended by subsequent Treaties, Rome, 25 March 1957.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 2
70
january 2007, but will in this thesis still regularly be referred to as UNICE. 
BUSINESSEUROPE is a cross-sectoral employer’s organisation. Its mission 
and priorities are to: (i) implement the reforms for growth and jobs, (ii) integrate 
the European market, (iii) govern the EU efficiently, (iv) shape globalisation 
and fight all kinds of protectionism, (v) promote a secure, competitive and 
climate-friendly energy system and (vi) reform European social systems to 
respond to global challenges. BUSINESSEUROPE strives for, among others, 
permanent liaison with official institutions. BUSINESSEUROPE has created 
an informal network in which European sector-level employers’ associations 
meet to discuss European policy on an informal basis.132 In 2003 (as it was 
then known) UNICE had 36 members and 3 observers from 29 countries, 
including the EU countries, the European Economic Area countries, and 
some Central and Eastern European countries. BUSINESSEUROPE is the 
largest European employers’ organisation in terms of economic coverage. It 
is a recognised cross-sectoral social partner.133 
When making decisions, BUSINESSEUROPE normally seeks a consensus 
among its members, and does not adopt a position if  that is contrary to 
the justified interests of one of its members. BUSINESSEUROPE has, 
however, the possibility of approving proposals unless three Member States 
vote against it. In the case that it concerns a draft agreement negotiated in 
the framework of the European social dialogue, specific rules apply. For a 
debate on the social dialogue to be valid, there must be a quorum of at least 
two-thirds of member-federations properly represented at the Council of 
Presidents’ meeting, whose country is affected by the proposal in question. 
To enter into a negotiation within the social dialogue, at least four-fifths of 
members who have voting rights (i.e. full members) must agree to start the 
negotiations. A draft agreement, once negotiated, must be adopted only by 
consensus among all the members with voting rights and whose country is 
affected by the agreement in question.134
4.3.2 The European Centre for Public Enterprises (CEEP)135
European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises 
of General Economic Interest (CEEP) was established in 1961 as an 
132  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
Development, Sectoral Variation and Prospects, page 30.
133  Reference is made to chapter 5, section 2.2 of this thesis.
134  This derives from articles 6.3 and 7.8 of BUSINESSEUROPE’s statutes, as kindly 
sent to me by Mr. P. Kettlewell of BUSINESSEUROPE. 
135  The information hereunder has been derived from CEEP’s website (www.ceep.org), 
unless otherwise stipulated.
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international non-profit association for scientific purposes. CEEP is a cross-
sectoral organisation representing enterprises and employers’ organisations 
with public participation and enterprises carrying out activities of general 
economic interests. CEEP incorporates several hundred member associations, 
enterprises and organisations in over 20 countries, having a total impact 
amounting to one-sixth/one-seventh of the entire European trading 
economy. One of CEEP’s main objectives is to represent enterprises and 
other employers with public participation, and of general economic interest, 
vis-à-vis the European institutions. CEEP is known to be more willing than 
BUSINESSEUROPE to be involved in the European social dialogue.136 CEEP 
is one of the three cross-sectoral employers’ organisations recognised by the 
Commission.137
Although not explicitly mentioned in CEEP’s rules of procedure, the 
decision-making process concerning the adoption of European collective 
labour agreements is dual: first, in the Social Affairs Committee of CEEP 
and second in the General Assembly of CEEP. In both cases unanimity is 
required.138
4.3.3 The European Association of Craft, Small and 
Medium Sized enterprises (UEAPME)139
The European Association of Craft and Small and Medium Sized enterprises 
(UEAPME) is an employer’s organisation representing the interests, at 
European level, of crafts, trades and small and medium sized enterprises in 
the whole of Europe. It has 81 member organisations consisting of national 
cross-sectoral federations, European branch federations and other associate 
members, all supporting small and medium sized enterprises. Across the 
whole of Europe, UEAPME represents over 11 million enterprises with 
around 50 million employees. UEAPME considers itself  as the ‘voice’ of 
crafts, trades and small and medium sized enterprises, one of its aims is being 
able to represent the common interests of its members vis-à-vis the European 
institutions. UEAPME is recognised as a cross-sectoral European Social 
Partner.140
136  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
Development, Sectoral Variation and Prospects, page 30.
137  Reference is made to chapter 5, section 2.2 of this thesis.
138  This information was kindly provided to me by Mrs. M. Vandomme of CEEP. 
139  The information hereunder has been derived from UEAMPE’s website (www.
ueapme.com), unless otherwise stipulated.
140  Reference is made to chapter 5, section 2.2 of this thesis.
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For many years UEAPME felt excluded from European bargaining by UNICE, 
CEEP and ETUC. This problem, however, was solved by the conclusion of 
a cooperation agreement between UEAPME and UNICE on 4 december 
1998. According to this agreement, UEAPME recognises UNICE as the sole 
European organisation representing cross-industry businesses of all sizes, and 
acknowledges that the vast majority of businesses represented by UNICE 
are small and medium sized enterprises. In turn, UNICE recognises that 
UEAPME is the main cross-industry organisation representing the specific 
interests of small and medium sized enterprises at European level, for which 
reason it has a role to play in the social dialogue and can, in cooperation 
with UNICE, make a useful contribution to defending the interests of 
employers in negotiations with ETUC. UNICE will consult UEAPME before 
expressing positions on behalf  of employers in public or in negotiations or 
other meetings in the social dialogue. Representatives of UEAPME will play 
a full part in preparatory meetings of the employers’ group, and in plenary 
meetings with the ETUC. UNICE will take into account as much as possible 
UEAPME’s views expressed during preparatory meetings of the employers’ 
group. UEAPME, however, does not have a veto over any negotiations. 
Because of this cooperation agreement, UEAPME is, through UNICE, fully 
involved in the European social dialogue.141
Although the above makes clear that UEAPME cannot block negotiations 
initiated by UNICE (BUSINESSEUROPE), for which reason UEAPME’s 
opinion is not decisive, it is still valuable to know how decisions on European 
collective labour agreements are made. The rule at UEAPME is the simple 
majority also for such collective agreements. however, in practice, 
UEAPME tries to reach a consensus during the entire negotiations and 
prior to the vote procedure.142 
5. Summary
There are five institutions of the Community that are relevant for this 
thesis: (i) the European Parliament, (ii) the Council of the European Union 
(the Council), (iii) the Commission of the European Communities (the 
Commission), (iv) the Court of justice and (v) the European Council.
141  The information set out in this paragraph derives from: Institut des Sciences 
du Travail, in its assessment of UEAPME, to be found on www.trav.ucl.ac.be/
partenaires/eu-6-en.html and from the EIRO publication from P. Foster, European 
employers’ organisations forge closer links within social dialogue, 28 March 1999, 
page 1.
142  This information derives from UEAPME, as kindly sent to me by Mrs. L. 
Volozinskis of UEAPME. 
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The European Parliament has important budgetary, decision-making and 
supervisory roles. 
The Commission is a very important actor within the European Community. 
The Commission (i) ensures that the provisions of the EC Treaty and the 
measures taken by the institutions thereto are applied, (ii) formulates 
recommendations or delivers opinions on matters dealt with in the EC Treaty, 
(iii) has its own power of decision and participates in the shaping of measures 
taken by the Council and by the European Parliament, and (iv) exercises the 
powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of the rules 
laid out by the latter. The Commission moreover plays a crucial part in the 
legislative process having, among other rights, the important right of legal 
initiative. This enabled the Commission to act as the “motor of integration”. 
Apart from the above, the Commission has a very specific and important role 
when it comes to the European social dialogue; it has the task of promoting 
consultation of management and labour at Community level and must facilitate 
their dialogue by ensuring balanced support for the parties involved.
The Council (i) ensures coordination of the general economic policies 
of the Member States, (ii) has decision-making powers and (iii) confers 
on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the 
implementation of the rules which the Council lays down. 
The Court of justice, comprised of two bodies (the Court of justice of the 
European Communities and the Court of First Instance), exercises the judicial 
supervision in the Community.
The statutory defined role of the European Council is that it is to provide the 
Union with the necessary impetus for its development and that it is to define 
its general political guidelines. More roles are, however, to be distinguished, 
including discussing the development of the Community and Union itself, 
confirming important changes in the institutional structure of the Community, 
focusing on significant constitutional initiatives, focusing on the state of the 
European economy, conflict resolution, initiating or developing particular 
policy strategies, focusing on external relations and considering new accessions 
to the Community.
The European Community cannot unlimitedly exercise powers. It can only 
act within the limits set out in the EC Treaty. Moreover, the Community 
institutions must refrain from taking action if  such action could just as well 
be taken by the Member States (principle of subsidiarity) and may not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the EC Treaty (principle 
of proportionality). The Commission will have to investigate what the most 
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appropriate level will be for the adoption of rules. This also entails that 
certain problems should be addressed by the social partners, being the most 
appropriate level for taking action (horizontal subsidiarity).
There are 6 different procedures for drafting Community legislation: (1) the 
Commission acting alone, (2) the Council and Commission acting alone, (3) 
the Council and Commission acting after having consulted the European 
Parliament, (4) the Council and Commission acting in cooperation with 
the European Parliament, (5) the Council and Commission acting in co-
decision with the European Parliament and (6) the Council, Commission and 
European Parliament acting in assent. The most common manner in which to 
enact Community legislation is the fifth manner mentioned above.
There are different types of Community regulations: (1) regulations, (2) 
directives, (3) decisions, (4) recommendations and (5) opinions. 
A regulation has general application and is binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. A directive is binding upon each Member 
State to which it is addressed as to the result to be achieved. A decision is 
binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. Recommendations 
and opinions do not have any binding force.
Social partners should be divided into employees’ representative organisations 
(trade unions) on the one hand and employers’ representative organisations on 
the other hand. Social partners are different in nature from other organisations 
because of their ability to take part in the collective bargaining process.
In order for the social partners to be able to participate in the (institutionalised) 
European social dialogue, the organisation involved should: (i) be cross-
industry or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised at 
European level; (ii) consist of organisations which are themselves an integral 
and recognised part of Member State social partner structures, have the 
capacity to negotiate agreements and are representative of all Member States, 
as far as possible and (iii) have adequate structures to ensure their effective 
participation in the consultation process. 
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) is the most important 
cross-industry employees’ representative organisation that is able to participate 
in the European social dialogue. The relevant cross-industry employers’ 
representative organisations participating in the European social dialogue 
are (i) the Union of Industrial end Employers’ Confederation (UNICE), as 
of 23 january 2007 called BUSINESSEUROPE (ii) the European Centre of 
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Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic 
Interest (CEEP) and (iii) the European Association of Craft and Small and 
Medium Sized enterprises (UEAPME).
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ChAPTER 3
ThE ChANGING ChALLENGES FOR ANd ThE 
ROLE OF ThE EUROPEAN SOCIAL PARTNERS
1. Introduction
Now that the relevant Community institutions and the cross-industry social 
partners have been introduced, it is time to briefly set out the history of 
the European social dialogue and the (changing) role therein of the social 
partners.
In section 2, the history of the European social dialogue and the role herein 
of the European social partners as from the nineteen fifties until the year 
2000 will be described. All “major” events in that period in the field of the 
European social dialogue will briefly be discussed. In section 3 it will be argued 
that since the year 2000 the challenges for and the role of the social partners 
have changed drastically, which will culminate in a preliminary conclusion 
in section 4. These changes have not escaped the European social partners’ 
attention and have led to their repositioning (section 5). Both the high Level 
Group on Industrial Relations and Change of the European Union and the 
Commission wish to enhance the position of the European social partners 
due to said changes and welcome their repositioning (section 6). After that, 
new developments (the European Consitution and the Treaty of Lisbon) 
have further emphasisid the importance of the role of the European social 
partners in the Community, as will be set out in section 7. The above will be 
summarised in section 8.
2. 1950 – 2000: the social partners’ European 
role until the Lisbon European Summit
Before starting to discuss the role the European social partners have had in 
the Community, I will first identify three seperate powers or activities of these 
social partners in the Community. First, European social partners may have 
a consultative role: the institutions of the Community may ask the social 
partners’ opinion on specific issues. European social partners may furthermore 
negotiate voluntary (non-binding) agreements, such as guidelines, codes of 
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conduct, or policy orientations. These are (transnational) tools, not based on 
a legally recognised power to conclude collective labour agreements. Last, 
European social partners may enter into proper collective bargaining, leading 
to binding (transnational) collective agreements. It is in particular important 
to keep the distinction between collective negotiation, resulting in non-
binding agreements, and collective bargaining, leading to binding collective 
agreements, in mind when analysing the role of European social partners in 
the Community.143
2.1 The early years
On a theoretical level, the possible influence of the social partners within a 
united Europe has long since been recognised. From as early as the end of the 
fifties, scholars discussed the advantages of European collective agreements.144 
These scholars argued that European collective agreements could possibly 
speed up European integration, create equal competition conditions, promote 
social justice and free movement of workers.145
Attempts to establish a European social dialogue in the seventies and the first 
half  of the eighties failed. This can be attributed to the economic climate, the 
Euro-scepticism of political leaders, the lack of European competency in the 
area of social policy (the requirement of unanimity) and the organisational 
weakness of the social partners involved.146
2.2 The eighties: Val Duchesse, Single European 
Act and the Community Charter
The above-mentioned status quo was broken due to the upcoming Single 
European Act. As a consequence thereof the social partners started playing 
a “real” role in the European Community as from the mid-eighties.147 In 
1984, the Council stated in the Second Social Action Plan that a consensus 
143  With regard to that distinction and its importance, reference is made to: E. Ales, 
S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-Ré, 
Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, pages 8 and 9.
144  For an overview of some of these scholars, reference is made to Franssen, Legal 
aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 59, note 56.
145  See for example G. Sadtler, Europäische Tarifverträge, Neue juristische 
Wochenschrift, volume 22, 1969, page 962.
146  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
Development, Sectoral Variation and Prospects, page 19.
147  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
Development, Sectoral Variation and Prospects, page 19.
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between the social partners had to be reached in order to seek full and better 
employment, to improve living and working conditions and to realise the full 
and free circulation of workers.148 In 1985, j. delors – at that time President of 
the Commission – invited three cross-industry social partners to a meeting in 
Val duchesse. These parties were ETUC, UNICE and CEEP.149 There, these 
three social partners agreed upon furthering the European social dialogue on 
an informal and voluntary basis.150 
In order to further stimulate the social dialogue, article 22 of the Single 
European Act,151 entering into force on 1 july 1987, introduced a new article 
118B to the EC Treaty that stated:
The Commission shall endeavour to develop the dialogue between management 
and labour on European level which could, if  the two sides consider it desirable, 
lead to relations based on an agreement.
Ironically, 1987 was also the year that ETUC left the social dialogue resulting 
from the Val duchesse meeting, because the European social developments 
came to a halt and it became evident that UNICE considered the social dialogue 
as a forum for non-binding voluntary discussion only.152 The adoption of the 
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, introduced in 
1989, led to the come-back of ETUC and thus restarted the European social 
dialogue. Article 12 of this Charter re-emphasized the social partners’ right 
to enter into agreements.153 It states that “the dialogue between the two sides 
of industry at European level may, if  the parties deem it desirable, result in 
contractual relations in particular at inter-occupational and sectoral level”.
2.3 The nineties: the Joint Agreement, the Protocol on Social 
Policy and the amendment of the EC Treaty
during the nineties the position of the social partners was strongly enhanced 
due to institutional changes and the progressive attitude of the Commission. 
148  Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 60.
149  Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 61.
150  Reference is made to Commission Communication COM (1996) 448, final, 
concerning the Development of the Social Dialogue at Community level, page 2.
151  Oj L 169, 29 june 1987, pages 1 – 28.
152  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
Development, Sectoral Variation and Prospects, page 20.
153  In as far this right needs a separate legal basis, an item that will be discussed in 
chapter 6, section 4.1.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 3
80
In this decade many foundations have been laid in order to provide the social 
partners with a strong starting position to play a relevant role within the 
European Community.
2.3.1 1991: Joint Agreement of the social partners 
On 31 October 1991, UNICE, ETUC and CEEP concluded an important 
joint Agreement.154 In this agreement they proposed the wording for the 
anticipated new articles 118, 118a and 118b of the EC Treaty. These draft 
articles concern (i) the social partners’ position to implement directives in 
Member States, (ii) the Commission’s task to promote the consultation of 
social partners and to facilitate the European social dialogue and (iii) the 
social partners’ right to enter into agreements, which could be implemented 
by a Council decision. The joint Agreement formed an important basis for 
the 1991 Protocol on Social Policy, which will be discussed below.155
2.3.2 1992: the Protocol on Social Policy
At the intergovernmental conference in Maastricht in 1992, the political 
agenda included the amendment of the EC Treaty in order to draft legislation 
on certain social matters by a qualified majority of votes (instead of 
unanimity) and to officially strengthen the position of the social partners.156 
The United Kingdom could, for reasons of domestic politics, not agree to 
these amendments. It did, however, condone the other Member States to 
154  The conclusion of the joint Agreement came as a surprise. It was thought that 
UNICE would never agree to such agreement, since it always had been very 
reluctant to further the European social dialogue and it had relied on a veto in 
the Council when it came to – in the opinion of UNICE: undesirable – European 
legislation in the field of social policy. UNICE, however, (rightly) expected that 
the intergovernmental conference in Maastricht in 1992 would lead to decision-
making in said field by a qualified majority of votes in stead of unanimity, and for 
that reason it rather secured its position itself  within the European social dialogue. 
Reference is made to Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The 
European Social Dialogue: Development, Sectoral Variation and Prospects, page  
20 – 21 and Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 64.
155  Reference is made to the legal notice on employment and social affairs, Social 
Dialogue, page 1 of the chapter on joint Opinions, as published on the internet on 
www.europa.eu.int.
156  Reference is made to R. Blanpain, The European Union, Employment, Social Policy 
and the Law, page 18 and C. Engels and L. Salas, Labour Law and the European 
Union after the Amsterdam Treaty, page 74, both in R. Blanpain (ed.), Institutional 
Changes and European Social Policies after the Treaty of Amsterdam, Kluwer Law 
International, The hague-London-Boston, 1998.
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go ahead.157 Consequently, these other eleven Member States concluded the 
Protocol on Social Policy that was subsequently annexed to the EC Treaty. 
The Protocol on Social Policy only applied to these 11 Member States – thus 
not to the United Kingdom – as a result of which a two-track social policy in 
the European Community was introduced.158 The wording of the Protocol on 
Social Policy is mainly the same as the wording that has been suggested by the 
social partners in the joint Agreement.159
Article 1 of the Protocol on Social Policy stipulates that the Community and 
its Member States shall i.a. promote the dialogue between management and 
labour. 
Article 2 of the Protocol on Social Policy sets out that the Community shall 
support certain specific social policy issues, such as improvement of working 
conditions, the information and consultation of workers and equal treatment. 
To that end, the Council could adopt directives by a qualified majority of 
votes. In other fields of social policy the Council can only adopt directives 
unanimously. The directives adopted could be implemented by the social 
partners within a Member State, should the Member State involved so 
desire. 
 
Pursuant to article 3 of the Protocol on Social Policy, the Commission should 
promote the consultation of the social partners on a Community level, to 
which end it should consult them prior to submitting proposals in the field 
of social policy. At the social partners’ request, they can start negotiations on 
issues the Commission intends to submit proposals on. If  these negotiations 
actually lead to agreement, this agreement may subsequently be implemented 
either through a Council decision or in accordance with the normal procedures 
and practices of the social partners and the Member States (article 4 of the 
Protocol on Social Policy). Besides this, article 4 also opened the possibility 
for the European social partners to enter into agreements on other issues.
Given the above, the Protocol on Social Policy (i) enhanced the possibility 
to draft Community legislation in the social policy field (due to the Protocol 
a qualified majority of votes suffices for a number of subjects instead of the 
previously required unanimity of votes) and (ii) attributed an important role 
157  Engels and Salas, Labour Law and the European Union after the Amsterdam Treaty, 
page 74.
158  Reference is made to the preamble of the Protocol on Social Policy.
159  See for a thorough comparison of the text of both documents: B. Bercusson, 
European Labour Law, pages 523 ff.
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to the social partners in this process. It did not, however, apply within the 
whole Community, due to the already mentioned United Kingdom’s opt-
out. 
2.3.3 1993: Commission Communication concerning the 
application of the Agreement on social policy
In 1993, the Commission adopted a Communication concerning the 
application of the Agreement on social policy.160 herein, the Commission set 
out how it will deal with the new situation created by the Protocol and which 
social partners it will recognise for consultation purposes. The Commission 
announced how to involve the social partners in the consultation process, 
how this could lead to agreements and how these agreements could be 
implemented. 
2.3.4 1996: Commission Communication “the Development 
of the Social Dialogue at Community level”
In 1996, the Commission adopted a Consultation Communication in order 
“to find ways to strengthen the social dialogue, to make it more adaptable and 
to associate the work of the social partners more closely in the development 
and implementation of EU policies, particularly employment and economic 
growth”.161 The Commission stressed it would continue to give its full support 
to the social dialogue, since it had made significant achievements and had 
showed rich potential for developing a partnership approach to social policy, 
which can play an important role in supporting European integration.162 
The social dialogue could, according to the Commission, prove valuable in 
developing and completing action on employment at Community level and 
could be further developed on other levels than just the Community level. 
It could also be important with regard to transnational industries and at 
regional levels, particularly in cross-border regions.163 At sectoral level, as 
well, the social dialogue could be given more substance.164
In order to gather as wide a range of views as possible on the means to 
be employed to promote and develop the European social dialogue, the 
160  COM (1993) 600 final.
161  COM (1996) 448, page 1b.
162  COM (1996) 448, pages 3 and 4.
163  COM (1996) 448, page 16.
164  COM (1996) 448, page 7.
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Commission invited all relevant organisations to share their opinion. Further 
steps would be taken after receipt of these responses.165 
 
2.3.5 1997: The Treaty of Amsterdam
In the above-mentioned Consultation Communication the Commission also 
stressed that the Protocol on Social Policy should be integrated in the EC 
Treaty.166 The Commission’s wish became reality during the intergovernmental 
conference in Amsterdam in 1997. The United Kingdom repealed its opt-out 
and accepted the Protocol on Social Policy.167 This Protocol was subsequently 
almost literally transferred to Title xI (Social Policy, education, vocational 
training and youth) of the EC Treaty. This title will be discussed in depth in 
chapter 5 of this thesis.
2.3.6 1998: Commission Communication “Adapting and 
promoting the Social Dialogue at Community level”
during 1997, more than 80 replies were received from national and European 
employers’ and employees’ organisations, European institutions and national 
authorities on the Commission’s request as laid out in the above-mentioned 
1996 Consultation Communication. The 1998 Communication from the 
Commission “adapting and promoting the Social dialogue at Community 
level” draws the “principal lessons” from the above consultation, and from 
recent developments.168 According to this Communication, the Commission 
has set itself  three objectives: (i) a more open social dialogue, (ii) a more 
effective dialogue between the European institutions and the social partners 
and (iii) the development of a real collective bargaining at European level. 
The Commission intended to reach these objectives through key actions in 
four main fields: information, consultation, employment partnership and 
negotiation. Obviously, that last aspect is the most relevant for this thesis. 
The Commission will encourage the further development of contractual 
relations between social partners, both at cross-industry and sectoral levels. 
The Commission states that “an active dialogue between management and 
labour leading to shared goals and practical commitments is the raison d’être 
165  COM (1996) 448, page 2.
166  COM (1996) 448, page 2.
167  Blanpain, The European Union, Employment, Social Policy and the Law, page 21.
168  COM (1998) 322, page 3.
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of the social dialogue”.169 In two paragraphs the Commission presented its 
view on European collective agreements (particular on concluding collective 
agreements under the Treaty of Amsterdam):170
The Commission considers that the development of contractual relations, as 
set out in the new treaty [the Treaty of Amsterdam; author], is a most effective 
mechanism to implement relevant commitments on Social Policy. The Commission 
therefore hopes the social partners will further develop their contractual relations 
at both inter-professional and sectoral level. Relations based on agreements should 
take their place alongside legislation in the development of social policy. The 
Commission considers that sectoral agreements between social partners can form 
an important basis for achieving social policy objectives, including the process of 
making agreements binding through Community law at the request of the social 
partners. 
The Commission will continue to give strong support to the initiation of 
negotiations under this procedure, pointing out that both the inter-professional 
and sectoral social partners are encouraged to take their responsibilities in this 
respect. 
The Commission made a strong appeal to the social partners to take the 
necessary steps to ensure that their dialogue remains strong and continues 
to attract widespread support.171 It furthermore requested the candidate 
countries to promote their social dialogue structures.172
3. 2000 – today: the social partners’ changing European 
role and the altered challenges they face
The role of and the challenges for the European social partners have gradually 
but distinctively changed from about the year 2000. As from then, their part 
in the development of Europe has been viewed more and more crucial.
3.1 The Lisbon Strategy, European governance, 
Union enlargement and new challenges 
The following noteworthy changes have occurred from about the year 2000:
169  COM (1998) 322, page 12.
170  COM (1998) 322, pages 14 and 15.
171  COM (1998) 322, page 13.
172  COM (1998) 322, page 17.
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3.1.1 2000: The Lisbon European Summit
In March 2000, the Lisbon European Summit took place and brought about 
the so-called Lisbon Strategy. The Lisbon Strategy is a commitment to bring 
about economic, social and environmental renewal in the EU. In March 2000, 
the European Council in Lisbon drafted a ten-year strategy to make the EU the 
“most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”.173 
Under the strategy, a stronger economy will drive job creation alongside 
social and environmental policies that ensure sustainable development and 
social inclusion.174
The role the Commission has in mind for the social partners in this process is 
of the utmost importance. In the year 2000 contribution of the Commission 
to the spring European Council meeting it stated:175
The social partners have a crucial role to play in helping to manage the transition 
to a knowledge based economy and society. Their contribution is needed not only 
as a result of the radical change in the world of work, but also because of the need 
to ensure a common understanding on all the elements required for a dynamic 
economy – in the linked chain from people to ideas to finance to market.
The importance of the social partners in modernising Europe and taking 
it to a competitive economy was stressed again shortly thereafter by the 
Commission in its Social Policy Agenda, where it deemed the development 
of social dialogue at European level “a key tool for the modernisation and 
further development of the European social model”.176
173  Reference is made to the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 
dOC/00/08, page 2.
174  For a brief  overview of the Lisbon Strategy, reference is made to the European 
Website: www.europa.eu.int/comm/lisbon_strategy.
175  Commission Communication COM (2000) 7, final, The Lisbon European Council 
– An Agenda of Economic and Social Renewal for Europe, Contribution of the 
European Commission to the Special European Council in Lisbon, 23 – 24th March 
2000, page 22.
176  Commission Communication COM (2000) 379 final, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Social Policy Agenda, page 23. For 
further information on the role of the social partners in the Lisbon Strategy, 
reference is made to C. Barnard, EC Employment law, Oxford University Press, 
2006, pages 151 ff.
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The role the European institutions have in mind for the social partners in 
achieving the goals as set out in the Lisbon Strategy, was the first step of their 
altered position in Europe.177
3.1.2 2001: White Paper on European Governance 
In the 2001 White Paper on European Governance the Commission observes 
a paradox in Europe: on the one hand Europeans want political leaders 
to find solutions for major problems, on the other hand they increasingly 
distrust institutions and politics, or are simply not interested in them.178 This 
is particularly the case at EU level. For that reason said White Paper assesses 
the way in which the Union uses the powers given by its citizens. It proposes 
opening up the policy-making process to get more people and organisations 
involved in shaping and delivering EU policy. Moreover, it promotes more 
openness, accountability and responsibility for everyone involved.
In order to achieve the above-mentioned, the Union must, according to the 
Commission, better combine different policy making tools such as legislation, 
social dialogue, structural funding and action programmes.179 There should 
also be more involvement of the general public in shaping and implementing 
EU policy, in particular of the civil society.180 Trade Unions and employers’ 
organisations – as a part of the civil society – (should) have a particular role 
and influence within it. After all, the EC Treaty requires the Commission to 
consult management and labour in preparing proposals in the social policy 
field, and they can enter into agreements that could subsequently be turned 
into Community law. The Commission thus requests the social partners play 
177  The fact that the Lisbon Strategy did not take off  as planned, does not alter the 
role of the (European) social partners in achieving the Lisbon Strategy objectives. 
Their role remains crucial in the relaunch of the Lisbon process in 2005. See for 
this relaunch: C. Barnard, EC Employment law, pages 157 ff.
178  Commission Communication COM (2001) 428, final, European Governance, A 
White Paper, page 3.
179  COM (2001) 428, page 8.
180  COM (2001) 428, page 14. “Civil society” includes social partners, non-
governmental organisations, professional associations and alike. For the exact 
definition of organised civil society reference is made to the Opinion of Economic 
and Social Committee on the role and contribution of civil society organizations in 
the building of Europe, Oj C 329, 17 November 1999, page 30.
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a role in overcoming the European governance problem.181 This is the second 
step of the altered role of the social partners in Europe.
3.1.3 2002: The High Level Group Report
In january 2002 the high Level Group on Industrial Relations and Change 
of the European Union (the “high Level Group”) published its report on 
“Industrial Relations and Industrial Change” (the “Report”). The Report 
aims to outline the manner on which industrial relations actors,182 but 
also governments, the Commission and other policy-makers can respond 
to the altered challenges facing European societies and play their role in 
changing management through meaningful social dialogue and improved 
partnerships.183
The above-mentioned “altered challenges” include globalisation, enlargement 
of the Union, shift from economic and monetary responsibility from national 
to European level, technological change and the transition to a knowledge 
economy, demographic trends (ageing, declining birth-rate and immigration), 
and changes in the labour market (a new balance between family, work and 
education).184 The high Level Group argues that these “unprecedented” 
challenges are changing the role of and the problems to be addressed by the 
actors of industrial relations. It therefore requires the development of a new 
181  This is an ongoing programme and is part of the EU’s “Better Regulation 
Strategy”. This strategy aims at simplifying and improving existing regulation, to 
better design new regulation and to reinforce the respect and the effectiveness of 
the rules. The strategy is based on three key action lines: (i) promoting the design 
and application of better regulation tools at the EU level, (ii) working more closely 
with the Member States to ensure that better regulation principles are applied 
consistently throughout the EU by all regulators and (iii) reinforcing the dialogue 
between stakeholders and all regulators at the EU and national levels. This last key 
action is founded on the participation of civil society, including social partners. 
Reference is made to ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/index_en.htm. For 
an overview of the follow-up initiatives triggered by the White Paper on European 
Governance, reference is made to S. Smismans, New governance – The solution 
for active European citizenship, or the end of citizenship?, Colombia journal of 
European Law, 2007, volume 13, number 3, page 8.
182  The term “Industrial Relations” in the Report is used in a broad sense, not 
only covering the relation between workers and management or between the 
organisations representing them (being the social partners), and not only involving 
the regulation of wages and employment conditions, but also the relevant legal and 
institutional frameworks and public policies. Reference is made to page 9 of the 
Report.
183  Reference is made to page 9 of the Report.
184  Reference is made to pages 11 – 15 of the Report.
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agenda for the industrial relations. This agenda should, among others, include 
(further) development of a general framework to enhance competitiveness 
and innovation with social cohesion, the possibility to adjust wages rapidly, 
new forms of flexible employment and working time and better working 
conditions and work organisation.185 Obviously, these are all subjects that 
directly involve the social partners. These altered challenges are the third step 
of an altered position of the social partners in Europe.
But industrial relations should, according to the high Level Group, not only 
focus on these challenges. Industrial relations can also contribute to good 
(European) governance.186 This particularly applies to the bipartite process of 
the industrial relations. The high Level Group holds collective bargaining as 
“an important regulatory institution of employment relations in democratic 
market economies”.187 Furthermore, industrial relations can push forward the 
European strategy for economical and social modernisation (Lisbon Strategy), 
fostering modernisation based on new social contract, exploring new ways to 
strengthen competitiveness with social cohesion and creating better prospects 
for employment.188 Finally, the high Level Group argues that the social 
partners’ position in the candidate countries should be further developed.189 
This subject has been further elaborated on in the Communication discussed 
below.
3.1.4 2002: Commission Communication “the European Social 
Dialogue, a force for innovation and change”
Also in 2002, the Commission published its Communication “the European 
Social dialogue, a force for innovation and change”.190 The aim of this 
communication is to lay the ground work for strengthening social dialogue in 
an enlarged Europe.191 This Communication essentially builds further upon 
the above-mentioned Report.
In this Communication, the Commission observes that the social dialogue 
“is a key to better governance”.192 It also notes that the European Social 
185  Reference is made to pages 17 – 23 of the Report.
186  Reference is made to page 24 of the Report.
187  Reference is made to page 24 of the Report.
188  Reference is made to page 9 of the Report.
189  Reference is made to page 31 of the Report.
190  COM (2002) 341, final.
191  COM (2002) 341, page 7.
192  COM (2002) 341, page 7.
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dialogue is a force that promotes change through its positive management. 
The dialogue is an important tool in achieving the Lisbon Strategy: it could 
bring the modernisation announced at the Lisbon European Council for all 
key issues on the European agenda. Attainment of two important strategic 
goals, full employment and reinforced social cohesion, depends, according to 
the Commission, to a considerable extent, on the action taken by the social 
partners.193
Finally, the Commission states that the social dialogue will be an important 
issue with regard to the enlargement of the Union. The Commission points 
out that the social dialogue “is enshrined in the Treaty and forms an integral 
part of the acquis communautaire”.194 The social partner structure in the 
candidate countries should be strengthened. The social partners in the 
countries that were already part of the Union that day could assist them with 
this strengthening process. According to the Commission the social partners 
of the candidate countries have an important role to play in the context of the 
pre-accession strategy.195 
This enlargement-process of the EU is the fourth step of the changing role of 
the social partners. Not only does the position of the social partners change 
due to the accession of new countries and are the social partners to play an 
important role in the pre-accession process, but their challenge remains in full 
force after said accession. The social partners can (and must) play an important 
role in the further development of these countries.196 The directorate-General 
for Employment and Social Affairs of the Commission noted:197
The social dialogue plays an essential role in the context of enlargement. It is 
seen not only as an element of the Community acquis, highlighted during the pre-
accession process, but also as a means of implementing it in the field. The social 
partners can therefore ensure that all Community provisions, after being formally 
adopted by the governments of the candidate countries, are properly implemented 
in the world of work and in business. Moreover, the social dialogue can act as 
193  COM (2002) 341, page 6.
194  COM (2002) 341, page 19.
195  COM (2002) 341, page 20.
196  See for example: C. Welz and T. Kauppinen, The Role of Social Dialogue in the 
Acceding Countries during the Preparatory Phase for Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), The International journal of Comparative Law And Industrial Relations, 
Winter 2004, pages 583 ff.
197  Reference is made to the European Commission, directorate-General for 
Employment and Social Affairs, The sectoral dialogue in Europe, december 2002, 
page 7. 
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a ‘driver’, able to reconcile sometimes divergent interests between the different 
socioeconomic players in the European Union and the candidate countries. (…) 
There is no doubt that the social dialogue will be one of the keys to the success 
of the enlargement and to the challenges to be met within a renewed European 
Union. 
Consequently, the fact that these countries are today full members of the 
EU does not change the fact that industrial relations in these countries need 
attention for many years to come.
 
4. Preliminary conclusion: the role of and challenges 
for the European social partners have changed
From the developments set out above, it can be derived that the role of and 
the challenges for the European social partners have been altered significantly 
in recent years. due to (i) the social partners’ role in achieving the goals of the 
Lisbon Strategy, (ii) their position in proper European governance, (iii) the 
altered challenges and (iv) their assistance of the social partners in the then 
candidate and today newly joined countries, the social partners have a new 
and increasingly important position in the Union. 
This new position has been explicitly acknowledged by the high Level Group 
in relation to the altered challenges facing the social partners. In its Report, 
the high Level Group has stated:198 
These processes [the altered challenges; author] are changing the role of and 
the problems to be addressed by the actors involved in industrial relations.
The Commission has also recognised the strongly altered position of the 
social partners. In its Communication on the European Social dialogue, a 
force for innovation and change, the Commission noted: 199
The social dialogue has entered a new era, moving on from setting in place 
the tools (consultation on Community initiatives, possible negotiation of 
independent agreements) enshrined in the Treaty.
198  Reference is made to page 9 of the Report.
199  COM (2002) 341, page 22.
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In its 2002 research, the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour studies also 
concluded that, 10 years after the social partners have entered into the joint 
Agreement, “the European social dialogue has arrived at a crossroads”.200
5. The repositioning of the European social partners: a new role
The above-mentioned changes have not escaped the European social partners’ 
notice. In the joint contribution by the social partners to the Laeken European 
Council of 7 december 2001,201 ETUC, UNICE/UAPME and CEEP 
expressed their intent to reposition their role in the light of (i) the debate on 
Europe’s future and governance, (ii) the (at that moment) future enlargement 
of the EU and (iii) the completion of the economic and monetary union. 
Basically, the European social partners planned not to be fully dependent 
on the Community institutions anymore. Instead of solely acting after 
having been consulted by the Commission and to have their subsequent 
agreements exclusively implemented by a Council decision, as they did before, 
the European social partners now rather take the initiative themselves and 
implement their agreements autonomously, with the instruments of industrial 
relations available to them at the national level.202
In the Laeken declaration, the above-mentioned social partners deemed 
it necessary to reaffirm (i) the specific role of the social partners, (ii) the 
distinction between bipartite social dialogue and tripartite concertation, (iii) 
the need to articulate tripartite concertation around the different aspects of 
the Lisbon Strategy and (iv) their wish to develop a work programme for a 
more autonomous social dialogue.
With regard to (i) their role, ETUC, UNICE/UAPME and CEEP agree 
with the Commission that they have a role in proper European governance. 
Notwithstanding this, the Commission should take into consideration the 
specifics of the social dialogue. According to said social partners, the nature 
of the responsibilities of the social partners, their legitimacy and their 
representativeness, together with their capacity to negotiate agreements places 
the social dialogue in a special position. 
200  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
Development, Sectoral Variation and Prospects, page 101.
201  This joint contribution is available on ETUC’s website; www.etuc.org/en/dossiers/
colbargain/splaeken.cfm.
202  See on this, for instance, S. Smismans, The European Social Dialogue in the Shadow 
of Hierarchy, journal of Public Policy, 2008, volume. 28, number 1, page 171.
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Moreover, (ii) the social partners insist in making a clear distinction between 
the bipartite social dialogue and the tripartite concertation between the social 
partners and the European public authorities. The tripartite concertation 
should (iii) take place by means of a tripartite concertation committee, 
replacing the Standing Committee on Employment, which would be the 
forum for concertation between the social partners and the public authorities 
on the overall European strategy defined in Lisbon. The committee should 
also examine the Community’s overall economic and social strategy ahead of 
the Spring European Council.
With regard to (iv) the social dialogue, the social partners announced a 
reflection on the best way of developing a more autonomous social dialogue. 
ETUC, UNICE/UAPME and CEEP will discuss what measures should be 
taken to better organise the work of the social dialogue in a work programme. 
That work programme will make use of different instruments (various types 
of European framework agreements, exchanges of experience, awareness-
raising campaigns, open debates, etc.) and would comprise a balanced range 
of themes that interest both employers and workers. Although the social 
partners will decide on and implement the fruits of their works autonomously, 
they will take into account that their work programme should make a useful 
contribution to European strategy, and for growth and employment as well 
as preparing for enlargement of the EU. This work programme, and more 
in general the achievements of the above-mentioned cross-industry social 
partners, will be discussed and briefly analysed in chapter 4, sections 5 and 
6.
6. The response of the High Level Group and the 
Commission to the new role of the European 
Social Partners: strengthening their position
The above-mentioned repositioning of the European cross-industry social 
partners is well received by the Community institutions and other European 
organs, as will be set out below. These parties are prepared to enhance the 
position of the European social partners in order to assist them in dealing 
with their new position and challenges. 
6.1 The High Level Group
Given the above-mentioned changed challenges, the high Level Group 
takes the opinion that the industrial relations require assistance. It therefore 
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intends to further improve the role of the industrial relations in the EU.203 The 
high Level Group argues that there needs to be a focus at EU level on key 
areas where a strategic role can be played that will enhance the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the industrial relations process, foster social dialogue and 
encourage agreements at all levels.204 Against that background, the high 
Level Group has presented a list of proposals to “enhance the interaction of 
industrial relations at the different levels”.205 
First, the high Level Group focuses on the enhancement of the industrial 
relations process at European level. It subscribes to the social partners’ point 
of view as set out in the Laeken declaration to establish a new committee 
at the highest political level close to the Spring European Council in order 
to rationalise and simplify the consultation and concertation process.206 It 
considers this to be important as it gives the social partners the possibility 
to discuss the interdependent policies of Lisbon Strategies. According to the 
high Level Group, tripartite process can provide useful strategic information 
to all actors and it can also lead to effective partnership for action. It is also 
useful for improving public policies and facilitating agreements between social 
partners.207 Moreover, the high Level Group deems it important to enhance 
the bilateral process as well, “promoting the initiative and responsibility of 
the social partners themselves”.208 This is in line with the “autonomous social 
dialogue” as pursued by the social partners in the Laeken declaration. 
Second, the high Level Group wishes to reinforce the instruments of industrial 
relations at European level. It points out that new approaches on regulation 
underline the merits of co-regulation – the social partners should be involved 
in fundamental decisions and discussions and play a role in both formulation 
and implementation209 – without undermining the role and responsibilities 
of public authorities.210 It furthermore stresses that new regulation should 
be based not only on a normative approach leading to binding rules (legal 
provisions or social agreements), but also on a learning process based on 
guidelines and benchmarks designed to improve actual behaviour.211 There 
203  Reference is made to page 5 and 32 of the Report.
204  Reference is made to page 5 of the Report.
205  Reference is made to page 33 of the Report.
206  Reference is made to page 34 of the Report.
207  Reference is made to page 35 of the Report.
208  Reference is made to Page 35 of the Report.
209  Reference is made to Page 33 of the Report.
210  Reference is made to page 35 of the Report.
211  Reference is made to Page 35 of the Report.
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should be a balance between these two approaches. The high Level Group 
suggests that the social partners “mix” the instruments (i) negotiating 
agreement, (ii) drafting recommendations and joint opinions, (iii) exchange 
of experience and benchmarking, and (iv) with certain new instruments 
in order to obtain their goals. According to the high Level Group, a new 
combination of framework agreements and recommendations can enrich 
bipartite process.212 This is also in line with the wish of the social partners as 
set out in the Laeken declaration to make use of “different instruments”. 
6.2 The Commission
The Commission wishes to enhance the role of the social partners in 
Europe as well. It intends (i) to develop fresh approaches to consultations 
on employment, economic policy and social protection and (ii) to introduce 
new ways of contributing to implementation of the economic and social 
reform strategy, particularly in the context of the European coordination of 
employment policies.213 
With regard to consultation, the Commission (i) intends to consult the social 
partners on the main initiatives having social repercussions, (ii) will set up an 
interdepartmental working party with the remit of drawing up an inventory 
of consultation methods and structures in place and helping to involve more 
closely all the departments concerned by activities connected with social 
dialogue, and (iii) will draft an internal code of conduct on consultation with 
the social partners.214
The Commission issued several ideas on how the social partners could be 
more involved in contributing to economic and social reform strategy, such as 
expanding the agenda of the social dialogue, encourage setting up new sectoral 
groupings for the social dialogue, improving monitoring and implementation 
of agreements reached between the social partners etc.215 
Moreover, the Commission has introduced a proposal for a Council decision 
establishing a Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment.216 This 
212  Reference is made to page 35 of the Report.
213  COM (2002) 341, page 6.
214  COM (2002) 341, page 9.
215  COM (2002) 341, pages 14 ff.
216  Proposal for a Council decision establishing a Tripartite Social Summit for Growth 
and Employment, 2002/0136, as attached to COM (2002) 341.
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proposal was adopted by a Council decision on 6 March 2003.217 Recital (4) 
of this Council decision clearly ties setting up the Tripartite Social Summit for 
Growth and Employment to the social partners wish as laid out in the Laeken 
declaration. The Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment 
must ensure that there is continuous concertation between the Council, the 
Commission and the social partners, in order to enable the social partners to 
contribute to the various components as set out in the Lisbon Strategy (article 
2). The Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment shall consist of 
the Council Presidency and the two subsequent Presidencies, the Commission 
and representatives of the social partners represented at the highest level 
(article 3.1). The Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment shall 
meet at least once a year, just before the Spring European Council (article 
5.1).
But also in its 2004 Communication “Partnership for change in an enlarged 
Europe – Enhancing the contribution of European social dialogue”, the 
Commission makes it evident that it wishes to further strengthen the position 
of the European social partners.218 The purpose of this Communication is to 
promote awareness and understanding of the results of the European social 
dialogue, to improve their impact, and to promote further developments based 
on effective interaction between different levels of industrial relations.219 
The Commission welcomes the social partners’ wish to pursue a more 
autonomous dialogue and to contribute achieving the Lisbon objectives.220 
It also continues to encourage the development of bipartite social dialogue 
within the new Member States and will increase its support of the European 
social partners in order to deal with the consequences of enlargement.221 
Furthermore, the Commission will monitor and help to improve the impact 
and follow-up of the European social dialogue.222 It encourages the European 
social partners to improve the clarity of their texts and include detailed 
follow-up provisions in the new generation texts (the “different instruments” 
217  Oj L 70, 14 March 2003, pages 31 – 33.
218  COM (2004) 557, final.
219  COM (2004) 557, page 4.
220  COM (2004) 557, page 8. The Commission does, however, have certain reservations 
as to the “autonomous dialogue” when it comes to implementing agreements 
autonomously in accordance with article 139.2 of the Treaty. Sometimes 
agreements can, according to the Commission, better be implemented by a Council 
decision. This will be discussed further in chapter 5, section 6 hereof. 
221  COM (2004) 557, page 9.
222  COM (2004) 557, pages 9 and 10.
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as mentioned by the social partners in the Laeken declaration).223 For these 
reasons, the Commission has attached two exhibits to the Communication 
stating the different typologies of the results of the European social dialogue 
and a checklist for new generation texts.224
6.3 Conclusion
From the above it can be concluded that the high Level Committee and the 
Commission are willing to cooperate with and to stimulate the new position of 
the European social partners in the European social dialogue. The European 
social partners therefore have an excellent opportunity to further develop the 
European social dialogue and to bring it to the next level. 
7. Recent developments on the role of the 
European social partners
The developments concerning the role and importance of the European social 
partners did not halt in recent years. The Community legislator wishes to 
attribute the European social partners an important position, initially in the 
European Constitution, and later on in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The European Constitution had a specific role in mind for the social partners 
within the EU.225 Title VI of the European Constitution concerns “the 
democratic life of the Union” and introduces the principle of representative 
democracy, the principle of participatory democracy and the role of the 
social partners herein. Article I-45 of the European Constitution makes 
clear that the working of the Union is founded on representative democracy, 
in which citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European 
Parliament. Member States are represented in the European Council, and are 
themselves democratically accountable either to their national parliaments 
or to their citizens. Citizens have the right to participate in the democratic 
life of the Union and decisions shall be transparent and as closely as possible 
to the citizens. Political parties at Union level express the will of the Union 
citizens. But apart from being a representative democracy, the Union will also 
abide by the rules of participatory democracy. Article I-46 of the European 
Constitution states that the institutions of the Union shall give citizens and 
representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly 
223  COM (2004) 557, page 7.
224  COM (2004) 557, exhibits 2 and 3.
225  European Constitution as signed on 29 October 2004 and published in Oj C 310, 
16 december 2004, pages 1 – 474.
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exchange their views in all areas of Union action. These institutions shall 
maintain an open and regular dialogue with representative associations and 
civil society, and shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned. 
Citizens are awarded a right to take the initiative of inviting the Commission to 
submit appropriate legislative proposals, provided that these citizens amount 
to not less than one million, coming from a significant number of Member 
States. Finally, article I-47 of the European Constitution stipulates that the 
EU recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at Union level. It 
shall furthermore facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting 
their autonomy. Given the fact that the European social partners can be 
“representative associations” and are part of civil society as referred to in 
article I-46 of the European Constitution, they were to play an important role 
in the participatory democracy of the Union. That role is further emphasised 
by recognising the importance of the social partners and their autonomy in 
article I-47 of the European Constitution, inserted in the title on the democratic 
life of the Union. The main idea is inspired by the governance debate, as briefly 
mentioned in section 3.1.2 above.226 As is known, the European Constitution 
is not ratified by France and the Netherlands due to the “no” votes of their 
citizens. during the meeting of the European Council of 21 and 22 june 2007, 
it became clear that the European Constitution will not be ratified anymore.227 
That, however, does not affect the fact that the Community institutions and 
the Member States wished to award an important role to the European social 
partners with regard to the democracy of the Union. Furthermore, it makes 
apparent that the European social partners’ autonomy is fully recognised at 
EU level. 
But also the Treaty of Lisbon emphasises the importance of the European 
social partners. Article 10 of the amended Treaty on European Union repeats 
the above-mentioned principle of representative democracy, while article 11 
does the same with regard to the principle of participatory democracy. An 
equivalent of article I-47 of the European Constitution is, however, lacking 
from the Treaty of Lisbon. That is not to say that the importance of the 
European social partners has diminished, as article 152 of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union makes clear: “The Union recognises 
and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, taking into account 
the diversity of national systems. It shall facilitate dialogue between the 
social partners, respecting their autonomy. The Tripartite Social Summit for 
226  S. Smismans, New governance – The solution for active European citizenship, or the 
end of citizenship?, page 10.
227  Presidency Conclusions to the Brussels European Council 21/22 june 2007, 
11177/07, page 15. 
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Growth and Employment shall contribute to social dialogue.” Although it 
is not certain that the Treaty of Lisbon will be ratified, as set out in chapter 
2, section 2, the continuing importance of the European social partners is 
clearly recognised in this Treaty. The same applies to the European social 
partners’ autonomy.
8. Summary
The social partners used to play a very modest role at European level. Only 
since the mid nineteen eighties their role gradually enhanced. The 1985 Val 
duchesse meeting kicked-off the European social dialogue. From there, it 
further developed. An important part of this development was the 1991 joint 
Agreement between UNICE, ETUC and CEEP, which laid the foundation 
for the 1992 Protocol on Social Policy drafted at the Maastricht European 
Summit. This Protocol stipulated that the social partners were to be consulted 
prior to the Commission submitting legislative proposals in the field of social 
policy. At the social partners’ discretion, they could initiate negotiations in 
order to reach an agreement on the issue at hand, which could subsequently 
either be implemented autonomously or by a Council decision. This Protocol 
was incorporated in the EC Treaty at the Amsterdam European Summit in 
1997.
Since 2000, both the challenges for and the role of the social partners within 
the EU have changed significantly. 
At the year 2000 Lisbon European Summit, a new European strategy (the 
Lisbon Strategy) was set out. The Lisbon Strategy is a commitment to bring 
about economic, social and environmental renewal in the EU. The European 
Council drafted a ten-year strategy to make the EU the world’s most dynamic 
and competitive economy. The social partners are to play an important 
role in this strategy, assisting the EU in reaching the goals set at the Lisbon 
Summit.
In 2001 the White Paper on European Governance was published. In this 
White Paper, the Commission noted that on the one hand Europeans feel 
alienated from the Union’s work, while on the other hand they still expect 
European-wide action in many domains. The Commission consequently 
decided to reform European governance and aimed to open up policy-making 
to make it more inclusive and accountable. One of the methods to achieve this 
is to better use different policy tools, including the European social dialogue.
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Furthermore, as from the beginning of 2000, the European Union was on the 
brink of enlargement. The social partners were to play an important role in 
this process. They needed to “smoothen” the enlargement, mainly by assisting 
the social partners in the then (in 2000) candidate countries. That role would 
remain relevant even after the accession of said countries.
In the meantime the industrial relations’ role and problems changed, as 
Europe faced new challenges: globalisation, economic and monetary union, 
technological change and the transition to a knowledge based economy, 
changing employment and labour markets, demographic change and new 
balances between family, work and education.
These developments came together in the 2002 report of the high Level Group 
on Industrial Relations and Change in the European Union. In that report it 
was argued that industrial relations (which include the social partners) can 
make an important contribution to good governance and push forward the 
Lisbon Strategy. The industrial relations were also to play a relevant role in the 
enlargement process and in dealing with the above-mentioned new challenges. 
This was subsequently affirmed and further emphasised by the Commission 
in its important 2002 Communication “the European social dialogue, a force 
for innovation and change”. The Commission hailed the social dialogue as 
the driving force behind successful economic and social reforms. 
In the light of these changes, the cross-industry European social partners 
(ETUC, UNICE/UAPME and CEEP) announced in their december 2001 
Laeken declaration that they intend to reposition their role. They deemed 
it necessary to reaffirm (i) the specific role of the social partners, (ii) the 
distinction between bipartite social dialogue and tripartite concertation, (iii) 
the need to articulate tripartite concertation around the different aspects of 
the Lisbon strategy, and (iv) their wish to develop a work programme for a 
more autonomous social dialogue.
This “repositioning” has been welcomed by the high Level Group and the 
Commission. Both wish to further strengthen the position of the European 
social partners. The 2002 report of the high Level Group, the 2002 Commission 
Communication “the European social dialogue, a force for innovation and 
change” and the 2004 Commission Communication “Partnership for change 
in an enlarged Europe – Enhancing the contribution of European social 
dialogue” all propose measures to enhance the European social partners’ 
position. The importance of the European social partners is subsequently 
clearly confirmed in the recent European Constitution and the Treaty of 
Lisbon.
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ChAPTER 4
ThE EUROPEANISATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
ANd EUROPEAN AGREEMENTS REAChEd
1. Introduction
As set out above, the social partners face altered challenges, and have 
announced the intention to reposition their role in the joint contribution at 
the Laeken Summit in december 2001. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
social partners feel that they should reposition, they were not completely 
inactive in the past either. They have concluded multiple joint statements, 
joint declarations and also agreements. hereafter, some of these achievements 
in the international field will be summarised. 
Section 3 discusses transnational collective labour agreements concluded at 
company-level. After that, the results of the European social dialogue will be 
set out. Since there is a rather clear distinction between sectoral and cross-
industry bargaining and negotiations in the European social dialogue, the 
achievements at both levels will be discussed separately in sections 4 and 5 
respectively. Section 6 gives some brief  comments on the results achieved in 
transnational collective bargaining and negotiations, also in the light of the 
repositioning of the European cross-industry social partners. however, prior 
to discussing these achievements having a transnational effect, section 2 gives 
an overview of the “Europeanisation of collective bargaining” at national 
level. In this section examples will be given of the influence of the European 
integration on all parties involved when fixing purely national employment 
conditions collectively. Section 7 summarises this chapter. 
2. The Europeanisation of national collective bargaining
It would be a misconception to assume that the “Europeanisation of collective 
bargaining” is solely achieved by the European social dialogue and its actors, 
the European (cross-industry and sectoral) social partners and European 
institutions, most notably the Commission. On the contrary, national 
collective bargaining and negotiations also lead to the Europeanisation of 
collective bargaining, involving many more actors than the above-mentioned. 
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Important aspects leading to the Europeanisation of national collective 
bargaining and negotiations are European legislation, such as the criteria on 
the European Monetary Union (“EMU”), and European integration, causing 
country borders to open up and resulting in transnational coordination. 
Europeanisation of national collective bargaining and negotiations take place 
at many levels. At least the following levels should be distinguished: (i) country 
level, (ii) inter-regional level, (iii) company level, (iv) European sectoral level 
and (v) European cross-industry level. All these levels will briefly be discussed 
hereafter.228
2.1 Examples of Europeanisation of national 
collective bargaining at country level
At country level, several tripartite “social pacts” have created new constraints 
for collective bargaining in order to contribute to the country’s effort to fulfil 
the criteria for EMU and/or to improve national competitiveness within the 
Single European Market.229 Four examples of tripartite social pacts aimed at 
enhancing competitiveness and at meeting the EMU criteria are presented in 
the table below.230
Ireland The national agreement, Partnership 2000 (1997–2000), makes an 
explicit reference to the Maastricht criteria and EMU. Among other 
matters, the agreement specifies maximum limits for wage increases 
in the private and public sectors, with the express aim of improving 
competitiveness and fulfilling the EMU convergence criteria.
228  This section merely gives a brief  overview of the Europeanisation of collective 
bargaining. For a more complete overview reference is made to: T. Schulten, 
Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining, An overview on Trade Union Initiatives 
for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, WSI discussion 
Paper No. 101, May 2002, as published on www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_wsi_diskp_101.
pdf and to E. Mermet and P. Clarke, The coordination of collective bargaining in 
Europe, annual report 2002, European Trade Union Institute, Brussels, 2003.
229  Reference is made to the EIRO research of 1999 from P. Marginson and T. 
Schulten, The Europeanisation of collective bargaining, 28 july 1999, page 2. See 
also C. Welz and T. Kauppinen, The Role of Social Dialogue in the Acceding 
Countries during the Preparatory Phase for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
pages 583 ff.
230  These examples derive from: P. Marginson and T. Schulten, The Europeanisation of 
collective bargaining, page 2 and 3.
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Italy The december 1998 tripartite Social pact for development and em-
ployment paid particular attention to the consequences of EMU for 
economic policy choices and industrial relations. In an explicit refer-
ence to conditions in other European economies, the pact stipulates 
that the reference point for future national sector-level negotiations 
should not be the national, but the average European, inflation 
rate.
Portugal The tripartite Strategic concertation pact of  december 1996 “has as 
its goal the full integration of Portugal in the building of Europe, 
through improving competitiveness and promoting employment 
and social cohesion”. The pact includes wage guidelines. The social 
pact was seen as an important factor in helping Portugal to become 
a member of EMU.
Norway The tripartite Social Pact covering the 1993-1997 period attempting 
to improve national competitiveness, stating that the wages should 
grow at a rate approximately 2% below that of Norway’s main com-
petitors.
however, probably the most far-reaching Member State’s attempt to improve 
its own competitiveness in the light of European integration is the 1996 
Belgian Act on Employment Promotion and the Preventive Safeguarding of 
Competitiveness.231 Pursuant to this Act, the Belgian social partners must 
take into account the forecast rise in wages in Belgium’s three main trade 
partners – Germany, France and the Netherlands – when negotiating on the 
maximum possible wage increase over the subsequent two years. Should the 
social partners fail to agree on such a maximum, the government takes over 
and fixes such a maximum itself.
Considering the above, the Member States involved can – with or without the 
social partners’ assistance – have a significant influence on the Europeanisation 
of collective bargaining, either through the conclusion of tripartite Social 
Pacts, or through state legislation.
231  Wet tot bevordering van de werkgelegenheid en tot preventieve vrijwaring van het 
concurrentievermogen, published on 1 August 1996, file number 1996-07-26/32.
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2.2 Examples of Europeanisation of national collective 
bargaining at inter-regional level
Since the late-1990’s, trade unions have started to strengthen cross-border 
trade union cooperation in the field of bargaining policy.232 The importance 
of this was already observed by the Commission in its 1996 communication 
concerning the development of the Social dialogue at Community level. The 
Commission noted a growing need to assist the development of “new levels 
of dialogue”.233 Such new levels include the social dialogue at regional level, 
“particularly in cross-border regions where the Internal Market and other EU 
policies are having a significant effect”.234 This observation has been further 
emphasised in the Commission’s 1998 Communication, in which it argued 
that there is a growing cross-border social dialogue at regional level ”both 
in relation to employment and the implementation of directives on working 
conditions”.235 
The most well-known inter-regional group that focuses on cross-border 
negotiation is the so-called “doorn Group”, named after the dutch town 
doorn where its first official meeting took place.236 It is established by trade 
unions from the Benelux Countries and Germany, but later on unions from 
France joined as well. The initiative originated from the Belgian trade unions 
and dates from 1996, the year in which they were confronted with the above-
mentioned Act on Employment Promotion and the Preventive Safeguarding 
of Competitiveness. Considering this Act, the Belgian trade unions had a 
particular interest in cooperating with unions in neighbouring countries.237
On 4 and 5 September 1998 the leaders of trade unions of said countries 
(all major confederations were represented) met in order to discuss collective 
232  T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining, An overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, page 5.
233  COM (1996) 448, page 16.
234  COM (1996) 448, page 16.
235  COM (1998) 322, page 18.
236  R. Blanpain, European Labour law, page 567.
237  EIRO publication from T. Schulten, Unions in Benelux and Germany favour close 
transnational coordination of bargaining policy in EMU, 28 October 1998, page 1.
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bargaining trends and the possible impact of the EMU.238 In their declaration 
dated 5 September 1998, they noted the following:239
The economic growth of recent years has produced too few results for workers 
in terms of more jobs, the reduction of unemployment and the improvement of 
purchasing power. In the participating countries – and in Europe as a whole – the 
rise in labour productivity has been to the unilateral benefit of capital. Employees’ 
share of the national income (the wage quota) has gone down. A continuation 
of this trend in the macroeconomic distribution of income is unjustifiable. The 
participating trade union organisations call for a change of trend, to the benefit of 
workers and their full participation in economic growth in the form of more jobs 
and improved purchasing power:
a) The participating trade unions aim to achieve collective bargaining settlements 
that correspond to the sum total of the evolution of prices and the increase in 
labour productivity.
b) The participating trade unions aim to achieve both the strengthening of mass 
purchasing power and employment-creating measures (e.g. shorter work 
times).
c) The participating organisations will regularly inform and consult each other 
on developments in bargaining policy.
The trade unions of the four countries intend to examine how they can back up 
their demands beyond national frontiers when necessary.
By attuning their wage policies, the participating organisations aim principally to 
prevent a bidding down of collectively bargained incomes between the participating 
countries, as sought by the employers. The trade unions see this neighbourly 
initiative as a step towards European cooperation on collective bargaining.
The participating trade union organisations have decided to keep each other 
intensively informed about their collective bargaining demands and results. To 
this end, a coordinating group of experts has been established, which is meeting 
regularly to exchange information and experience on collective bargaining. This 
working group also serves as a forum for information exchanges between the 
participating organisations on initiatives vis-à-vis their governments and on state 
measures that impact on bargaining policy.
238  T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining, An overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, page 6.
239  Reference is made to the doorn declaration, as published in the dutch language on 
www.icem.org/update/upd1998/doornnl.html, and is (partially) translated on www.
icem.org/update/upd1998/upd98-73.html.
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The doorn initiative can be seen as “a genuine pioneering step towards an 
Europeanisation of collective bargaining”,240 as it was the first time that 
unions had determined a joint cross-border bargaining guideline for their 
national bargaining policy.241 Through annual two-day meetings with top 
level representatives of the unions involved and more regular meetings by a 
small “coordinating group of experts”242 the doorn Group closely coordinates 
collective bargaining. The original focus of the doorn Group was very much 
on wage policy.243 This has somewhat changed over the years. At subsequent 
meetings topics included: safeguarding and creation of employment, working 
time and lifelong learning.244 
The doorn Group has considered its creation and its declaration as an 
important step towards European coordination on collective bargaining and 
had hoped that its initiative would have set an example for other countries in 
the EU.245 however, to date, the doorn initiative has remained rather unique 
and has found no real successors in other European regions.246 Nonetheless, 
there are other, though less extensive and less inclusive, examples of groups 
that have played their part in the Europeanisation of national collective 
bargaining at inter-regional level. One such example is the German 
Metalworkers’ Union IG Metall, which has launched an initiative for cross-
border collective bargaining networks at inter-regional level in 1997.247 Under 
this initiative, each IG Metall district organisation needed to develop a solid 
network of collective bargaining cooperation with the neighbouring countries 
Metalworkers’ Unions. This initiative has intensified in 1999, when the 
240  T. Schulten, Unions in Benelux and Germany favour close transnational coordination 
of bargaining policy in EMU, page 4.
241  T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining An overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, page 7.
242  T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining An overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, page 6.
243  T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining An overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, page 7.
244  EIRO publications from: T. Schulten, Unions makes positive assessment of 
transnational coordination of bargaining policy, 28 September 1999, page 1; T. 
Schulten, Doorn Group holds fourth annual meeting, 28 September 2000, page 3; and 
T. Schulten, Doorn Group holds fifth annual meeting, 26 October 2001, page 2.
245  T. Schulten, Unions in Benelux and Germany favour close transnational coordination 
of bargaining policy in EMU, page 3.
246  T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining An overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, page 8.
247  T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining An overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, page 8.
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close cooperation led to joint planning of collective bargaining. The unions 
participating in this network have developed the following:248
•	 a	mutual	exchange	of	trade	union	observers	during	collective	bargaining	
rounds, including mutual participation in trade union collective bargai-
ning committees, negotiations with the employers and industrial action;
•	 the	development	of	a	common	day-to-day	information	system	on	col-
lective bargaining issues;
•	 common	training	seminars	on	the	system	of	collective	bargaining	and	
trade unions collective bargaining policy;
•	 common	working	groups	on	different	collective	bargaining	issues;
•	 mutual recognition of trade union membership.
Initiatives like the ones in the metalwork industry have also been undertaken 
in other sectors, such as the construction,249 chemical250 and banking sector.251 
All in all, one must conclude that Europeanisation of collective bargaining at 
inter-regional level is a fact.
2.3 Examples of Europeanisation of national 
collective bargaining at company-level
In its 1996 Communication, the Commission observed an increasing need to 
assist, among other things, the social dialogue in the “growing transnational 
industries”.252 In its 1998 Communication, the Commission noticed “a fast-
developing social dialogue within multinational companies”.253 This appeared 
from the fact that the social partners in the companies concerned concluded 
over 400 agreements in the era between the adoption of the directive on the 
establishment of a European Works Council and its coming into force.254
Notwithstanding this development, there are only a few national collective 
agreements within multinationals that explicitly take into account the 
248  T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining An overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, page 9.
249  T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining An overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, page 10; 
and P. Marginson and T. Schulten, The Europeanisation of collective bargaining, 
page 9.
250  P. Marginson and T. Schulten, The Europeanisation of collective bargaining, page 9.
251  P. Marginson and T. Schulten, The Europeanisation of collective bargaining, page 8.
252  COM (1996) 448, page 16.
253  COM (1998) 322, page 17.
254  COM (1998) 322, page 17.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 4
108
(economic) conditions of other European countries. One of the most explicit 
references is probably the 1997 company-level agreement of British Vauxhall, 
in which pay is being linked to the movement of economic indicators in 
other European countries. due to the management concern of the impact 
on production costs of the pound sterling continuing to trade at a high rate 
of exchange, part of the pay rise in the third and last year following the 
conclusion of the company-level agreement is contingent on sterling falling 
below a specified level against deutsche Mark.255
What occurs more often is a form of “tied” bargaining within European 
multinationals. Although the negotiations are performed at local or national 
enterprise level, the reference points utilised by management in negotiations 
are European or wider.256 Most multinationals collect data on labour-related 
aspects of performance, relating to the different countries in which they operate, 
such as overall labour costs, headcount, labour productivity, labour turnover 
and absenteeism, pay settlements and incidence of industrial disputes.257 This 
data can be used in bargaining at local and national enterprise level over 
working and employment practices in the context of ongoing (actual and 
potential) decisions on investments, relocation of production and divestment 
or closure.258 Changes in working practices and conditions are traded against 
securing either future investments or current production for the site involved. 
In the table below examples of multinationals’ management utilisation of 
cross-border comparisons are set out:259
255  P. Marginson and T. Schulten, The Europeanisation of collective bargaining, page 9.
256  P. Marginson and T. Schulten, The Europeanisation of collective bargaining, page 9.
257  P. Marginson and T. Schulten, The Europeanisation of collective bargaining, page 
10.
258  P. Marginson and T. Schulten, The Europeanisation of collective bargaining, page 
10.
259  This table derives from: P. Marginson and T. Schulten, The Europeanisation of 
collective bargaining, page 10, 11 and 12.
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Company/sector Use of comparisons
Automotive Press reports and research studies suggest that “coercive com-
parisons” are regularly used by the large automotive manu-
facturing multinational companies operating in two or more 
EEA countries – including BMW/Rover, Ford, General Mo-
tors, Peugeot, Renault and Volkswagen – in local negotia-
tions aimed at securing productivity-enhancing concessions in 
working and employment practices in return for commitment 
to future investment in local operations.
Finnish forest  
products
The forest product multinational companies headquartered in 
Finland make frequent reference to the performance of their 
business units in other European countries – in terms of head-
count, productivity and working time – in plant-level negotia-
tions around production reorganisation. 
Food industry A study of the Greek, Spanish and UK operations of the Eu-
ropean food business of a leading multinational found that 
a key dimension of the competition between plants in differ-
ent countries for allocations of production for particular lines 
was, in terms of measures, introduced via local negotiations to 
increase the flexibility of employment and working. 
Swatch, Toyota, 
hoover
In recent years, decisions by Swatch to locate in Lorraine and 
Toyota in the north of France, and by hoover to relocate part 
of its production from France to Scotland, have been support-
ed by extensively publicised international comparative data on 
productivity levels, wage levels and flexibility.
UK engineering, 
printing and retail
Findings from a panel survey over five years of (national and 
multinational) companies in the UK engineering, printing and 
retail sectors, indicate that international “benchmarking” of 
employee performance is reasonably common in engineering, 
but unusual in printing, and rare in retail. It is suggested that 
changes in numbers employed and in work organisation, se-
cured through parallel negotiations over working and employ-
ment practices, are the means by which management bring 
overall labour costs into line with those of international com-
petitors in the sector.
But, unlike the above-mentioned might suggest, comparing group companies’ 
data is not exclusively an employer’s activity. Employees of the Czech car 
manufacturer Skoda, for instance, went on strike in April 2007 after their 
demand of a wage increase of 12% was denied. The reason of this firm pay 
demand was that Skoda employees would like to see their wages move towards 
those of their German colleagues assembling cars for parent company 
Volkswagen. The union head of Skoda expressed the opinion that the work of 
the Czech employees was just as good as the work of the German employees, 
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 4
110
for which reason the salaries should be in line as well. The strike turned out 
effective, as Skoda had to agree on a 12.7% pay rise until the end of 2008.260
The above sufficiently shows that Europeanisation of national collective 
bargaining also occurs within multinationals situated in Europe.
2.4 Examples of Europeanisation of national collective 
bargaining at European sectoral level
Particularly since 1997, there have been various initiatives taken by European 
sectoral social partners aimed at a more explicit European coordination of 
national bargaining.261 These initiatives almost exclusively originated from 
trade unions; very few European sectoral employers’ organisations have 
systematically developed European coordination.262
One of the few European sectoral employers’ organisations that did attempt to 
coordinate national collective bargaining from a European perspective is the 
Western European Metal Trades Employers’ Organisation. This organisation 
produces a monthly newsletter on “international social policy developments”, 
which includes information on recent national developments in sectoral 
bargaining and international statistics comparing industrial relations trends 
in the European metalworking industry.263
The European sectoral trade unions in the metal industry have put quite a lot 
of effort in the Europeanisation of collective bargaining as well. The European 
Metalworkers’ Federation (“EMF”) has developed “the most advanced 
approach towards a European coordination of collective bargaining in terms 
of content and institutional practices”.264 The EMF strategy contains two core 
elements. First, it has developed a joint commitment to European guidelines 
for national collective bargaining, which is meant to prevent downward 
competition. Second, EMF has developed certain minimum standards which 
all EMF affiliates should feel obliged to bargain for.265
260  See the article: Eastern Europe Pricing Itself Out of Cheap Labor Market?, 18 April 
2007, as published on the website Spiegel Online.
261  P. Marginson and T. Schulten, The Europeanisation of collective bargaining, page 7. 
262  P. Marginson and T. Schulten, The Europeanisation of collective bargaining, page 6.
263  P. Marginson and T. Schulten, The Europeanisation of collective bargaining, page 6.
264  T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining. An overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, page 11.
265  T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining. An overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, page 11.
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But not only EMF has developed a policy with regard to the Europeanisation 
of collective bargaining at European sectoral level. Many other European 
Industry Federations have followed EMF’s example.266 To summarise, 
European sectoral social partners, and particularly European sectoral trade 
unions, have developed an extensive network and coordination aimed at the 
Europeanisation of collective bargaining of its national affiliates.
2.5 Examples of Europeanisation of national collective 
bargaining at European cross-industry level
Arguably, the best example of a cross-industry organisation that calls upon 
its affiliates to take into consideration European wide policies in their 
national collective bargaining is ETUC. This is, however, a relatively recent 
development. Only since the end of the 1990’s has ETUC’s attention been 
drawn to European coordination of wage claims. Two developments caused 
this attention. First, ETUC has been confronted with the doorn Group and 
the EMF initiative to coordinate collective bargaining, upon which this issue 
became more important within ETUC. Second, after the introduction of the 
EMU-criteria ETUC has been pressurised by European institutions to define 
its own position.267 As a result of this ETUC has, among others, stated in its 
resolution drafted at its 1999 congress that it will:268
•	 promote	 a	 strategy	 for	 coordinated	European	 collective	bargaining	 at	
sectoral and inter-sectoral level and the securitisation of a consistent ap-
proach via coordination within ETUC;
•	 establish	the	tools	and	procedures	needed	for	such	coordination,	inclu-
ding the creation of a committee for the coordination of collective bar-
gaining policies and through reordering work and refocusing activities.
Following this resolution, ETUC has indeed actively coordinated national 
cross-industry collective bargaining through the drafting of guidelines.269 
These guidelines include, for example, the following issues: (i) strengthening 
266  See the table as set out in: T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining An 
overview on Trade Union Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective 
Bargaining Policy, page 19.
267  T. Schulten, Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining An overview on Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy, page 21.
268  EIRO publication from T. Weber, Ninth ETUC Congress calls for a European 
system of industrial relations, 28 july 1999, page 5.
269  See for example the EIRO publication from A. Broughton, ETUC Executive 
Committee endorses guideline on collective bargaining coordination, 28 january 2001, 
page 1.
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the qualitative side of collective bargaining, in particular with regard to 
equal pay and precarious employment , (ii) coordination on working time, 
(iii) ensuring progress for all workers and the preservation of sectoral/multi-
employer bargaining systems, (iv) continuing the campaign for equal pay, and 
(v) contributing to the Lisbon agenda of the knowledge society.270 ETUC has 
called upon a strict follow-up of the coordination guidelines.271 ETUC even 
established so-called Interregional Trade Union Councils around borders 
with the main aim of establishing joint guidelines to avoid social and wage 
dumping.272 At the end of 2006, 42 of these Councils have been established.273 
ETUC does not solely want to coordinate national collective bargaining, but 
in the longer-term it even aims for Europeanisation of trade unions.274 From 
the above it can be derived that the Europeanisation of collective bargaining 
has also proved to be important for cross-industry European social partners.
3. Company-level transnational collective labour agreements 
Bargaining for transnational collective labour agreements can be witnessed at 
company-level.275 Two topics in particular attract the interest of multinational 
companies in this respect: corporate social responsibility and restructuring.276 
With regard to the first topic, a growing number of multinational companies is 
adopting codes of conduct establishing social rights and obligations for their 
employees. Where such codes used to be established unilaterally, today they 
are often the product of transnational bargaining.277 In case of transnational 
restructuring – such as a merger, spin-off, a joint venture, a plant closure or 
270  EIRO publication from B. harper, ETUC adopts resolution on coordination of 
collective bargaining, 1 june 2004, page 2.
271  Reference is made to the Resolution adopted by the ETUC executive Committee 
on the coordination of collective bargaining 2003/2004 and the participation of 
workers, dated 17-18 March 2004, page 2.
272  E. Mermet and P. Clarke, The coordination of collective bargaining in Europe, page 
42.
273  ETUC, Activity Report 2003 – 2006, published March 2007, page 65.
274  C. degryse, European social dialogue: a mixed picture, ETUI report, 1 February 
2000, page 8. 
275  d. Bé, A report on the European Commission initiative for a European framework for 
transnational collective bargaining, in: K. Papadakis, Cross-Border Social Dialogue 
and Agreements: An emerging global industrial relations framework?, International 
Labour Organisation, Geneva, 2008, page 223.
276  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 16.
277  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 21.
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another form of staff  reduction - multinational companies also increasingly 
rely upon transnational collective bargaining.278 
 
This development is in line with the general internationalisation of 
companies, which is in turn accommodated by European legislation. Both the 
aforementioned directive on the establishment of a European Works Council 
and the directive supplementing the Statute for a European company (SE) 
(which followed the Regulation on the Statute for a European company)279 
show the importance of multinational companies in Europe. These directives 
actually introduced a sort of transnational bargaining. After all, both 
directives empower a Special Negotiating Body to negotiate arrangements 
for the involvement of employees in the multinational company. That Special 
Negotiating Body is comprised of employees from different countries and 
the arrangements reached also have transnational effects, and can therefore 
be considered a form of “transnational collective bargaining”. But also after 
the employee representation body is established – which can be best seen with 
regard to the European Works Council, as that body has been around for 
some time now – it sometimes continues to bargain with the multinational 
company.280 
But more importantly for this thesis, as agreements concluded with employee 
representatives such as the Works Council are excluded from its scope,281 
multinational companies have also entered into collective bargaining with 
sectoral European trade unions on agreements that have international 
coverage. The first examples of framework agreements reached between 
these parties date back to the end of the 1980’s, but as from 2000 their 
number increased significantly. Up to and including 2005 approximately 
278  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 28.
279  Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a 
European company (SE), Oj L 294, 10 November 2001, pages 1 – 21.
280  An overview of results achieved between multinational companies and European 
Works Councils can be found in: E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. 
Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, 
Present and Future, page 23
281  Reference is made to chapter 1, section 2.2.
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35 framework agreements have been concluded.282 But also 2006 and 2007 
witnessed the conclusion of a number of transnational collective labour 
agreements at company-level. Examples are agreements concluded with the 
companies Schneider Electric, the Areva Group, PSA Peugeot Citroën and 
the Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung Media Group.283 Also notable are the 
international framework agreements concluded between the Suez Group on 
the one hand and the European Works Council Committee, French trade 
unions and ETUC on the other.284 These agreements relate to topics that 
are normally dealt with nationally, including profit-sharing, job and skill 
requirements and equality and diversity.
On occasion, as also appears from the aforementioned example involving the 
Suez Group, not only the multinational company and a sectoral European 
trade union execute the transnational collective labour agreement, but 
national trade unions as well. This has, according to the Report, been the 
case in at least 8 transnational collective labour agreements.285 In such cases, 
the transnational collective agreement is transposed into national collective 
282  An overview of results achieved between multinational companies and European 
sectoral trade unions can be found in: E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, 
S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: 
Past, Present and Future, pages 24 ff. A word of caution is in place though. 
According to the Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, these 
framework agreements cannot be considered collective labour agreements with 
clearly defined obligations but rather “an expression of common principles and/or 
objectives for a shared corporate culture”. See Bundesvereinigung der deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbände, Position on discussions on an optional European framework 
for transnational collective bargaining, Berlin, 6 November 2006, page 9, available at 
www.bda-online.de/www/bdaonline.nsf/id/48F1932d682E09E6C125728F005dAd
69/$file/Stn-engl.pdf.
283  Reference is made to the following EIRO publications: M. Whittall, Schneider 
Electric and European Metalworkers’ Federation sign agreement in anticipating 
change, 24 September 2007; V. Telljohann, European Framework agreement on equal 
opportunities signed at Areva, 5 February 2007; V. Telljohann, Global framework 
agreement signed at PSA Peugeot Citroën, 28 june 2006; and V. Telljohann and 
M. Tapia, Landmark international framework agreement signed in media sector, 19 
November 2007.
284  Reference is made to the EIRO publication from V. Telljohann and M. Tapia, Suez 
Group signs three international framework agreements, 9 October 2007.
285  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 27. The 
Report did not take into account the agreements concluded with the Suez Group, 
so the actual number exceeds 8.
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agreements and submitted to the legislation of the countries in which the 
agreement has to take force.286
The above-mentioned development, that is the increasing number of 
transnational collective agreements concluded at enterprise level in recent 
years, is not strictly limited to Europe. A study of the International Labour 
Organisation established that at the end of the year 2007 62 international 
framework agreements were concluded on a global level. International 
framework agreements are negotiated instruments between multinational 
enterprises and global union federations, being international federations of 
national unions by sector of activity.287 Although this number of 62 may be 
small compared with the number of unilateral codes of conducts adopted 
by multinational enterprises, the pace at which the international framework 
agreements have spread in recent years is notable. In the period 1988 to 
2002 only 23 international framework agreements were concluded, the other 
agreements were signed in the years that followed. If, instead of merely 
focusing on agreements signed by a global union federation on labour’s 
side, one should look at all transnational agreements concluded between a 
multinational enterprise and an employees’ organisation (including European 
Works Councils and European trade unions), the number of agreements 
concluded would amount to hundreds, most of them adopted in the last few 
years.288 
4. Bargaining in the European social dialogue at sectoral level
International collective bargaining and, in particular, transnational 
negotiations also occur at European sectoral level. In the 1998 Communication 
“Adapting and promoting the Social dialogue at Community level”, the 
Commission argued that “the sectoral level is a very important area for 
development both on general issues such as employment, industrial change 
286  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 27.
287  Although international framework agreements are concluded between a company 
on the one hand and a trade union on the other, these agreements cannot be 
considered “real” collective labour agreements, but rather “imperfect” collective 
labour agreements. K. Papadakis, G. Casale and K. Tsotroudi, International 
framework agreements as elements of a cross-border industrial relations framework, 
in: K. Papadakis, Cross-Border Social Dialogue and Agreements: An emerging 
global industrial relations framework?, International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 
2008, pages 67 – 87.
288  K. Papadakis, Introduction, in: K. Papadakis, Cross-Border Social Dialogue and 
Agreements: An emerging global industrial relations framework?, International 
Labour Organisation, Geneva, 2008, pages 2 and 3.
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and a new organization of work and on upcoming specific demands on the 
labour market.”289 The Commission therefore considered the development of 
negotiations at sectoral level “a key issue”.290 The Commission also noted that 
the sectoral potential for joint action and negotiation of agreements “is by no 
means used to the full”.291
For these reasons, the Commission established Sectoral Social dialogue 
Committees (SSd Committees) and thus confirmed the role and the 
representativeness of European employers’ and employees’ organisations.292 
The SSd Committees will, for the sector of activity for which they are 
established, (i) be consulted on developments on Community level having 
social implications and (ii) develop and promote the social dialogue at sectoral 
level.293 The SSd Committees are established on the joint request of the social 
partners294 representing both sides of the industry in the sector concerned.295 
The SSd Committees are bipartite committees and have a maximum of 40 
representatives in all, with an equal number of representatives on both sides 
of the industry.296 In general, the SSd Committees operate on the basis of 
mutual recognition and are mostly composed of one European trade union 
and one European employers’ organisation.297
The effort that the Commission has put in the further development of the 
sectoral social dialogue seems to have paid off. In the years following 1998, 
the SSd Committees have been very active.298 In its 2002 Communication “the 
289  COM (1998) 322, page 14.
290  COM (1998) 322, page 14.
291  COM (1998) 322, page 14.
292  Commission decision of 20 May 1998 on the establishment of Sectoral dialogue 
Committees promoting the dialogue between the social partners at European level, 
98/500/EC, Oj L 225, 12 August 1998, pages 27 and 28.
293  Article 2 of the Commission decision on the establishment of Sectoral dialogue 
Committees promoting the dialogue between the social partners at European level.
294  Exactly which parties qualify as social partners will be discussed in chapter 5, 
section 2.2.
295  Article 1 of the Commission decision on the establishment of Sectoral dialogue 
Committees promoting the dialogue between the social partners at European level.
296  Article 3 of the Commission decision on the establishment of Sectoral dialogue 
Committees promoting the dialogue between the social partners at European level.
297  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 11.
298  See, for instance, for the results that have been achieved in the sectoral social 
dialogue during the years 2000 and 2001 the EIRO publication from A. Broughton, 
Recent developments in sectoral social dialogue, 4 February 2002, pages 1 and 2.
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European social dialogue, a force for innovation and change”, the Commission 
noted that the sectoral social dialogue had grown and it wished “to continue 
its support for the flourishing European sectoral social dialogue and to 
promote the establishment of further committees so that all main branches 
are covered”.299 The Commission noted that the sectoral level is the “proper 
level for discussing on many issues linked to employment, working conditions, 
vocational training, industrial change, the knowledge society, demographic 
patterns, enlargement and globalisation”.300 In 2003 the directorate-General 
for Employment and Social Affairs of the Commission briefly set out the state 
of affairs in the sectoral dialogue in Europe, which at that moment consisted 
of 27301 sectoral social dialogue committees.302 The directorate-General noted 
that, since the establishment of the SSd Committees, the social partners 
involved concluded approximately 230 commitments of different types and 
scale, such as opinions and common positions, declarations, guidelines and 
codes of conduct, charters, agreements etc.303 Most of these commitments 
have been adopted to clarify the position of the social partners on a certain 
subject,304 but other commitments have been implemented by a Council 
decision on the basis of articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty.305
299  COM (2002) 341, page 16.
300  COM (2002) 341, page 16.
301  In the year 2004, 31 sectoral social dialogue committees have been established. 
Reference is made to annex 4 of the Commission Communication, Partnership 
for change in an enlarged Europe – Enhancing the contribution of European social 
dialogue, COM (2004), 557. In june 2007, 34 sectoral social dialogue committees 
are in place, and the social partners in three other sectors submitted applications to 
establish such a committee. Reference is made to: ec.europa.eu/employment_social/
social_dialogue/ sectoral_en.htm.
302  European Commission, directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 
The sectoral dialogue in Europe, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2003, pages 20 – 45. The manuscript was completed in december 
2002.
303  European Commission, directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 
The sectoral dialogue in Europe, page 10. For an up to date overview of all results 
achieved in the sectoral social dialogue reference is made to the special website on 
this topic: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social /social_dialogue/index_en.htm.
304  European Commission, directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 
The sectoral dialogue in Europe, page 10.
305  This applies, for example, to the sectoral agreements on (i) working time in sea 
transport (Council directive 1999/63/EC, Oj L 167, 2 july 1999, pages 33 – 37), (ii) 
civil aviation (Council directive 2000/79/EC, Oj L 302, 1 december 2000, pages 57 
– 60) and (iii) certain aspects of the working conditions of mobile workers assigned 
to interoperable cross-border services (Council directive 2005/47/EC, Oj L 195, 27 
july 2005, pages 15 – 17). Reference is made to COM (2004) 557, page 15.
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In the december 2002 report “the European Social dialogue: development, 
sectoral variation and prospects” the results of the European sectoral social 
dialogue were also analysed. This report was drafted by the Amsterdam 
Institute of Advanced Labour Studies at the request of the dutch Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment. The report noted that the results of the 
European sectoral social dialogue had increased dramatically from the 1980’s 
to the 1990’s.306 According to the report, the rapid increase in the 1990’s could 
be largely attributed to the increasing number of sectors involved with the 
European sectoral social dialogue. The report sets out that the number of 
sectors in which results have been achieved has increased from 1 in 1978 to 
28 in 2001.307 The report clearly distinguished between joint statements and 
framework agreements. joint statements are results reached without binding 
elements (and are therefore the result of negotiations) as opposed to framework 
agreements that are binding on the parties involved (and thus are the result of 
bargaining).308 The report analysed that the majority of results that have been 
achieved in the European sectoral social dialogue relate to joint statements 
(210) and that merely 10% (20) relate to framework agreements.309 
In 2006 the directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs of the 
Commission again conducted research on the development of the sectoral 
dialogue in Europe.310 According to this report, the sectoral social dialogue 
“produces outcomes of practical importance and makes a significant 
contribution to the governance of the EU as a whole”.311 It notes that the 
SSd Committees have developed actions that enable them to respond flexibly 
in respect of their own needs and their sectors’ interests. SSd Committees 
primarily seek action in three areas: (i) influencing their own members within 
the sector, (ii) ensuring that the sector’s views are heard beyond the confines of 
306  Which is especially easy to see in the table that can be found in: h. Benedictus, R. 
de Boer, M. van der Meer, W. Salverda, j. Visser and M. Zijl, Amsterdam Institute 
for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: development, sectoral 
variation and prospects, december 2002, page 47.
307  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
development, sectoral variation and prospects, page 47.
308  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
development, sectoral variation and prospects, page 17.
309  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
development, sectoral variation and prospects, page 48.
310  European Commission, directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 
Recent developments in the European Sectoral Social Dialogue, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2006. The manuscript was completed 
in december 2005.
311  European Commission, directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 
Recent developments in the European Sectoral Social Dialogue, page 5.
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the particular industry, and (iii) negotiating agreements for implementation.312 
The themes of interest of the SSd Committees mainly relate to:313
•	 Enlargement	of	 the	EU:	SSD	Committees	have	been	actively	engaged	
with the social partners of the acceding countries and have helped them 
to build their capacity to work effectively;
•	 Sector	restructuring:	SSD	Committees	have	responded	to	restructuring	
needs through policy development, joint opinions and ideas and action 
through seminars, conferences and training;
•	 Corporate	Social	Responsibility:	ideas	of	corporate	social	responsibility	
have been worked out in several sectors;
•	 Core	labour	standards:	an	important	element	in	corporate	social	respon-
sibility is the adoption of ILO core labour standards, such as freedom of 
association, the right to collective bargaining, and bans on forced and 
child labour and freedom from discrimination;
•	 Training	and	lifelong	learning:	many	SSD	Committees	have	focused	on	
training, lifelong learning and disseminating best practices;
•	 Equal	opportunities:	SSD	Committees	have	remained	active	in	the	field	
of equal opportunities; and
•	 Health	and	safety:	SSD	Committees	have	been	concerned	that	general	
policies on health and safety are shaped to the needs of their particular 
industries and have acted on that in several sectors.
In his research, Pochet observes that the productivity (number of texts 
adopted) per sector varies considerably.314 With regard to the number of 
documents adopted each year, there is no clear trend. The maximum number 
appears in the years 2000 and 2004 (40 documents). Furthermore, there is no 
visible trend towards the adoption of more binding texts. In fact, according 
to Pochet, fewer than 2% of the texts adopted at sectoral level are agreements 
with binding effects.315 
The above sets out general activities and developments in the European 
sectoral social dialogue. Some of the most notable achievements in this 
dialogue will be discussed below.
312  European Commission, directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 
Recent developments in the European Sectoral Social Dialogue, page 6.
313  European Commission, directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 
Recent developments in the European Sectoral Social Dialogue, pages 7 – 9.
314  P. Pochet, European social dialogue between hard and soft law, Paper prepared for 
the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 2007, 
page 8.
315  P. Pochet, European social dialogue between hard and soft law, page 15.
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The sector “agriculture” played a pioneering role in the European sectoral 
social dialogue. The first joint commission was established in 1974 and 
three agreements have been signed between 1978 and 1980.316 The social 
partners involved were also responsible for the first “breakthrough” sectoral 
collective agreement that was concluded in 1997, the recommendation 
framework agreement on paid employment in agriculture.317 For the first 
time, a European level voluntary agreement had been concluded that set 
out all essential elements of an employment relation, such as not to exceed 
weekly working hours, daily rest periods, maximum duration of night shifts 
and paid leave.318 After this agreement, the social partners concluded a White 
Paper on vocational training in 2000 and an agreement on the elimination of 
restrictions on access to labour markets in the EU in 2002.319 Also in 2002 the 
social partners entered into a European agreement on vocational training in 
agriculture, to be followed by the 2004 joint declaration “health and Safety 
in Agriculture – Best practices and Proposals for Action”, the 2005 European 
agreement on the reduction of workers’ exposure to the risk of work-related 
musculo-skeletal disorders in agriculture and finally the 2005 joint declaration 
on health and safety.320 
The European level social partners in the civil aviation sector have concluded 
an agreement on the organisation of working time in March 2000. The 
agreement is applicable to the mobile staff  in civil aviation and contains 
stipulations concerning annual leave of 4 weeks, free health assessments, a 
maximum annual working time limit, a maximum “block flight time” and 
minimum rest requirements.321 This agreement has been implemented by a 
Council directive on 27 November 2000.322 
The Telecommunication sector has been the most productive sector in terms 
of the number of results attained. The social partners in this sector are, up 
316  European Commission, directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 
The sectoral dialogue in Europe, page 20.
317  EIRO publication from T. Weber, Framework agreement in agriculture: a milestone 
in the European sectoral social dialogue, 28 September 1997.
318  T. Weber, Framework agreement in agriculture: a milestone in the European sectoral 
social dialogue, page 3.
319  European Commission, directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 
The sectoral dialogue in Europe, page 20.
320  European Commission, directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 
Recent developments in the European Sectoral Social Dialogue, page 12.
321  EIRO publication from A. Broughton, Civil aviation social partners conclude 
working time accord, 28 April 2000.
322  Council directive 2000/79/EC, Oj L 302, 1 december 2000, pages 57 – 60.
THE EUROPEANISATION Of COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND EUROPEAN AGREEMENTS REACHED
121
to the end of 2002,323 responsible for 30 joint statements and 2 framework 
agreements.324 The joint statements mainly concern opinions of the social 
partners on certain developments in the EU, mostly attempting to influence the 
European decision-making process. The first framework agreement basically 
established the social dialogue in this sector, while the second framework 
agreement relates to telework. This agreement entails a number of rights and 
duties for both employers and employees with respect to teleworking.325 
5. Bargaining in the European social 
dialogue at cross-industry level
According to the aforementioned report “the European Social dialogue: 
development, sectoral variation and prospects”, between 1986 and August 2002 
the social partners at cross-industry level (UNICE (BUSINESSEUROPE), 
CEEP, ETUC and UEAPME) issued a joint statement or entered into a 
framework agreement 40 times.326 Also in this case, the joint statements heavily 
outnumber the framework agreements. The cross-industry social partners 
entered into 36 joint opinions, the first being the so-called 1986 “joint opinion 
on the community’s cooperative growth strategy for more employment”.327 
According to some, the first couple of joint statements were merely intended 
to show that the European social partners were able to draft joint opinions on 
complex issues.328 Two important subjects on which joint statements have been 
issued are training and the future of the European social dialogue itself. The 
cross-industry social partners have, at the moment of drafting of the above-
mentioned report, concluded 10 joint statements on training and education 
323  For more recent development in this sector reference is made to: European 
Commission, directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, Recent 
developments in the European Sectoral Social Dialogue, pages 83 - 85.
324  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
development, sectoral variation and prospects, page 53.
325  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
development, sectoral variation and prospects, page 50.
326  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
development, sectoral variation and prospects, page 32.
327  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
development, sectoral variation and prospects, page 32.
328  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
development, sectoral variation and prospects, page 32.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 4
122
and 6 on the European social dialogue.329 A recent joint analysis focuses 
on how to deal with challenges confronting the European social partners, 
including globalisation, technological change and an ageing society.330 The 
results of this joint analysis will guide and influence future initiatives of the 
cross-industry European social partners.331 Besides issuing joint statements, 
the cross-industry European social partners entered into agreements as well. 
To date,332 they entered into 6 framework agreements. These agreements 
have been either implemented by a Council decision by means of a directive 
(the first three), or by the social partners themselves in accordance with the 
procedures and practices specific to management and labour and to the 
Member States (the last three). The agreements will be introduced in the 
following paragraphs.
5.1 Framework agreement on parental leave 
Through 1983 and 1984, the Council failed to act on the proposal for 
a directive on parental leave for family reasons.333 For that reason, the 
Commission consulted the social partners twice on the possible direction of 
Community action relating to reconciling working and family life. After this 
second consultation, the organisations UNICE, CEEP and UTUC informed 
the Commission of their desire to conclude a framework agreement on 
said subject matter. On 14 december 1995 they concluded the framework 
agreement on parental leave. The framework agreement was implemented by 
the directive of 3 june 1996.334
The framework agreement sets out minimum requirements on parental 
leave and time off  from work due to force majeure, as an important means 
329  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
development, sectoral variation and prospects, pages 33 and 34. For an up to date 
overview of all results achieved in the cross-industry social dialogue reference is 
made to the special website on this topic: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social /
social_dialogue/index_en.htm.
330  ETUC/CES, BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP, Key challenges facing 
European labour markets: a joint analysis of European social partners, October 2007.
331  ETUI-REhS, Benchmarking Working Europe 2007, page 116. 
332  That is june 2008.
333  Reference is made to the proposal for a Council directive on parental leave for 
family reasons as published in Oj C 33, 9 december 1983, page 6 as amended on 
15 November 1984 (Oj C 316, 27 November 1984, page 7). Reference is also made 
to recital 4 of the Council directive on the framework agreement on parental leave 
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, Council directive 96/34/EC, Oj L 
145, 19 june 1996, pages 4 – 9.
334  Council directive 96/34/EC, Oj L 145, 19 june 1996, pages 4 – 9.
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of reconciling work and family life and promoting equal opportunities and 
treatment of men and women. The agreement applies to all workers – men and 
women – who have an employment contract or employment relationship as 
defined by the law, collective agreements or practices in force in each Member 
State. Pursuant to article 2.1 of the framework agreement, men and women 
workers have a right to parental leave on grounds of the birth or adoption 
of a child to enable them to take care of that child, for at least three months, 
until a given age of up to 8 years. The Member States and/or social partners 
are to ensure that the employees can exercise this right and are protected from 
dismissal connected to taking parental leave (article 2.4). Rights acquired or 
in the process of being acquired by the employee on the date parental leave 
starts are maintained as they stand until the end of the parental leave (article 
2.6). The employee should, as a rule, return to the same position after he or 
she has taken parental leave (article 2.5). Moreover, Member States and/or 
the social partners must take all necessary measures to entitle employees to 
time off  from work on grounds of force majeure for urgent family reasons 
or sickness or accident making his or her immediate presence indispensable 
(article 3.1). Notwithstanding the framework agreement, Member States 
are free to apply for more favourable provisions than those set out in the 
framework agreement.
5.2 Framework agreement on part-time work
during the Essen European Summit, the European Council had stressed 
the importance of a more flexible organisation of work. The Commission 
consulted the social partners twice on the possible direction of Community 
action with regard to flexible working time and job security, in order for the 
social partners UNICE, CEEP and ETUC to announce their desire to agree on 
a framework agreement relating to part-time work. The Social Partners came 
to an agreement on said matter on 6 june 1997. The framework agreement 
was implemented by the directive of 15 december 1997.335
The framework agreement sets out the general principles and minimum 
requirements relating to part-time work. Its purpose is (i) to provide for the 
removal of discrimination against part-time workers and to improve the 
quality of part-time work and (ii) to facilitate the development of part-time 
work on a voluntary basis and to contribute to the flexible organisation of 
working time in a manner which takes into account the needs of employers 
and workers (article 1). The agreement applies to part-time workers who have 
an employment contract or an employment relationship in a Member State. 
335  Council directive 97/81/EC, Oj L 14, 20 january 1998, pages 9 – 14.
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A “part-time worker” is an employee whose normal hours of work are less 
than the normal hours of work of a comparable full-time worker (article 
3.1).
With regard to employment conditions, part-time workers shall not be treated 
in a less favourable manner than comparable full-time workers solely because 
they work part-time, unless different treatment is objectively justifiable (article 
4.1). Both the Member States and the social partners should identify and 
review obstacles which may limit opportunities for part-time work and, where 
appropriate, eliminate them (article 5.1). Employers should give consideration 
to an employee’s request for transferring from full-time to part-time work and 
vice versa. Employers should also inform employees on the availability of part-
time and full-time positions, facilitate access to part-time work and inform 
workers’ representative bodies about part-time working in the enterprise 
(article 5.3). Member States and/or social partners may maintain or introduce 
more favourable provisions than set out in the Framework Agreement (article 
6.1).
5.3 Framework agreement on fixed-term work
In its resolution of 9 February 1999 on the 1999 Employment Guidelines, the 
Council invited the social partners to negotiate agreements to modernise the 
organisation of work, including flexible working arrangements. Subsequently, 
the Commission consulted the social partners on the possible direction of 
Community action concerning flexible working time and job security. UNICE, 
CEEP and ETUC informed the Commission of their desire to enter into 
an agreement regarding fixed-term work. This agreement – the framework 
agreement on fixed-term work – was concluded on 18 March 1999. The 
agreement has been put into effect by the directive of 28 june 1999.336
Said agreement sets out the general principles and minimum requirements 
relating to fixed-term work. Its purpose is (i) to improve the quality of fixed-
term work by ensuring the application of the principle of non-discrimination 
and (ii) to establish a framework to prevent abuse arising from the use of 
successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships (article 1). The 
agreement applies to fixed-term workers, with the exception of employees 
placed by a temporary work agency at the disposition of a user enterprise. 
Member States are free to stipulate, after consulting the social partners, the 
exclusion of the framework agreement from – briefly put – employment 
agreements with a training/apprenticeship goal (preamble and article 2 
336  Council directive 1999/70/EC, Oj L 175, 10 july 1999, pages 43 – 48.
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of the framework agreement). A “fixed-term worker” is a person having 
an employment contract or relationship entered into directly between the 
employer and the worker where the end of the employment contract or 
relationship is determined by objective conditions such as reaching a specific 
date, completing a specific task, or the occurrence of a specific event (article 
3.1).
Pursuant to the framework agreement, fixed-term contracts should be the 
exception and contracts of an indefinite duration should be the rule (preamble). 
Moreover, fixed-term workers are not to be treated in a less favourable manner 
than permanent workers solely because they have a fixed-term contract, unless 
different treatment is justified on objective grounds (article 4.1). Abuse of 
fixed-term contracts should be prevented, by means of implementing one or 
more of the following measures in the Member States: (a) objective reasons 
justifying the renewal of such contracts or relationships, (b) the maximum 
total duration of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships 
and (c) the number of renewals of such contracts or relationships (article 
5.1). 
Fixed-term workers should be informed of possible vacancies in the 
undertaking and must be taken into consideration when calculating the 
threshold above which workers’ representative bodies, provided for in national 
and Community law, may be constituted in the undertaking as required by 
national provisions (articles 6.1 and 7.1). Obviously, Member States and/or the 
social partners are free to maintain or introduce more favourable provisions 
for workers than set out in the framework agreement (article 8.1).
5.4 Framework agreement on telework
The fourth framework agreement entered into by the cross-industry Social 
Partners is the framework agreement on telework, concluded on 16 july 2000 
by UTUC (and the liaison committee EUROCAdRES/CEC), UNICE/ 
UEAPME and CEEP. As opposed to the previous framework agreements, 
the framework agreement on telework has not been implemented by Council 
decision. Instead, the framework agreement has been implemented by the 
members of the contracting parties in accordance with the procedures and 
practices specific to management and labour in Member States (article 12).
Pursuant to article 2 of the framework agreement, telework is “a form of 
organising and/or performing work, using information technology, in the 
context of an employment contract/relationship, where work, which could 
also be performed at the employer’s premises, is carried out away from those 
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premises on a regular basis.” The framework agreement applies to teleworkers, 
who are persons who carry out telework. Telework is voluntary for the worker 
and the employer involved. Teleworking may be required as part of a worker’s 
initial job description or may be engaged in as a voluntary arrangement 
subsequently (article 3). The teleworker is entitled to all basic information 
with regard to his employment, such as information on applicable collective 
agreements, description of the work etc. Additionally, the teleworker 
may require further written information, such as the department of the 
undertaking to which the teleworker is attached, his/her immediate superior, 
reporting arrangements etc. (article 3). Teleworkers are entitled to the same 
employment conditions as comparable workers at the employer’s premises 
(article 4). They also have the same collective rights as these workers (article 
11). Moreover, teleworkers must have the same access to training and career 
development opportunities as comparable workers at the employer’s premises 
and shall be subject to the same appraisal policies as those other workers 
(article 10). They should furthermore be able to communicate freely with 
workers’ representatives (article 11). The employer informs the teleworker 
on relevant legislation and company rules concerning data protection and 
the employer must respect the teleworker’s privacy (articles 5 and 6). The 
employer is, as a rule, responsible for the work equipment and the protection 
of the occupational health and safety of the teleworker (articles 6 and 7). The 
employer ensures that the teleworker will not be isolated from the rest of the 
working community in the company (article 9). 
5.5 Framework agreement on work-related stress
Subsequently, on 8 October 2004 the cross-industry social partners UTUC 
(and the liaison committee EUROCAdRES/CEC), UNICE, UEAPME and 
CEEP entered into the framework agreement on work-related stress. This 
framework agreement is to be implemented by the members of the contracting 
parties within three years of the date of signature, thus prior to 8 October 
2007. 
The aim of this framework agreement is to increase awareness and 
understanding of employers, workers and their representatives of work-related 
stress. The objective is to provide employers and workers with a framework to 
identify and prevent, or manage problems of work-related stress (article 2). 
The accord, however, does not cover violence, harassment and post-traumatic 
stress, since these issues shall be dealt with in separate negotiations (article 2). 
Stress is defined as a state that is accompanied by physical, psychological or 
social complaints or dysfunctions and which results from individuals feeling 
unable to bridge a gap with the requirements or expectations placed on them 
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(article 3). If  a work-related stress problem is identified, action must be taken 
to prevent, eliminate or reduce it. The responsibility for determining the 
appropriate measures rests with the employer (article 4). More in general, the 
employer has the obligation under the framework directive 89/391 to protect 
the occupational safety and health of its workers. Pursuant to article 5, this 
duty also applies to problems of work-related stress in so far as they entail a 
risk to health and safety. Addressing problems of work-related stress may be 
carried out within an overall process of risk assessment, through a separate 
stress policy and/or by specific measures targeted at identified stress factors 
(article 5). The measures to prevent, eliminate or reduce problems of work-
related stress can vary. These measures can be collective, individual or both. 
Anti-stress measures should be regularly reviewed once they are in place 
(article 6).
5.6 Framework agreement on harassment and violence at work
The most recent framework agreement entered into by the cross-industry 
social partners is the framework agreement on harassment and violence at 
work. This agreement is concluded between UTUC (and the liaison committee 
EUROCAdRES/CEC), BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME and CEEP on 
26 April 2007. This agreement is to be implemented by the members of the 
signatory parties within three year of the date of its execution. Implementation 
of the framework agreement does not constitute valid grounds to reduce the 
general level of protection afforded to workers in the field of this agreement.
The signatory parties consider harassment and violence unacceptable and 
condemn them (part 1). The framework agreement’s aim is dual, as it is to 
(i) increase the awareness and understanding of employers, workers and 
their representatives of workplace harassment and violence and (ii) provide 
employers, workers and their representatives at all levels with an action-
oriented framework to identify, prevent and manage problems of harassment 
and violence at work (part 2). harassment and violence may take different 
forms. harassment occurs when one (or more) worker(s) or manager(s) is 
(are) repeatedly and deliberately abused, threatened and/or humiliated in 
circumstances relating to work. Violence occurs when one (or more) worker(s)
or manager(s) is (are) assaulted in circumstances relating to work (part 3). 
According to the signatory parties, raising awareness and appropriate training 
of managers and workers can reduce the likelihood of harassment and 
violence at work. Enterprises must clearly state that harassment and violence 
will not be tolerated. This statement will specify procedures to be followed 
where cases arise. These procedures will be underpinned by but not confined 
to the following: 
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•	 It	is	in	the	interest	of	all	parties	to	proceed	with	the	necessary	discretion	
to protect the dignity and privacy of all;
•	 No	information	should	be	disclosed	to	parties	not	involved	in	the	case;
•	 Complaints	should	be	investigated	and	dealt	with	without	undue	delay;
•	 All	parties	involved	should	get	an	impartial	hearing	and	fair	treatment;
•	 Complaints	should	be	backed	up	by	detailed	information;
•	 False	accusations	should	not	be	tolerated	and	may	result	in	disciplinary	
action;
•	 External	assistance	may	help.
If  harassment and violence have occurred, appropriate measures will be 
taken in relation to the perpetrator(s), which may include disciplinary action 
up to and including dismissal. The victim(s) should receive support and, if  
necessary, help with reintegration.
6. Some remarks on the results achieved in transnational 
collective bargaining and the repositioning 
of the cross-industry social partners
here, the results achieved in transnational collective bargaining and 
negotiations will be briefly analysed (section 6.1). Furthermore it will be 
assessed whether the European cross-industry social partners actually 
repositioned themselves following their Laeken declaration (section 6.2).
6.1 A brief analysis of the results achieved in 
transnational collective bargaining
The above shows that there is a more or less vivid “transnational bargaining 
climate” in Europe. This is particularly true when output is considered. But 
when one considers the content of the collective agreements with an 
international scope, especially those agreements concluded within the 
European social dialogue, one has to conclude that many results are non-
binding documents and non-binding joint statements (and therefore are the 
result of negotiations rather than proper bargaining). Besides, although these 
joint statements are considerable in number, they are often hardly shocking 
in content. For example, the content of the 36 cross-industry joint statements 
made until August 2002 mainly relate to training and the European social 
dialogue itself, and the 210 sectoral joint statements reached in the same 
period are mainly directed at European institutions.337 This last category of 
337  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
development, sectoral variation and prospects, page 88.
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joint statements has rather a political goal than a direct social or employment 
related goal.338 There only have been a limited number of framework 
agreements concluded up to August 2002; 5 at cross-industry level and 20 at 
sectoral level. Their importance within the individual Member States is rather 
insignificant, since the provisions negotiated remain well below the minimum 
levels of employment conditions established in most Member States.339 Also 
Pochet claims that the results of the sectoral social dialogue are, at least those 
regarding autonomous agreements, “unimpressive”.340
6.2 Repositioning of the European cross-industry social partners?
As mentioned in section 5 of chapter 3, the cross-industry European social 
partners deemed it necessary to reposition. An important objective in that 
respect, as set out in the Laeken declaration, was their wish to develop a more 
autonomous social dialogue. As a part of objective, the cross-industry social 
partners ETUC, UNICE/UEAPME and CEEP have agreed on the “Work 
Programme of the European Social Partners 2003-2005” on 28 November 
2002. According to its introduction, the work programme is build on “a 
spectrum of diversified instruments and comprises a balanced range of themes 
of common interest for employers and workers”. The work programme is to 
make a useful contribution to the Lisbon Strategy as well as to the preparation 
of the enlargement. Its content is grouped around three priorities: employment, 
mobility and enlargement. On 23 March 2006 the same parties, together 
with the liaison committee EUROCAdRES/CEC, concluded the “Work 
Programme of the European Social Partners 2006-2008.” The social partners 
reiterate their support for the Lisbon Strategy aimed at turning Europe into 
the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth, with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion. Through the second work programme, the social partners wish to 
contribute to and promote growth, jobs and the modernisation of the EU 
social model. The work programme focuses on Europe’s major economic and 
338  The Report states that “influencing European policy making is the main motivation 
of social partners for entering into the social dialogue”, Amsterdam Institute for 
Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: development, sectoral 
variation and prospects, page 100.
339  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies, The European Social Dialogue: 
development, sectoral variation and prospects, page 100. According to ETUC, 
however, the framework agreement on parental leave improved social/employment 
law in five of the fifteen countries it took effect, and the framework agreement 
on part-time work improved the situation is Britain and Ireland. See C. degryse, 
European social dialogue: a mixed picture, pages 10 and 11.
340  P. Pochet, European social dialogue between hard and soft law, page 12.
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social challenges. In order to contribute to enhancing Europe’s employment 
and growth potential and the impact of the European social dialogue, the social 
partners will undertake a joint analysis on the key challenges facing Europe’s 
labour markets, looking at issues such as: (i) macro-economic and labour 
market policies, (ii) demographic change, active ageing, youth integration, 
mobility and migration, (iii) lifelong learning, competitiveness, innovation 
and the integration of disadvantaged groups on the labour market, (iv) 
balance between flexibility and security, and (v) undeclared work. These work 
programmes show that the cross-industry social partners want to shape the 
European future, taking into account Europe’s challenges, independent from 
the Community institutions.341 The cross-industry social partners have indeed 
been rather successful implementing these autonomous work programmes.342 
This development can be considered a part of the enhanced autonomy of 
these social partners. The same can be said about the implementation of 
the most recent three framework agreements. These agreements all had to 
be implemented autonomously, not involving the Community institutions in 
this process.
ETUC, in particular, seems very keen on firmly developing its position. At 
the eleventh Congress of the ETUC that took place in Seville on 21 – 24 
May 2007, it adopted an “offensive” strategy and action plan, summarised in 
the Seville Manifesto. Basically, ETUC wants to strengthen European trade 
unionism and its own capacities to face several of its challenges. It plans to 
go on the offensive for: (i) a European labour market with a strong social 
dimension, (ii) a higher quality social dialogue, collective bargaining and 
workers participation, (iii) more effective European economic, social and 
environmental governance, (iv) a stronger EU, and (v) stronger unions and a 
stronger ETUC. The second “front” includes “more intense consideration of 
how to develop and coordinate European level collective bargaining, including 
at sectoral, cross border, and transnational company levels, and supporting the 
work of the European Industry Federations”.343 Given the Seville Manifesto, 
it seems that ETUC is aiming at a more prominent role in Europe. 
7. Summary
The “Europeanisation of collective bargaining” is not solely achieved by the 
European social dialogue and its actors, the European (cross-industry and 
341  See also S. Smismans, The European social dialogue between constitutional and 
labour law, European Law Review, 2007, volume 32, number 3, page 345.
342  ETUI-REhS, Benchmarking Working Europe 2007, pages 116 and 117.
343  Reference is made to the Seville Manifesto, which can be found on ETUC’s website.
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sectoral) social partners and European institutions, such as the Commission. 
National collective bargaining and negotiations can lead to the Europeanisation 
of collective bargaining as well. In this respect, at least five levels should be 
distinguished: (i) country level, (ii) inter-regional level, (iii) company level, (iv) 
European sectoral level and (v) European cross-industry level. 
At country level, (tripartite) social pacts have been concluded in order to 
contribute to the country’s effort to fulfil the criteria for EMU and/or to 
improve national competitiveness within the Single European Market. In 
Belgium, the social partners must, by law, take into account the forecast rise 
in wages in Belgium’s three main trade partners when negotiating on the 
maximum possible wage increase over the subsequent two years.
At inter-regional level, several initiatives have been developed to coordinate 
national collective bargaining. The most well-known example of such inter-
regional initiative is the doorn Group. This group of representatives of Belgian, 
dutch, Luxembourg, German and French trade unions has established cross-
border guidelines for their national bargaining policies. Another example is 
the German Metalworkers’ Union IG Metall that has launched initiatives for 
cross-border collective bargaining networks.
 
At company level, there is a modest trend towards Europeanisation of collective 
bargaining. Although negotiations are normally national, the reference points 
utilised by management (and sometimes labour) in negotiations are sometimes 
European (or wider).
At sectoral level, there have been several initiatives taken, primarily by trade 
unions, aimed at a more explicit European coordination of national bargaining. 
The most far reaching initiative originates from the European Metalworkers’ 
Federation, and this organisation has developed (i) a joint commitment to 
European guidelines for national collective bargaining, which is meant to 
prevent downward competition and (ii) certain minimum standards that all 
EMF affiliates should feel obliged to bargain for. Other European Industry 
Federations, in one way or another, have followed this example.
At cross-industry level, it is mainly ETUC that has put energy into the 
Europeanisation of national collective bargaining. The ETUC actively 
promotes a strategy for coordinated European collective bargaining at 
sectoral and intersectoral level and the securitisation of a consistent approach 
via coordination within the ETUC. 
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At European company-level, quite a few transnational collective labour 
agreements have been concluded. This has partially been done with the 
European Works Council, but more importantly also with European sectoral 
trade unions, sometimes combined with national trade unions. The topics of 
corporate social responsibility and restructuring have attracted the interest of 
multinational companies in particular.
A relatively vivid European sectoral social dialogue exists. Since the 
establishment of sectoral social dialogue committees in 1998 until the 
middle of 2002, the social partners involved concluded approximately 230 
commitments of different types and scale, such as opinions and common 
positions, declarations, guidelines and codes of conduct, charters, agreements 
etc. Most of these commitments have been adopted to clarify the position 
of the social partners on a certain subject. Some of these commitments have 
been implemented by a Council decision. 
At European cross-industry level, between 1986 and August 2002 the 
social partners (UNICE, CEEP, ETUC and UEAPME) have issued joint 
statements and entered into framework agreements 40 times in the European 
social dialogue. Also in this case, the joint statements heavily outnumber 
the framework agreements. The cross-industry social partners have entered 
into 36 joint opinions, primarily dealing with training and the future of 
the European social dialogue itself. Said social partners have concluded six 
framework agreements, of which three have been implemented by a Council 
decision and three by the members of the contracting parties in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and 
Member States. 
Based on the number of results, transnational collective bargaining is 
intensifying. however, it should be noted that many results reached are 
non-binding (and therefore cannot truly be considered the fruits of proper 
bargaining). There has been only a limited number of binding framework 
agreements concluded. Their importance within the individual Member 
States is rather insignificant, since the provisions negotiated remain well 
below the minimum levels of employment conditions established in most 
Member States. The cross-industry social partners did, following their Laeken 
declaration, succeed in achieving a more autonomous bargaining process. 
ETUC particularly seems to aim at a more prominent role in Europe.
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ChAPTER 5
ARTICLES 136 – 139 OF ThE EC TREATY
1. Introduction
From the previous chapters, it can be derived that the European social 
partners have concluded a number of agreements and have an excellent 
opportunity to further enhance their output. Some of these agreements have 
been reached within the scope of the articles 136 – 139 of the EC Treaty. 
These articles contain the legal framework of the so-called (social) dialogue 
between management and labour. In this chapter, this legal framework will be 
discussed in depth.
In section 2, the mandatory consultation process of management and labour 
will be set out (article 138 of the EC Treaty). The Commission must consult 
the social partners in a two-stage process about all its proposals in the social 
policy field. Exactly which organisations qualify as “management and labour” 
and what proposals fall within “the social policy field” will be discussed in 
that section. 
After the consultation process, the social partners are, on the basis of article 
138.4 of the EC Treaty, entitled to enter into negotiations in order to conclude 
an agreement on the issue at hand, as will be dealt with in section 3. In 
this section special attention will be drawn to the question of which social 
partners may enter into such an agreement. But it seems that also without 
prior consultation the European social partners may, pursuant to article 139 
if  the EC Treaty, enter into agreements. This autonomous negotiation process 
and the parties involved in it will be discussed in section 4.
Article 139.1 of the EC Treaty stipulates that the European social partners 
may enter into “contractual relations, including agreements”. Apparently, 
“contractual relations” must be viewed as a broad concept which includes 
“agreements”. Although this distinction is rather puzzling, it has important 
consequences as will be argued in section 5. In the same section an attempt 
will be made to classify “contractual relations”. 
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Once the social partners have reached an agreement (after the consultation 
process or autonomously), they can, pursuant to article 139.2 of the EC 
Treaty, either request it to be implemented by a Council decision or implement 
it themselves in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to 
management and labour and to the Member States. These methods of 
implementation will be scrutinised in sections 6 and 7 respectively. Section 8 
will summarise this chapter.
2. The consultation of the social partners
Pursuant to article 136.1 of the EC Treaty, the Community and the Member 
States shall promote, among other things, the dialogue between management 
and labour. According to the third paragraph of this article, this development 
will i.a. ensue from the procedures provided for in the EC Treaty. here, the 
fact that the European social partners are to be consulted in a two-stage 
process about all the Commission’s proposals in the social policy field, comes 
into play.
2.1 Two-stage consultation process
2.1.1 Consultation stage 1
Pursuant to article 138.2 of the EC Treaty, the Commission shall consult the 
social partners before submitting proposals in the social policy field. judging 
from the words used in this article (the Commission shall consult as opposed 
to can consult), this is not a discretionary power of the Commission, but an 
obligation.344 
According to the Commission’s Communication “concerning the application 
of the Agreement on social policy”, the consultation will be initiated by 
sending the relevant social partners345 a letter concerning the direction 
Community action in the social policy field might go. The social partners may 
– individually or collectively – reply by letter or, at their discretion, convene 
an ad hoc meeting.346
344  See also E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 79 and 
Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 1060. See furthermore the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee on the Communication concerning the application of the Agreement 
on Social Policy presented by the Commission to the Council and to the European 
Parliament, paragraph 3.3.4.
345  Which social partners are to be consulted, will be discussed in section 2.2 below.
346  COM (1993) 600, page 19.
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There has been some discussion with regard to the duration of this first 
consultation stage. In its above-mentioned Communication, the Commission 
noted that the consultation period should not exceed 6 weeks.347 This led 
to critical remarks from some important social partners, who favoured 
a period of several months.348 As a result of this, the Commission argued 
in its 1996 Communication “the development of the Social dialogue at 
Community level” that, while the general time-limit should remain fixed on 
6 weeks, the deadline for consultations should be adaptable and should be 
set by the Commission on a case-by-case basis, depending on the nature and 
complexity of the subject at hand.349 In its 1998 Communication “Adapting 
and promoting the Social dialogue at Community level” the Commission 
decided accordingly.350
2.1.2 Consultation stage 2
The second stage starts if, after having finalised the above-mentioned first 
consultation stage, the Commission considers Community action advisable. 
Whether or not this is the case, is entirely up to the Commission.351 Should 
action be considered the way to proceed, the Commission shall consult the 
social partners on the content of the envisaged proposal, upon which these 
social partners can forward their opinion or even recommendation (article 
138.3 of the EC Treaty).
According to the aforementioned Commission’s Communication “concerning 
the application of the Agreement on social policy”, this entails that the 
Commission will send a second letter to the social partners, incorporating 
the content of the planned proposal initiative, together with an indication 
of the possible legal basis thereof. The social partners should subsequently 
deliver to the Commission in writing and, where the social partners so wish 
through an ad hoc meeting, an opinion setting out the points of agreement 
347  COM (1993) 600, page 19.
348  UNICE recommended a period of at least three months and CEEP considered 
a three to four months time-frame reasonable. Reference is made to E. Franssen, 
Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 79.
349  COM (1996) 448, page 13.
350  COM (1998) 322, page 9.
351  COM (1993) 600, page 19.
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and disagreement in their respective positions on said draft text. The duration 
of this second stage should also not exceed 6 weeks.352 353
2.2 Management and labour: which social partners are to be consulted?
As appears in articles 138.2 and 138.3 of the EC Treaty, the parties that 
need to be consulted in the two-stage consultation process are “labour” and 
“management”. The EC Treaty does not define said parties. That raises the 
question of who these parties are.
As is set out in chapter 3, section 2.3 of this thesis, article 138 of the EC 
Treaty is originally based on article 3 of the joint Agreement concluded 
between UNICE, ETUC and CEEP. These parties therefore logically classify 
as “labour and management” as referred to in article 138 of the EC Treaty. 
however, more parties are involved in the social dialogue.
In the period September 1992 up to july 1993 the Commission conducted an 
extensive study of European employers’ and workers’ organisations. The most 
important purpose of the study was to get an overview of who was represented 
by a number of European federations at all-industry level. There were two 
main lessons the Commission drew from the aforementioned research. First, it 
concluded that the diversity of practice in the different Member States is such 
that there is no single model as to representativeness that could be replicated 
at European level. Second, it stated that, since the different Member States 
systems have all taken many years to grow and develop, it is difficult to see 
how a European system can be created by administrative decision in the short 
term.354 
Following said research, the Commission in its 1993 Communication 
“concerning the application of the Agreement on social policy” set out the 
352  COM (1993) 600, pages 19 and 20.
353  The Economic and Social Committee considered this period of six weeks 
insufficient. Especially during the second phase, the social partners should 
be granted ample time in order to enable them to produce effective critiques 
on the content of, or detailed amendments to, the proposal or substantive 
recommendations. Reference is made to the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee on the Communication concerning the application of the Agreement 
on Social Policy presented by the Commission to the Council and to the European 
Parliament, paragraph 3.4.3.
354  Reference is made to annex 3 of COM (1993) 600. For a further analysis on these 
conclusions, reference is made to B. Bercusson, European Labour Law, pages 558 – 
562.
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criteria that organisations must meet in order to be consulted on the basis of 
article 138 EC Treaty. They should:
1. be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or categories and be orga-
nised at European level;
2. consist of organisations which are themselves an integral and recognised 
part of Member State social partner structures and with the capacity 
to negotiate agreements, and which are representative of all Member 
States, as far as possible; and
3. have adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the 
consultation process.
The European Parliament suggested to amend the above-mentioned criteria 
by including further considerations to the list: (i) the eligible organisations 
should be composed of organisations representing employers or workers with 
membership which is voluntary at both national and European level, (ii) they 
should be composed of members who are entitled to be involved directly, 
or through their members, in collective bargaining at their respective levels 
and (iii) they should have a mandate from their members to represent them 
in the context of the Community social dialogue and can demonstrate their 
representativeness.355 The Economic and Social Committee also wanted to 
add to the criteria the capacity of the national social partners to negotiate 
for and bind national structures.356 The Commission sought the opinion of 
the social partners on these proposed changes.357 Although there was strong 
disagreement between the social partners on the aspect of representativity,358 
the Commission nonetheless observed in its 1998 Communication that “the 
vast majority of respondents were in favour of maintaining the current criteria 
determining which organisations should be consulted”.359 Consequently, the 
Commission maintained these criteria.
355  Report of the Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and the Working 
Environment, on the application of the Agreement on Social Policy, 20 April 1994, 
PE 207.928/final, paragraph 1.
356  Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Communication 
concerning the application of the Agreement on Social Policy presented by the 
Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, paragraph 2.1.12.
357  COM (1996) 448, page 12.
358  E. Franssen and A.T.j.M. jacobs, The question of representativity in the European 
social dialogue, Common Market Law Review 1998, page 1301.
359  COM (1998) 322, page 9.
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What was somewhat peculiar was that the Commission in the same 1998 
Communication proposed to establish sectoral dialogue committees,360 for 
which it also fixed demands that organisations should meet in order to be 
eligible to participate in such committees. These demands are exactly the 
same as the three demands mentioned above, with the exception of the second 
demand, which requires organisations to be “an integral and recognised part 
of Member States’ social partner structures and with the capacity to negotiate 
agreements, and which are representative of several Member States”.361 This 
demand seems to weaken the geographical dimension of the organisations 
participating in the European (sectoral) social dialogue to some extent.362
In any event, the fact that (apart from the change concerning the sectoral social 
dialogue) the requirements organisations should satisfy in order to participate 
in the European social dialogue remained unaltered, does not entail that the 
organisations that participate in the consultation process have remained the 
same as well over the years. Based on the above-mentioned representativeness 
study, the Commission has drafted a list of organisations that are to be 
consulted.363 This list has been reviewed on several occasions over time364 
and there is a more or less ongoing research on the representativeness of the 
social partners. Today, there are about 50 organisations that are consulted 
in conformity with article 138 of the EC Treaty.365 These organisations are 
the representative European social partners satisfying the Commission’s 
requirements.
2.3 Social Policy field: exactly whereon are the 
social partners to be consulted?
Article 138.2 of the EC Treaty stipulates that the social partners are to be 
consulted on proposals in the “social policy field”. Clearly, all proposals 
pertaining to issues laid out in the articles 137 and 140 of the EC Treaty are to 
360  See chapter 4, section 4.
361  Reference is made to Article 1 of the Commission decision on the establishment of 
Sectoral dialogue Committees promoting the dialogue between the social partners 
at European level.
362  See also: j. Kirton-darling (ed.), Representativeness of Public Sector Trade Unions 
in Europe, State Administration and Local Government Sectors, published by ETUI, 
Brussels, 2004, page 20. 
363  Reference is made to annex 2 of COM (1993) 600.
364  On the occasions of COM (1996) 448, COM (1998) 322; and COM (2002) 341, for 
example, the list of organisations has been updated.
365  Reference is made to the social dialogue website (http://europa.eu.int/comm/
employment_social/social_dialogue/represent_en.htm).
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be considered proposals submitted in the social policy field. The social policy 
field must, however, be regarded as broader than this alone.
In its 1993 Communication, the Commission stated that the consultation 
procedures should apply to all social policy proposals, whatever legal basis is 
eventually decided on.366 In Annex 1 to this Communication, the Commission 
provided an overview of the main legal bases for social policy measures. 
Apparently, the Commission intended to apply the consultation process to 
all social initiatives stated in that overview. Moreover, the Commission even 
reserved its right to engage in specific consultations on any other horizontal 
or sectoral-type proposal which has social implications.367 
The Commission did indeed apply article 138 of the EC Treaty liberally.368 
Although it noted in 1996 that the consultation procedure is only mandatory 
within the context on the Agreement on Social Policy, it had committed itself, 
in order to standardise its approach, to applying this procedure for all social 
policy initiatives, irrespective of their legal bases.369 In 1998 the Commission 
announced to develop and broaden its practice of consultations on those 
developments in the social policy field not covered by the formal consultations 
under article 138 EC Treaty, for example on green papers.370 Later on, the 
Commission even further broadened the subject of consultation, where it 
expressed its intention to consult the social partners “on the main initiatives 
having social repercussions”.371
Given the above, the Commission broadly defines the concept “social policy 
field” as used in article 138.2 of the EC Treaty. This is also recognised by 
scholars. According to Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, the norm of 
instruction requiring consultation embraces all Community initiatives and 
proposals which have a social or socio-economic significance, such as measures 
implementing the present articles 42 and 158 – 162, and the articles 125 – 130 
of the EC Treaty.372 Franssen subscribes to this point of view.373 European 
366  COM (1993) 600, page 24.
367  COM (1993) 600, page 24.
368  Although it must be noted that the list of issues under consultation gets shorter 
every year. ETUI-REhS, Benchmarking Working Europe 2007, page 115.
369  COM (1996) 448, page 23.
370  COM (1998) 322, page 7.
371  COM (2002) 341, page 9.
372  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 1061.
373  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 82.
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bodies also view the social policy field rather broadly. The Economic and 
Social Committee, for example, stated that the aforementioned consultation 
procedure should be applied to every proposal “which is linked to social 
policy”.374
3. From consultation to negotiation
3.1 The negotiation process
On the occasion of the above-mentioned consultation, the social partners are 
entitled to inform the Commission of their wish to enter into an agreement. 
This negotiation process may take up to 9 months and can be extended upon 
joint agreement between the social partners involved and the Commission 
(article 138.4 of the EC Treaty).
At or before expiration of said period of 9 months, the social partners must 
submit to the Commission a report concerning the negotiations. This report 
may inform the Commission that:375
A they have concluded an agreement and jointly request the Commission 
to propose that the Council adopts a decision on implementation;376 or
B having concluded an agreement between themselves, they prefer to im-
plement it in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to 
management and labour and to the Member States;377 or
C they envisage pursuing the negotiations beyond the 9 months and accor-
dingly request the Commission to decide with them upon a new dead-
line; or
d they are unable to reach an agreement. 
374  Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Communication concerning 
the application of the Agreement on Social Policy presented by the Commission to 
the Council and to the European Parliament, paragraph 3.3.1.
375  This overview literally derives from COM (1993) 600, page 3.
376  Reference is made to article 139.2 of the EC Treaty.
377  Reference is made to article 139.2 of the EC Treaty.
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If  the social partners have notified that no agreement can be reached, the 
Commission will examine whether action still is appropriate. The Economic 
and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European 
Parliament will in such a case be consulted in accordance with the procedures 
laid out in the EC Treaty.378 If  an agreement has been reached, there are – 
as can be derived from A and B above – two options available to the social 
partners: their agreement can either be implemented by a Council decision or 
in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour and to the Member States. These methods of implementation will be 
discussed in paragraphs 6 and 7 respectively.
3.2 The social partners involved
just like the EC Treaty does not make evident which parties are to be consulted 
in the two-stage consultation process, it is also unclear which parties are 
entitled to enter into negotiation after finalising the consultation process. 
The Commission attempted to give some clarity in its 1993 Communication 
“concerning the application of the Agreement on social policy”. The 
Commission stated that it regards the negotiations between the social 
partners as an independent, autonomous activity.379 Consequently, the social 
partners concerned are those who agree to negotiate with each other.380 These 
observations did not, however, stop UEAPME from starting an important case 
against the Council regarding its alleged right to participate in negotiations 
under article 139 of the EC Treaty (at that time article 4 of the Agreement on 
Social Policy).381 This matter concerned the following.
In 1995 the Commission consulted the social partners in the two-stage 
consultation process with regard to reconciling working and family life. At 
both stages, UEAPME took part in the consultation process, but it also urged 
the Commission to do everything in its power to ensure that certain important 
issues and certain representatives of management and labour were not to be 
excluded from possible negotiations. At the end of the consultation process, 
UNICE, CEEP and ETUC informed the Commission of their desire to enter 
into negotiations on parental leave. UEAPME was not admitted to these 
378  Article 137.2 of the EC Treaty.
379  Whether these negotiations can truly be considered autonomous will be discussed 
in section 3.5, chapter 6 of this thesis. 
380  COM (1993) 600, page 25.
381  Court of First Instance, 17 june 1998, T-135/96, UEAPME/Council of the 
European Union.
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negotiations. The aforementioned parties agreed on the framework agreement 
on parental leave. They submitted this agreement to the Commission, with the 
request that it be implemented by a Council decision on a proposal from the 
Commission. Meanwhile, UEAPME informed the Commission of its regret on 
not having been able to participate in the dialogue between management and 
labour, and submitted its criticism of the proposed framework agreement. 
On 3 june 1996 directive 96/34, giving effect to the framework agreement, 
was adopted by the Council. On 5 September 1996 UEAPME lodged an 
application at the Court of First Instance, requesting the annulment of that 
directive. UEAPME argued, briefly put, that it should have been party to 
the negotiations leading to the framework agreement. On this challenge of 
UEAPME, the Court had i.a. to verify whether the particular features of the 
procedure culminating in the adoption of said directive had correctly been 
applied.382 
The Court considered that neither article 3.4 nor article 4 of the Agreement 
on Social Policy (the current articles 138.4 and 139 of the EC Treaty) expressly 
identifies “management and labour” for the purposes of negotiations referred 
to. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that, the way in which the provisions are 
structured, and the existence of the prior consultation stage suggest that 
the representatives of management and labour which participate in the 
negotiations must, at the very least, have been among those consulted by 
the Commission. This does not imply, however, that all those consulted by 
the Commission have the right to take part in the negotiations. According 
to the Court, the negotiation stage depends exclusively on the initiative of 
those representatives of management and labour who wish to launch such 
negotiations. The representatives of management and labour concerned in 
the negotiation stage are therefore those who have demonstrated their mutual 
willingness to initiate the process provided for in article 4 of the Agreement 
on Social Policy and to follow it through to its conclusion. The Court thus 
concludes that the Agreement on Social Policy does not confer on any 
representative of management and labour, whatever the interests purportedly 
represented, a general right to take part in any negotiations entered into in 
accordance with article 3.4 of the Agreement on Social Policy, even though 
it is open to any representative of management and labour which has been 
consulted pursuant to article 3.2 and article 3.3 of the Agreement on Social 
Policy to initiate such negotiations. Moreover, the mere fact that UEAPME 
382  One of the main difficulties of the UEAPME was the problem of admissibility. 
For an in depth view on that topic, reference is made to E. Franssen and A.T.M.j. 
jacobs, The question of representativity in the European social dialogue, pages 1303 
ff.
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contacted the Commission on several occasions asking to participate in 
the negotiations between other representatives of management and labour 
does not affect that position, since it is the representatives of management 
and labour concerned, and not the Commission, which have charge of the 
negotiations stage properly so called.
This ruling gives important footholds when it comes to understanding 
which parties can participate in the negotiations as arranged for in the EC 
Treaty. These parties have to be (i) among those parties consulted by the 
Commission and (ii) admitted to the negotiation table by the other social 
partners involved. 
3.3 Differing representativity demands depending 
on the implementation method?
The above gives an answer to the question of which parties may, following a 
consultation, enter into negotiations. Given the way the ruling of the Court of 
First Instance is phrased, it does not matter whether the parties that enter into 
the collective bargaining have an aim to have their agreement implemented by 
a Council decision or in accordance with the procedures and practices specific 
to management and labour and to the Member States. After all, the Court of 
First Instance simply ruled:383 
Thus neither Article 3 (4) nor Article 4 of the Agreement expressly identifies 
“management and labour” for the purposes of the negotiations referred to. 
Nevertheless, the way in which the provisions are structured and the existence 
of the prior consultation stage suggest that the representatives of management 
and labour which participate in the negotiations must at the very least have been 
among those consulted by the Commission.
Apparently, the Court of First Instance does not distinguish between 
management and labour mentioned in article 3.4 of the Agreement on Social 
Policy (article 138.4 of the EC Treaty; the parties that should be consulted) 
and management and labour mentioned in article 4 thereof (article 139 of 
the EC Treaty; the parties that may enter into an agreement); neither article 
identifies management and labour. It seems that these parties must, according 
to the Court, be considered the same. Indeed, the articles 138 and 139 of the 
EC Treaty use exactly the same terminology for the European social partners: 
383  Paragraph 75 of the UEAPME case.
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management and labour. Management and labour in both articles must 
therefore apparently be viewed identical.384 
What may very well differ depending on the chosen implementation method 
is not so much the parties that are entitled to participate in negotiation, but 
their level of representativity with regard to the agreement they concluded. 
Undeniably true, all social partners need to be representative in order to 
be entitled to participate to the European social dialogue in the first place, 
but the representativity check seems to go further in case an agreement is 
implemented by a Council decision. In order to explain this, I will continue 
discussing the UEAPME case. As set out above, UEAPME had no right to 
participate in collective bargaining. But that was not the end of the case. The 
Court of First Instance subsequently focused on the role of the European 
institutions in relation to the European social dialogue. It ruled that, since 
the European Parliament does not participate in the procedure leading to the 
implementation of agreements entered into between labour and management, 
the principle of democracy on which the Union is founded requires that the 
participation of the people be otherwise assured, in this instance through 
the parties representative of management and labour who concluded the 
agreement which is endowed by the Council.385 In order to make sure that that 
requirement is complied with, the Commission and the Council are, according 
to the Court of First Instance, under a duty to verify that the signatories 
to the agreement are sufficiently representative. Whether these parties are 
sufficiently representative must be measured in relation to the content of 
the agreement. If  the contracting parties, taken together, are insufficiently 
representative, the Commission and the Council must, according to the Court 
of First Instance, refuse to implement the agreement at Community level. 
Should they fail to do so, the organisations that were consulted, but were not 
party to the agreement, and whose representation in relation to the content 
of the agreement is necessary to raise the collective representativity of the 
signatories to the required level, have the right to prevent implementation 
of the agreement by means of a legislative instrument at Community level. 
384  See in the same manner the report of the Committee on Social Affairs, 
Employment and the Working Environment, on the application of the Agreement 
on Social Policy, paragraph 4.
385  It is unclear on exactly which basis the Court of First Instance based its ruling that 
the “democracy” of the social partners can substitute Parliamentary democracy. 
Reference is made to , F. dorssemont, Over de ‘representativiteit’ van ‘sociale 
partners’ in de Europese Sociale Dialoog [About ‘representativity’ of ‘social partners’ 
in the European Social Dialogue], Sociaal Recht, 2004, 4, page 147. See also 
A.T.j.M. jacobs, European Social Concertation, page 365, in: S.A. Fareso (ed.), 
Collective bargaining in Europe, Madrid, 2005. 
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These organisations may bring an action for annulment of the Council 
decision implementing the agreement. The European Courts (the Court 
of First Instance and ultimately the European Court of justice) therefore 
finally verify the level of representativity. In the underlying matter, however, 
the Court of First Instance decided that the original signatory parties were, 
even without UEAPME, sufficiently representative in order for the Council to 
decide to implement the agreement on parental leave.
Apparently, the signatory parties to the agreement must be sufficiently 
representative. This requirement, however, seems to focus on agreements that 
are to be implemented by a Council decisions. In any case, the Commission 
and Council must, according to the Court of First Instance, verify whether 
the agreement meets the representativity requirements. These institutions 
are only involved should agreements be implemented by a Council decision, 
and not in case they are implemented in accordance with the procedures and 
practices specific to management and labour and to the Member States. The 
Court of First Instance indeed solely focused on the first implementation 
method.386 The line of reasoning used by the Court of First Instance does not 
seem to apply to agreements implemented in accordance with the procedures 
and practices specific to management and labour and to the Member States, 
as this implementation method does not involve Community institutions, 
and representativity of the social partners can therefore not “replace” the 
democratic role of the European Parliament. The requirement of “sufficient 
representativity” seems therefore not to apply to agreements concluded 
by the proper social partners (organisations that are among those parties 
consulted by the Commission and admitted to the negotiation table by the 
other social partners involved) that are to be implemented in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and to 
386  See for example paragraph 88 where the Court of First Instance states: “It is 
proper to stress the importance of the obligation incumbent on the Commissions 
and the Council to verify the representativity of the signatories to an agreement 
concluded pursuant to Articles 3(4) and 4 of the Agreement, which the Council has 
been asked to implement at Community level” (emphasis added).
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the Member States.387 Moreover, the EC Treaty itself  does not formulate any 
representativity requirement.388
3.4 The situation after the UEAPME case
UEAPME appealed against the aforementioned ruling of the Court of First 
Instance. however, after UEAPME and UNICE reached a cooperation 
agreement on 4 december 1998, UEAPME withdrew the appeal,389 for which 
reason the ruling “merely” remained a decision of the Court of First Instance. 
Still, the ruling gives footholds on three important topics: the parties involved 
in the social dialogue, the legitimacy of the social dialogue and the control by 
Community institutions of the social dialogue process.390 
The parties which can participate in the negotiations, as arranged for in the 
EC Treaty, have to be (i) among those parties consulted by the Commission 
and (ii) admitted to the negotiation table by the other social partners involved. 
however, in order for their agreement to be implemented by a Council 
decision, they must, taken together, be sufficiently representative, which 
depends on the content of the agreement.391 This level of representativity is to 
be verified by the Commission and Council and, ultimately, by the European 
Court. The Commission may not propose to implement and the Council may 
not implement the agreement at Community level, in case the representativity 
of the signatory parties is insufficient. The “representativity issue” seems not 
applicable should the signatory parties choose to implement their agreement 
in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour and to the Member States.
387  jacobs too claims that there is no state interference regarding representativity 
in case European agreements are implemented by the European social partners 
themselves. See A.T.j.M. jacobs, European Social Concertation, page 384.
388  In my opinion the lack of the “sufficiently representative” requirement is not overly 
worrisome from a Community perspective as the agreements that are implemented 
in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour and to the Member States have little Community relevance. Lack of 
representativity may, however, cause problems when implementing a European 
agreement autonomously. Reference is made to chapter 6, sections 4.2 and 4.3.2.
389  j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative 
Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, Ministry of Labour, helsinki 2004, Finland, page 120. UEAPME also 
withdrew an identical law suit on the validity of the directive on parental leave (T-
55/98). See also chapter 2, section 4.3.3.
390  Reference is made to B. Bercusson, Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour 
Law, Industrial Law journal, Volume 28, Number 2, june 1999, page 154. 
391  This topic will be further scrutinised in section 6.2.2.1 of this chapter.
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The Commission obviously welcomed the ruling in the UEAPME case,392 but 
remained sensitive to the matter at hand. In its 1996 Communication “the 
development of the Social dialogue at Community level”, it stated that it 
continues to believe that only the social partners themselves can develop 
their own dialogue and negotiating structures, and that it cannot impose 
participants on a freely undertaken negotiation. The Commission, however, 
encouraged the European social partner organisations to cooperate more 
closely and be open and flexible in order to ensure appropriate participation 
in negotiations.393 In its 1998 Communication “Adapting and promoting the 
Social dialogue at Community level” the Commission reaffirmed that it is up 
to the social partners to decide who sits at any negotiation table and it is up 
to them to find the necessary compromises.394 According to the Commission, 
the negotiation process is based upon principles of autonomy and mutual 
recognition of the negotiating parties.395 
4.  Autonomous negotiation within the framework 
of article 136 – 139 of the EC Treaty
The above section relates to negotiations following consultation. This sequence 
seems to naturally flow from the structure of the articles 138 and 139 of the 
EC Treaty, as the Court of First Instance ruled: first consultation, which may 
lead to negotiation.396 This gives rise to the question whether social partners 
are solely entitled to enter into agreements within the scope of the articles 
138 and 139 of the EC Treaty after consultation of the Commission. Some 
scholars have argued that this is the case. Very clear on this issue is Betten, 
who stated about negotiations without a prior consultation procedure:397
392  The Commission itself, just like the Court of First Instance, also links the right 
to be consulted to the right to enter into agreements. In its 2004 communication 
the Commission noted: “In order to identify the social partners to be consulted 
under Article 138 of the EC Treaty, the Commission carries out representativeness 
studies on the European organisations. This information is also important for the 
setting up of new sectoral social dialogue committees, as well as the Commission’s 
assessment of the representative status of the signatory parties to Article 139(2) 
agreements.” COM (2004) 557, page 9 (emphasis added). 
393  COM (1996) 448, page 14.
394  COM (1998) 322, page 12.
395  COM (1998) 322, page 14.
396  Paragraph 75 of the UEAPME case.
397  L. Betten, The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community Social 
Policy, page 29. 
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In my opinion such negotiations would fall outside this procedure. Although, of 
course, a social dialogue can start without a Commission proposal, the results of 
that dialogue would not, however, fall under the MASP398 (and, in future, the E.C. 
Treaty). hence, an agreement by social partners not based on an initial Commission 
proposal, would fall outside the context of Community law. The MASP clearly 
implies that the social partners can take a proposal away from the Commission. 
If  there is no such a proposal, there is nothing to take away. The other option 
would imply that social partners can set the agenda for the Community’s (social) 
legislative programme; that would be contrary to the Commission’s role in the 
Community.
The European Economic and Social Committee views this differently and 
simply states that the social partners may, before the Commission considers 
a possible direction of Community action in the social policy field and 
independent of the consultation, initiate the social dialogue autonomously. 
This autonomous social dialogue may, according to the European Economic 
and Social Committee, lead in accordance with Article 4 of the joint 
Agreement to contractual relations, including agreements.399
The Commission was never particularly clear on this issue until its 1998 
Communication “adapting and promoting the social dialogue on Community 
level”. herein it stated that “before proposing a decision implementing an 
agreement negotiated on a matter within the material scope of Article 2 
ASP, but outside the formal consultation procedure, the Commission has the 
obligation to assess the appropriateness of Community action in that field”.400 
The Commission affirmed this point of view later on as well.401 Given the 
fact that the Commission itself  takes this view – in fact restricting its right to 
initiative in a material sense - this position should be regarded as relatively 
reliable.402 
398  Maastricht Agreement on Social Policy; author.
399  Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Communication 
concerning the application of the Agreement on Social Policy presented by the 
Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, paragraph 4.1.3.
400  COM (1998) 322 final, page 16, emphasis added.
401  The Commission stated, for instance, in 2004 that it has a particular role to play in 
the case of autonomous agreements implemented in accordance with article 139.2, 
if the agreement was the result of an article 138 consultation (COM (2004) 557 final, 
page 10; emphasis added). The way in which the Commission phrased this sentence 
logically brings forth that an agreement can also be implemented in accordance 
with article 139.2, if  it was not the result of an article 138 consultation.
402  j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative 
Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 102.
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More importantly, it should indeed be noted that article 139 of the EC Treaty 
does not introduce the precondition to first enter into consultation, prior to 
concluding an agreement on the basis of article 139.1 of the EC Treaty. Article 
139.1 does not give any reason to demand such a precondition either. On the 
contrary, this article stipulates rather generally that “should management and 
labour so desire, the dialogue between them at Community level may lead to 
contractual relations, including agreements”. In practice, this possibility also 
has been used. The maritime, transport and civil aviation sector agreements 
on working time, and the railway sector agreement on the working conditions 
of mobile workers assigned to cross-border interoperable services have, for 
example, not been concluded as a result of prior consultation under article 138 
of the EC Treaty. These agreements used the space left in directives. This lack 
of prior consultation, however, gave no reason to refuse their implementation 
by a Council decision.403
Article 139.1 of the EC Treaty therefore (also) opens the way for “autonomous 
negotiations”.404 And exactly this is what the cross-industry European social 
partners wish to pursue according to their Laeken declaration.405 These 
agreements entered into after autonomous negotiations may, just as agreements 
entered into following consultation, be implemented by a Council decision or 
in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour and to the Member States.406
 
Unlike the situation in which the European social partners start negotiations 
after the two-stage consultation process, there is no formal negotiation 
process when it comes to autonomous negotiation. This makes sense, given 
the fact that these negotiations are, as said, autonomous. Furthermore, 
as opposed to “negotiation following consultation”, there are no direct 
Community institution’s interests at stake in autonomous negotiation. For 
instance, negotiation following consultation suspends the legislative process at 
Community level,407 which gives valid reason to set strict deadlines concerning 
these sorts of negotiations. This is obviously not the case with autonomous 
negotiation. The lack of rules on the negotiation process, however, does not, 
in my view, bring forth that other parties than the social partners set out in 
403  Reference is made to COM (2004) 557, pages 15 – 16.
404  In as far this needed opening, a subject that will be discussed in chapter 6, section 
4.1.
405  Reference is made to chapter 3, section 5.
406  See also A.T.j.M. jacobs, European Social Concertation, page 362. See furthermore 
S. Smismans, The European Social Dialogue in the Shadow of Hierarchy, page 170.
407  COM (2004) 557, page 10.
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section 3.2 above may participate. The ruling of the Court of First Instance 
in the UEAPME case seems to apply to social partners that start autonomous 
negotiations under article 139 of the EC Treaty as well. After all, as set out, 
the Court of First Instance ruled that “management and labour” in articles 
138 and 139 of the EC Treaty are one and the same. This brings forth that the 
European social partners who wish to start autonomous negotiations leading 
to an agreement referred to in article 139.1 of the EC Treaty, must be among 
the parties entitled to being consulted by the Commission. This seems in line 
with the Commission’s own view in this respect. The Commission analyses 
representativity with regard to the European social dialogue on its website. 
It states that “the question of the representativeness of the organisations is 
fundamental as it constitutes the basis of their legitimacy for consultation 
by the Commission and for their contractual commitments”.408 Only 
representative organisations – being the organisations that are consulted 
by the Commission – are, according to the Commission, entitled to enter 
into contractual commitments within the context of the European social 
dialogue. 
5. Contractual relations, including agreements
The above makes clear that European social partners may enter into 
negotiations after being consulted or autonomously. Pursuant to article 
139.1 of the EC Treaty, these negotiations may lead to “contractual relations, 
including agreements”. Apparently, “contractual relations” comprises a 
broader range of arrangements than “agreements” alone,409 although it also 
has been argued that the difference between agreements and contractual 
relations is merely a semantic one.410 Should there be a difference between 
both concepts, as the text of article 139.1 of the EC Treaty at least suggests, 
this difference is not entirely irrelevant, as will be argued in section 5.1 below. 
An attempt to classify the different sorts of contractual relations will be made 
in section 5.2.
408  See the social dialogue website: (http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/
social_dialogue/ represent_en.htm.
409  This distinction between “contractual relations”, as a genus, and its species 
“agreements” is rather puzzling. Most legal traditions tend to take “agreements” 
as genus. Reference is made to F. dorssemont, Some Reflections on the Origin, 
Problems and Perspectives of the European Social Dialogue, page 11.
410  j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative 
Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 30.
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5.1 The relevance of distinguishing between agreements 
and other contractual relations
There are at least two reasons to distinguish “agreements” from other 
“contractual relations”. First, the social partners whom have entered into 
negotiations on the basis of article 138.4 of the EC Treaty must within a 
9 months period either conclude an agreement (or request further time to 
conclude an agreement) or inform the Commission that they are unable to 
reach an agreement. I refer to section 3.1 above. The Commission explicitly 
uses the word “agreement” and not the words “contractual relations”. Second, 
only “agreements” can be implemented in accordance with article 139.2 of the 
EC Treaty. Apparently, contractual relations that are not agreements cannot 
be implemented in the fashion laid out in that article.
5.2 The different “contractual relations, including agreements”
As often is the case, the EC Treaty itself  does not make clear what contractual 
relations and what agreements are. As Barnard puts it: “there is no indication 
as to what constitutes an agreement, nor what is considered a suitable 
subject-matter of the agreement”.411 The Commission, however, attempted to 
classify the various results of the European social dialogue. According to the 
Commission, there are four categories of results: (i) agreements implemented 
in accordance with article 139.2 of the EC Treaty, (ii) process-oriented texts, 
(iii) joint opinions and tools, and (iv) procedural texts.412 hereinafter, I will 
follow this classification.
5.2.1 Agreements implemented in accordance with article 139.2 of the EC Treaty
The Commission’s classification of this category is, to say the least, odd. One 
would suspect that the Commission would define the term “agreement”, so 
it can be assessed whether a result can be implemented in accordance with 
article 139.2 of the EC Treaty. This is, however, not the case. The Commission 
solely calls upon the social partners themselves to clarify “the terms used 
to describe their contributions and reserve the term “agreement” to texts 
implemented in accordance with the procedures laid out in Article 139(2) of 
the Treaty”.413 The Commission confirms this point of view later, where it 
states that the essential difference between agreements and other results is that 
411  C. Barnard, EC Employment law, page 89.
412  Com (2004) 557, pages 15 ff.
413  Com (2002) 341, page 18.
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the first “are to be implemented and monitored by a given date”.414 This, of 
course, does not give any clarity on the definition of agreement and is merely 
circular reasoning: an agreement is an agreement if  it has to be implemented 
in accordance with article 139.2 of the EC Treaty. 
Given the lack of a definition of the term agreement, there are two logical 
options to assess whether an understanding classifies as an agreement: (i) a 
more or less general and European definition of agreement should be followed 
or (ii) the definition of agreement stipulated in the law of the country that 
governs the understanding should be followed. As the latter option would 
lead to a changing definition of the term agreement, depending on the law 
that applies to the understanding, the first option seems best fit. This is even 
more so since international tools are as a general rule better able than national 
tools to explain a European concept.415
When defining a uniform definition of agreement, two institutions immediately 
come to mind: UNIdROIT and the Commission on European Contract Law 
(also known as the Lando Commission). UNIdROIT drafted the Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts, and the Commission Lando the 
Principles of European Contract Law. The only problem of both Principles 
is that they lack to provide a definition of the term agreement; they “merely” 
give information on concluding agreements, interpreting them etc. This, of 
course, also gives some insight in the different ingredients of an agreement.
Given the fact that both Principles refer to “parties”, instead of one party, 
and topics like offer and acceptance are important, it is easy to conclude that 
at least two parties should be present in order to enter into an agreement. 
These parties must have the intention to be legally bound and they must reach 
sufficient agreement in order to conclude an agreement (article 2:101 of the 
Principles of European Contract Law and articles 1.3, 2.1 and 2.1.13 of the 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts). The agreement must have 
a certain (legal) effect on the parties (either one or more of the parties must 
perform; chapter 7 of the Principles of European Contract Law and chapter 
6 of the Principles of International Commercial Contracts).
414  Com (2004) 557, page 7.
415  Blainpain agreed with M. Weiss that, should a European concept be insufficiently 
clear, international interpretation methods should prevail over national ones. 
R. Blanpain, Sociale partners en de Europese Unie; taak en legitimatie [Social 
partners and the European Union; task and legitimacy], in Betten et al. (ed.), 
Ongelijkheidscompensatie als rode draad in het recht (Liber Amicorum M.G. Rood) 
[Compensation of inequality as the red thread in law (Liber Amicorum M.G. Rood)], 
deventer 1997, pages 293 and 294.
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All in all, a general international definition of agreement could read as follows: 
an agreement is an act whereby two or more parties reach sufficient consent as 
to do or omit from doing something that affects their legal relation.
It remains questionable whether the aforementioned definition of agreement 
suffices for the purposes of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty. After all, the 
definition is rather broad and can even include the other categories mentioned 
below. Moreover, the definition is developed in a general context while, given 
the fact that the social partners must enter into the agreement referred to in 
article 139.2 of the EC Treaty, it makes sense that such an agreement should 
be some sort of collective agreement. This is, however, not beyond dispute. 
According to Kampmeyer, the term agreement as used in article 139 of the EC 
Treaty is not a collective agreement.416 Whether or not this is the case, depends 
– again – on the definition of collective agreement. ILO recommendation no 
91, for example, defines collective agreements as follows: 
(…) all agreements in writing regarding working conditions and terms of 
employment concluded between an employer or a group of employers or one or 
more employers’ organisations, on the one hand, and one or more respresentative 
workers’ organisations, or, in the absence of such organisations, the representatives 
of the workers duly elected and authorised by them in accordance with national 
laws and regulations, on the other. 
Although this definition clearly is meant for national collective agreements 
as opposed to European collective agreements, one must conclude that the 
agreements reached so far under articles 136 – 139 of the EC Treaty fall within 
the definition of collective agreement.417 This definition more accurately 
describes “agreement” as mentioned in article 139 of the EC Treaty. however, 
whether this definition always clearly distinguishes between “agreement” and 
other contractual relations remains to be seen.
5.2.2 Process-oriented texts
This category consists, according to the Commission, of a “variety of joint 
texts which are implemented in a more incremental and process-oriented way 
than agreements”.418 Again, the Commission does not really describe the 
content of these sorts of texts, but rather its implementation method. The 
416  Kampmeyer, as referred to in: E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social 
Dialogue, page 102, note 2.
417  See E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 103.
418  COM (2004) 557, page 16.
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Commission, however, gives more insight to these sorts of texts by dividing 
them in three sub-categories. First there are frameworks of action, which 
consist of the identification of certain policy priorities towards which the 
national social partners undertake to work. Second, guidelines and codes of 
conduct fall in a sub-category. They make recommendations and/or provide 
guidelines to national affiliates concerning the establishment of standards or 
principles. Last, there are policy orientations, which concern texts in which 
the social partners pursue a proactive approach to promoting certain policies 
among their members.
5.2.3 Joint opinions and tools
The Commission defines this category as social partners’ “texts and tools 
which contribute to exchanging information, either upwards from the social 
partners to the European institutions and/or national public authorities, 
or downwards, by explaining the implications of EU policies to national 
members”.419 According to the Commission, no implementation, monitoring 
and follow-up provisions are inserted in texts and tools in this category.
5.2.4 Procedural texts
This category consists of texts “which seek to lay down the rules for the 
bipartite dialogue between the parties”.420
6. Implementation by a Council decision
Once the social partners have concluded an agreement concerning matters 
covered by article 137 of the EC Treaty, they can jointly request it be 
implemented by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission 
(article 139.2 of the EC Treaty). According to the Commission, under 
some circumstances this manner of implementation should be chosen over 
independent implementation by the social partners. Where fundamental 
rights or important political options are at stake or in a situation where the 
rules must be applied in a uniform fashion in all Member States and coverage 
must be complete, preference should be given to implementation by a Council 
decision. The same applies to the revision of previously existing directives 
adopted by the Council and European Parliament through the normal 
legislative procedure.421 The procedure for this form of implementation will 
419  COM (2004) 557, page 18.
420  COM (2004) 557, page 19.
421  COM (2004) 557, page 10.
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be set out below. Thereafter, the conditions an agreement must meet in order 
to be implemented this way will be discussed.
6.1 The procedure for implementation
Article 139.2 of the EC Treaty clearly stipulates that the agreement reached 
shall be implemented by a Council decision at the joint request of  the signatory 
parties. Consequently, all parties to the agreement must consent to such a 
form of implementation. The EC Treaty does not give any requirements 
regarding the manner in which the signatory parties must offer the agreement 
to the Commission, but it makes sense that the request is done in writing and 
contains the agreement itself.422
The Commission subsequently verifies whether the agreement fulfils 
several conditions, which conditions will be discussed in section 6.2 below. 
The Commission will consider either or not to present the agreement for 
implementation to the Council. Should it decide not to do so, the Commission 
will immediately inform the signatory parties of the reason for its decision.423 
Should the Commission intent to present a proposal for a decision to implement 
the agreement to the Council, the Commission will provide the Council with 
an explanatory memorandum, giving its comments and assessment of the 
agreement concluded by the social partners.424
The Commission has not allowed itself  to alter the agreement. It will merely 
propose, following the above-mentioned examination of the agreement, the 
422  E. Franssen, Legal Aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 187.
423  COM (1993) 600, page 29. It should be noted that some view that the Commission 
cannot refuse to propose the agreement to the Council. In their view the 
Commission has merely a “waitress” position. See, for example, B. Bercusson, 
Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law, page 162 and A.T.j.M. jacobs, 
European Social Concertation, page 363. The Economic and Social Committee 
stated that “it is not clear that the Commission can refuse the second path 
[implementation by a Council decision]”; Economic and Social Committee on the 
Communication concerning the application of the Agreement on Social Policy 
presented by the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, 
paragraph 5.3.2. Other scholars simply agree with the Commission that it can 
refuse to propose to the Council the implementation of a European agreement. 
See, for example, L. Betten, The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in 
Community Social Policy, page 33. See also F. dorssemont, Contractual governance 
by management and labour in EC labour law, page 291. More importantly, the Court 
of First Instance clearly held in the UEAPME case that the Commission is under 
the obligation to verify the agreement, which seems to imply that the Commission 
can refuse to propose the agreement to the Council.
424  COM (1993) 600, page 29.
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adoption of a decision of the agreement as concluded.425 The Commission 
does not allow the Council to amend the agreement either. According to the 
Commission, the Council decision must be limited to “making binding the 
provisions of the agreement concluded between the social partners, so the text 
of the agreement would not form part of the decision, but would be annexed 
thereto”.426 If  the Council would decide not to implement the agreement as 
concluded by the social partners, the Commission will withdraw its proposal 
for a decision. In such a case, the Commission will examine whether another 
legislative instrument in the area concerned would be appropriate.427
The Council therefore in fact has merely a “yes” or “no” vote. The Council 
has accepted that it cannot modify the agreement.428 It did, however, express 
its concerns about certain elements of the content of the first agreement 
implemented in such a manner (the framework agreement on parental leave), 
elements which were, according to some Member States, the responsibility of 
national authorities or concerned procedural and institutional matters.429
Pursuant to the second paragraph of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty, the 
Council shall decide on the proposal by qualified majority, except where the 
agreement in question contains one or more provisions relating to one of 
the areas for which unanimity is required based on article 137.2 of the EC 
Treaty.430 In that case, the Council shall act unanimously.431
The EC Treaty itself  simply refers to a Council decision to implement an 
agreement; no choice has been made as to which legal instrument would be the 
425  COM (1993) 600, page 28.
426  COM (1993) 600, page 29.
427  COM (1993) 600, page 29.
428  The fact that the Commission and the Council cannot change the content of the 
agreement seems widely accepted. See j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of 
European Communities, EC Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal 
Basis of European Collective Agreements, page 106. 
429  COM (1996) 448, page 13.
430  Unanimity is required in the fields of: social security and social protection of 
workers, protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated, 
representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, 
including co-determination and conditions of employment for third-country 
nationals legally residing in Community territory. 
431  Some topics may prove difficult to classify, which can make it hard to determine 
whether a qualified majority suffices or that unanimity is required. Moreover, 
agreements that need to be implemented may contain topics to which the “qualified 
majority rule” applies, but also topics that need unanimity. See for these difficulties 
A.T.j.M. jacobs, European Social Concertation, pages 374 and 375.
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most appropriate means for implementation. According to the Commission, 
the choice of legal instrument (directive, regulation or decision) depends on 
the content of the agreement at hand.432 To date, all agreements that have been 
implemented by a Council decision were implemented through a directive.
The EC Treaty does not reserve a role for the European Parliament in this 
procedure, this much to the disappointment of the European Parliament.433 
The Commission does, however, inform the European Parliament of the 
proposed implementation of the agreement concluded by the social partners. 
The Commission sends the European Parliament the text of the agreement, 
together with its proposal for a decision and the explanatory memorandum, 
so that the Parliament may deliver its opinion to the Commission and to the 
Council.434
The non-participation of the European Parliament in this legislative process 
– the European Parliament is informed but has no official role – could be 
considered as undermining the principle of democracy.435 According to the 
Court of First Instance, as discussed, this principle is not undermined, as 
long as the social partners involved are sufficiently represented, which has 
to be examined by both the Commission and the Council. Through the 
participation of sufficiently represented social partners, the participation of 
the people of the European Union is, in the opinion of the Court, assured.436
6.2 Conditions attached to implementation of an 
agreement by a Council decision
An agreement concluded by the social partners must meet several conditions 
prior to its implementation by a Council decision. Only one condition derives 
directly from the EC Treaty and concerns the content of the agreement, which 
432  COM (1996) 448, page 13.
433  See j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC 
Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 108. 
434  COM (1993) 600, page 29. Once the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, this 
information procedure will be formalised. From then, at the end of the first 
subparagraph of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty, the following sentence will be 
added: “The European Parliament shall be informed.” 
435  Many scholars argued for more inclusive participation of the European Parliament. 
See, for instance, L. Betten, The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy 
in Community Social Policy, pages 34 and 35 and B. Bercusson, Democratic 
Legitimacy and European Labour Law, page 170.
436  UEAPME case, paragraph 89.
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must be covered by article 137 of the EC Treaty.437 The other conditions are, 
on the contrary, not mentioned in the EC Treaty itself, but are set out in the 
different Commission’s Communications and the explanatory memorandums 
accompanying the proposals to implement agreements by a Council decision. 
There are basically 6 additional conditions,438 which will be discussed below.
6.2.1 Condition imposed by the EC Treaty: the content of the agreement
As mentioned above, pursuant to article 139.2 of the EC Treaty, an agreement 
can only be implemented by a Council decision if  it concerns matters covered 
by article 137 EC Treaty. Article 137 goes on to set out the fields in which the 
Community shall support and implement the activities of the Member States. 
These fields are:
a. improvement in particular of the working environment to protect wor-
kers’ health and safety;
b. working conditions;
c. social security and social protection of workers;
d. protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated;
e. the information and consultation of workers;
f. representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and em-
ployers, including co-determination;
g. conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in 
Community territory;
h. the integration of persons excluded from the labour market;
i. quality between men and women with regard to labour market opportu-
nities and treatment at work;
j. the combating of social exclusion;
k. the modernisation of social protection system without prejudice to point 
(c).
however, article 137.5 of the EC Treaty stipulates that article 137 shall not 
apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike and the right to 
impose lock-outs.439
437  It is somewhat ironic to note that, although this condition derives from the EC 
Treaty, it has been a source of a long debate. See chapter 6, section 5.1. 
438  A.T.j.M. jacobs and A. Ojeda-Aviles, The European social dialogue – Some legal 
issues. In: A legal framework for European industrial relations. Report by the ETUI 
Research Network on Transnational trade union rights, Brussels, june 1999, page 61.
439  The scope of this stipulation will be scrutinised in chapter 6, section 5.1 and 
chapter 14, section 2.
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6.2.2 Conditions imposed by the Commission/Council
As previously discussed, the agreements reached by the social partners 
can only be implemented by a Council decision upon a proposal from the 
Commission. The Commission therefore has the opportunity to verify the 
agreement and to decide whether or not it will indeed present a proposal for 
a decision to the Council.440
In its 1993 communication, the Commission noted it will prepare proposals 
for decisions to the Council following consideration of (i) the representative 
status of the contracting parties, (ii) their mandate, (iii) the legality of each 
clause in the collective agreement in relation to Community law and (iv) the 
provisions regarding small and medium-sized undertakings.441 These criteria 
have been re-affirmed in 1998.442 Although in its 2002 Communication the 
Commission did not mention “mandate” in its list of criteria for implementing 
an agreement,443 it is unlikely that this criterion has become irrelevant, 
especially considering that agreements implemented by a Council decision 
after this Communication have been tested on mandate.444 Beside these 
conditions, the Commission in fact also assesses the agreements in the light of 
two other criteria, (v) a general approval and (vi) the principle of subsidiarity. 
All these conditions will be discussed below.
6.2.2.1 The representative status of the contracting parties
Prior to implementing an agreement by a Council decision, it should be 
assessed whether the signatory parties to the agreement are sufficiently 
representative. Where a sufficient degree of representativity is lacking, the 
Commission and the Council must, according to the Court of First Instance 
in the UEAPME case, refuse to implement an agreement concluded by the 
social partners at Community level. Consequently, the representativity test is 
rather important.
440  Assuming that the Commission indeed is entitled not to present the proposal to the 
Council. Reference is made to section 6.1 above.
441  COM (1993) 600, page 29.
442  COM (1998) 322, page 16.
443  COM (2002) 341, page 19. 
444  As was the case with regard to the agreement between the Community of 
European Railways (CER) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation 
(EFT) on certain aspects of the working conditions of mobile workers assigned to 
interoperable cross-border services, as set out in COM (2005), 32 final.
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Let us scrutinise the representativity test applied by the Court of First 
Instance further. It ruled that it must be ascertained “whether, having regard 
to the content of the agreement in question, the signatories, taken together, 
are sufficiently representative”.445 This sentence gives rise to four remarks.
First, it is clear that the representativity must be viewed in relation to the specific 
agreement that is concluded. The Court of First Instance stated, apart from 
the above, that the representativity of the signatory parties must be measured 
“with respect to the substantive scope of the framework agreement”.446 It also 
verified which individuals were covered by the agreement.447 Consequently, 
agreements may be legitimate when signed by organisations that are merely 
representative in view of the narrow scope of the agreement.448
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Court judges the representativity 
of the totality of the signatory parties, not the representativity of one single 
organisation.449 As Bercusson puts it, “social partner organisations could 
sign an agreement which, cumulatively, achieved the requisite degree of 
representativity.”450 
Third, the degree of representativity must be “sufficient”. There is therefore 
neither a need for an absolute degree of representativity,451 nor did the 
Court of First Instance establish a 50% rule.452 The party that challenges 
the directive that implemented the agreement, must state a strong case as to 
why its participation was truly needed in order to reach a sufficient level of 
representativity. The Court of First Instance clearly showed this by stating 
that UEAPME could not argue that “its level of representativity is so great 
that its non-participation in the conclusion of an agreement between general 
cross-industry organisations automatically means that the requirement of 
sufficient collective representativity was not satisfied”.453 Still, there seems 
445  UEAPME case, paragraph 90.
446  UEAPME case, paragraph 91.
447  UEAPME case, paragraph 94.
448  B. Bercusson, Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law, page 156.
449  E. Franssen and A.T.j.M. jacobs, The question of representativity in the European 
social dialogue, page 1309.
450  B. Bercusson, Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law, page 158.
451  B. Bercusson, Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law, page 157.
452  j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative 
Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 124.
453  UEAPME case, paragraph 104.
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to be a loophole, as the Court of First Instance stated as well that “if  the 
various signatories to the framework agreement are to satisfy the requirement 
of sufficient collective representativity, they must therefore be qualified to 
represent all categories of undertakings and workers at Community level”.454 If  
a specific category is insufficiently represented by the signatory parties, they 
require another party that does sufficiently represent that category in order to 
conclude an agreement that can be implemented by a Council decision.
Last, it should be noted that the Court of First Instance is not particularly 
clear on the criteria of representativity.455 It referred to the criteria set out by 
the Commission and to the cross-industry character, and the general nature of 
the mandate of the signatory parties.456 It also acknowledged that the criterion 
of numbers of representativity may be taken into consideration. however, the 
Court of First Instance continued that these numbers are not decisive.457 It 
stated that, although the UEAPME did have a considerable number of small 
and medium-sized enterprises amongst its members, UNICE also counted 
a substantial number of these enterprises amongst its members, and the 
wording of the framework agreement made it clear that their position was 
not left out of the negotiations leading to the agreement’s conclusion.458 The 
court of First Instance seemed satisfied that the interests of the small and 
medium-sized enterprises were taken into account.459
The above summarises the position of the Court of First Instance on the 
representativity test. But what about the Commission? As with the Court 
of First Instance, the Commission also never formulated “hard and fast 
rules” as to exactly when the social partners are sufficiently representative to 
warrant the implementation of their agreement by a Council decision. In its 
1996 Communication, however, the Commission more or less had to address 
this issue, given the (at that time pending) UEAPME case. The Commission 
formulated rather vague criteria to assess the representativity of the social 
partners involved in an agreement. It considered:460 
454  UEAPME case, paragraph 94.
455  B. Bercusson, Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law, page 158.
456  UEAPME case, paragraph 96.
457  UEAPME case, paragraph 102.
458  UEAPME case, paragraphs 102 - 104.
459  B. Bercusson, Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law, pages 158 and 
159.
460  COM (1996) 448, page 14.
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(…) the Commission does have the responsibility to assess the validity of an 
agreement in the light of its content, which requires an assessment of whether 
those affected by the agreement have been represented. The Commission considers 
that the question of the representativeness of the parties engaged in negotiation 
must be examined on a case by case basis, as the conditions will vary depending 
on the subject matter under negotiation. The Commission must therefore examine 
whether those involved in a negotiation have a genuine interest in the matter and 
can demonstrate significant representation in the domain concerned.
 
Apparently, the Commission will execute a twofold test. It assesses (i) whether 
those affected by the agreement have been represented and (ii) whether 
those involved in negotiation have a genuine interest in the matter and can 
demonstrate significant representation in the domain concerned. Both tests 
are factual and based on common knowledge. The Commission sets no 
specific criteria for its review. In subsequent Communications on the European 
Social dialogue, the Commission continued to stress the importance of the 
representativity test (“it is important to emphasise that the Commission does 
not make a legislative proposal to the Council making the agreement binding 
if  it considers that the signatory parties are not sufficiently representative in 
relation to the scope of their agreement”),461 but gave no further criteria on 
exactly how the representativity would be verified. 
The explanatory memorandums from the Commission to the Council, which 
accompany the agreements which are to be implemented (I refer to paragraph 
6.1. above), provide some additional information on how the representativity 
test is applied. From these memorandums, it can be derived that a difference 
exists between both cross-industry agreements and sectoral agreements.
The cross-industry framework agreements have all been concluded by ETUC, 
CEEP and UNICE.462 Perhaps for that reason, the representativity test as 
laid out in the explanatory memorandums is a more or less formal one. In the 
explanatory memorandum concerning the framework agreement on part-time 
work, for example, the Commission merely followed a three-step assessment. 
First, the Commission noted that the three organisations involved met the 
three (representativity) criteria that were laid out with respect to the right 
to be consulted.463 This is hardly surprising, since if  the parties would not 
have met these criteria, they would not have been consulted on this issue in 
461  COM (1998) 322, page 16.
462  Chapter 4, section 4.
463  COM (1997) 392 final, page 3.
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the first place. Second, the Commission stated that the three organisations 
involved are the only three general cross-industry organisations that are on 
the list of parties that must be consulted. Third, the Commission noted that, 
from the employers’ organisations, UNICE is the most representative of all 
industrial sectors and categories of enterprises and CEEP provides significant 
representation of public enterprises or enterprises with public participation 
in the Member States. On the side of the trade union organisations, the 
Commission considered ETUC “by far the most representative cross-
industry trade union confederation”. Combining these arguments, the 
Commission concluded that the three organisations fulfilled the condition of 
representativeness. 
The representativity test is applied more elaborately when it regards sectoral 
agreements. This can be noted, for instance, in the explanatory memorandum 
accompanying the agreement between the Community of European Railways 
(CER) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation (EFT) on certain 
aspects of the working conditions of mobile workers assigned to interoperable 
cross-border services.464 In that case the Commission applied a four-step test.
First, the Commission noted that both signatory parties met the representativity 
criteria as required from the social partners in order to be consulted. Second, 
the Commission mentioned that the agreement only covered mobile workers 
assigned to interoperable cross-border services. Third, the Commission held 
that both contracting parties had substantiated that they are sufficiently 
representative of mobile workers in the railway sector. On balance, CER’s 
members account for approximately 95% of all jobs in the railway sector and 
EFT represents the “vast majority of workers belonging to a trade union in the 
sector”.465 Fourth, the Commission observed that organisations representing 
the interests of infrastructure managers and railway companies at European 
level had been established, and that another European association made up 
of various independent trade unions for train drivers is in place. With regard 
to these organisations, the Commission considered that these were not yet 
464  COM (2005) 32 final.
465  COM (2005) 32, page 3. It is noteworthy that in its motivation on representativity 
the Commission only gives actual numbers on the coverage rate on the side of 
the employers. These employers cover 95% of the jobs in the relevant sector. The 
Commission could just as well have chosen to define coverage as the number 
of employees (indirectly) represented by the contracting European employees 
organisation that are employed by an employer (indirectly) represented by the 
contracting European employers organisation, set off  against the total number of 
jobs in the relevant sector. This would obviously lead to a much lower coverage 
rate. See also A.T.j.M. jacobs, European Social Concertation, page 368.
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regarded as representative of the sector and were therefore not consulted by the 
Commission. Consequently, the Commission concluded that the signatories 
of the agreement in question have sufficient representative status with regard 
to the railway sector in general and the workers who may be covered by the 
agreement’s provisions.466 
6.2.2.2 The mandate of the European Social Partners
An issue that is closely related to representativity, in any case in the situation 
at hand,467 is mandate. The European social partners must sufficiently prove 
that they have had a mandate from their national members to negotiate the 
agreement.468 The European organisations must thus show that they act on 
behalf  of their national members.469
6.2.2.3  The legality of the agreement
It goes without saying that the content of the agreement that is to be 
implemented by a Council decision may not contravene Community law. 
For that reason, the Commission shall verify each clause in the collective 
agreements in relation to Community law.470 In this respect, it should also be 
noted that the European social partners may provide for obligations on the 
466  COM (2005) 32, page 6.
467  Although mandate is not always necessary when it comes to collective bargaining 
in many Member States – trade unions may be representative for a certain group of 
employees, and may (consequently) bind these employees in the bargaining process, 
without having to obtain specific individual mandates from these employees (i.e. 
mandate and respresentation are not one and the same) – in this case it is important 
as to assess that the European social partners indeed communicate the (majority) 
opinion of their members, the national employers’ and employees’ organisations. 
In the end, these members are representative for the ultimate consumers of the 
agreement, the employers and employees. For the difference between mandate 
and representation, I refer to A.Ph.C.M. jaspers, Representativiteit: representeren 
of vertegenwoordigen? [Representativity: representation or mandate?], ArA 2008/1, 
pages 4 ff.
468  See for example COM (2005) 32, page 6; COM (1999) 203 final, page 5; and COM 
(1997) 392, page 4.
469  The manner in which the Commission verifies mandate differed to some extent in 
time. First the Commission simply stated it will check/verify mandate, subsequently 
it stated it will take mandate into account, thereafter it did not mention mandate 
al all and finally it returned by stating that it will assess mandate. Reference is 
made to j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC 
Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, pages 130 and 131.
470  COM (1993) 600, page 29.
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Member States in the agreement; this fact does not undermine the legality of 
the agreement. According to the Commission, the obligations imposed on the 
Member States do not derive directly from the agreement between the social 
partners but from the arrangement for applying the agreement.471
6.2.2.4  Small and medium-sized undertakings
Small and medium-sized undertakings have a nearly “sacred” position within 
the Union. If  the Council wishes to support and complement the activities of 
the Member States in the fields specified in article 137.1 of the EC Treaty by 
means of directives, it must avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal 
constraints in a way which holds back the creation and development of small 
and medium-sized undertakings (article 137.2 under (b) of the EC Treaty). 
For that reason, the European social partners must take the position of these 
small and medium-sized undertakings into consideration when negotiating 
an agreement that should be implemented by a Council decision. To that end, 
the social partners tend to add a paragraph in the agreement concerning these 
undertakings. By way of example, reference is made to general consideration 
7 of the framework agreement on part-time work, that stipulates:472
Whereas this agreement takes into consideration the need to improve social policy 
requirements, to enhance the competitiveness of the Community economy and 
to avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which 
would hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized 
undertakings.
6.2.2.5  General approval of the agreement
Although the Commission claims to test an agreement only against four 
criteria, which are mentioned above, the explanatory memorandums betray 
further criteria. Although never stipulated explicitly, the Commission seems 
to examine the political merits of the agreements.473 
Under the heading “Assessment of the agreement” the Commission noted, 
with regard to the framework agreement on part-time work, that it considers 
471  For an example thereof I refer to the explanatory memorandum regarding the 
Framework Agreement on Fixed-term work, COM (1999) 203, page 7.
472  Council directive 97/81/EC (Oj L 14, 20 january 1998, pages 9 – 14).
473  See A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 114. See also j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European 
Communities, EC Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of 
European Collective Agreements, page 103.
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part-time work “an important factor in promoting employment and equal 
opportunities for women and men”. It also stated that the social partners’ 
contribution is positive in itself  and that it guarantees that consideration 
is given both to business competitiveness and to the interests of workers. It 
then claimed that it “wholeheartedly endorses the aim of the social partners’ 
framework agreement and sees it as an important step (…)”.474 Only after 
these considerations, the Commission concludes, under the same heading 
“Assessment of the agreement”, that “all the conditions are fulfilled for 
forwarding a proposal designed to implement the framework agreement 
between the social partners by way of a Council decision”.475 Given (i) that 
sequence – the Commission first positively receives the agreement, and only 
then decides to forward the agreement to the Council –, (ii) the positive 
wording, and (iii) the place where the Commission approves the agreement 
(under the heading “assessment of the agreement”), it should be concluded 
that the agreement must pass a general test applied by the Commission on its 
content. 
The same sort of general test has been applied in the explanatory memorandum 
regarding the agreement on parental leave,476 fixed-term work,477 and the 
agreement between the Community of European railways (CER) and the 
European Transport Workers’ Federation (EFT) on certain aspects of the 
working conditions of mobile workers assigned to inter-operable cross-border 
services.478
6.2.2.6  The principle of subsidiarity
Although in its Communications on the European social dialogue the 
Commission did not draw attention to this issue, another factor that must 
be taken into consideration when deciding whether or not to implement an 
agreement by a Council decision, is whether that decision meets the demands 
of the principle of subsidiarity.479 It should thus be established whether the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot sufficiently be achieved by the 
474  COM (1997) 392, page 6.
475  COM (1997) 392, page 7.
476  COM (1996) 26 final.
477  COM (1999) 203.
478  COM (2005) 32, page 8.
479  The Commission refers to “subsidiarity” in its explanatory memorandums, 
but regards this principle in a broad manner, including proportionality: “(…) 
the principle of subsidiarity as regards its two criteria, namely necessity and 
proportionality (…).” See COM (1997) 392, page 9.
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Member States and should therefore be achieved by the Community and 
whether the action does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the EC Treaty (article 5 of the EC Treaty). For a more in-depth 
discussion of this principle I refer to chapter 2, section 3.1 of this thesis. All 
the agreements that are to be implemented by a Council decision must pass 
the subsidiarity tests. All explanatory memorandums specifically execute that 
test.
6.3 The legal effect of implementation by a Council decision
Once implemented by a Council decision, the agreement has a clear legal 
effect. As from that moment, the agreement is part of European legislation 
and enjoys such a status. As stated above, all agreements implemented to date 
by a Council decision have been implemented as directives. Their legal status 
is consequently one of a directive. The directive must be implemented prior to 
a given date and overrides deviating national legislation.
7. Implementation in accordance with procedures 
and practices in the Member States
Should the social partners decide not to request their agreement to be 
implemented by a Council decision, they can implement it “in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the 
Member States” (article 139.2 of the EC Treaty). This provision is subject to a 
declaration that was part of the Protocol on Social Policy (“the declaration”):480 
The 11 high Contracting Parties declare that the first of the arrangements for 
application of the agreements between management and labour at Community 
level referred to in Article 4(2) will consist in developing, by collective bargaining 
according to the rules of each Member State, the content of the agreements, and 
that consequently this arrangement implies no obligation on the Member States to 
apply the agreements directly or to work out rules for their transposition, nor any 
obligation to amend national legislation in force to facilitate their implementation. 
480  Reference is made to the declaration regarding article 4(2) of the Protocol on 
Social Policy (14).
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Although the legal status of the declaration is unclear (it is likely to be 
regarded as a non-binding and non-enforceable arrangement),481 the content 
is certainly helpful to assess the scope of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty, since 
it derives directly from the 11 high Contracting Parties.
7.1 The procedure for implementation
According to the text of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty and the declaration, 
the social partners may implement the content of a European collective 
agreement by means of national procedures, in accordance with the rules of 
each Member State. The formal rules of implementation at national level thus 
depend on the national law of each Member State.
7.2 Conditions attached to implementation in accordance 
with procedures and practices in the Member States
  
As opposed to the implementation of agreements by a Council decision, there 
are no limitations to implementing an agreement in accordance with procedures 
and practices in the Member States as to subject matter. Consequently, the 
European social partners may enter into agreements on all subjects they like. 
According to the declaration, however, the content of an agreement may not 
contravene the laws of the Member State in which it is to be implemented.482 
Obviously, the content may not violate Community legislation either. 
7.3 The legal effect of implementation in accordance with 
procedures and practices in the Member States
As will be set out in part II of this thesis, in most Member States collective 
labour agreements have a direct normative effect. This means that the 
normative parts of the collective labour agreements (i.e. the parts that 
regulate the employment conditions between the individual employer and 
the individual employee) directly apply to the employment agreement. do 
481  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 149. Also 
Szysczak and Toth argue that the declaration has no legal effect. See, including 
references, j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC 
Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 141.
482  According to Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat the declaration is somewhat 
curious in this respect. According to them, it is obvious that agreements that have 
to be worked out on national level cannot “oust national legislation”. Kapteyn and 
VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities, page 
1062.
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agreements implemented in accordance with procedures and practices in the 
Member States also have such a direct normative effect?
7.3.1 Direct normative effect of  agreements implemented in accordance 
with procedures and practices in the Member States
The declaration suggests that no such direct normative effect exists. It 
stipulates that the Member States are under no obligation to “apply the 
agreements directly or to work out rules for their transposition”. It seems 
therefore that the social partners involved have to make sure agreements are 
properly implemented, prior for them having any normative effect. 
deinert, however, takes a different view given his “model of parallel status of 
effect”.483 According to him, European collective agreements have normative 
effect because of article 139.2, first part, of the EC Treaty. he argues that 
the EC Treaty provides 2 alternatives for the implementation of European 
collective agreements, which are equally effective. According to deinert, the 
high Contracting Parties have drafted the first part of article 139.2 of the 
EC Treaty in order to attribute a new right to the European social partners.484 
Moreover, deinert refers to the “freedom of collective bargaining”, which he 
perceives as fundamental and existing on European level. he asks himself  
the question what good that right would do if  European social partners are 
allowed to “conclude collective agreements on the one hand but to leave those 
agreements without any effects for the individual labour contract parties on 
the other hand”?485 These effects on individual labour contracts are therefore, 
according to deinert, also part of the freedom of collective bargaining.486 
In sum, deinert takes the opinion that European collective agreements are 
automatically transferred into the Member States, and enjoy a legal status in 
that country equal to other (national) collective agreements in that country. 
The European collective agreements have normative effect, if  and to extent 
that national collective agreements have such an effect as well within a 
jurisdiction.
The above is, in my opinion, not sufficiently convincing. The text of article 
139.2 is rather clear and explicitly stipulates that agreements “shall be 
483  O. deinert, Self-Executing Collective Agreements in EC Law, page 43, in: M. de 
Vos (ed.), A Decade Beyond Maastricht: The European Social Dialogue Revisited, 
Kluwer Law International, The hague, 2003.
484  O. deinert, Self-Executing Collective Agreements in EC Law, page 37.
485  O. deinert, Self-Executing Collective Agreements in EC Law, page 38.
486  O. deinert, Self-Executing Collective Agreements in EC Law, page 38.
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implemented (…)”. This use of wording suggests (or rather: demands) an 
action to be taken,487 and cannot possibly point to an automatic applicability 
of  an agreement.488 489 Moreover, it seems rather odd that article 139.2 of the 
EC Treaty gives two implementation methods, while – if  deinert’s opinion 
is to be followed – one is not really an implementation method at all, but a 
measure of direct applicability of an agreement. Furthermore, as it is already 
debatable whether on European level “freedom of collective bargaining” 
exists, it is far more debatable (and in my opinion very unlikely), that if  such 
freedom exists, this would go as far as giving normative effect to an agreement 
reached.490 Moreover, deinert’s argument that not attributing direct normative 
effect to agreements concluded in the European social dialogue would be at 
odds with the freedom of collective bargaining, is not entirely convincing. 
Among all the different legal effects that can be assigned to collective labour 
agreements (and are assigned in the various Member states), it is hard to 
see why the option of national implementation of the European agreement 
would violate the freedom of collective bargaining. 491 Finally, I mention 
that the European collective agreements reached in the past that were to be 
implemented by the mechanisms and practices of the Member States, have 
been transposed actively in the different Member States. According to the 
first joint report on the implementation of the framework agreement on 
telework, presented to the European Commissioner for employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities on 11 October 2006, all 25 Member States 
487  According to the Webster’s new Twentieth Century dictionary of the English 
Language, unabridged, second editions, 1971, the word “implement” means 
to carry into effect, to provide with the means for carrying into effect etc. This 
suggests an action to be taken.
488  deinert notes that at first glance the text of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty indicates 
a need for transposition agreements. According to him, however, the text only 
seems unusual with regard to legal systems with detailed regulation on collective 
employment law. If  we would turn to other countries, such as denmark, where 
no Collective Agreements Acts exist and the social partners themselves arrange 
for that law, the reference is article 139.2 of the EC Treaty “seems to have a very 
deep meaning”. I honestly do not see that. If  the text would have the meaning as 
suggested by deinert, it would not have a “very deep meaning”, but it would simply 
be “very unclear”. It does not make any sense to stipulate a text that unclear, while 
the text, if  read in the way deinert suggests, would have an enormous impact. It 
furthermore makes no sense that the text would only be logical with regard to a few 
countries, in this case being denmark (and even then it is not clear at all), and not 
to many other European countries. 
489  See also F. Franssen, De Europese sociale dialoog [The European social dialogue], 
Arbeid Integraal 2007/1, page 24.
490  See chapter 8, section 4.2.
491  S. Smismans, The European social dialogue between constitutional and labour law, 
page 361.
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(except for Cyprus, Slovakia, Estonia and Lithuania) actively implemented the 
telework agreement. This has been carried out in line with national industrial 
relation systems, more specifically through national and sectoral collective 
agreements, codes of conduct and legislation.492 Apparently, the (European) 
social partners themselves are also of the opinion that European collective 
agreements lack direct normative effect.493
7.3.2 Binding effects of the agreement to be implemented in accordance 
with procedures and practices in the Member States
As argued above, agreements that are to be implemented nationally lack a 
direct normative effect. The question still remains whether they are binding 
in another form and, if  so, on whom. Four parties can be relevant in this 
respect, being (i) the European social partners themselves, (ii) the national 
members of these European social partners, (iii) the individual employers and 
employees and (iv) the different Member States. With regard to each party it 
should be first assessed whether an institutional binding effect exists (based 
on article 139 of the EC Treaty). If  this is not the case, it should subsequently 
be verified whether there is any contractual obligation on that party.
7.3.2.1 The European social partners
An obvious question that needs answering is whether a collective agreement 
poses any binding effects on the European social partners on the basis of 
article 139 of the EC Treaty. The first paragraph of this article sets out 
that these social partners may enter into contractual relations, including 
agreements. This stipulation “merely” entitles the European social partners 
to enter into an agreement and does not impose any obligation on them. 
The second paragraph, in as far as is relevant to the underlying subject, 
stipulates that agreements reached shall be implemented in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and 
the Member States. It is, however, unlikely that this stipulation is directed 
at the European social partners. After all, the European social partners are 
492  Reference is made to the EU press release on 11 October 2006, Turning European 
Social dialogue into national action – workers and employers implement telework 
agreement, as published on www.europe.eu.int/rapid/pressReleases.
493  Attributing direct normative effect to European agreements would also raise 
important questions of legitimacy. See on this: S. Smismans, The European social 
dialogue between constitutional and labour law, page 361. See also section 7.4 below.
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not capable of implementing collective agreements nationally.494 Only their 
members, the national social partners, have that capacity. It should therefore 
be concluded that article 139 of the EC Treaty does not bind the European 
social partners with regard to the conclusion and national implementation of 
European collective agreements.495
Notwithstanding said conclusion, there could be an obligation on the 
European social partners to either force or urge their members to implement 
their agreement nationally. The former seems illogical; if  the European social 
partners were entitled to represent the individual members and have done so 
in good faith, I cannot, in the absence of a specific legal stipulation to that 
effect, see any reason why the European social partners are under the legal 
obligation to force their members to implement the agreement. Any action to 
that effect should be directed to the individual members themselves. Article 
139.2 of the EC Treaty could, however, bring about an obligation on the 
European social partners to perform to their best ability to stimulate their 
members to implement the agreement. A same effort obligation could derive 
from the contractual relation between the European social partners, either 
explicit as part of the contract, or implicit, as a part of contractual good 
faith, imposed on the parties involved by the law governing the agreement.496
494  This conclusion is somewhat in strains with the fact the term “management and 
labour” used in article 138 and other parts of 139 of the EC Treaty refers to 
European social partners. Normally, terms used in legislation - especially in one 
and the same article of a piece of legislation - should have the same meaning (see 
also section 3.3 above). however, the words “management and labour and the 
Member States” as used in article 139.2 of the EC Treaty seem to have to be read 
in conjunction. As the Member States are not obliged to implement European 
agreements, as will be set out in section 7.3.2.4 below, their mentioning in article 
139.2 must have a different purpose. In my opinion, these words entail that 
“management and labour” at Member State level – that is: national social partners – 
should implement the European agreement. Obviously, the text would be much 
clearer if  it would have said “management and labour in Member States”. For this 
discussion I also refer to section 7.4 below. 
495  See also E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 129 
and R. Blanpain, Europese raamovereenkomsten, de toekomst van het Europees 
Arbeidsrecht [European framework agreements, the future of European employment 
law], Arbeid Integraal, 2007/1, page 9.
496  Franssen is of the opinion that such obligation exist. She also refers to G. Schnorr 
who subscribes to this point of view. See E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European 
Social Dialogue, page 126. The Commission also takes this opinion. It states: “there 
is an obligation (…) for the signatory parties to exercise influence on their members 
in order to implement the European agreement”; COM (2004) 557, page 16. 
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To summarise, article 139 of the EC Treaty does not impose any institutional 
obligations on the European social partners, with the possible exception that, 
once an agreement has been reached, they should urge their members to 
implement that agreement.
As will be argued in chapter 8 of this thesis, within Europe freedom of contract 
exists. With regard to the European social partners, this freedom is formalised 
in article 139.1 of the EC Treaty. Consequently, the European social partners 
may enter into agreements with binding effects. Whether, from a contractual 
point of view, an agreement reached contains any binding elements upon the 
European social partners themselves, depends on the content of the agreement 
in connection with the law applicable thereon. In deviation of Franssen,497 the 
latter has, in my opinion, as a rule to be established in accordance with rules 
of private international law.
Which set of private international law rules is to be used, depends on the law 
of the state of which a court is competent in the matter at hand.498 Within 
a European context, the competent court should normally be determined 
on the basis of the Council Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters.499 Once the 
court of a Member State proofs competent, the law governing the European 
collective agreement should in principle be determined in accordance with 
the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome 
Convention).500 In the end, all Member States are party to the Rome Convention 
(the Rome Convention is part of the acquis communautaire). This Convention 
applies if  its (i) material, (ii) formal and (iii) temporal requirements are met. 
Pursuant to article 1, the Rome Convention materially applies to contractual 
obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of different 
497  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 117.
498  The European Court of justice seems not to be competent with regard to 
autonomous agreements concluded by the European social partners. See, including 
references, j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC 
Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 144.
499  EC Regulation 44/2001, Oj L 12, 16 january 2001, pages 1 – 23.
500  The Rome Convention is going to be replaced by a regulation, Regulation (EC) 
593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), Oj L 177, 4 july 
2008, pages 6 – 15, hereinafter to be referred to as Rome I. Rome I shall pursuant 
to article 29 apply from 17 december 2009, and only slightly modifies the Rome 
Convention. This replacement will not affect the analysis in this thesis on applicable 
law, unless expressly stated otherwise.
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countries.501 The question is whether European collective agreements involve 
such a choice of law. Should the contracting parties be situated in different 
countries, there is no doubt that the agreement involves different jurisdictions, 
as a consequence whereof the Rome Convention materially applies. But even 
when the contracting parties are all formally established in the same country, 
which is not unlikely since all cross-industry social partners are situated in 
Belgium,502 the agreement may still very well have important international 
aspects to it invoking the material application of the Rome Convention. Such 
an agreement could, for example, give rise to international obligations. And 
exactly this is quite often the goal of a European collective agreement: it 
obliges the individual members of the European social partners to implement 
the contents of the agreement within the different national jurisdictions. 
having said that, it is useful to bear in mind the original report accompanying 
the Rome Convention, which gives important rules for the Convention’s 
interpretation.503 With regard to article 1 this report states:
It must be stressed that the uniform rules apply to the abovementioned obligations 
only “in situations involving a choice between the laws of different countries”. The 
purpose of this provision is to define the true aims of the uniform rules. We know 
that the law applicable to contracts and to the obligations arising from them is not 
always that of the country where the problems of interpretation or enforcement 
are in issue. There are situations in which this law is not regarded by the legislature 
or by the case law as that best suited to govern the contract and the obligations 
resulting from it. These are situations which involve one or more elements foreign 
to the internal social system of a country (for example, the fact that one or all 
of the parties to the contract are foreign nationals or persons habitually resident 
abroad, the fact that the contract was made abroad, the fact that one or more of the 
obligations of the parties are to be performed in a foreign country [emphasis added 
by the author], etc.), thereby giving the legal systems of several countries claims 
to apply. These are precisely the situations in which the uniform rules are intended 
to apply. 
501  Article 1 also excludes certain types of agreements from the scope of the Rome 
Convention, which exceptions are normally irrelevant for collective agreements.
502  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 117. See 
also j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC 
Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 132.
503  Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by 
M. Giuliano Professor, University of Milan (who contributed the introduction 
and the comments on Articles 1, 3 to 8, 10, 12, and 13) and P. Lagarde Professor, 
University of Paris I (who contributed the comments on Articles 2, 9, 11, and 14 to 
33), Oj C 282, 31 October 1980, pages 1 – 50.
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In situations in which the European collective agreement’s goal is its 
implementation in different European countries, the agreement falls, given the 
report, within the material scope of the Rome Convention. If, however, the 
European social partners are all situated in the same country and conclude 
an agreement that merely affects them nationally, the Rome Convention does 
not apply.
Pursuant to article 2, the Rome Convention has a universal formal character. 
Consequently, the court of a contracting state must apply the rules from 
this Convention, regardless of whether the dispute concerns parties from 
contracting states or other states. In other words, the Convention is a “uniform 
measure of private international law which will replace the rules of private 
international law in force in each of the contracting states”504 (obviously 
only with regard to subject matters covered by it and subject to any other 
convention to which the contracting states are party as stipulated in article 
21 of the Rome Convention). Moreover, the choice of law laid out in the 
Convention may result in the law of a state not party to the Convention being 
applied. 
Finally, with regard to the Convention’s temporal scope, article 17 stipulates 
that the Convention shall apply in a contracting state to contracts made 
after the date on which the Convention has entered into force with respect 
to that state. It thus depends on the national legislation of the state 
concerned as from when the Rome Convention applies.505 
Given the above, the Rome Convention normally applies to European 
collective agreements entered into by the European social partners with 
an aim to be implemented nationally. It is therefore relevant to assess the 
consequences of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to these 
agreements.
According to article 3.1 of the Rome Convention, the contract is governed by 
the law chosen by the contracting parties. This choice must be expressed or 
demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case. In case a choice of law is absent, the agreement 
shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely 
connected (article 4.1 of the Rome Convention). 
504  Reference is made to the comments in the report concerning article 2.
505  Rome I shall, pursuant to article 28, apply to contracts concluded after  
17 december 2009.
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Pursuant to article 4.2, it is presumed that the contract is most closely 
connected with the country where the party who (i) is to effect the performance 
which is characteristic of the contract and (ii) entered into the contract in 
the course of his trade or profession has, at the time of conclusion of the 
contract, his principal place of business. Should said party, under the terms 
of the contract, have to perform through a place of business other than his 
principal place of business, the country in which that other place of business 
is situated will be considered the country that is most closely connected to 
the agreement. The aforementioned rules regarding the “close connection” do 
not apply if  the characteristic performance cannot be determined. Moreover, 
these rules shall not apply if  it appears from the circumstances as a whole that 
the contract is more closely connected with another country (article 4.5 of the 
Rome Convention).
When applied to European collective agreements, the agreement will be 
governed by the law that has been chosen by the social partners involved. In 
default of an express or implied choice by the parties, the law applies of the 
country with which the agreement is most closely connected. In the case of 
agreements that are to be implemented in all Member States in accordance 
with article 139.2 of the EC Treaty, it will most likely prove very difficult to 
determine which party is to effect the performance which is characteristic of 
the contract. After all, all parties involved (and primarily the national social 
partners situated in the different Member States) must equally cooperate with 
the implementation process. Therefore, not the characteristic performance but 
other factors should determine the country with which the agreement is most 
closely connected. If, as will be the rule in many situations, the contracting 
parties are situated in Belgium and the agreement is also concluded in that 
country, it is, in my opinion, logical that Belgian law, as the law of the country 
most connected to the agreement, shall govern the agreement.506
Given the above, it must be concluded that possible obligatory effects of the 
European collective agreements on the European social partners have to be 
assessed by the terms of the contract interpreted by the law that applies to the 
agreement.507
506  R. Blanpain, Europese raamovereenkomsten, de toekomst van het Europees 
Arbeidsrecht, page 8.
507  Blanpain argues that European collective agreements that are to be implemented 
autonomously do not impose binding obligations upon the European social 
partners, as they not wish such obligations to exist. See R. Blanpain, Europese 
raamovereenkomsten, de toekomst van het Europees Arbeidsrecht, page 9.
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7.3.2.2 The members of the European social partners
It is uncertain whether article 139.2 of the EC Treaty poses any obligations 
on the (national) social partners to implement a European collective 
agreement. The wording used in this article seems to suggest that indeed 
such legal obligation exists. In any case, it says that agreements “shall be 
implemented”, which normally involves a legal obligation. This is the view of 
the Commission.508 As mentioned above, if  such obligation exists, it is directed 
to the members of the European social partners, the national social partners, 
since only they have the capacity to implement agreements in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the 
Member States. But does such obligation really exist? This is, to say the least, 
questionable.
First, it should be borne in mind that the EC Treaty contains rights and 
obligations of the different Community institutions; it is not designed 
to impose obligations on private organisations (such as national social 
partners).509 Therefore, it seems illogical that article 139.2 of the EC Treaty 
imposes an obligation on the national social partners.
Second, article 139.2 of the EC Treaty does not make clear as to whom it 
concerns. Although, as stated above, it must be directed to the national social 
partners, it is unclear exactly to which national social partners. Are only 
national social partners represented by the European social partners who 
entered into the collective agreement subject to a possible legal obligation, or 
are all national social partners regardless of their role in the agreement bound 
by such possible legal obligation? It seems strange to distillate an important 
institutional obligation from an arrangement that in itself  is unclear to whom 
it is directed. This is an indication that such institutional obligation does not 
exist.
Third, an obligation on the national social partners to implement a collective 
agreement seems to be at odds with the freedom of collective bargaining that 
exists on national level.510 Although national social partners that were duly 
represented by the European social partners could be considered to have used 
508  COM (2004) 557, page 16.
509  B. Bödding, Die europarechtlichen Instrumentarien der Sozialpartner, page 77, as 
referred to by E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 
121.
510  Reference is made to chapter 8, section 4.1. See also E. Franssen, Legal aspects of 
the European Social Dialogue, page 130.
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their freedom through the European social partners,511 that cannot be said 
with regard to national social partners that were not represented. This last 
category may also be effected by article 139.2 of the EC Treaty, as argued 
in the paragraph above. If  this indeed would be the case, it would be at odds 
with these national social partners’ freedom of collective bargaining; they are 
forced to use their right to collective bargaining to implement a bargaining 
result in which they did not participate.
Fourth, not all agreements concluded at European level have to be implemented 
(either by a Council decision or nationally). European social partners may 
very well conclude agreements that merely affect themselves. An obligation to 
implement such an agreement, as seems to follow from the wording of article 
139.2 of the EC Treaty, is therefore not logical.512 This is also an indication 
that such an obligation does not exist. 
Last, the wording “shall implement” as used in article 139.2 of the EC Treaty, 
should probably not be taken literally with regard to the national social 
partners, since exactly the same wording does not have to be taken literally 
with regard to the Community institutions. As set out in section 6.1 of this 
chapter, the Council is free either to implement the European collective 
agreement or to refuse such implementation. This freedom exists regardless 
of the fact that article 139.2 of the EC Treaty stipulates that agreements shall 
be implemented by a Council decision.513 It seems very odd that exactly the 
same wording in exactly the same article constitutes an obligation on the part 
of national social partners, while it does not on the Community institutions.
511  See A.T.j.M. jacobs, European Social Concertation, page 380.
512  Unless such agreement that is not to be implemented does not qualify as an 
“agreement” referred to in article 139 of the EC Treaty. See also section 5 above. 
513  See also Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the 
European Communities, page 1062 who are very clear about this. They state: “(…) 
an agreement between the social partners cannot restrict the independent freedom 
of discretion which the Commission and the Council have under the EC Treaty. 
Both Institutions are, it is submitted, free to form their own views as to whether, 
and, if  so, to what extent they wish to ‘grandfather’ a particular agreement 
concluded by the social partners.” 
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Given the above, it should be concluded that article 139.2 of the EC Treaty 
most likely imposes no obligation on the national social partners to implement 
European collective agreements.514
Whether an agreement imposes contractual obligations on the members of the 
European social partners and, if  so, to what extent, is a question that should be 
answered in a two-step approach. First, from the collective agreement reached 
by the European social partners it should be derived whether it has the goal 
of imposing obligations on the European social partners’ members. Whether 
this is the case, depends on the text of the agreement in combination with the 
law applicable to the agreement. Second, should the agreement contain such 
obligations, it should be assessed whether these obligations are binding upon 
the members. Whether this is the case, depends on whether a member has 
been correctly represented by its European social partner, i.e. whether this 
European social partner has acted within the power of attorney given to it by 
its member. This question needs to be answered in accordance with the law 
that applies to the principal-agent relation between the individual member and 
its European social partner. What law governs that relation again depends on 
the private international law rules that apply in the country of which the court 
514  See also F. dorssemont, Some Reflections on the Origin, Problems and Perspectives 
of the European Social Dialogue, page 27. See also j. Rojot, A. Le Flanchec and 
C. Voynett-Fourboul, European Collective Bargaining, new Prospects or much 
Ado about Little, The International journal Of Comparative Labour Law And 
Industrial Relations, volume 17, issue 3, 2001, page 353, in which they state: 
“No obligation to see that this application [to implement on a national level by 
collective bargaining; author] is carried out weights on the Member States and 
the representative bodies having signed (…) have no power to see that it is either 
enforced or adopted in a national framework by their national constituents.” This 
text implies that the national members of the European social partners are not 
forced to implement an agreement. See furthermore C. Barnard, EC Employment 
law, page 90, who states: “in case of an EC-level agreement, there is no obligation 
to bargain on these matters at national level nor to ensure that it applies to all 
workers”. The same view is expressed by Betten, Sciarra and Lyon-Caen, as 
referred to in j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, 
EC Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European 
Collective Agreements, pages 140 and 142. Franssen stated: “At present I see no 
other option than that the European organisations use their power of persuasion 
to influence each other and their national affiliates because EU legislation does 
not provide any solution to these problems.” See E. Franssen, Implementation of 
European Collective Agreements: Some Troublesome Issues, Maastricht journal of 
Comparative Law, 1998, volume 5, page 62. 
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is competent.515 In any case, the Rome Convention does not apply. Article 
1.2 under f  of the Rome Convention explicitly excludes the question whether 
an agent is able to bind a principal to a third party from its material scope.516 
In some countries, the Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency will be 
used.517 Pursuant to article 5 of this Convention the internal law chosen by the 
principal and the agent shall govern the agency relationship between them. 
If  no law has been chosen, as a general rule, the law of the state where the 
agent has its business establishment applies (article 5 of the Convention).518 
If  the competent court is situated outside a state in which said Convention is 
in force, it will depend on that state’s private international law rules which law 
applies to the relation between the principal and the agent. 
As a rule, the relation between the European social partner and its members is 
subject to some sort of constitution.519 The material rules of the relation of the 
aforementioned parties are normally arranged therein. If, pursuant to (i) that 
constitution, (ii) possible other/further agreement between said parties and 
(iii) the applicable law governing their relation the European social partners 
had a sufficient and binding power of attorney from their members, these 
515  According to Franssen Belgian private international law should be used to assess 
what law applies to the principal – agent relation: E. Franssen; Legal aspects of the 
European Social Dialogue, page 132. This seems incorrect. It depends on the private 
international law rules of the country in which the court that deals with the conflict 
at hand resides.
516  Given this provision, I do not agree with Franssen’s view that the law applicable 
to the internal relation of the European organisations is to be determined by the 
Rome Convention; E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, 
page 133, footnote 91. The law applicable to an important part of this relation 
– is the European social partner entitled to bind its members, the national social 
partners? – cannot be determined by the Rome Convention. The same applies to 
Rome I (point g of article 1.2). 
517  The Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency is concluded on 14 March 1978 
and entered into force on 1 May 1992. This Convention is in force in Argentina, 
France, the Netherlands and Portugal.
518  Franssen argues that agency rules are not relevant for the relationship between 
the European organisation and its own affiliates “since agency is not about the 
relationship between the agent and his principal”; E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the 
European Social Dialogue, page 133. Franssen, however, apparently uses a (too) 
narrow definition of agency. The Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency 
explicitly deals with the law applicable to the relationship between the principal and 
its agent in article 5. Moreover, the explanatory report drafted by I.G.F. Karsten 
accompanying said Convention explicitly states on page 10 that agency involves 
three separate relationships, being the relation between (i) the principal and the 
agent, (ii) the principal and the third party and (iii) the agent and the third party. 
The rules of agency thus very well apply to the relation principal – agent. 
519  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 131.
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members are bound to the relevant part (i.e. the part that applies to them) of 
the collective agreement. That relevant part could, for example, oblige them 
to implement the collective agreement nationally.520 
7.3.2.3 The individual employers and employees
As mentioned in section 7.3.1 above, article 139.2 of the EC Treaty does not 
have the effect that individual employees and employers are directly bound to 
the European collective agreement. Once the agreement has been implemented 
nationally, it can obviously bind said parties, in so far as, and to the extent 
that national rules arrange for that binding effect. If  the agreement is not 
implemented, the individual employees and employers cannot be subject to 
rights or obligations arising from there on the basis of the EC Treaty. 
The only manner upon which individual employees and employers could 
contractually be bound to a European collective agreement is through agency. 
All European trade unions consist of national trade unions, as opposed to 
individual employees, the latter which are therefore not directly represented 
by the European social partners. As a rule, the same is the case with regard to 
European employers’ organisations. jacobs and Ojeda – Aviles consider this as 
a chain of mandates, in effect binding the individual employer and employers.521 
The individual employees/employers are represented by the national trade 
unions/employers’ organisations that in their turn are represented by the 
European trade unions/European employers’ organisations. An agreement 
reached by these European organisations therefore binds individual employees 
and employees. This opinion is, in my view, not entirely convincing for several 
reasons.
First, it is questionable whether an individual (be it an employee or employer) 
who joined a social partner consented to their being represented at European 
520  In deviation of Franssen and jacobs, in my opinion the mere joining of a 
European social partner by a national social partner does not in itself  oblige the 
latter to implement a European agreement reached (E. Franssen, Legal aspects 
of the European Social Dialogue, page 132; and A.T.j.M. jacobs, European Social 
Concertation, page 380). There must in my view be an arrangement between 
both parties to that effect (either implicit or explicit). Self-evidently, in most if  
not all cases such arrangement will be in place. Blanpain seems to take the same 
position. R. Blanpain, Europese raamovereenkomsten, de toekomst van het Europees 
Arbeidsrecht, page 9.
521  A.T.j.M. jacobs and A. Ojeda-Aviles, The European social dialogue – Some legal 
issues, page 67.
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level. I assume that the mandate will in many cases prove insufficient.522 Even if  
a mandate is in place, it is still questionable whether the individual involved is 
aware of the consequences of his mandate. For example, in some jurisdictions, 
members of social partners may vote on draft collective agreements. The 
outcome of this voting is often decisive for the acceptance or refusal of the 
agreement. This is not, however, always the case on European level. If, for 
example, a national trade union refuses a European agreement (after having 
heard its members), this agreement may very well still be accepted on European 
level. After all, the ETUC uses a 2/3 majority rule for the acceptance or non-
acceptance of a European agreement. The votes cast on a national level are 
therefore not automatically decisive at European level. It would very much 
surprise me if  employees on national level that gave their mandate know that 
the majority of national members of trade unions can under circumstances 
not prevent a European collective agreement from being entered into.523
Second, the express goal of articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty is to enter 
into an agreement that is subsequently implemented by the national social 
partners (or by a Council decision). The agreement is therefore directed at 
the national social partners (who should implement) and not to individual 
employers and employees. Logically, individuals cannot derive rights from 
an agreement that is not meant for them; it was never the intention of the 
contracting parties to conclude an agreement directly for the individual 
employers and employees. 
Third, the system of “chain of mandates” is at odds with many national 
collective law systems. In these countries, specific rules are drafted that regulate 
the normative effect of collective agreements. That rules would be superfluous 
if  the chain of mandates system would suffice. These rules furthermore often 
give additional requirements to an agreement prior to this agreement having 
effect.524 In such jurisdictions, the “chain of mandates theory” simply does not 
522  With “mandate” I mean that the individual concerned knows and (implicitly) 
agrees upon joining a national association that his employment conditions may be 
(indirectly) determined by a European association. 
523  The paragraph remains somewhat speculative as I was unable to find any research 
on this topic. I have checked the articles of association of the largest trade union 
in the Netherlands (FNV). Although it refers to international participation of the 
FNV, it does not state anything about potential consequences. The FNV website 
also mentions such international participation and has a link to ETUC, but again 
no references to potential consequences of the European participation.
524  For example, many Member States require a collective labour agreement to be 
registered in order to have effect. See chapter 13, section 5.1.
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work. Given the above, European collective agreements offer neither direct 
rights nor obligations to individual employers and employees.525 526 527
7.3.2.4 The Member States
Article 139.2 of the EC Treaty imposes no obligations on the Member States, 
as no such thing is mentioned in that article. Moreover, this clearly follows on 
from the declaration, which, among other things, says that the arrangement 
of national implementation of agreements “implies no obligation on the 
Member States to apply the agreements directly or to work out rules for their 
transposition, nor any obligation to amend national legislation in force to 
facilitate their implementation”. Although, as already mentioned above, the 
legal status of this declaration is unclear, the content seems accurate.528 Since 
Member States are not a party to the European collective agreements, nor are 
525  This could in my opinion only be different if, at national level, the law would 
permit European collective labour agreements to apply directly, or would recognise 
that the European agreement contain third party rights that can be accepted and 
subsequently applied by the individual employers or employees. This, however, is an 
issue purely at national level and should be viewed separately from the European 
effects of a European agreement. 
526  I agree with the remarks of hellsten on the chain of mandates theory: “The 
attempt of jacobs and Ojeda-Aviles is certainly the most respectable. Still, it would 
mean such a step that one has to doubt whether national courts would apply such 
a doctrine without a clear message of the European Court of justice.” j. hellsten, 
Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative Process 
Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective Agreements, page 
143. jacobs himself  also expresses some doubts on his own theory. In a fairly recent 
contribution he stated: “(…) there are no real guarantees that the Euro-Agreements 
will be fully and erga omnes implemented via the ‘procedures and practices specific 
to management and labour and the Member States’.” A.T.j.M. jacobs, European 
Social Concertation, page 382.
527  See also F. Franssen, De Europese sociale dialoog, page 25.
528  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 151. See also 
Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 1062, who state: “It is obvious that agreements concluded at 
national level (…) cannot (…) oblige the Member States to amend existing national 
legislation to facilitate the implementation of those agreements.” See furthermore 
C. Barnard, EC Employment law, page 90 and F. dorssemont, Contractual 
governance by management and labour in EC labour law, pages 293.
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they being represented, there are no contractual obligations on the Member 
States arising from the agreement.529 
7.4 Does article 139.2 of the EC Treaty allow European social 
partners to draft a framework agreement enabling the direct 
applicability of subsequent European agreements?
The above explains the legal effects of an agreement concluded by the 
European social partners that is subsequently implemented in accordance 
with procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the 
Member States. The bottom line is that such an agreement should or even 
must be implemented by national affiliates of the European social partners 
in each Member State. however, Schiek argues that article 139.2 of the EC 
Treaty empowers the European social partners to enter into a European 
Basic Social Partner Agreement that allows them to conclude subsequent 
agreements that have direct effects on individual employment agreements 
situated in the EU.530
According to Schiek, collective labour agreements in all Member States have 
a dual function: they regulate the relationship between the contracting parties 
529  jacobs expresses some doubts as to the question whether the Member States are 
obliged to implement agreements. he argues: “the words ‘shall’ and ‘and’ in this 
article [article 139.2 of the EC Treaty; author], read together, could well lead to 
the conclusion, that the Member States are in fact obliged to take measures to 
adapt the legal toolbox of their industrial relations systems in order to improve 
the implementation of Euro-Agreements via the voluntary road”. A.T.j.M. 
jacobs, European Social Concertation, page 382. The same doubts are expresses by 
Bercusson in: B. Bercusson, European Labour Law, page 569. I am not convinced. 
As argued in section 7.3.2.2 above, the word “shall” seems not to be taken literally. 
Furthermore, the words “and Member States” in my view (although very unclearly) 
express that the article refers to national social partners, as opposed to European 
social partners. Moreover, jacobs does not make evident exactly what Member 
States have to do should his interpretation of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty be 
correct. he states that the Member States must adapt their legislation in order to 
improve the implementation of Euro-agreements. Apparently, the Member States 
must only improve implementation, but do not have to implement themselves. But 
how should they improve that implementation? Should they adopt an act stating 
that national affiliates of European social partners may implement at national level 
a European agreement? What sort of power should such implemented agreement 
have? Fact is that Member States have not acted in the way jacobs suggests. 
Furthermore, should the European legislator indeed have wanted the Member 
States to assist with the implementation of European agreements, it should have 
given these Member States at least some guidance in this respect.
530  d. Schiek, Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in European 
Labour Law: How to read Article 139 EC.
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on the one hand and individual employment agreements on the other. In some 
Member States, such as denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom, collective 
labour agreements have that dual function even in (partial) absence of state 
legislation. In denmark the legal status of a collective labour agreement is 
based on an agreement between both sides of the industry dating back to 
1899. It is argued that, because of said agreement, in denmark (i) members of 
the contracting parties to a collective labour agreement are partakers of that 
collective labour agreement, (ii) as a consequence whereof they are directly 
contractually bound by that collective labour agreement, while (iii) there 
is a contractual obligation between the individual employer and employee 
to abide to the applicable collective labour agreement.531 Given this danish 
example, Schiek argues that it is possible to have a system on collective labour 
agreements without having legislation to that effect, provided that the social 
partners themselves arrange for the relevant legal framework. She continues 
by stating that the introduction of the current article 139.2 of the EC Treaty 
must have meant the introduction of a method of implementation of European 
agreements not already available to the European social partners. It reads that 
European agreements shall be implemented in accordance with procedures 
and practices specific to management and labour and the Member States. The 
words “management and labour” in that context refer to the European social 
partners, not to their national affiliates. Therefore, European social partners 
must be able to implement these European agreements.532 Their agreements 
are absorbed by article 139.2 of the EC Treaty and are given legal relevance 
531  d. Schiek, Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in European 
Labour Law: How to read Article 139 EC, page 37.
532  This interpretation would render the words “and Member States” useless. If  
the European social partners would be entitled to directly implement their 
agreements in accordance with their own procedures and practices, what would 
be the role of the Member States? Schiek explains that these words are to make 
clear that the implementation method of the European social partners may not 
violate the national practices of one or more Member States (see pages 52 and 
53). This, however, would place the European social partners in an extremely 
difficult position, as the national implementation techniques differ considerable 
from Member State to Member State. There simply does not seem to be an 
implementation technique that would fit in the current laws of all Member 
States. A solution for that problem would be to follow deinert’s aforementioned 
“model of parallel status of effect”. This would make it possible to implement an 
agreement in each Member State. This solution is rejected by Schiek. She rightly 
claims that deinert’s model is in fact a model for national implementation, and not 
for European implementation (see page 51). This leaves the problem that European 
implementation is in fact impossible. Schiek tries to solve that problem by stating 
that the European agreements have, as EU law, supremacy over national law. This, 
however, would lead to enormous problems with regard to legitimacy. I refer to the 
explanation in the main text. 
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as an element of Community law.533 This would, according to Schiek, also 
be consistent with the right to collective bargaining. Article 139.2 of the 
EC Treaty thus “enables the European social partners to establish their own 
procedures and practices concerning the effect that European social partner 
agreements will have on individual employment relationships as well as on 
industrial relations. A basic contract would replace statutory regulation of 
this matter, for which the EU does as yet have no competence (Article 137(6) 
EC)”.534 The agreements entered into between the European social partners and 
implemented in accordance with their own procedures and practices would, 
according to Schiek, have to be considered Community law. The principle of 
supremacy of EU law applies to these agreements and the “European basic 
Social Partner Agreement”. Consequently, Member States would be barred 
from disabling the legal effects of the European social partner agreements.535 
The above theory does not convince me. Its basis is shaky, as the system is 
built on the danish model. This danish model is an exception in Europe. 
Nearly all Member States have extensive legislation in the field of collective 
labour law, especially intended to arrange the legal effects of collective labour 
agreements. It seems odd to make the danish exception rule in Europe. 
This exception is made rule on the assumption that article 139.2 of the EC 
Treaty must have meant the introduction of a method of implementation of 
European agreements not already available to the European social partners. 
This assumption is shaky as well. It has (in my opinion: rightfully) been 
argued that article 139.2 of the EC Treaty must merely be seen as a political 
statement.536 And even if  it were assumed that the European social partners 
have the power to autonomously implement their European agreements, I 
cannot see any indication that article 139.2 of the EC Treaty entitles them to 
do so as a part of Community law. On the contrary, article 139.2 of the EC 
Treaty would in such a case prescribe that national laws have to be obliged, 
making clear that national laws are higher in hierarchy than European 
collective labour agreements implemented autonomously. If  that would be 
any different, this would lead to serious legitimacy problems. There are no 
formal checks on representativity of the European social partners when they 
conclude a European agreement that is to be implemented autonomously. 
What would the legitimacy be of such an agreement assuming the status of 
533  d. Schiek, Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in European 
Labour Law: How to read Article 139 EC, pages 53 and 54.
534  d. Schiek, Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in European 
Labour Law: How to read Article 139 EC, page 54.
535  d. Schiek, Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in European 
Labour Law: How to read Article 139 EC, page 55.
536  Reference is made to chapter 6, section 4.1.
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Community law? There would be none.537 It would furthermore violate the 
national traditions of Member States. As will be explained in part II of this 
thesis, some collective labour agreements may gain an erga omnes effect, but 
only if  strict requirements have been met. These requirements are lacking 
when it comes to European agreements implemented autonomously. To sum 
up, the suggestion of Schiek seems to lack (sufficient) legal basis.538 
8. Summary
Pursuant to article 138.2 of the EC Treaty, the Commission must consult (i) 
the social partners before submitting proposals in (ii) the social policy field. 
The social partners that are consulted must meet three criteria. They must: (i) 
be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised at 
European level, (ii) consist of organisations which are themselves an integral 
and recognised part of Member State social partner structures and with the 
capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are representative of all Member 
States, as far as possible and (iii) have adequate structures to ensure their 
effective participation in the consultation process. Based on these criteria, the 
Commission has drafted a list of organisations that are to be consulted. This 
list has been reviewed on several occasions over time. Currently, there are 
about 50 organisations that are consulted.
The Commission broadly defines the concept “social policy field”. Not only 
the proposals pertaining to issues laid out in the articles 137 and 140 of the 
EC Treaty fall hereunder, but all Community initiatives and proposals which 
have a social or socio-economic significance. 
Said consultation process comprises of two stages. In the first stage, the 
Commission sends the relevant social partners a letter concerning the 
direction Community action in the social policy field might go to. The social 
partners may reply, either individually or collectively, in principle, within a 6 
537  Smismans argues as well that attributing direct normative effect to European 
agreements would raise important questions of legitimacy. S. Smismans, The 
European social dialogue between constitutional and labour law, page 361. doing 
the same indirectly, via a “European basic Social Partner Agreement”, would not 
change that.
538  A possible solution would be that an agreement concluded between the European 
social partners is subsequently implemented by a Council decision. This, however, 
is something that Schiek does not have in mind. Article 137.5 of the EC Treaty 
would, in Schiek’s view, block Council implementation of such an agreement. For a 
further discussion on this subject, reference is made to chapter 14, section 2.
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weeks’ time period. The second stage starts if, after the first stage is finished, 
the Commission considers Community action advisable. In such a case, the 
Commission consults the social partners on the content of the envisaged 
proposal, upon which these social partners can forward their opinion or 
even recommendations (article 138.3 of the EC Treaty). The duration of this 
second stage should also not exceed 6 weeks.
On the occasion of the consultation, the social partners are entitled to 
inform the Commission of their wish to enter into a collective agreement. 
This negotiation process may take up to 9 months and can be extended upon 
joint agreement between the social partners involved and the Commission 
(article 138.4 of the EC Treaty). The social partners that can participate in the 
negotiations have, according to the ruling of the Court of First Instance in the 
UEAPME case, to be (a) among those parties consulted by the Commission 
and (b) admitted to the negotiation table by the other social partners involved. 
Alternatively, the social partners may enter into negotiations without prior 
consultation being required. The same social partners, as defined by the 
Court of First Instance, are entitled to participate in the negotiations leading 
to article 139 agreements.
Pursuant to article 139.1 of the EC Treaty, the European social partners 
may enter into contractual relations, including agreements. Apparently, 
although disputable, a difference exists between the two forms. It is important 
to distinguish between contractual relations, not being agreements and 
agreements, because only agreements can be implemented in the manner as 
set out in article 139.2 of the EC Treaty. Given the important consequences of 
this distinction, it is odd that no definition of agreement is given. Contractual 
relations could be divided into four categories: (i) agreements implemented 
in accordance with article 139.2 of the EC Treaty, (ii) process-oriented texts, 
(iii) joint opinions and tools, and (iv) procedural texts. The term “agreement” 
could best be described as a form of collective agreement. 
If  the social partners have reached an agreement they can (i) either request 
that it be implemented by a Council decision or (ii) implement it themselves 
in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour, and to the Member States.
Should the social partners choose the first option, they must jointly request 
that the agreement be implemented by a Council decision on a proposal from 
the Commission (article 139.2 of the EC Treaty). In such a case, the agreement 
must meet seven conditions:
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1. the agreement must concern matters covered by article 137 of the EC 
Treaty; 
2. the contracting parties must have a sufficiently representative status; 
3. the contracting parties must have a mandate of their members;
4. the content of the agreement may not contravene Community law (lega-
lity);
5. the agreement must avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal 
constraints that holds back the creation and development of small and 
medium-sized undertakings;
6. the agreement must pass a general (political) test on its content; and
7. the objectives of the proposed implementation must not sufficiently be 
achieved by the Member States and should therefore be achieved by the 
Community, and the action should not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the EC Treaty (principle of subsidiarity and 
proportionality).
If  these conditions are met and the agreement is forwarded for implementation, 
the Commission will not alter the agreement. The Commission does not 
allow the Council to amend the agreement either. The Council decides on the 
proposal by qualified majority, except where the agreement in question contains 
one or more provisions relating to one of the areas for which unanimity is 
required based on article 137.2 of the EC Treaty, in which case the Council 
shall act unanimously. The European Parliament does not play an official 
role in this procedure, but is informed of the proposed implementation of the 
agreement. The choice of legal instrument (directive, regulation or decision) 
for the implementation depends on the content of the agreement at hand. To 
date, all agreements have been implemented through a directive.
The social partners could also choose to implement the agreement in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and 
the Member States. The content of the European collective agreement is, in 
such a case, transposed, by means of national procedures, in each Member 
State. The formal rules of implementation at national level thus depend on 
the national law of each Member State. The European collective agreement 
has no direct normative effect. That does not mean that the agreement cannot 
have any effect on the (possible) parties involved: (i) the European social 
partners, (ii) their members, (iii) the individual employers and employees and 
(iv) the Member States.
The agreement does not have institutional effects on the European social 
partners (with the possible exception that, once an agreement has been 
reached, they should urge their members to implement that agreement), but 
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may have contractual, obligatory effects. The latter has to be assessed by the 
terms of the contract interpreted by the law that applies to the agreement. 
In all likelihood, the agreement poses no institutional obligation on the part of 
the national social partners to implement European collective agreements. On 
the contractual side this depends on (i) the convention that possible regulates 
the relation between the European social partner and its members, (ii) 
possible other/further agreement between said parties and (iii) the applicable 
law governing their relation. 
Given the lack of a direct normative effect of the agreement, it does not 
impose any institutional obligations on the employers and employees. This is, 
in principle, also the case concerning the contractual side of the agreement. 
The agreements neither impose any institutional nor contractual obligations 
on the Member States.
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ChAPTER 6
A CRITICAL VIEW ON (INSTITUTIONALISEd) 
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
1. Introduction
In the previous chapters, the institutional framework of the European social 
dialogue, the dialogue’s history as well as the achievements of the European 
social partners have been set out. Given the only brief  history of the European 
social dialogue when compared to collective employment law known in the 
individual Member States, it is clear that the both are not easily compared. 
As will be discussed below in section 2, the “setting” of the European social 
dialogue laid out in articles 136 – 139 of the EC Treaty is quite unique. It 
will be argued that, in deviation from national laws, in European context 
supportive laws stimulating European collective bargaining have preceded 
the actual collective bargaining itself. The conclusion will be that the “real” 
function of the European social dialogue as set out in said articles is not 
so much promoting the possibilities and interests of the European social 
partners, but rather promoting the goals of the Community institutions. This 
section relies on the persuasive book “Regulating Social Europe: Reality and 
Myth of Collective Bargaining in the EC Legal Order” of A. Lo Faro. The 
ideas, concepts and conclusions in this section derive from that book. 
The aforementioned setting and function of the current institutionalised 
European social dialogue may very well be responsible for the European 
collective bargaining system suffering from important flaws and limitations 
when compared to “normal” collective bargaining practiced in individual 
Member States.539 These flaws and limitations will be put forward in a general 
part, relating to the current system as a whole (section 3), and parts specifically 
concerning the implementation of agreements in accordance with mechanisms 
539  I emphasise that the bargaining system existing within the European social 
dialogue is set off  against the normal, free bargaining systems normally in force 
in Member States. Therefore, I can very well criticise requirements applicable 
to the bargaining system in place within the European social dialogue, which 
requirements make perfect sense from the point of view of that dialogue, but not 
from the point of view of free bargaining in the various Member States. 
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and practices specific to Member States (section 4) and by a Council decision 
(section 5).
Given the inadequacies of the current system, section 6 concerns the potential 
possibilities of the European social partners entering into collective agreements 
on European level, outside the scope of articles 138 – 139 of the EC Treaty. 
It will be concluded that parties who qualify as “labour” and “management”, 
as referred to in articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty, automatically act 
within the scope of these articles. This imposes no limitations on these 
parties, it “merely” gives them additional rights, which they can chose to use 
or not. Parties that do not qualify as “labour” and “management” can also 
conclude transnational collective labour agreements, but these agreements 
lack Community relevance. Finally, section 7 summarises the content of this 
chapter.
2. The setting of articles 136 – 139 of the 
EC Treaty and their goal
As set out in chapter 3, in section 2.2, the European social partners did not 
play a “real” role within Europe until the mid-eighties. It was then that CEEP, 
UNICE and ETUC agreed upon furthering the European social dialogue on 
an informal and voluntary basis. It was a fragile beginning and ETUC even 
left the bargaining scene from 1987 until 1989. The actual “breakthrough” 
came in Maastricht, during the Intergovernmental Conference held in 1992. 
At that conference the Protocol on Social Policy was drafted, which forms the 
basis of the current articles 136 – 139 of the EC Treaty.
Given (i) the relatively brief  period of time between the first “real” role of 
the European social partners (mid-eighties) and the moment legislation 
promoting the European social dialogue was enacted (1992) and (ii) the serious 
starting problems driving ETUC away from negotiations for 2 years, already 
at first glance it seems unlikely that the Protocol on Social Policy furthered 
an existing and a more or less vivid interaction between the European social 
partners. It is said that, in deviation from the “standard” situation in the 
different Member States, in supranational context legislation supporting 
collective bargaining has preceded the actual collective bargaining itself.540 
For that reason scholars argue that, without the institutionalised structure, 
European collective bargaining would not have attracted as much attention as 
540  Caruso, 1997, page 332, as referred to in A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: 
reality and myth of collective bargaining, page 58.
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it has today.541 The aforementioned “reversal of action” and its consequences 
are described by Lo Faro as follows:542
(a) the reversal of the historically entrenched sequence between a prius which is the 
social formation of collective autonomy and a posterius which is intervention 
by state legislation; and
(b) as a necessary consequence, a reversal of the traditional analytical approach 
to bargaining dynamics, consisting in attributing to the legislative intervention 
“anticipating” Community collective autonomy (the ASP) an importance 
which at this stage seems inevitably pre-eminent.
(…) It is often said that the functioning of a self-contained bargaining system at 
Community level is hindered by a number of “missing elements” which prejudice 
its full operation as a regime: the fact that there are no clear rules on representation, 
no fully representative actors, no defined Community collective interest and no 
clear rules on the normative effect of collective agreements. In short, an absence 
of many of the fundamental elements characteristic of, or crucial to the very 
existence of, any bargaining system worthy of the name.
Given the above, European collective bargaining is radically different to 
national collective bargaining.543 544 This difference could be explained when 
scrutinising the function of the European social dialogue within the European 
system as a whole. According to Lo Faro, this function is not so much 
promoting the European social partners’ interests, but rather is “no more 
than one of providing support for Community regulation and legitimacy”.545 
The current institutionalised European Social dialogue must accordingly be 
541  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 57.
542  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 59.
543  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 61.
544  Lo Faro did ask himself  the question whether said differences between national 
collective bargaining and European collective bargaining could be explained by the 
fact that the latter is younger and thus less mature. This, however, did not seem to 
be the case. When European collective bargaining is analysed through collective 
autonomy and pluralism, one should conclude, according to Lo Faro, that both are 
unsuitable for European collective bargaining. Reference is made to: A. Lo Faro, 
Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, page 61 and 
chapter 4.
545  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 161.
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seen as a mere regulatory technique. This might explain some of the flaws in 
the current European system. 
3. Some general critical remarks concerning collective bargaining 
in the context of articles 136 – 139 of the EC Treaty
No system is flawless. This is certainly true when it comes to the current 
institutionalised collective bargaining system. A lot of critical remarks can be 
made regarding the European social dialogue. I will limit myself  to remarks 
concerning (i) the absence of important constitutional rights (freedom of 
association, right to collective bargaining and the right to strike), (ii) the 
participants of the European social dialogue (who are “management and 
labour”, are they representative and do they have full autonomy) and (iii) 
the lack of direct normative effect of the European agreements reached, 
which leads to the lack of uniform applicability of European collective 
agreements.546 
3.1 The absence of the constitutional rights of freedom of association, 
right to collective bargaining and the right to strike
Although it was and to some extent still is debatable whether the right to 
strike, the right to collective bargaining547 and the freedom of association are 
lacking from Community collective bargaining in general,548 it is certain that 
these rights are not constitutional rights. Quite on the contrary, the freedom 
of association and the right to strike are explicitly excluded from the scope 
of the EC Treaty, given article 137.5 of the EC Treaty.549 Without doubt, 
these rights are crucial to any collective bargaining system and should thus be 
546  For a general overview of the flaws relating to the European social dialogue, 
reference is made to R. Kowanz, Europäische Kolektivvertragsordnung, 
Bestandsaufnahme und Entwicklungsperspektieven [European Collective Agreements, 
inventory and future perspectives], Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1999, 
pages 220 – 256.
547  At least the right to collective bargaining for management and labour is stipulated 
in article 139 of the EC Treaty. 
548  Reference is made to chapter 8 hereof.
549  As will be discussed in section 5.1 below, as well as in chapter 14, section 2, the 
exact scope of this provision was unclear.
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awarded a constitutional place.550 Buda describes the current situation in this 
respect rather strikingly:551
No European right of association or right to collective action (strike) exists as 
yet and the Agreement expressly excludes this area from European legislation. 
This gives rise to a contradictory situation in which the Commission has the 
task of promoting dialogue between the social partners, including with a view to 
concluding agreements, but, on the other hand, has no powers to lay down binding 
legal and institutional conditions which might be conducive to a possible system 
of European labour relations. 
One might believe that the aforementioned rights are excluded from 
Community law due to abstention, which might be understood as a profound 
respect for these rights. however, these rights need active protection by public 
authority; a laissez-faire attitude does not suffice.552 In fact, the Committee 
on Employment and Social affairs, on the request of the President of the 
European Parliament, advised to enshrine these fundamental rights in 
European legislation, and to rescind article 137.5 of the EC Treaty.553 This 
advice, however, has never been implemented.
3.2 Definition of management and labour
The EC Treaty attributes important rights concerning the European social 
dialogue to “management and labour”, among which the right to enter into 
collective agreements. Exactly which parties qualify as “management and 
550  The following authors belong to the ones that stressed the importance of these 
rights: A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective 
bargaining, page 102 and 153, E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social 
Dialogue, page 8 and further and F. dorssemont, Some Reflections on the Origin, 
Problems and Perspectives of the European Social Dialogue, page 9.
551  d. Buda, On course for European labour relations? The prospects for the social 
dialogue in the European Union, in W. E. Lecher and h. W. Platzer, European 
Union – European Industrial Relations? Global challenges, national developments and 
transnational dynamics, Routledge, London, 1998, page 33.
552  F. dorssemont, Some Reflections on the Origin, Problems and Perspectives of the 
European Social Dialogue, page 14. See also S. Sciarra, The evolving structure 
of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; Draft General Report, page 12. 
The report can be found on: http://www.unifi.it/polo-universitario-europeo/
ricerche/collective_bargaining.html, and K. Boonstra, Government Responsibility 
and Bargaining Scope within Article 4 of ILO Convention 98, The International 
journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Autumn 2004, page 
457.
553  Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Report on transnational trade union 
rights in the European Union, PE 223.118/final, 20 March 1998.
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labour” is a legal question that ultimately has to be decided by the European 
Court of justice.554 A difficulty in that respect is that the EC Treaty is silent 
about any demands concerning the European social partners. Consequently, 
the Commission tried to fill this gap. It put forth that management and labour 
are organisations that should (i) be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors 
or categories and be organised at European level, (ii) consist of organisations 
which are themselves an integral and recognised part of Member State social 
partner structures and with the capacity to negotiate agreements, and which 
are representative of all Member States, as far as possible, and (iii) have 
adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the consultation 
process.555 These organisations may, given the ruling of the Court of First 
Instance in the UEAPME case, enter into collective bargaining if  admitted to 
the negotiation table by the other social partners involved.
It is logical that the Commission sets criteria that must be met by parties in 
order to qualify as “management and labour”.556 After all, these parties gain 
important (consultation and negotiation) rights which need legitimating.557 
This was rightly pointed out in the report of Reding for the European 
Parliament (although the statement related to agreements implemented by a 
Council decision):558 
The possibility of agreements between the social partners, ratified by the Council, 
opens up a promising new avenue and brings decision making procedures closer 
to the people. This provision will, of course, have to be applied with proper care; 
only organisations which are truly representative should be recognised as ‘social 
partners’ and the institutional balance established by the Treaty must not be 
disrupted. 
554  R. Blanpain, Sociale partners en de Europese Unie; taak en legitimatie, page 297.
555  Chapter 5, section 2.2.
556  Although it is less logical that these criteria do not follow from the EC Treaty. As 
things are now, it is, in fact, the Commission who can to a great extent decide who 
is involved in collective bargaining. The Commission selects these parties and only 
the parties involved in the consultation process may enter into collective bargaining 
on the topic concerned, should the agreement be implemented by a Council 
decision. This is peculiar. See also S. Smismans, The European social dialogue 
between constitutional and labour law, page 350.
557  R. Blanpain, Sociale partners en de Europese Unie; taak en legitimatie, page 285.
558  Report of the Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and the Working 
Environment, on the application of the Agreement on Social Policy, 20 April 1994, 
PE 207.928/final, page 9.
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The legitimacy of the participation of the social partners involved in the 
European social dialogue therefore lies in their representativity;559 they are 
close to the people and must be considered to represent these people, at least 
the European employers and employees.560 The social partners need to prevent 
that there is a “social democratic deficit” in the European social dialogue.561 
The three criteria applied by the Commission in order to define “management 
and labour” must be set against this backdrop.
That organisations must be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or 
categories is fine (although it is not always easy to define cross-industry).562 
This includes as many parties as possible. however, the subsequent 
requirement – they need to be organised at European level – excludes a 
number of parties. In any case, in order to involve as many social partners 
as possible, with an aim to raise the level of representativity, it is not 
necessary to only involve European organisations.563 This is particularly true 
as (representative) national social partners are sometimes excluded from 
membership of European organisations.564 Moreover, should an agreement 
be especially relevant for a number of countries and not throughout the entire 
European Union (agreements on ports are, for example, in particular relevant 
for coastal states), the requirement of a European organisation level is out of 
559  Although, again, the EC Treaty itself  does not (explicitly) demand representativity, 
as is rightly pointed out by Bercusson. See B. Bercusson, European Labour Law, 
page 558.
560  L. Betten, The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community Social 
Policy, pages 34 and 35. See also European Commission, directorate-General for 
Employment and Social Affairs, Recent developments in the European Sectoral 
Social Dialogue, page 5, in which it is stated: “The sectoral organisations listed in 
the report can all lay claim to their representativeness (…). This, together with their 
social mandate, gives them the authority to negotiate and, where it is appropriate, 
to reach agreements”. 
561  R. Blanpain, Sociale partners en de Europese Unie; taak en legitimatie, page 296. 
See also E. Franssen and A.T.j.M. jacobs, The question of representativity in the 
European social dialogue, page 1305.
562  The term cross-industry caused problems at the Institut des Sciences du Travail, 
which institute had to conduct the research “on the representativeness of European 
Social Partner Organisations”. See for examples page 3 of their report: Report on 
the representativeness of European Social Partner Organisations, Part I, September 
1999.
563  R. Blanpain, Sociale partners en de Europese Unie; taak en legitimatie, page 295.
564  For example, the French trade union Confédération Générale du Travail was refused 
for years from ETUC membership. Reference is made to R. Blanpain, Sociale 
partners en de Europese Unie; taak en legitimatie, page 295. The Confédération 
Générale du Travail joined ETUC only in March 1999. See C. degryse, European 
social dialogue: a mixed picture, page 7.
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place.565 Such a requirement also does not sit well with the European tradition 
of pluralism.566 Of course the Commission does have a legitimate interest to 
keep the number of participating social partners as low as possible in order 
to strive towards a highest level of efficiency as possible. however, efficiency 
and the national members delegate their “representativity” – their power to 
represent and, depending on the jurisdiction, bind employers and employees 
- to the European social partners may not be confused.567 568
The second criterion, the “social partners should consist of organisations 
which are themselves an integral and recognised part of Member State social 
partner structures and with the capacity to negotiate agreements, and which 
are representative of all Member States, as far as possible”, gives further rise for 
discussion. The first part of this second criterion is logical. As said, the national 
members delegate their “representativity” to the European social partners. In 
order to do so, they should be a recognised part of Member State social partner 
structures and able to negotiate agreements. Furthermore, they should be able 
to implement the European agreement reached in the several Member States, 
which can be done if  the members meet the aforementioned requirements. 
The second part is much more open for discussion. As already stated, the fact 
that members of the European social partners should be representative makes 
sense. however, it is still not clear precisely when a European social partner 
565  Also Bercusson deems it important to verify representativity in relation to the 
geographical area the agreement must cover. he states: “Collective agreements 
among social partners in a group of Member States could also satisfy the 
requirement of ‘sufficient collective representativity’ if  the geographical scope of 
the agreement was clearly circumscribed”. B. Bercusson, Democratic Legitimacy 
and European Labour Law, page 168.
566  E. Franssen and A.T.j.M. jacobs, The question of representativity in the European 
social dialogue, page 1309. The enlargement of the European Union has not 
reduced this tradition. I refer to the report of S. Sciarra, The evolving structure of 
Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; Draft General Report, page 6, in which 
it is stated: “(…) we can highlight that especially in new Member States emphasis is 
put on pluralism among collective actors and on the increased number of unions”. 
567  R. Blanpain, Sociale partners en de Europese Unie; taak en legitimatie, page 296.
568  The Commission is keen on combating exclusion in social law. See for example 
the Communication from the Commission on the Social Agenda, COM (2005) 
33, final. Classical labour law often strengthens the position of the “insiders”, 
the people that are already introduced in the social systems, to the detriment of 
the “outsiders”. This should give the Commission sufficient reason to promote 
plurality, in order to protect the outsiders as much as possible. See also F. 
dorssemont, Green Paper Modernising Labour Law to meet the Challenges of the 
21st Century, ‘Collectief Arbeidsrecht, waer bestu bleven?’ [Green Paper Modernising 
Labour Law to meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, ‘Collective Labour Law, 
where are thou?’], Arbeid Integraal 2007/1, page 152. 
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is considered representative. This is an issue that will be discussed separately 
in the section below. What I do mention already is that the European social 
partners should, given the second criterion, be representative in “all Member 
States, as far as possible”. This again excludes national social partners and 
limits the representativity of the parties involved.
Closely related to this second criterion, at least at Community level,569 is the 
requirement proposed by the European Parliament: the European social 
partners should have a mandate from their members to represent them in the 
context of the Community social dialogue. This requirement appears to make 
sense, given the aforementioned consideration that the national members 
delegate their “representativity” to the European social partners. Nevertheless, 
the Commission did not adopt this requirement.570 In my opinion this is a 
flaw. After all, European social partners ultimately represent the European 
people, or at least the European employers and employees. The distance 
between these ultimate consumers of the European collective agreements and 
the European social partners is substantial. It is possible, for example, that a 
national trade union confederation is a member of the ETUC. That national 
confederation represents national trade unions, which in turn represent the 
employees (who are member). It must indeed be clear that the European 
social partners actually serve the interests of the remote consumers, which 
can be made clear by having proper mandates. Although some scholars state 
that verifying the mandate violates the autonomy of the social partners and 
should therefore not take place,571 I disagree. The mere fact that European 
social partners represent a great number of representative national members, 
entitles them to participate in the European social dialogue. This should, 
therefore, be verifiable.572 
The third criterion – that the European social partners should have adequate 
structures to ensure their effective participation in the consultation process – 
makes sense. There should be a certain level of efficiency in the consultation 
569  See the footnotes in chapter 5, section 6.2.2.2.
570  Although the Commission in fact verifies the existence of a proper mandate in case 
an agreement is implemented by a Council decision. Reference is made to chapter 
5, section 6.2.2.2.
571  B. Bercusson, Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law, page 162.
572  See also j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC 
Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 133.
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process, provided, of course, that this efficiency is not confused with 
democracy.573
3.3 Social partners and representativity
As stated in the above section, the legitimacy of the participation of the social 
partners involved in the European social dialogue lies in their representativity. 
The three criteria introduced by the Commission to define “management and 
labour” must single out these representative parties in order to allow them to 
participate in the European social dialogue. Singling out the representative 
the social partners, however, is a troublesome task. Franssen and jacobs 
rightly described representativity of the European social partners as “one of 
the thorniest issues of the European social dialogue”.574 
In the context of the European social dialogue, representativity of the 
European social partners concerns the relation between the social partners 
and the people of the EU. The European social partners draft agreements 
that can influence these people’s rights and obligations – most of the times, 
in particular, that of the employers and employees. The European social 
partners should therefore be considered a trustworthy spokesperson for these 
people, and, again, most of the times mainly for the European employers and 
employees.575
The Economic and Social Committee rightly stated that representativity in 
the European social dialogue can be shaped two ways: taking, as a starting 
point, national representativity criteria when selecting social partners or 
selecting these as “having regard to the nature of the process and the outcome 
of the EC social dialogue”.576 In the latter case, according to the Economic 
and Social Committee, transnational criteria are linked to national social 
partners, and organisational capacity. After an extensive study of European 
573  In other words: the aim towards efficiency may not entail that otherwise suitable 
social partners are excluded from the consultation process for mere efficiency 
reasons, endangering the democratic legitimacy of the European social dialogue. R. 
Blanpain, Sociale partners en de Europese Unie; taak en legitimatie, page 296.
574  E. Franssen and A.T.j.M. jacobs, The question of representativity in the European 
social dialogue, page 1297.
575  dorssemont calls this “representativity in the sociological sense”. See, including 
references, F. dorssemont, Over de ‘representativiteit’ van ‘sociale partners’ in de 
Europese Sociale Dialoog, page 143.
576  Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Communication 
concerning the application of the Agreement on Social Policy presented by the 
Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, paragraph 2.1.9.
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employers’ and workers’ organisations, it proved impossible to replicate 
a single national model as to representativeness at European level.577 The 
Commission therefore drafted the aforementioned three transnational criteria 
that are linked to national social partners.
The difficulty of these criteria when it concerns representativity – are the 
social partners involved trustworthy spokespersons for the group of people 
they claim to represent? – is that these criteria are purely formal. They 
relate to the organisational structure of the European social partners, but 
do not touch on the topic of whether the agreement concluded by the 
European social partners adequately addresses the interests of the people 
the agreement affects and which interests the social partners supposedly 
represent.578 Undeniably, the members of the European social partners need, 
pursuant to the second criterion, to be “an integral and recognised part of 
Member State social partner structures and with the capacity to negotiate 
agreements” and need even to be “representative of all Member States, as far 
as possible”, but the criteria for being representative and the consequences of 
that differ considerably from country to country. These national criteria do 
not “guarantee” that the European social partners, comprised of a number of 
these representative national social partners, are representative for the people 
of the EU. The Institut des Sciences du Travail, which conducted the research 
on the representativness of the European social partners’ organisations, 
was clear about that. It stated that it only examined the “the institutional 
consequences which arise depending on whether or not the affiliate members 
of the European organisation are recognised as representative”.579 It continued 
by stating that representativeness – which was understood as the recognition 
of the “legitimacy of an organisation of social partners to negotiate collective 
agreements or to participate in developing social policies” – can be interpreted 
in a variety of ways, ways which differ in the light of various national traditions 
in this area.580 The Institut des Sciences du Travail thus only verifies the national 
representativeness of the different members of the European social partners, 
which differs from country to country, but does not verify whether as a whole 
the European organisation is actually representative, i.e. is to be considered 
a trustworthy spokesperson for the group of people whose interests it claims 
577  Reference is made to annex 3 of COM (1993), 600 final.
578  M. Schmidt, Representativity – A Claim Not Satisfied: The Social Partners’ role 
in the EC law-Making Procedure for Social Policy, The International journal Of 
Comparative Labour Law And Industrial Relations, Autumn 1999, page 264.
579  Institut des Sciences du Travail, Report on the representativeness of European Social 
Partner Organisations, Part I, page 5.
580  Institut des Sciences du Travail, Report on the representativeness of European Social 
Partner Organisations, Part I, page 5.
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to represent. That raises the question of whether European social partners 
recognised by the Commission can be considered truly representative.
The above question was answered in a negative manner in the past by a number 
of organisations. On the employers’ side, UNICE (BUSINESSEUROPE) 
claims to represent the interests of all private business, including small and 
medium-sized enterprises, a claim which has been challenged by UEAPME. 
CEEP represents public enterprises, but it does not represent all public 
enterprises, such as the civil service.581 On the employees’ side, ETUC represents 
the majority of trade unions, but other European trade unions whish to be 
involved in negotiations as well.582 As already mentioned above, some national 
organisations wish to be represented at European level as well. 
But there is also other, more fundamental, critique on the European social 
partners’ representativity. The fact is that the big umbrella organisations 
UNICE, CEEP and ETUC are traditionally involved in the cross-industry 
collective bargaining.583 however, these parties do not represent all categories 
of  employers and employees for several reasons.584 After all, not all trade unions 
and employers’ organisations are affiliated to these umbrella organisations. 
Moreover, the decision-making process of these organisations is not always 
based on unanimity, setting aside a minority view.585 Furthermore, only a small 
number of employers and employees are actually organised at national level, a 
number which seems to be even dropping further among employees.586 In that 
respect is should also be noted that not all groups of employees are evenly 
unionised. Typically, it is the elderly male full-time worker (working in the 
public sector) who is unionised, leaving underrepresented part-time workers, 
581  E. Franssen and A.T.j.M. jacobs, The question of representativity in the European 
social dialogue, page 1299.
582  Such as the Confédération Européenne des Syndicats Indépendants and the 
Confédération Européenne des Cadres. Reference is made to E. Franssen and 
A.T.j.M. jacobs, The question of representativity in the European social dialogue, 
page 1299. The latter organisation has since 2000, given the cooperation agreement 
concluded with ETUC and EUROCAdRE, gained influence in the European 
social dialogue. Reference is made to chapter 2, section 4.2.
583  See chapter 3, section 5.
584  M. Schmidt, Representativity – A Claim Not Satisfied: The Social Partners’ role in 
the EC law-Making Procedure for Social Policy, page 265.
585  See chapter 2, section 4.
586  See chapter 13, section 2.2.1.
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temporary workers, younger workers and women.587 It is their interests that 
the European employees’ organisations typically represent, and not so much 
the interests of the people of the EU as a whole.588
Betten particularly emphasises the already mentioned fact that only a limited 
number of employees and employers are represented by social partners. 
She poses the rhetorical questions of whether it is not important that “if  
not all, then at least a majority of workers and employers are represented” 
and whether it does not go “against the grain of a democratic society, to 
the principles of which all Member States subscribe, not to respect the 
majority rule”.589 Betten apparently views representativity of the European 
social partners as a matter of “representative democracy” (emphasising the 
counting of numbers of individuals involved; hereafter also to be referred to as 
factual representativity), rather than a matter of “participatory democracy”590 
(emphasising the role of the social partners).591 592 I do not subscribe to that 
point of view: representativity of the social partners should not be placed in a 
model requiring a majority participation of all individuals concerned. If  such 
a demand would be extrapolated to democratic states, it should be concluded 
that democratically chosen institutions could not function without being 
587  Reference is made to M. Schmidt, Representativity – A Claim Not Satisfied: The 
Social Partners’ role in the EC law-Making Procedure for Social Policy, page 265. 
See also the trade union membership Survey 1993–2003, which states that the 
average female/male ratio in unions in the 26 European Countries that have been 
investigated is 41,5% against 58,5%; M. Carley, Trade union membership 1993–2003, 
21 May 2005, EIRO, page 10. The ratio of female trade union members, however, is 
moving closer to that of men. For an analysis of the “typical” trade union member, 
reference is made to j. Visser, Union membership statistics in 24 countries, Monthly 
Labor Review, january 2006, pages 46 and 47.
588  L. Betten, The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community Social 
Policy, page 35.
589  L. Betten, The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community Social 
Policy, page 32.
590  Barnard states the following about the participatory model of democracy: “At the 
hart of this model lies the idea that decisions are taken as close to the citizens as 
possible on subject matters of interest and relevance to the citizens.” C. Barnard, 
EC Employment law, page 101.
591  For the difference between representative democracy” and “participating 
democracy” reference is made to F. dorssemont, Over de ‘representativiteit’ van 
‘sociale partners’ in de Europese Sociale Dialoog, page 147. See also T. Novitz, 
International and European Protection of the Right to Strike: A Comparative Study 
of Standards Set by the International Labour Organization, the Council of Europe 
and the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2003, pages 15 – 22.
592  Or is there a form of “associative democracy”, because the participation of the 
people is assured via democratically organised associations? See S. Smismans, The 
European social dialogue between constitutional and labour law, page 348.
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chosen by at least 50% of the people who were entitled to vote. It is not unique 
that in some elections the turnout is lower than 50%.593 Still, the legitimacy 
of decision-making of that democratic institution is not challenged.594 Why 
should this be radically different when social partners are concerned? 595 
Moreover, members of social partners have to contribute time, money and 
energy for their membership, which is not the case in “normal” democratic 
elections. The members of the social partners are therefore quite likely to be 
more involved (at least they sacrificed more) and possibly better informed 
than voters in normal democratic elections. Consequently, the outcome of 
a process which is agreed upon after obtaining the consent of a trade union 
with a density of, for example, 30% among the relevant group of employees 
could sometimes be considered “better” than the outcome of a process which 
is agreed upon after a general election within that group, with a turn-out of 
for example 35%.
here, it is also useful to keep in mind the European Constitution. Although 
not ratified, it has clear ideas about the democratic life of the Union. 
The Union was not only to be founded on the principle of representative 
democracy, but also on the principle of participatory democracy, in which 
social partners had an important role to play. Reducing the role of social 
partners to “representative democracy” would do their position little justice. 
Although admittedly less explicit, also the Treaty of Lisbon emphasises 
the importance of the European social partners, while equally stressing 
the importance of both the principle of representative democracy and the 
principle of participatory democracy. I refer to chapter 3, section 7.
593  For the 2004 European Parliament elections the turnout ranged from 90.8% 
in Belgium to a low of 17.0% in Sweden. The average turnout in the European 
Community amounted to 45.6%. Reference is made to F. Amtenbrink, 
Continuation or Reorientation? What Future for European Integration?, Boom, The 
hague, 2007, page 40.
594  F. dorssemont, Over de ‘representativiteit’ van ‘sociale partners’ in de Europese 
Sociale Dialoog, page 147.
595  The only difference is that governments can easier be held accountable for 
unpopular policies than social partners, as governments can lose votes in the next 
election. Still, that does not explain why social partners having a density among 
the people/companies of over 50% may be considered representative, while social 
partners with a lower density rate may not, as they both suffer from the same 
potential accountability problems. See also: T. Novitz, International and European 
Protection of the Right to Strike: A Comparative Study of Standards Set by the 
International Labour Organization, the Council of Europe and the European Union, 
page 19.
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Notwithstanding these last remarks, the above demonstrates that serious 
questions can be placed concerning the true representativity of the European 
social partners. An additional problem constitutes the fact that the Commission 
never formulated clear and unambiguous material rules on the representativity 
of the social partners.596 These rules are therefore not sufficiently clear, 
transparent and drafted in advance, which is demanded by the ILO in respect 
to collective bargaining.597 Although the ILO standards do not (directly) 
apply to the Community, it makes perfect sense that the European citizens, 
as possible ultimate consumers of agreements drafted by the European 
social partners, exactly know which parties may directly participate in the 
European social dialogue. Equally, the European employers’ and employees’ 
organisations, as possible participants in the European social dialogue, are 
also entitled to know in advance exactly when they may participate in the 
European social dialogue (and therefore what they should do to meet the 
relevant standards, if  they do not participate yet).
3.4 Lack of direct normative / uniform effect
European collective agreements do not directly affect the individual 
employers and employees. In any case, prior to binding said individuals, these 
agreements must either be implemented in each Member State in accordance 
with that state’s and social partners’ normal rules and procedures, or must 
be implemented by a Council decision. Either way, in order to reach binding 
effects on individuals, third parties have to take appropriate action. In 
other words, the European agreements have no direct normative effect, but 
rather a possible indirect effect depending upon third party’s cooperation. 
This implementation process may very well jeopardise the uniformity of the 
agreement. 
Should the European collective labour agreement be implemented in 
accordance with national procedures, the status of the implemented collective 
labour agreement will differ from state to state. The implementation methods 
596  See, for instance, Bercusson who states: “The Commission’s criteria ignore the 
problems that bedevil the use of ‘representativeness’ as a criterion. (…) The 
Commission has effectively opted for administrative decision as the short term 
solution to the problem of selecting which organisations fall within the scope of 
labour and management in the Agreement.” See B. Bercusson, European Labour 
Law, page 560.
597  j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative 
Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 126 and R. Blanpain, Sociale partners en de Europese Unie; taak 
en legitimatie, page 294.
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may very well not be the same. Some countries may use guidelines to 
implement, other collective labour agreements or tripartite arrangements. 
But even if  every Member State would implement the European collective 
labour agreement in the same way, for example by a national collective labour 
agreement, the legal effects would still differ. The legal effects of a collective 
labour agreement are simple not the same in the various Member States, as 
will be demonstrated in part II of this thesis. Moreover, during the national 
implementation procedure the content of the European collective labour 
agreements may change. The national social partners are under no institutional 
obligation to “copy-paste” the European agreement upon implementation. 
They may, for example, add other rights and obligations to the agreement in 
the implementation process.598
Should the European agreement be implemented by a Council decision, 
history learns that this is normally done by a directive.599 This directive must 
subsequently be implemented in the different Member States. Although the 
legal status of the implemented directive is more or less the same in each 
Member State – the implementation must be clear and legally certain in each 
Member State600 – the content of the European agreement may very well 
change along the way. The Member State may, as it wishes, add other rights and 
obligations to the European agreement during the national implementation 
process. All in all, it is not surprising that Keller stated on the (lack of) uniform 
effect of implementation of European collective agreements:601
The instruments for implementation are not part of community law but rather 
remain wholly within the competence – and are hence at the discretion – of 
598  As the proof of the pudding is in the eating, if  should be remarked that the 
implementation of the first autonomous framework agreement on telework 
indeed led to great diversity from country to country, as can be derived from the 
following quote from S. Weiler, Diversity in implementation of telework agreement 
across the EU, 9 january 2007, to be found on the Eurofound website: “Member 
organisations of the agreement’s signatory parties agreed on instruments and 
procedures that reflect a huge disparity both in the implementation and in the 
development of innovative social dialogue practices. In this regard, the European 
social partners consider that the difficulties met are due to the lack of experience 
among member organisations in implementing a European framework agreement, 
the novelty of the issue and the diversity of industrial relations systems in the 
various Member States.” See also F. Franssen, De Europese sociale dialoog, page 
25. 
599  Reference is made to chapter 5, section 6.1.
600  Reference is made to chapter 2 section 3.3.
601  B. Keller, National industrial relations and the prospects for European collective 
bargaining – The view from a German standpoint, page 53.
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national decision-making bodies. Given the lack of any supranational law on 
collective bargaining and collective agreements, it is impossible to ensure even 
a reasonable uniform degree of implementation of the substance of European 
collective agreements (…).
This lack of uniform effect of the European collective labour agreement in 
each Member State is an important flaw, since uniform applicability leading 
to the elimination of social competition is “the quintessence” of collective 
agreements.602 603
3.5 Lack of European social partners’ autonomy 
As a consequence of the aforementioned lack of direct normative effect of 
the agreements concluded, and the consequent European social partners’ 
dependability on third parties to implement the agreement, the European 
social partners have a less evolved autonomy when compared to the social 
partners’ typical situation in Member States.604 This can be noticed on 
different levels. 
First, the European social partners are never certain whether their agreement 
will acquire normative effect when entering into such an agreement. Although 
from the literal wording used in article 139 of the EC treaty it appears that 
602  F. dorssemont, Some Reflections on the Origin, Problems and Perspectives of 
the European Social Dialogue, page 7. See also E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, 
S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-Ré, Transnational Collective 
Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 15.
603  To a certain extent this argument needs to be differentiated. The European 
agreements should arrange for certain minimum standards. These minimum 
standards should eliminate downward social competition. The fact that Member 
States or national social partners add more rights to this minimum standard is 
in itself  not a problem in order to achieve these minimum standards. however, 
minimum standards can only be achieved if  the legal status of the national 
collective agreement (should the agreement be implemented in accordance with 
national procedures) is always binding upon all parties involved, which is not the 
case as will be set out in part II hereof. Moreover, minimum arrangements seem 
sometimes “lost in translation”, as appears from the following quote with regard to 
the framework agreement on telework: “The lack of translations of the European 
agreement into different languages should be reviewed as it cannot be the objective 
that the national colleagues have to start ‘re-negotiating’ the European agreement. 
In any case, the translation exercise should not be used to downgrade the EU text! 
The EU text is the minimum!” ETUI-REhS, Benchmarking Working Europe 2007, 
page 118.
604  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 15.
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the Community institutions have no choice but to implement the agreement 
presented to them by the European social partners, in fact they assess the 
agreement and subsequently decide whether or not to implement. For this 
process I refer to chapter 5, section 6 hereof. Furthermore, a right for the 
signatories to have the agreement implemented in accordance with the 
practices specific to the social partners and the Member States seems to be 
lacking, as is discussed in chapter 5, section 7. This seems to be at odds with 
full social partners’ autonomy. 
Second, even when implemented, the implementation procedures can – as 
mentioned in the previous section – materially change the contents of the 
agreement, prior to it having normative effect within the Member States. As 
a consequence, the implementation process may potentially jeopardise the 
content of the agreement, which in turn may jeopardise the often delicate 
balance of the agreement and its (international) uniform application. This 
uncertainty about the final wording of the implemented agreement seems at 
odds with the social partners’ autonomy.
Third, the European social partners lose to a certain extent control over their 
“product” once it has been implemented. After national implementation, 
the agreement becomes a national product and is difficult to control from 
an international perspective. Not only is it difficult to be fully informed of 
national implementation details,605 but it may also be difficult to force the 
national social partners to alter the agreement should that deem necessary to 
the European social partners. Once an agreement is implemented by a Council 
decision, the European social partners more or less lose all their control, 
since the agreement is then “transferred” into Community legislation.606 This 
leaves the European social partners empty-handed should a Member State 
implement the directive in a manner not desired by them.607 
Although a lot can be said on the European social partners’ autonomy and 
some more will be said further on in this thesis, a final remark in this respect 
concerns the role of the Commission in the collective bargaining process and 
its potential infringement in the social partners’ autonomy. The brief  history 
of the European social dialogue clearly shows that the trade unions (have) 
had considerable difficulties entering into meaningful negotiation with the 
605  Reference is made to section 4.3.4 hereof.
606  See also F. dorssemont, Contractual governance by management and labour in EC 
labour law, page 305.
607  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 120. See also: E. Franssen, Implementation of European Collective 
Agreements: Some Troublesome Issues, page 60.
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European employers’ organisations. The fact that agreements have been 
concluded in the past, does not seem to derive from the latter’s willingness 
to freely negotiate, but rather from the pressure put on it by the Commission, 
who has clearly stated that without an agreement the legislative initiative will 
return to the Commission which would lead, at least for the employers, to 
inferior results.608 It would take legal measures if  no collective agreement was 
to be concluded. Bercusson accurately described this as: “bargaining in the 
shadow of the law”.609 
This pressure from the Commission could be regarded as an infringement on 
the autonomy of the European social partners.610 A more natural response 
of the European trade unions, or at least a response more befitting an 
autonomous collective bargaining process, would be for them to start a strike 
or threaten to start one, should the employers’ organisations refuse to enter 
into negotiation (which brings us back to the first mentioned subject, being 
the lack of a constitutional right to strike).611 612
4. Some critical remarks concerning agreements 
implemented autonomously 
After these general remarks, let us scrutinise a specific form of implementation, 
the implementation of agreements “in accordance with the procedures and 
practices specific to management and labour and the Member States” (article 
139.2 of the EC Treaty). 
608  C. Barnard, EC Employment law, page 102.
609  B. Bercusson, Maastricht: a Fundamental Change in European Labour Law, 1992, 
Industrial Law journal, page 185.
610  Or at the minimum it caused the European social partners to enter into agreements 
of which they did not choose the subject themselves. As Caruso puts it, the risk 
exists that collective bargaining is turned into an ”instrument for the consensual 
attainment of objectives which have not been selected autonomously but imposed 
from outside”, Caruso, 1997, page 331, as mentioned in A. Lo Faro, Regulating 
Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, page 133. 
611  Schiek argues that autonomy presupposes the absence of public intervention as 
well as private domination. d. Schiek, Autonomous Collective Agreements as a 
Regulatory Device in European Labour Law: How to read Article 139 EC, page 26. 
Both elements are lacking on a European level.
612  It is reminded that the European social partners (thus including the employers’ 
organisations) have decided in their Laeken declaration to develop a more 
autonomous social dialogue. This might bring forth that Commission pressure 
stimulating collective bargaining may not be necessary anymore in the future. 
Reference is made to chapter 3, section 5 of this thesis.
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There is a lot that can be said on this subject. A basic question is whether 
the underlying stipulation in the EC Treaty introduced a new right or simply 
confirmed an already existing entitlement. This is a matter that will be 
discussed in section 4.1. Another (and for the goal of this thesis relevant) 
question is whether the first part of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty is of 
relevance for European collective bargaining. As will also be set out in section 
4.2, agreements implemented in this manner have been called “weak” and 
“inconsequential”. Finally, section 4.3 sets out the specific disadvantages 
concerning the underlying method of implementation. 
4.1 Did article 139.2 of the EC-Treaty introduce new rights with regard to 
the conclusion and national implementation of collective agreements?
There is a discussion among scholars whether article 139.1 in combination with 
the first part of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty (the European social partners 
(i) may enter into agreements which subsequently (ii) can613 be implemented 
by national mechanisms and practices) added anything to the already existing 
rights of the European social partners. 
Some say this is not the case.614 They view that, within the Community, 
all parties enjoy the freedom of negotiation. This freedom also suggests 
that European social partners may enter into agreements with each other. 
Moreover, they are allowed to do so on behalf  of their members, whom they 
represent. The European social partners have therefore always been entitled 
to enter into agreement with each other, also when this leads to obligations 
on the part of their members (should these members have properly instructed 
their “agents”, the European social partners, to do so).615 The national social 
partners, in their turn, already had the right to implement certain agreements, 
in accordance with their own (national) procedures and practices. 
613  Article 139.2 of the EC Treaty actually stipulates that agreements reached “shall” 
be implemented. As is set out in chapter 5, section 7.3.2, however, there is (most 
likely) neither an institutional obligation on the national social partners nor on the 
Member States to implement the agreement, as a consequence whereof the word 
“can” describes the situation more accurately.
614  Reference is made, for example, to A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality 
and myth of collective bargaining, page 92, who also refers to other scholars. 
615  Clear on this was hellsten, who stated about the possibility that social partners 
could conclude European collective agreements: “(…) while the social partners 
certainly had their competence under private international law without any EC 
clause”. j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC 
Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 32.
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A fine example of that “theory”, although the case did not relate to the 
underlying matter, constitutes the opinion of Advocate-General A. jacobs in 
the Albany case.616 he noted that the collective bargaining process is protected 
by the general principle of freedom of contract. For that reason he concluded 
that the collective bargaining process is sufficiently protected at European 
level. From jacobs’ argument Franssen derived a Community right to freedom 
of collective bargaining.617 In her view, this freedom already existed through 
the “freedom of contract” and needed therefore no formal implementation 
in the EC Treaty.618 Franssen seems thus to agree with other scholars that 
article 139.1 and the first part of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty do not 
constitute a new right. dorssemont, however, refutes Franssen’s opinion.619 
he argues that freedom of contract does not automatically contain freedom 
of collective bargaining. A different view would do injustice to the own 
peculiarities of collective bargaining. It would make the distinction between 
obligatory and normative effects of stipulations very difficult. Agents have no 
obligations towards their counterparties and merely bind their principal(s), 
while employees’ and employers’ organisations do have obligations of their 
own. This was exactly the reason for many countries (such as the Netherlands, 
France and Germany) to draft legislation on collective bargaining.
I tend to (partially) agree with dorssemont’s objections. The mere freedom 
of contract does not automatically constitute the freedom of collective 
bargaining, provided that the freedom of collective bargaining is deemed to 
include the (direct) normative effects that collective agreements may have. 
Freedom of contract alone insufficiently deals with the normative effect 
collective agreements have in many jurisdictions.620 These objections, however, 
do not lead to the conclusion that the combination of article 139.1 with the 
first part of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty introduced a new right. In the end, 
616  Case C-67/96, Albany International BV / Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds 
Textielindustrie, 21 September 1999.
617  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 22. The subject 
“freedom of collective bargaining” will be dealt with in depth in part II of this 
thesis.
618  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 23.
619  F. dorssemont, review of E. Franssen’s Legal aspects of the European Social 
Dialogue, page 278.
620  In my opinion, collective labour law is an atypical form of contract law because 
of the normative effect (i.e. the direct binding effect between the employer and 
employee) clauses in a collective agreement have in many jurisdictions. The mere 
fact that the agent can bind its principal(s) and itself, I do not consider overly odd, 
in deviation from dorssemont’s opinion. Although an agent’s role is to bind its 
principal, a contract may very well have a mixed content, in which the “agent” not 
exclusively acts as an agent, but also represents itself  in certain specific clauses.
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what do these articles really stipulate? No more and no less than (i) European 
social partners may enter into agreements which (ii) can be implemented 
nationally. The fact that the European social partners were entitled to enter 
into agreements was already covered by the freedom of contract (see jacobs 
above), as was the fact that European social partners may act as agents for 
their members (it depends on the rules of private international law exactly 
which national law covers this agency agreement). The item that separates 
collective bargaining from “normal” contract law, being the normative effect 
the agreements may have, does not derive from the EC Treaty, but from 
the national laws of the Member States, to which article 139.2 of the EC 
Treaty refers. It is thus not the EC Treaty, but the national laws that arrange 
the normative effect of the agreement, national laws which were already in 
place prior to article 139.2 of the EC Treaty. Consequently, article 139.1 
in combination with the first part of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty did not 
introduce anything new and must, as Lyon-Caen puts it, be seen as a merely 
political statement.621 
4.2 What is the relevance in Community context of agreements 
implemented nationally through article 139.2 of the EC-Treaty?
Closely related to the aforementioned is the question whether agreements 
entered into at European level that are subsequently implemented in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the 
Member States, have Community relevance. This is debatable.
On the one side, Lo Faro claims that agreements implemented in the manner 
stated above are “weak” and “inconsequential” with regard to the Community 
legal order.622 In essence, he argues that agreements that are to be implemented 
nationally lack a normative status in the Community. Agreements implemented 
by a Council decision (“strong” agreements) obviously have such normative 
status; that clearly follows from the EC Treaty itself. Also Betten and Sciarra 
view autonomous agreements not relevant within EC Law.623 On the other 
side would deinert obviously not label European collective agreements 
621  According to A. Lyon-Caen, the aforementioned provisions concerned “à première 
vue inutile … demeure avant tout politique”. Reference is made to A. Lo Faro, 
Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, page 92, 
footnote 3, in which Lyon-Caen was quoted.
622  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 91.
623  Their opinions are summarised in: j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of 
European Communities, EC Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal 
Basis of European Collective Agreements, page 140.
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implemented in accordance with national systems weak or inconsequential, 
since, as already mentioned, he takes the opinion that such agreements have 
normative effect. The same applies to Schiek, who argues that agreements 
entered into between the European social partners and implemented in 
accordance with their own procedures and practices would have to be 
considered Community law. As argued in section 7.3.1 and 7.4 of chapter 
5 respectively, their arguments are not convincing. Other authors opt for a 
more nuanced approach. Bercusson, for example, defends that autonomous 
European agreements should have “some” binding effect and, consequently, 
some effect in European law.624 jacobs and Ojeda-Aviles, as stated, try to 
obtain such an effect through a chain of mandates.625 Although Franssen 
observed that European collective agreements lack normative effect,626 she 
seems to be in favour of the aforementioned chain of mandates theory.627 
What can be concluded from the above? It must be noted that there is a high 
level of consensus that European collective agreements lack normative effect, 
as a consequence whereof these have first to be implemented nationally 
in order to gain such an effect. Consequently, the agreements have no real 
impact on the Community itself, but “merely” on the individual Member 
States. The bargaining of the agreement and its implementation must, after 
all, occur within the rules of regulations of the national state involved. The 
enforcement of the agreement – which by then is a national arrangement – is 
also mainly a national matter; from a European perspective it is difficult and 
sometimes even impossible to demand specific performance of the European 
collective agreement.628 This “national reach” of agreements implemented in 
accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour and the Member States also appears from the 1993 Communication, 
in which the Commission states:629
In the event of negotiations resulting in an agreement that the social partners 
decide to implement via the voluntary route, the terms of this agreement will bind 
624  his view is summarised in: j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European 
Communities, EC Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of 
European Collective Agreements, page 139.
625  Reference is made chapter 5, section 7.3.2.3.
626  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 139.
627  E. Franssen, Implementation of European Collective Agreements: Some Troublesome 
Issues, pages 64 and 65.
628  I refer to sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 hereinafter.
629  COM (1993) 600 final, page 28.
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their members and will affect only them and only in accordance with the practices 
and procedures specific to them in their respective Member States.
These considerations bring forth that European collective agreements not 
implemented by a Council decision, lack real Community relevance and 
are mainly relevant at national level. After all, the Community is not to be 
reduced to the sum of all Member States together and has a system of its 
own.630 This has to be nuanced to some extent. Obviously, the European 
agreement reached also binds the organisations that concluded it and thus 
not only their national members. Moreover, to a certain extent the agreement 
is relevant for the Community as well. Should the social partners enter into 
negotiations after being consulted by the Commission in accordance with 
article 138 of the EC Treaty, this negotiation process will normally suspend 
the legislative process for in principle a period up to 9 months.631 Moreover, 
the Commission will publish and monitor the agreement reached to assess 
the extent to which the agreement has contributed to the achievement of the 
Community’s objectives. Should the Commission decide that the agreement 
insufficiently meet these objectives, it will consider, in so far as necessary, to 
exercise its right of initiative and forward a proposal for a legislative act.632 
Nevertheless, to summarise, agreements implemented in accordance with the 
procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member 
States have only little Community relevance.
does the above make European bargaining with the aim of implementing 
its fruit nationally irrelevant for this thesis? In my opinion, partly it does. At 
base, these agreements are, if  their effect is concerned, national agreements 
and can be compared to “national” transnational collective labour agreements 
as referred to in chapter 1, section 2.1. This thesis focuses on “European” 
transnational collective agreements; agreements that are equally recognised 
and applied in the jurisdictions of all or some Member States. The focus 
of this thesis thus lies elsewhere. That is not to say, however, that collective 
agreements implemented in accordance with national procedures and practices 
are entirely irrelevant, since they do give useful insights in a more autonomous 
way of bargaining when compared to collective agreements implemented by 
630  Reference is made to the ruling of the European Court of justice in Van Gend & 
Loos vs. the Netherlands, 5 February 1963, case number 26/62, in which the Court 
ruled: “(…) the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law (…)” 
(emphasis added by author). This ruling has been confirmed several times. 
631  For this time frame reference is made to section 3.1 of chapter 5. 
632  COM (2004) 557, page 10. The Commission may also do so at any point in 
time, including during the implementation period, should it conclude that either 
management or labour are delaying the pursuit of Community objectives. 
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a Council decision, autonomy which is desirable, as will be set out in this 
thesis. 
4.3 Disadvantages attached to the underlying system
The underlying implementation system suffers from a number of 
disadvantages. The following come to mind: (i) there is an unclear binding 
effect of the agreement reached, (ii) there are insufficient rules with regard 
to the requirements the European social partners have to meet, (iii) potential 
difficulties exist with regard to the implementation of the agreement and (iv) 
difficulties are in place concerning the effects, follow-up and enforcement of 
the agreement.
4.3.1 No clear binding effect
As set out in chapter 5, agreements that are to be implemented nationally lack 
a direct normative effect. The binding effects that such agreements do have 
are rather unclear and complicated.633 This is clearly an important flaw in the 
current system.
4.3.2 Insufficient rules with regard to the requirements 
the social partners have to meet
The EC Treaty is silent about any demands concerning the European social 
partners. Article 139.1 of the EC Treaty simply puts that “management” and 
“labour” may enter into agreements. These agreements shall, given article 
139.2, first part, be implemented nationally.
As set out in chapter 5, not all parties qualify as management and labour as 
referred to in article 139 of the EC Treaty. There are certain general criteria 
an organisation must meet in order to be viewed as management or labour. 
These organisations must be (i) among those organisations consulted by the 
Commission and (ii) admitted to the negotiation table by the other social 
partners involved.634 The organisations that can be consulted on the basis of 
article 138 EC Treaty should (i) be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors 
or categories and be organised at European level, (ii) consist of organisations 
which are themselves an integral and recognised part of Member State social 
partner structures and with the capacity to negotiate agreements, and which 
are representative of all Member States, as far as possible, and (iii) have 
633  Chapter 5, section 7.3.
634  Chapter 5, section 3.2.
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adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the consultation 
process.635 
The Commission has set further criteria for European social partners who 
wish to enter into agreements that are subsequently implemented by a 
Council decision. Among others, these social partners must (a) show that 
they have had ample mandate from their national members to negotiate and 
(b) are sufficiently representative.636 These or other criteria are simply not in 
place with regard to European social partners who chose to implement their 
agreement nationally.
It is true that it more or less logically flows from the “core criteria” set for 
the European social partners – they must consist of organisations which are 
themselves an integral and recognised part of Member State social partner 
structures – that European social partners should have sufficient mandate. 
This furthermore is a logical consequence from the fact that the national 
social partners must implement the agreement reached – something that 
would be very difficult to achieve if  the European social partners were to 
conclude agreements without any mandate from their national members. 
This, however, is not the case when it comes to representativity. 
As will be set out in part II of this thesis, a number of Member States require 
a certain level of representativity of the social partners in order for them to 
enter into legally binding (national) collective labour agreements. does the 
fact that these demands are lacking at European level possibly conflicts with 
the rules of the countries which have such requirements on national level? 
According to Franssen, this is not the case. At least, she is not inclined to 
demand any representativity requirements for European social partners, if  the 
agreement reached is not implemented into Community law.637 She considers 
that “very small organisations of workers and employers may also conclude 
valid collective agreements, because the agreements will only apply to the 
members of the concluding parties”. This statement is not entirely convincing. 
In many jurisdictions a collective labour agreement must be applied to all 
employees of a company (the collective agreements have erga omnes effects), 
should that company be bound to the collective labour agreement, regardless 
of whether its employees are member of the contracting trade unions or not. 
I refer to part II of this thesis. If, within these jurisdictions, the legislator 
demands certain requirements concerning representativity in order to reach 
635  Chapter 5, section 2.2.
636  Chapter 5, section 6.2.
637  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 106.
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legally binding collective labour agreements, it seems illogical not to demand 
this at European level.638
4.3.3 Potential difficulties concerning the implementation
The above paragraph brings us to another difficulty, which concerns the 
national implementation of European collective agreements. As stated above, a 
Member State may require the social partners to meet certain (representativity) 
demands in order to reach a binding national collective labour agreement, 
or may demand other formalities to be satisfied. As facts are now, nothing 
will stop European social partners to enter into agreements which should 
be implemented nationally, without the European social partners being 
sufficiently representative (from a national Member State’s point of view), or 
having complied with other necessary formalities. This may very well stand 
in the way of national implementation of the agreement. This is particularly 
the case, since the Protocol on Social Policy clearly states that Member States 
are neither under an obligation to work out rules for the transposition of 
the agreements, nor to amend national legislation in force to facilitate their 
implementation. The Member States can thus stick to their rules effectively 
blocking national implementation of European agreements. The problem, 
simply put, is that the systems and structures of national law has to be put 
in use to implement collective agreements concluded at European level, while 
these national systems and structures were never intended to deal with a “new 
hierarchy of EC-level obligations”.639
Another problem with regard to implementation is that, according to the 
general criteria set for European social partners, they must i.a. consist of 
organisations which are part of Member State social partner structures and 
with the capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are representative of all 
Member States, as far as possible (emphasis added).640 Consequently, it seems 
possible for the European social partners to conclude agreements without 
involving national social partners of one or a few Member States, if  their 
involvement appeared not possible. If  the national social partners of one or 
a few Member States were not involved in the negotiation process leading to 
an agreement on European level, how can that agreement be implemented in 
said Member State(s)? There is, in such a case, no contractual obligation on 
638  This is for instance the rule in Belgium. Reference is made to chapter 11.
639  C. Barnard, EC Employment law, page 90, with reference to hepple.
640  With regard to the sectoral social dialogue the geographical dimension of the 
organisations participating in the European (sectoral) social dialogue is even 
weaker, as they have to be representative of several Member States. Reference is 
made to chapter 5, section 2.2.
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the national social partner to implement the agreement. This constitutes a 
potential problem. 
The above two paragraphs deal with the “impossibility” to implement at 
national level a European agreement. Another issue is that a national member 
of the European organisation simply refuses to implement the agreement, for 
example because it voted against the agreement, but was outvoted.641 Such a 
member is most likely not under an institutional obligation to implement.642 It 
then depends on the European social partner to urge its member to implement 
the agreement .643 Another angle of approach is to force the national member 
on contractual grounds to implement the agreement. This is not an easy route 
to take. In the end, a decision to force your own member on contractual 
grounds to implement an agreement is not a decision that will be taken lightly. 
Moreover, from a legal point of view this step is also not easy and effective. 
This was rightly put by hellsten as follows:644
Leaving independent European Agreements subject only to national law and/
or private international law would make their execution liable to excessive legal 
and technical constraints. There would be an obvious risk of damaging their 
effectiveness as legal provisions.
4.3.4 The effects, follow-up and enforcement of implemented 
European collective agreements
The quote above brings us to the issue of effective implementation. Once a 
European agreement is implemented, it should have a “real” impact within the 
jurisdiction of the Member States. This is not automatically the case. It depends 
on the implementation method used what the impact of an implemented 
agreement is. As already mentioned, the implementation methods used with 
641  This is not a purely theoretical situation. The autonomous agreement on telework 
was simply not implemented in all Member States at the moment it should have 
been implemented. See: S. Weiler, Diversity in implementation of telework agreement 
across the EU.
642  Reference is made to chapter 5, section 7.3.2.2.
643  This was nicely put by Franssen: “At present I see no other option than that the 
European organisations use their power of persuasion to influence each other and 
their national affiliates because EU legislation does not provide any solution to 
these problems.” E. Franssen, Implementation of European Collective Agreements: 
Some Troublesome Issues, pages 62.
644  j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative 
Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 9.
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regard to the framework agreements on telework differed considerably.645 But 
even when the European agreement is implemented by a collective labour 
agreement, a real impact is not guaranteed. A particular difficulty in that 
respect is the status of collective agreements in certain jurisdictions. For 
instance, in the United Kingdom collective labour agreements do not bind 
by law. Consequently, the content of a European agreement may very well be 
implemented nationally, but individual parties in some Member States can 
easily deviate from this collective agreement, while the same parties in other 
jurisdictions are fully bound to this content. But apart from the status of 
a collective labour agreement, also subjects like the existence of erga omnes 
effects of the implemented European collective agreement, the possibility 
to extend it and sanctions on non-compliance of said collective agreement 
differ greatly from country to country.646 To summarise, the effects of the 
implemented European collective agreement may vary considerably per 
jurisdiction.647 
Another, related, issue is whether all national members of the European 
organisations have the required technical capacities to effectively implement 
a European collective agreement. This is an issue that worries the 
Commission.648 According to the Commission, data on the coverage rate 
of collective agreements in Member States suggests that in several states 
effective implementation may be problematic.649 For successful and uniform 
implementation of a European agreement in each and every Member State, 
all national affiliates should be properly informed and follow-up mechanisms 
(monitoring the implementation) should be in place. The existence of both 
elements has been deemed crucial by the Commission for years now.650 In 
particular, the lack of a proper follow-up is in the Commission’s view 
worrisome. According to the Commission, many texts of agreements reached 
by the European social partners contain “imprecise and vague follow-up 
645  Reference is made to section 3.4 above.
646  E. Franssen, Implementation of European Collective Agreements: Some Troublesome 
Issues, pages 62.
647  Blanpain argues that the implementation of European collective labour agreements 
takes place at “different speeds” due to the differing national implementation 
procedures. R. Blanpain, Europese raamovereenkomsten, de toekomst van het 
Europees Arbeidsrecht, pages 9 and 10.
648  But also ETUI-REhS referred to the problem of weaknesses in social dialogue 
(structures) in new Member States. It even noted that some countries did not have 
the structures to implement the framework agreement on telework. See: ETUI-
REhS, Benchmarking Working Europe 2007, page 118.
649  COM (2004) 557, page 6.
650  COM (1998) 322, page 15.
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provisions”.651 For that reason, the Commission has called upon the European 
social partners in its 2002 Communication “to strengthen substantially 
the procedures for on-the-spot monitoring and to prepare regular reports 
on implementation of agreements signed”.652 In its 2004 Communication, 
the Commission encouraged the social partners to improve the clarity of 
their texts and to include detailed follow-up provisions.653 According to the 
proposed “drafting checklist for new generation social partner texts” an 
agreement should, amongst others, contain provisions that (i) indicate the 
deadline by which the provisions should be implemented, (ii) indicate clearly 
how the text will be implemented and promoted at national level, including 
whether or not it should be implemented in a binding fashion in all cases, 
(iii) indicate clearly through which structures the monitoring/reporting will 
be undertaken, and the purpose of the reports at different stages, (iv) indicate 
when and/or at which intervals monitoring/reporting will take place, (v) 
specify the procedures to be followed for dispute settlement and (vi) indicate 
the members of the signatory parties at whom the text is directed.654 
The above makes clear that, to date, no sufficient follow-up/monitoring system 
is in place. This automatically makes enforcement of European agreements 
problematic: if  it is not established whether agreements are executed, how 
can they be enforced? If  we put this besides the remarks made in the section 
above on the difficulties surrounding effective implementation, it is clear that 
enforcement of collective agreements that are to be implemented in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the 
Member States is difficult.
5. Some critical remarks concerning agreements 
implemented by a Council decision
As has been argued above, there are a number of disadvantages attached to 
agreements reached by the European social partners that are subsequently 
implemented nationally. Perhaps the most important drawback with respect 
to this thesis is the fact that agreements implemented in such a manner lack 
transnational effects: their scope is limited to the specific jurisdiction in which 
they are implemented.
651  COM (2004) 557, page 6.
652  COM (2002) 341, page 19. These reports should outline progress on the content of 
the implementation of agreements and their coverage.
653  COM (2004) 557, page 7.
654  COM (2004) 557, page 20.
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Obviously, this is different with regard to agreements that are implemented 
by a Council decision, the second implementation method of article 139.2 
of the EC Treaty. Once implemented, they acquire “Community status”. 
The fact that these agreements will have to be implemented in the Member 
States’ jurisdiction anyway after their Community implementation, which 
will normally be the case since all agreements to date have been implemented 
by means of a directive, does not affect that Community status (although, 
as mentioned above, it might affect the agreements’ content). As previously 
explained, the implementation of a directive must be clear and legally certain, 
and can be tested by the Commission and ultimately the European Court 
of justice.655 That is why special attention should be given to agreements 
implemented by a Council decision.
An important question, and one that is already introduced in section 3.5 
above, is whether this implementation method enables the European social 
partners to fully and freely use their bargaining capacity. At first glance, an 
implementation system through which the agreement acquires legal standing 
within the Community seems pretty solid and favourable to the European 
social partners. A closer look, however, shows that this mechanism significantly 
limits the European social partners. These limitations can be divided into two 
categories: (i) (possible) limitations concerning the content of the agreement 
and (ii) limitations imposed on the agreement by the implementation 
procedure.
5.1 Limitations concerning the content of the agreement
As set out in chapter 5, section 6.2.1 of this thesis, the EC Treaty itself  imposes 
important limitations on contents to agreements that are to be implemented 
by a Council decision. The agreements must concern matters covered by 
article 137 of the EC Treaty, being the fields in which the Community shall 
support the activities of the Member States. The collective bargaining topics 
are therefore limited. This is definitely the case, since article 137.5 of the EC 
Treaty explicitly excludes pay, the right of association, the right to strike 
and the right to impose lock-outs from the contents of article 137 of the 
EC Treaty.656 All these issues can be key issues in a typical national collective 
agreement.
655  Reference is made to chapter 2, sections 2 and 3 of this thesis.
656  See for this stipulation for example: European Court of justice, 1 december 2005, 
C-14/04, Dellas/Premier Ministre.
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It was, however, not beyond dispute whether the social partners are, in fact, 
hindered by the limited number of topics of article 137 of the EC Treaty, 
and more in particular the limitations of the fifth paragraph. A study of 
hellsten established that there were two means of shaping the position 
and consequences of article 137.5 of the EC Treaty.657 First, there was the 
constitutional approach. In that approach the Council must block Community 
legislation in the fields of said article. The rationale behind this position is that 
matters of article 137.5 of the EC Treaty are simply excluded from, or at least 
not covered by, article 137 of the EC Treaty, while article 139 of the EC Treaty 
demands that the content of an agreement concluded by the social partners 
that is to be implemented by a Council decision is to concern matters covered 
by article 137. This approach had many supporters.658 The second approach 
was based on contractual freedom. The rationale behind this thinking was 
that the social protocol of articles 136 – 139 of the EC Treaty contains 
programmes on how legislation is to be enacted, and that the limitations of 
article 137 of the EC Treaty concern the first programme, being the drafting 
of legislation on the basis of article 137 of the EC Treaty. The limitations of 
article 137.5 of the EC Treaty do not concern the other programmes, such as 
the second programme of implementing Community legislation, being the 
implementation of a European agreement concluded on the basis of article 
657  j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative 
Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, pages 40 ff.
658  The following are mentioned by hellsten: Blanpain & Engels, Sciarra, Weiss, 
Treu, Venturini, degimbe and the Commission. j. hellsten, Reviewing Social 
Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative Process Involving Social 
Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective Agreements, page 40. Also Lo Faro 
argues that the matters excluded by article 137.5 of the EC Treaty are not to be 
inserted in agreements concluded by the social partners that are to be implemented 
by a Council decision; Lo Faro, regulating Social Europe, pages 104 and 105. 
Furthermore, the Legal Service of the Commission affirmed on a question of the 
European social partners while they were negotiating on a framework agreement 
on temporary agency in an oral statement that no European framework agreement 
could explicitly mention the right to strike or regulate its modalities. See S. 
Clauwaert, International / transnational primary and secondary collective action, an 
overview of international, European and national legislation, 2002, dWP 2002.01.01 
(E), page 10.
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139 of the EC Treaty. This approach also had its share of supporters.659 In a 
joint position, a number of scholars simply stated that it was unclear whether 
article 137.5 of the EC Treaty limits the scope of agreements concluded at 
Community level under article 139.660 hellsten subscribed to this point of 
view and stated:661 
In sum, Article 137(5) creates some problems of interpretation regarding pay but 
otherwise, too. These problems cannot be solved by mere reinterpretation but only 
by amending the Treaty, hence by repealing article 137(5) EC as a whole.
Recently, the Court of justice clarified the scope of article 137.5 of the EC 
Treaty in two separate cases.662 In these cases the Court needed to answer several 
questions on directive 1999/70/EC, implementing the framework agreement 
on fixed-term work,663 including the questions whether the “employment 
conditions” as referred to in clause 4 of the framework agreement include 
length-of-service allowance (Del Cerro Alonso case), and whether they 
include conditions of an employment contract relating to remuneration and 
pension (Impact case).664 In order to answer these questions, it was relevant to 
establish whether article 137.5 of the EC Treaty would prevent that framework 
agreement to deal with allowances, remuneration and pension. 
659  hellsten states that this line of thinking is at least supported by Bercusson. 
however, A. Lyon-Caen and Simitis also take the opinion that the social protocol 
in fact is a programme. j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European 
Communities, EC Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of 
European Collective Agreements, pages 40 and 41. Furthermore, Franssen views 
that the social partners can conclude an agreement and subsequently choose to 
have it implemented by a Council decision on matters mentioned in article 137.5 
of the EC Treaty. E. Franssen, Legal Aspects of the European Social Dialogue, 
pages 185 and 186.
660  The scholars are: Bercusson, Blanke, Bruun, jacobs, Ojeda-Aviles and Veneziani. 
See j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC 
Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 41.
661  j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative 
Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 99.
662  European Court of justice, 13 September 2007, C-307/05, Del Cerro Alonso and 
European Court of justice, 15 April 2008, C-268/06, Impact/Minister.
663  See Chapter 4, section 5.3.
664  Clause 4.1 reads: “In respect of employment conditions, fixed-term workers shall 
not be treated in a less favourable manner than comparable permanent workers 
solely because they have a fixed-term contract or relation unless different treatment 
is justified on objective grounds.”
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Advocate-General Poiares Maduro clearly stated in his opinion in the Del 
Cerro Alonso case that clause 4 of the framework agreement cannot refer to 
allowances, due to article 137.5 of the EC Treaty. 665  Advocate-General Kokott 
arrived at the opposite conclusion relating to remuneration and pension, in 
the conclusion in the Impact case. 666
The Court of justice stated in both cases that, since article 137.5 of the EC 
Treaty derogates from paragraph 1 and 4 of that article, the matters reserved 
by that paragraph must be interpreted strictly. The Court continued that the 
exception relating to pay set out in article 137.5 of the EC Treaty is explained 
by the fact that fixing the level of pay falls within the contractual freedom of 
the social partners at a national level and within the relevant competence of 
Member States. For these reasons, it was considered appropriate to exclude 
determination of the level of wages from harmonisation under articles 136 ff 
of  the EC Treaty. Therefore, the exception of article 137.5 must, according 
to the Court of justice in the Impact case, on the one hand be interpreted as 
covering measures – such as the equivalence of all or some of the constituent 
parts of pay and/or the level of pay in the Member States, or the setting of a 
minimum guaranteed Community wage – which amount to direct interference 
by Community law in the determination of pay within the Community. 
however, that exception cannot, on the other hand, be extended to any 
question involving any sort of link with pay, as that would deprive some areas 
of article 137.1 of the EC Treaty of much of their substance. Consequently, 
the derogation in article 137.5 of the EC Treaty does not preclude the 
interpretation of clause 4 of the framework agreement as imposing on the 
Member States the obligation to ensure that fixed-term workers are guaranteed 
the application of the non-discrimination principle in relation to pay.667
The above makes clear that questions involving pay may be dealt with at 
Community level, but that the level of pay falls outside the Community 
scope, also when it concerns the implementation by a Council decision of an 
agreement reached by the European social partners in the European social 
dialogue. does that mean, as to the cases at hand, that national authorities 
remain free to set the level of pay differently for permanent and fixed-term 
employees? The answer to this question is negative, as the Court of justice 
665  Opinion of Advocate-General Poiares Maduro, 10 january 2007, C-307/05, Del 
Cerro Alonso.
666  Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, 9 january 2008, C-268/06, Impact/Minister.
667  The Court also noted that this observation does not contravene its judgement in 
the aforementioned Dellas case (European Court of justice, 1 december 2005, 
C-14/04). See in particular paragraphs 38 and 39 of the Dellas case and paragraphs 
43 – 45 of the Del Cerro Alonso case.
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made evident. The national authorities remain authorised to set the level of 
pay, but must nevertheless exercise that authority consistently with Community 
law – such as clause 4 of the framework agreement – in the areas in which the 
Community has competence. This has also been ruled by the European Court 
of justice in relation with the right to strike.668 
Given the above, it should be concluded that article 137.5 of the EC Treaty 
applies to agreements concluded by the social partners and implemented by a 
Council decision. These agreements may concern issues linked to the matters 
set out in that paragraph. The agreements may, however, not set out specific 
rules on levels of pay. It seems to logically follow from the aforementioned 
cases that these agreements may not harmonise the conditions when or 
how to exercise the right of association, the right to strike and the right to 
impose lock-outs too. This poses a limitation on the bargaining freedom 
of the European social partners, in case they wish to apply their agreement 
internationally (through a Council decision). In such a case, it should also be 
acknowledged that the European social partners lack full collective autonomy. 
This lack of autonomy is disturbing against the background of a remark of 
Caruso: “The possibility of regulating and determining an autonomous level 
of transnational bargaining relations necessarily involves the capacity and 
will of the European social partners to define, in complete autonomy, the 
boundaries of the collective interests that can be protected at that level.”669 
It is also disturbing against the backdrop of article 152 of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union, as introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which states that the Union shall respect the European social partners’ 
autonomy.
5.2 Limitations imposed in the implementation procedure
As stated in chapter 5, section 6.2.2, the Commission assesses the agreement 
presented to it by the European social partners and verifies whether it meets 
6 separate conditions, being (i) the representative status of the contracting 
parties, (ii) their mandate, (iii) the legality of each clause in the collective 
agreement in relation to Community law, (iv) the provisions regarding small 
and medium-sized undertakings, (v) a general approval and (vi) the principle 
of subsidiarity. Some of these conditions further limit the European social 
668  See the European Court of justice, 11 december 2007, C-438/05, Viking, 
paragraph 40 and the European Court of justice, 18 december 2007, C-341/05, 
LavalSvenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, paragraph 87. These cases will be 
discussed in depth in chapter 8, sections 6.3.1.2 and 6.3.3.
669  Caruso, 1997, page 332, as mentioned in A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: 
reality and myth of collective bargaining, page 106.
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partners’ free bargaining process when compared to collective bargaining at 
national level.
5.2.1 The representative status of the contracting parties
Although all social partners involved in the European social dialogue must 
be representative, the test is stricter in case agreements are to be implemented 
by a Council decision. After all, the signatories to the agreement that is to be 
implemented by a Council decision must be sufficiently representative according 
to the Court of First Instance. This representativity test is of relevance since 
the European Parliament does not participate in the procedure leading to the 
implementation of such agreements, and the principle of democracy on which 
the Union is founded requires that the participation of the people be otherwise 
assured, in this instance through the parties representative of management 
and labour who concluded the agreement. The Court of First Instance ruled 
that the Commission, the Council and ultimately the European Court should 
verify whether these signatory parties are sufficiently representative.
Neither the Court of First Instance, nor the Commission formulated “hard 
and fast rules” as to when social partners can be considered sufficiently 
representative. This is not only in violation of ILO requirements,670 but it 
also limits the autonomy of the social partners. In any case, three institutions 
(the Commission, the Council and ultimately the European Court) may 
test the representativity of the social partner and may nullify the result 
(implementation of the agreement by a Council decision) intended by the 
signatories. The Commission may, according to Bercusson, even effectively 
force the participation of certain parties required for the sufficient collective 
representativity needed to achieve democratic legitimacy.671 
5.2.2  The mandate of the European Social Partners
The condition that the European social partners must show they have acted on 
behalf  of their members does not likely impose a limitation on their collective 
bargaining capabilities. “Mandate” is a logical precondition for collective 
bargaining at European level, as already set out in section 3.2 above. 
670  Although the ILO standards do not directly apply to the Community, the content 
thereof is still of relevance. See section 3.3 above.
671  B. Bercusson, Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law, page 160.
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5.2.3 The legality of the agreement
The fact that agreements must not contravene Community law in itself  does 
not limit the European social partners free bargaining capacity in a non-
justified manner. This condition is a “normal” condition with regard to 
collective bargaining, as will be pointed out in part II of this thesis. What is 
odd, however, is that the Commission verifies this aspect and not the European 
Court of justice, an institution which is, for obvious reasons, better equipped 
for such a verification.672 Because the judgement of a non-judicial institution 
can block the implementation of a collective agreement, this condition poses 
a limitation on the European social partners in the context of European 
collective bargaining.
5.2.4 Small and medium-sized undertakings
Any directive aimed at supporting and complementing the activities of the 
small and medium-sized undertakings, must avoid imposing administrative, 
financial and legal constraints in a way which holds back the creation and 
development of these undertakings (article 137.2 under (b) of the EC Treaty). 
The European social partners must, therefore, take these undertakings into 
account, should they wish their agreement be implemented by a Council 
decision (directive).
Although this condition makes sense from a Community legislative perspective 
– the small and medium-sized undertakings are generally protected to a 
large extent within the Community – this condition makes less sense when 
applied only to the social partners and is, as a matter of fact, nowhere to be 
found in the laws of the individual Member States that I have researched in 
part II of this thesis. Moreover, there can be valid reasons for the European 
social partners to (also) focus on small and medium-sized undertakings and 
impose obligations on them, given that these undertakings operate in areas of 
economic activities in which “the most blatant situations of failure to apply 
labour law standards are found”.673 As a consequence, this condition also puts 
restraints on the European social partners’ freedom to collective bargaining.
672  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 108.
673  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 113.
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5.2.5 General approval of  the agreement
This condition, in which the Commission examines the (political) merits of 
the agreement, is an obvious limitation of the freedom to collective bargaining 
of the European social partners. In the end, the collective autonomy puts 
forward that the social partners are free to determine the working conditions 
themselves and consequently without “political” intervention on the merits 
by the Commission or any other Community institution.674
5.2.6 The principle of subsidiarity
All agreements implemented by a Council decision must pass the subsidiarity 
test. Although this test is sensible when it comes to Community legislation, 
this is less the case in relation to the European social partners seq (if  their 
fruits are not to be considered as substitutes of European legislation). On 
balance, given the collective autonomy of the European social partners, 
it should be up to them, and not to the Commission, to decide whether 
certain measures might be taken at international level or at national level. 
Consequently, this condition also imposes limitations to the European social 
partners’ autonomy.
5.3 Conclusion
From the above-mentioned, it can be derived that agreements implemented 
by a Council decision impose important restrictions on the European social 
partners. These restrictions concern the content of the agreement and the 
conditions that the agreements must meet in order to be implemented in 
said manner. In relation to this second restriction, especially the criteria on 
representativity, small and medium-sized undertakings, the political general 
approval and subsidiarity limit the social partners in their collective autonomy. 
These limitations make sense, should the European social dialogue be viewed 
as a regulatory technique, but not if  it is to be considered a proper collective 
bargaining system. 
674  Clear on this is Boonstra, who stated the following: “autonomy implies that the 
social partners must be allowed to choose an appropriate procedure and that they 
should not be pressurised or forced to bargain in the shadow of state intervention”. 
K. Boonstra, Government Responsibility and Bargaining Scope within Article 4 of 
ILO Convention 98, page 461.
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6. Collective agreements outside the scope of 
articles 138 – 139 of the EC Treaty
On 24 july 1997, GEOPA/COPA (representing management) and EFA/
ETUC (representing labour) entered into the Recommendation Framework 
Agreement on the Improvement of Paid Employment in Agriculture. Franssen 
interviewed a spokesperson from both sides of the industry about the legal 
status of this agreement. According to EFA/ETUC, the agreement did not 
fall within the scope of articles 138 – 139 of the EC Treaty, while GEOPA/
COPA did not a priori excluded that possibility.675 Apparently, the European 
social partners themselves are of the opinion that they can conclude collective 
agreements outside the scope of articles 138 – 139 of the EC Treaty. Three 
questions arise in that respect. First, does it really matter whether an agreement 
is concluded inside or outside the European social dialogue for parties that 
qualify as “management and labour”, as referred to in the provisions on 
the European social dialogue? Second, what are the legal consequences of 
a transnational collective labour agreement concluded outside the scope of 
the European social dialogue? And, last, do transnational collective labour 
agreements concluded outside the scope of the European social dialogue offer 
the same potential advantages as the European transnational collective labour 
agreement proposed in this thesis?
6.1 Collective agreements concluded inside or 
outside the European social dialogue
As argued in chapter 5, parties that qualify as “management and labour” can 
reach an agreement even without being consulted by the Commission. It is 
therefore hardly surprising that an agreement can be concluded outside the 
scope of consultation of article 138 of the EC Treaty. This is not as evident 
with regard to article 139.1 of the EC Treaty. This article says nothing more 
and nothing less than, may management and labour so desire, they may 
enter into contractual relations. This is exactly what the above-mentioned 
organisations did. Given the fact that (i) GEOPA/COPA and EFA/ETUC 
qualify as “labour” and “management” as referred to in article 139 of the 
EC Treaty and (ii) they concluded an agreement, they logically acted within 
the scope of article 139.1 of the EC Treaty. They simple fulfilled that article’s 
criteria. The above-mentioned opinion of GEOPA/COPA and EFA/ETUC 
that they acted outside the scope of articles 138 – 139 of the EC Treaty 
675  E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 113.
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therefore seems incorrect.676 A more interesting question is whether this is of 
relevance for them.
6.2 Consequences of a transnational collective labour agreement 
concluded outside the European social dialogue
There are two obvious disadvantages attached to working outside the scope of 
articles 138 – 139 of the EC Treaty. First, the organisations working outside the 
scope of article 138 of the EC Treaty will not be consulted by the Commission. 
Second, they cannot have their agreements reached implemented by a Council 
decision. For organisations that qualify as “labour” and “management” as 
referred to in articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty, this can hardly be called 
a disadvantage. These parties apparently chose not to be consulted and not 
to implement an agreement reached by a Council decision; they refrain from 
using certain rights.677 There are, in my opinion, no real advantages attached 
to working outside the scope of articles 138 – 139 of the EC Treaty, since these 
articles do not limit the European social partners in any way (they “merely” 
give additional entitlements, i.e. the right to be consulted and the right to have 
agreements implemented by a Council decision). 
Obviously, organisations that are not considered “labour” and “management” 
as referred to in articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty cannot apply the 
provisions of the European social dialogue. Nevertheless, organisations 
that do not meet that qualification but are recognised as social partners or 
consist of national social partners as members, are still entitled to enter into 
an agreement that subsequently is implemented in accordance with national 
law. This entitlement is protected by the European freedom of contract in 
combination with national law.678 They are only not entitled to be consulted by 
the Commission and they lack the right to have their agreement implemented 
by a Council decision. Apart from that, their position is not very different 
when compared to management and labour above. 
676  They may have meant that they concluded the agreement outside the scope of the 
combination of  articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty, since they were not consulted 
by the Commission. If  that was what they meant, the conclusion that they acted 
outside the combination of these articles is obviously correct.
677  For this reason it is, in my opinion, impossible for these organisations to fall 
outside the scope of articles 138 - 139 of the EC Treaty. They fall inside that scope, 
but chose not to use the rights attached thereto. 
678  Reference is made to section 4.1 hereof. See also clearly L. Betten, The Democratic 
Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community Social Policy, pages 29.
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6.3 Analysis of transnational collective labour agreements 
concluded outside the scope of the European social dialogue 
An obvious advantage of transnational collective labour agreements 
concluded outside the scope of the European social dialogue is that multiple 
parties can potentially participate, as these parties do not have to meet the 
criteria set for “labour” and “management”. As already set out in chapter 4 
section 3, multinational companies (that do not qualify as “management”) 
have already entered into transnational collective bargaining. Then again, 
these transnational collective labour agreements are far from flawless. 
The transnational collective labour agreements, as stated in the paragraph 
above, must be considered “national” transnational collective labour 
agreements as referred to in chapter 1, section 2.1. They are nothing more 
and nothing less than agreements governed by national law or laws, having 
effect in different countries. They have no Community relevance and do not 
qualify as European transnational collective labour agreements which are the 
research subject of this thesis. 
These national transnational collective agreements furthermore give rise to 
a number of (partially) additional difficulties. There are no specific rules on 
subjects like the procedure, the negotiating agents and the binding powers of a 
transnational collective labour agreement:679 a transnational collective labour 
agreement simply has no specific legal status, and certainly no Community 
status. Its actual (national) status and effects must, in consequence, be 
determined by national law on a case-by-case scenario, in accordance with 
the principles of private international law.680 This may prove troublesome. 
The status of such “national” transnational collective labour agreement, for 
example, does not necessarily have to be the same in all the jurisdictions in 
which it has force. The definition and criteria of a collective labour agreement 
may very well be different in each jurisdiction, as a result whereof an agreement 
that qualifies as a collective labour agreement in the country in which it was 
concluded, may very well not qualify as such in another jurisdiction to which 
it applies. Its status can, therefore, vary from country to country. But even if  
the national transnational collective labour agreement would be recognised as 
such in each jurisdiction it has force, its effects would still differ from country to 
country. For example, some countries adhere to the rule that collective labour 
679  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, report for the 
European Commission, February 2006, page 27.
680  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 21.
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agreements apply to all employees (falling within the scope of applicability of 
the collective labour agreement) employed by the employer that is bound by 
the collective labour agreement, while other countries prescribe that collective 
labour agreements only directly apply to such employees who are a member of 
the trade union(s) that concluded the collective labour agreement concerned.681 
These differences in status and effects of the national transnational collective 
labour agreement do not improve its legal certainty. Another problem a 
national transnational collective labour agreement faces regards applicable 
law. It is difficult to establish which law applies to the national transnational 
collective labour agreement. That is also the case with regard to the provisions 
that aim to regulate the employment conditions of individual employees. It 
is very well possible, if  not likely, that the employment conditions of the 
employees working in the different countries in which the agreement has force 
are subject to different national laws. Pursuant to article 6.2 of the Rome 
Convention, the employment agreement is normally governed by the law of 
the country in which the employee habitually works. Even chosen law can, 
given article 6.1 of the Rome Convention, in principle not deviate from 
the mandatory provisions of the law of the country in which the employee 
habitually works. If  the national transnational collective labour agreement 
is subject to the law of one country, its incorporation into the employment 
agreement of an employee working in another country may lead to a situation 
that to one and the same employment agreement two sets of law apply: the law 
of the country in which the employee is working, and the law of the country 
applicable to the collective labour agreement. This leads to complicated legal 
questions and certainly to uncertainty. 
In practice, multinational companies concluding (national) transnational 
collective agreements with sectoral European trade unions try to work around 
these difficulties by transposing an international framework agreement into 
a national collective labour agreement submitted to the legislation of the 
country in which it is to apply.682 Consequently, the implemented collective 
labour agreements acquire the status and effects as determined in the country 
of implementation. The law of that country applies as well. however, as a 
consequence the original transnational collective labour agreement has little 
meaning anymore, as the legal effects derive from the implemented national 
collective labour agreements. These agreements do not have a uniform effect, 
one of the typical aims of collective labour agreements. Moreover, this 
681  Reference is made to chapter 13, section 8.3.
682  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 27. See also 
chapter 4, section 3 of this thesis.
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system can hardly be considered effective. In fact, all flaws accompanying 
the implementation of agreements “in accordance with the procedures and 
practices specific to management and labour and the Member States” apply 
mutatis mutandis to this situation. This working around the above-mentioned 
difficulties is, in sum, a second best option. It would be much more effective 
to be able to conclude European transnational collective labour agreements, 
which is the aim of this thesis. 
7. Summary
The setting of articles 136 – 139 of the EC Treaty seems to strongly deviate from 
the more or less standard situation in the Member States concerning collective 
employment law. It is said that in supranational context legislation supporting 
collective bargaining has preceded the actual collective bargaining itself. This 
“reversal of action” seems to suggest that European collective bargaining is 
radically different to national collective bargaining. This difference could be 
explained when scrutinising the function of the European social dialogue 
which is, according to Lo Faro, not so much promoting the European social 
partners’ interests, but “no more than one of providing support for Community 
regulation and legitimacy”. The current institutionalised European Social 
dialogue must accordingly be seen as a regulatory technique. This might 
explain some flaws in the current European system. I have divided these flaws 
into three categories: flaws relating to the articles 136 – 139 in general, those 
relating to agreements implemented by national mechanisms and practices, 
and those relating to agreements implemented by a Council decision.
The general remarks relate to (i) the absence of important constitutional rights 
(freedom of association, right to collective bargaining and the right to strike), 
(ii) the participants of the European social dialogue (who are “management 
and labour”, are they representative and do they have full autonomy) and 
(iii) the lack of direct normative effect of the European agreements reached, 
which leads to the lack of uniform applicability of the European collective 
labour agreements.
Regarding implementation of agreements by national mechanisms and 
practices, it must be concluded that this introduces nothing new. Moreover, 
it can be argued that this manner of implementation is “weak” and even 
“inconsequential” as it has very little Community relevance. Partly as a 
consequence hereof, there are a number of important flaws attached to this 
implementation method. The following are mentioned above: (i) there is an 
unclear binding effect of the agreement reached, (ii) there are insufficient 
rules concerning the requirements that the European social partners have 
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to meet, (iii) potential difficulties exist with regard to the implementation of 
the agreement and (iv) difficulties exist concerning the effects, follow-up and 
enforcement of the agreement.
Obviously, implementation of agreements by a Council decision is something 
that did not exist prior to its institutional introduction. Although this method 
of implementation has Community relevance, there are still disadvantages. 
Basically, these disadvantages can be divided into (i) limitations concerning 
the content of the agreement and (ii) limitations imposed on the agreement 
by the implementation procedure. The content of the agreement must be 
covered by article 137 of the EC Treaty and is subject to the exception of 
article 137.5 of the EC Treaty, which limits the European social partners’ 
autonomy. Furthermore, the criteria on representativity, small and medium-
sized undertakings, the political general approval and subsidiarity limit the 
social partners in their collective autonomy. The implementation process by 
a Council decision seems to not really be meant as an instrument to assist 
the European social partners to enter into collective labour agreements 
on an autonomous basis, but should rather be considered as a regulatory 
technique.
To opt for concluding agreements “outside” articles 138-139 of the EC Treaty 
is not helpful; the distinction between concluding agreements “within” or 
“outside” the scope of these articles seems artificial for organisations that 
qualify as “labour” and “management” as referred to in articles 138 and 139 
of the EC Treaty. In the end, collective labour agreement concluded by these 
organisations simply fall within the scope of these articles, which merely gives 
them additional rights which they are free to use or not. If  organisations 
do not meet said qualification, they can still enter into agreements that are 
subsequently implemented by themselves or their members in jurisdictions 
in accordance with the rules of those jurisdictions. These organisations are, 
however, not entitled to the additional rights set forth in articles 138 and 
139 of the EC Treaty. They do face the same difficulties as management 
and labour face with regard to the European social dialogue, and wich are 
mentioned above. All flaws accompanying the implementation of agreements 
“in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management 
and labour and the Member States” apply mutatis mutandis to this situation. 
Transnational collective labour agreements concluded “outside” articles 138-
139 of the EC Treaty have no Community legal status; they are “national” 
transnational collective labour agreements. They are agreements governed by 
national law, having effects in other countries, depending on the applicable 
law to that agreement and the national law of the countries in which they 
should have an effect. These types of transnational collective labour 
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agreements outside the scope of the European social dialogue in fact fully 
lack Community relevance.
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ChAPTER 7
POSSIBLE AdVANTAGES OF TRANSNATIONAL 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING; TOWARdS A NEW SYSTEM?
1. Introduction
Chapter 6 shows that there are important flaws in today’s transnational 
collective bargaining. If  that bargaining occurs within the European social 
dialogue there are many flaws relating to the articles 136 – 139 of the EC 
Treaty in general, those relating to agreements implemented by national 
mechanisms and practices, and those relating to agreements implemented by 
a Council decision. If  transnational collective bargaining occurs outside the 
European social dialogue many of the same and other flaws arise as well. 
Furthermore, such transnational collective agreements fully lack Community 
relevance, as they simply do not exist in Community law. These flaws are 
undesirable if  it is concluded that there are existing and potential advantages 
attached to transnational collective bargaining, which in fact there are. Some 
of these advantages have been mentioned in previous chapters, others are yet 
to be outlined. The advantages can be divided into institutional advantages 
(section 2) and advantages for the parties involved and their members (section 
3). Section 4 sets out the possible disadvantages connected to a new system of 
transnational collective bargaining. The position of the potential participants 
of transnational collective bargaining will be discussed in section 5. 
Section 6 subsequently attempts to answer both preliminary questions 
posed: (i) is there a need or demand for transnational collective labour 
agreements and, if  so, (ii) should a new system on transnational collective 
bargaining be developed? In this section it will also be noted that both the 
Commission and the European Economic and Social Committee are keen on 
developing such a new system. Section 7 discusses the report “Transnational 
Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future”, which was drafted by a 
group of experts and discusses among others the possible way to proceed 
in transnational collective bargaining. This group wishes to establish joint 
negotiating bodies within which transnational collective labour agreements 
can be concluded. Section 8 discusses the receipt of said report by the parties 
concerned, while section 9 evaluates the report. Section 9 sets out that the 
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proposals outlined in the aforementioned report are too closely related to 
institutionalised collective bargaining within the European social dialogue. 
Consequently, it suffers from many of the same flaws as bargaining within 
the European social dialogue does. It is argued in section 9 that a new system 
of transnational collective bargaining should not be based on a new form of 
the European social dialogue but instead on “classical” collective bargaining 
as in place in the Member States. This thesis will focus on such a form of 
transnational collective bargaining. In section 10 the question whether there 
are suitable alternatives for Community legislation on transnational collective 
bargaining will be addressed. Subsequently, transnational European collective 
bargaining will be put in its proper perspective in section 11, after which 
section 12 summarises this chapter.
2. Institutional advantages
On an institutional level, European collective bargaining has a number of 
advantages, which made it popular with the Community institutions. At least 
five such advantages can be distinguished. European collective bargaining 
may: (i) prove useful in case Community institutions are unable to make 
decisions; (ii) help to overcome regulatory shortcomings; (iii) help to overcome 
the democratic deficit; (iv) prove to be an important tool for proper European 
Governance; and (v) be a proper method for horizontal subsidiarity.
2.1  European collective bargaining may prove useful when 
Community institutions are unable to make decisions
An important goal of the European Community is to abolish barriers between 
Member States in order to establish a fully unified internal market (reference 
is made to article 2 of the EC Treaty). The European Community used to 
thoroughly believe that such harmonisation would be best achieved by directives. 
This confidence appears clearly from the 1985 White Paper on completing 
the internal market683 and the 1987 Single European Act. Scholars refer to 
this principle as the “harmonisation by directive” or the “integration through 
law” model. An important and immediately recognised risk endangering this 
model was the fact that it could lead to over-regulation.684 The Commission 
mainly doubted whether it would be possible to achieve the adoption of 
sufficient directives in order to harmonise Europe, since at that time (1985) 
683  COM (1985) 310 final.
684  COM (1985) 310, page 20.
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the requirement of unanimity in Council decisions was still in full force.685 
Although nowadays the aforementioned “harmonisation by directive” model 
is much in decline, the thought that Community institutions are not always 
able to make all necessary decisions remains vivid. here, European collective 
bargaining could play a role. The European social partners may very well be 
capable of reaching agreements where the Community institutions cannot. 
This may be considered an advantage of European collective bargaining. 
2.2 European collective bargaining may help to 
overcome regulatory shortcomings
As just mentioned, the “harmonisation by directive” model is in decline, which 
started around the mid-nineties of the previous century. The Commission 
noted that implementation and enforcement of directives in the Member States 
were not always effective. In its 1992 Communication “the operation of the 
Community internal market”, the Commission pledged to monitor “not only 
the situation as regards the decision-making process but also the transposition 
and implementation problems in the Member States”.686 The Commission 
apparently doubted the effectiveness of directives and therefore advocated 
the principle of “doing less but doing it better”.687 The 1996 Government 
Progress Report added to this: “the diversity of jurisdictions in which rules 
must be applied and the lack of a strong executive capacity on the part of 
the Commission (…) have led it already to develop methods which can better 
deal with this gap and to some extent this has led to a transformation of the 
ways in which rules are formulated and implemented”.688 The aforementioned 
problem relating to implementing and enforcing directives is normally referred 
to as “regulatory deficiency”.
Taking the above into consideration, the Commission searched for other 
techniques than legislation to harmonise Europe. It turned, for example, 
685  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 8.
686  Communication of the Commission to the Council and Parliament, SEC (92), 2277 
final, The Operation of the Community Internal Market, page 3.
687  Resolution on the implementation of the legislative programme and other activities 
in 1995, and the Commission’s Work Programme for 1996, Oj C 17, 22 january 
1996, page 169, remark 3. 
688  Reference is made to the Governance Progress Report, CdP (96) 2216, European 
Commission, Forward Studies Unit, december 1996, as quoted in: Lo Faro, 
Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, page 36.
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to mutual recognition, regulatory competition and standardisation.689 This 
list can be further amplified with collective bargaining: European collective 
bargaining might help overcome the regulatory deficit within the European 
social community. In his already oft-mentioned study, Lo Faro argued in a 
persuasive manner that this is the main function of collective bargaining in 
the European social dialogue. he states that European collective bargaining 
“is mainly intended – in the overall context of a general redefinition of 
Community strategies – as one of the Community’s potential remedies to 
its decision-making bottlenecks and implementation problems in the field 
of labour law and social policy”.690 Although this should neither be the sole 
role, nor main reason, for transnational collective bargaining, it is a positive 
side-effect that constitutes, in my opinion, a valid reason to further support 
transnational collective bargaining. 
2.3 European collective bargaining may help to 
overcome the “democratic deficit”
It is argued that European legislation, at least to a certain extent, suffers from 
a democratic deficit. Although an awful lot has been written on “democratic 
deficit”, and several definitions have been introduced, the EU glossary 
provides for a quite clear and, for the current purpose, useful description of 
the term:691 
 
The democratic deficit is a concept invoked principally in the argument that the 
European Union and its various bodies suffer from a lack of democracy and 
seem inaccessible to the ordinary citizen because their method of operating is 
so complex. The view is that the Community institutional set-up is dominated 
689  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
pages 38 ff. It should be added that the Commission nowadays especially aims for 
little regulation. Reference is made to ETUI-REhS, Benchmarking Working Europe 
2007, pages 128 and 129. 
690  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 52. Smismans argued that the European social dialogue has a modest 
outcome as an alternative regulatory technique. S. Smismans, The European Social 
Dialogue in the Shadow of Hierarchy, page 170.
691  EU Glossary, www.eu.int/scadplus/glossary/dempcratic_deficit_en.htm. I realise 
that referring to the EU Glossary on a topic that has received much attention 
by scholars may be perceived as odd and “little scientific” by some. however, 
I simply cannot see the point in (over)complicating matters by referring to an 
overabundance of literature on this topic, while a perfectly suitable definition is 
given in the EU Glossary, making clear where the problems are. For the readers 
who are interested in knowing more about the “democratic deficit”, I gladly refer to 
Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, pages 167 – 173, and the 
list of literature mentioned by them in footnote 107 on page 167.
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by an institution combining legislative and government powers (the Council of 
the European Union) and an institution that lacks democratic legitimacy (the 
European Commission).
It is therefore important to investigate alternatives which could give a more 
democratic foundation to the decision-making process in Europe. Recently, 
Amtenbrink plead for a greater involvement of the European citizens in 
order to enhance the democratic level of the European Community. Their 
involvement would aid the European integration process. he argued that 
the citizens should be the owners of European policy and decision-making. 
Today’s institutional framework does not suffice in his view.692 In line with 
Amtenbrink’s plea of a greater involvement of citizens in order to further 
democracy in Europe, but also in line with the principle of participatory 
democracy outlined in the European Constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon,693 
the European social partners may play a role in Europe’s policy-making, 
since they are considered representatives of “labour and management” (and 
therefore ultimately of a large group of European citizens). This is recognised 
by the Court of First Instance in the UEAPME case.694 The European Social 
Partners therefore may, i.a. through collective bargaining, contribute to a 
more democratic European society.695
2.4 European collective bargaining may prove to be an 
important tool for proper European Governance
As set out in chapter 3, section 3.1.2 of this thesis, another problem facing 
the European Community is European Governance. In the White Paper on 
“European Governance”, the Commission observes that, on the one hand, 
Europeans want political leaders to find solutions for major problems, while 
on the other, they increasingly distrust institutions and politics, or are not 
interested in them.696 The Commission subsequently assesses the way in which 
the Union uses the powers given by its citizens and proposes opening up the 
policy-making process. To reach that goal, the Commission advises the use of 
a better combination of policy making tools, including the social dialogue. 
Trade Unions and employers’ organisations should also be more involved in 
692  F. Amtenbrink, Continuation or Reorientation? What Future for European 
Integration?.
693  See chapter 3, section 7.
694  Consideration 89 of the UEAPME case.
695  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 145.
696  COM (2001) 428, page 3.
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shaping and implementing EU policy. 697 European collective bargaining can 
thus play a role in proper European Governance.698
2.5 European collective bargaining is a proper 
method for horizontal subsidiarity
As discussed in chapter 2, section 3.1 of this thesis, the concept of horizontal 
subsidiarity may imply that it is best that the European social partners take 
appropriate action regarding an international issue, instead of Community 
institutions. European collective bargaining therefore forms an important 
tool for the principle of subsidiarity.699
2.6 Analysing these institutional advantages
These institutional advantages have led the Commission to actively stimulate 
collective bargaining in the European social dialogue. This is also the reason that 
Lo Faro argues that current European collective bargaining seems primarily 
aimed at providing support to Community regulation and legitimacy.700 
Although collective bargaining in the European social dialogue suffers from 
multiple flaws that, at least partially, can be traced back to said aim of current 
European collective bargaining, the above-mentioned advantages are real and 
existing. These advantages can, at least to a certain extent, still be achieved 
in a more autonomous system of transnational collective bargaining, which 
I will propose. These advantages give reason to further develop a European 
system on transnational collective bargaining.
697  Reinforcing the dialogue between stakeholders (including social partners) and all 
regulators at the EU and national levels is one of the three key actions under the 
EU’s “Better Regulation Strategy”. Reference is made to ec.europa.eu/governance/
better_regulation/index_en.htm. Although dialogue does not equate bargaining, 
the role of the (European) social partners in better governance at EU level is clearly 
recognised.
698  Smismans, for one, views transnational collective bargaining as a concept of 
(European) Governance. S. Smismans, Transnational private governance in the EU: 
When social partners bargain beyond borders, in: A. Nolke and j.C. Graz (eds.), 
Transnational Private Governance and its limits, Routledge, Abingdon, 2007.
699  Sovzak, for example, argued that International Framework Agreements reflect 
the principle of subsidiarity. See A. Sobczak, Legal dimensions of international 
framework agreements in the field of corporate social responsibility, page 121.
700  See chapter 6, section 2.
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3. Advantages for the parties involved and their members
There are not only institutional advantages relating to (European) 
transnational collective bargaining. The social partners themselves, and 
ultimately the employers and employees, can benefit from transnational 
collective bargaining as well. Some of the benefits are of a general nature, 
whilst others specifically relate to trade unions and their members on the one 
hand, or employers’ organisations and individual employers on the other. 
hereunder, a list if  advantages that transnational collective bargaining might 
offer is given, in no particular sequence.
3.1 Europeanisation and internationalisation of markets
The European Single Market was officially completed on 1 january 1993. 
Amongst others, it guaranteed the freedom of movement of goods, capital, 
services and labour. The goal of this “one market” was to take away internal 
frontiers. This has indeed been the case with regard to capital: cross-border 
cooperation between companies and cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
are “business as usual” at present. Capital and companies simply do not 
restrict themselves to national borders. Labour, however, does not seem to have 
the same international drive.701 Therefore, an optimal usage of the freedoms 
granted in the European Community is lacking. Transnational collective 
agreements could establish the right conditions, making international 
labour more attractive, and thus making better use of the European labour 
resources.702 Ellerkmann, former General Secretary of CEEP, stated in that 
respect:703
Employee mobility would be an initial case (…). Existing obstacles to mobility 
should be removed as swiftly as possible – a prospect which both social partners 
could regard as opportune.
701  W. E. Lecher and h. W. Platzer, Global trends and the European context, in W. E. 
Lecher and h. W. Platzer, European Union – European Industrial Relations? Global 
challenges, national developments and transnational dynamics, Routledge, London, 
1998, page 12. See also the opinion of Advocate General P. Poiares Maduro, 23 
May 2007, in case C-438/05, Viking, paragraph 70.
702  W. E. Lecher and h. W. Platzer, Global trends and the European context, page 
12. See also the last footnote of section 2.3 of chapter 16, and the suggestion in 
chapter 17, section 6.
703  W. Ellerkmann, The European Centre of Public Enterprises (CEEP), in W. E. 
Lecher and h. W. Platzer, European Union – European Industrial Relations? Global 
challenges, national developments and transnational dynamics, Routledge, London, 
1998, page 190.
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Ellerkmann expects that the consequences of the Single Market, especially 
after a growing economic integration, will lead to transnational negotiations.704 
These transnational negotiations must be considered especially key for the 
trade unions. As capital crosses the borders of the European Single Market 
easier than labour does, enabling employers to open a branch in another 
European country, trade unions run the risk of lagging behind.
But this is not the only effect of the Single Market. The Single Market, 
combined with (i) technical revolutions such as data-processing technologies 
and telecommunications and (ii) international and even global economical 
links, also leads to an “unprecedented importance in the competition between 
sites to attract economic activity”.705 This competition exceeds national 
borders. As a result of this, the social partners should take into consideration 
that setting employment conditions is not a purely national exercise. On a 
macro-regional level, these developments could even lead to the “European 
Social State” competing with the rest of the world.706 The European social 
partners working together, which could also be by concluding transnational 
collective agreements, could strengthen the competitive position of Europe. To 
some extent, this is also the role that is given to the European social partners 
in the light of the Lisbon Strategy.707 
3.2 Preventing social dumping / maintaining a social Europe
In order to maintain a social Europe, which is pursuant to article 2 of the EC 
Treaty one of the objectives of the European Community, social dumping 
must be prevented. Maintaining minimum social standards at European 
level is a common interest of all European trade unions.708 The European 
trade unions should define a European policy hereon, and could very well 
enter into a transnational agreement on this issue. Preventing social dumping 
may also appeal to employers and employers’ organisations. Employers can 
704  W. Ellerkmann, The European Centre of Public Enterprises (CEEP), page 190. The 
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs also expressed its view to strengthen 
fundamental transnational trade union rights “in order to fully implement the 
European single market”. See Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, 
Report on transnational trade union rights in the European Union, recital j.
705  W. E. Lecher and h. W. Platzer, Global trends and the European context, page 2.
706  W. E. Lecher and h. W. Platzer, Global trends and the European context, page 2.
707  Chapter 3, section 3.1.1.
708  d. Buda, On course for European labour relations? The prospects for the social 
dialogue in the European Union, page 35.
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have an interest in operating in a European market that sets fair minimum 
employment conditions. Obviously, this creates a level playing field.709
This concept of a social Europe with a level playing field can also be found 
in directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
december 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services (“Posted Workers directive”).710 The Posted Workers 
directive aims to coordinate the laws of the Member States in order to lay 
down “a nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection to be observed 
in the host country by employers who post workers to perform temporary 
work in the territory of a Member State where the services are provided”.711 
This mandatory protection is partly provided for by national collective 
labour agreements that are declared generally applicable. Why not offer such 
minimum protection to cross-border employees in a transnational collective 
agreement that has equal force in each relevant Member State?712 This could 
aid a social Europe.713 Many authors are of the opinion that a “social Europe” 
does indeed lie in the hands of European-wide action. A good example of this 
is Lea, who stated:714
In an integrated European market, with the growth of transnational capital and 
a convergence of attitudes between most national governments, social protection 
will increasingly be advanced through action at European level. Indeed, given the 
pressures generated by the globalisation of the world economy, it is more vital 
than ever that the European project succeeds.
709  The importance of a level playing field for employers (in the maritime sector) 
is stressed by Lillie. Lillie states that a number of transnational employers’ 
organisations were keen on entering into transnational collective agreements in 
order to level the playing field with low-standard operators. N. Lillie, The ILO 
Maritime Labour Convention, 2006: A new paradigm for global labour rights 
implementation, in: K. Papadakis, Cross-Border Social Dialogue and Agreements: 
An emerging global industrial relations framework?, International Labour 
Organisation, Geneva, 2008, page 193.
710  Oj L 18, 21 january 1997, pages 1 – 6.
711  Consideration 13 of the Posted Workers directive.
712  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 32.
713  Reference is made to A. Ojeda-Avilés, European Collective Bargaining and Posted 
Workers – Comments on Directive 96/71/EC, The International journal Of 
Comparative Labour Law And Industrial Relations, Summer 1997, page 130.
714  d. Lea, European Social Dialogue and Industrial Relations – The view of the TUC, 
in W. E. Lecher and h. W. Platzer, European Union – European Industrial Relations? 
Global challenges, national developments and transnational dynamics, Routledge, 
London, 1998, page 138.
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A similar conclusion is drawn in the recent study of the social impact of 
globalisation in the EU. The study’s key message is that the EU as a whole will 
gain from globalisation, but that the benefits will not be uniformly distributed 
across individuals and countries. Moreover, the gains of globalisation will 
not accrue automatically, but will instead depend on successful adaptation 
and appropriate policy responses. According to the study, the EU needs to 
implement policies that smooth the adjustment process and offer protection 
to those who are vulnerable to the changes and uncertainties that globalisation 
will bring.715 Given the nature of the actions to be taken, the European social 
partners seem in my view to be very suitable candidates to address these 
issues.
Equally de Ly argues, although relating to harmonisation in the EU in 
general, that equal or similar rules and regulations prevent unfair competition. 
Participants in the relevant markets, after (partial) harmonisation, do not have 
to focus on rules and regulations to make their decisions, but instead on other 
factor to reach an optimum economic allocation and therefore efficiency.716 
Schiek as well views that collective labour law can enhance Europe. She 
states that labour law regulatory models may develop an adequate regulatory 
environment for work in a knowledge and information society.717 
3.3 The introduction of the European Monetary Union
Before the EMU, economic and monetary policies were closely related and 
exercised at the same constitutional level. Pay setting was, to a relatively 
large extent, the responsibility of the national social partners.718 This system 
ensured balance. In the case of a regional fall of income, economic measures 
could bring stability, such as providing people with adequate social insurance. 
If  the social partners agreed on salary levels exceeding the levels that could 
reasonably be supported by the country’s economic situation, national 
currency exchange rates could be used to cushion the effects.
715  I. Begg, j. draxler and j. Mortensen, Is Social Europe Fit for Globalisation? A study 
of the social impact of globalisation in the European Union, report for the European 
Commission, March 2008.
716  F. de Ly, Europese Gemeenschap en Privaatrecht [European Community and Private 
Law], W.E.j. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1993, page 26.
717  d. Schiek, Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in European 
Labour Law: How to read Article 139 EC, page 27.
718  M. Coen, The European dimension to collective bargaining post-Maastricht, in W. E. 
Lecher and h. W. Platzer, European Union – European Industrial Relations? Global 
challenges, national developments and transnational dynamics, Routledge, London, 
1998, page 66.
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This all changed with the EMU. Economic policy remained a predominantly 
national affair, if  only for the reason that the European Community lacks 
sufficient funding to take adequate economical measures in case of a regional 
fall of income. By contrast, monetary policy shifted from national to European 
level within the Community. The European Central Bank introduced a 
stability-oriented policy: major adjustments in the Euro exchange rates are 
unlikely. The economic and monetary policies are thus not exercised at the 
same level anymore. Their material link, however, remained. Reference is made 
to the President of the Central Bank of the Land of North Rhine/Westphalia, 
jochimsen, who claimed that “any structure in which only monetary policy, 
but nothing else, is integrated will be built on sand”. he added that it was 
therefore necessary to coordinate pay, financial and social policies.719
Since exchange rates can no longer protect national competitiveness and 
employment, collective bargaining plays a more important role in promoting 
economic stability in the Member States than it used to do. Proper collective 
bargaining is therefore more economically important than ever. To some 
extent this can even be placed in a legal key. Pursuant to article 99 of the EC 
Treaty, Member States must regard their economic policies as a matter of 
common concern. They also have to conduct their economic policies “with a 
view to attributing to the achievements of the objectives of the Community” 
(article 98 of the EC Treaty), which i.a. are (i) a balanced and sustainable 
development of economic activities and (ii) a high degree of competitiveness 
and convergence of economic performance (article 2 of the EC Treaty). The 
Member States are therefore under the obligation, given the stability-oriented 
policy of the Central European Bank, to influence, as far as possible, well 
balanced pay settings.720
The above considerations have important consequences for collective 
bargaining, after all: “once the ability to vary nominal exchange rates has 
been removed, labour market flexibility, and in particular pay flexibility, is 
the most important instrument of [economic] adjustment”.721 Pay setting is 
done in advance, while adapting the economic situation through exchange 
rates adjustments is something that is done after the consequences of a 
certain salary level are known. This suggests that the social partners in the 
EMU must very carefully set the level of pay; posterior reparations in the 
719  R. jochimsen, in handelsblatt, 4/5, june 1993, as quoted in M. Coen, The 
European dimension to collective bargaining post-Maastricht, page 68.
720  M. Coen, The European dimension to collective bargaining post-Maastricht, pages 
67 and 68.
721  M. Coen, The European dimension to collective bargaining post-Maastricht, page 69.
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economic situation are not possible anymore. This also means that the social 
partners must, more than ever, refrain from disrupting the sustainability of 
macro-economic relationships, “in order to minimise any pre- or post-pay-
increase passing on of costs”. This, together with the avoidance of growing 
distributional conflicts between differently developed regions, is, according to 
Coen, the reason why European bargaining is necessary. he states:722
It is improbable that Europeanising all spheres of policy will exclude a European 
harmonisation of collective bargaining – that is, it will involve more than mere 
traditional and international cooperation but rather a convergence of bargaining 
forms, claims and the establishment of forms for the European regulation of 
labour costs, even if  regional and sectoral pay differentials must become the 
central regulative process of the integration in order to even out differences in real 
productivity.
Coen is not the only one who is convinced that the introduction of the EMU 
will lead to transnational collective bargaining. Equally certain about that 
are Lecher and Platzer who state that “EMU will not only place growing 
pressures on the parties to collective bargaining (…); it will itself  generate a 
need for cross-border collective bargaining because of the need to establish 
some general framework conditions at EU level.”723 The introduction of the 
EMU seems therefore a good reason to, in due time,724 introduce a form of 
(European) transnational collective bargaining.725 In any case, it was one of 
the reasons the doorn Group got together the first time.726
722  M. Coen, The European dimension to collective bargaining post-Maastricht, pages 
69 and 70.
723  W. E. Lecher and h. W. Platzer, Global trends and the European context, pages 7 
and 8.
724  The words “in due time” are of relevance. E. Traversa, for example, stated 
(emphasis added): “Given these factors (lack of geographical mobility, major 
disparities in productivity and labour costs and in tax and social security systems), 
the social partners are still, and in the foreseeable future will continue to be, 
responsible for collective agreements on the level and content of wages at national 
level.” The author did observe, however, Europeanisation of collective bargaining. 
E. Traversa, The consequences of European Monetary Union on Collective 
bargaining and the National Social Security Systems, The International journal Of 
Comparative Labour Law And Industrial Relations, Spring 2000, page 48.
725  See also d. Buda, who states: “Undoubtedly, coordination or centralisation of 
policy on collective agreements in a full EMU would be all the more necessary but 
also considerably more difficult to achieve due to the imbalances involved”, in d. 
Buda, On course for European labour relations? The prospects for the social dialogue 
in the European Union, page 37.
726  Chapter 3, section 2.2.
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3.4 Tackling “common” problems at the appropriate level
Certain problems in the European Community are “common” problems, in 
other words problems that all social partners face. These problems would 
best be tackled at a transnational or even European level.727 Some common 
problems are purely sectoral, such as fair competition in road transport 
(companies should not be able to charge cheaper rates due to violation of 
necessary but expensive safety measures) and a minimum level of training 
for sailors in the maritime sector (preventing price competition due to using 
ill-trained sailors who might be a safety hazard).728 Other problems are of a 
broader, cross-industry nature, such as demographic trends (ageing, declining 
birth rates and immigration), changes in the labour market (a new balance 
between family, work and education), health and safety, working times etc.729 
These problems can best be tackled at European level, in order to create a 
solution that is broadly based. 
More in general, transnational or even European level, may prove the most 
appropriate level to conclude agreements. In any case, article 28 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union730 stipulates that collective 
bargaining should be carried out on the appropriate level.731 Article 11 of 
727  h.W. Platzer, Industrial Relations and European Integration, in W. E. Lecher and 
h. W. Platzer, European Union – European Industrial Relations? Global challenges, 
national developments and transnational dynamics, Routledge, London, 1998, page 
97.
728  It should be noted that maritime organisations are considering entering into a 
European collective labour agreement on the inland shipping trade. An important 
reason for this development is that many companies “flag out” to countries with 
lower social premiums. As a consequence, national trade unions are losing grip in 
this sector. Reference is made to the article: Sector-cao binnenvaart op de klippen 
[Sectoral collective labour agreement on the inland shipping trade on the rocks], as 
published in the magazine “de SleepBinnenkrant” of the dutch trade union FNV, 
december 2005, pages 4 ff.
729  See chapter 3, section 3.1.3.
730  Oj C 364, 18 december 2000, page 1.
731  Veneziani states about “appropriate level” as referred to in article 28 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union the following: “The principle of 
the collective autonomy of the social partners means the reference to “appropriate 
levels” leaves it to the unfettered discretion to the parties to the bargaining process 
to decide which is the most appropriate level to undertake collective bargaining. 
This may be European, national territorial, interconfederal, sectoral, national or 
international group of enterprises or plant level.” B. Veneziani, in B. Bercusson 
(ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – summary 
version - , ETUI, Brussels, 2002, page 57.
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the directive on Equal Treatment Irrespective of Race or Ethic Origins732 
and article 13 of the directive on Equal Treatment in Employment and 
Occupation733 refer to the social partners’ ability to conclude anti-discrimination 
 agreements on the appropriate level as well. This appropriate level may very 
well be a transnational or even European level.734
3.5 Possible advantages for European multinationals
There are a number of potential advantages for European multinationals with 
regard to transnational collective agreements, such as:735
•	 creating	corporate	identity	/	image;	
•	 tailor-made	solutions	for	problems	at	company-level;
•	 international	familiar	structures;
•	 equal	level	of	health	and	safety	protection;
•	 simplifying	transnational	restructuring	processes;
•	 consistent	and	equal	regime;
•	 introducing	binding	European	Manuals;
•	 confidence-building	/	motivating	employees.
This may encourage employers to enter into transnational collective agreements. 
As set out in chapter 4, section 3, European multinational companies already 
are, to a certain extent, engaged in transnational collective bargaining, 
primarily focusing on corporate social responsibility and restructuring.
732  Council directive 2000/43/EC, Oj L 180, 19 july 2000, page 22.
733  Council directive 2000/78/EC, Oj L 303, 2 december 2000, page 16.
734  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés 
dal-Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 32. 
See also B. Veneziani, who states in relation to article 28 of the of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union: “One thing is arguably clear: it must be appropriate 
to negotiate some matters at European level.” B. Veneziani, in B. Bercusson (ed.), 
European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – summary 
version - , page 58.
735  Some of the items mentioned in the list derive from (i) d. Buda, On course for 
European labour relations? The prospects for the social dialogue in the European 
Union, page 39 and (ii) A. Klak, European Industrial Relations: an employer’s 
viewpoint, in W. E. Lecher and h. W. Platzer, European Union – European Industrial 
Relations? Global challenges, national developments and transnational dynamics, 
Routledge, London, 1998, page 152.
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3.6 Taking matters in own hands
An important reason for the European social partners (especially the 
employers’ organisations) to enter into an agreement, and subsequently ask 
the Commission to arrange implementation of that agreement, is to take 
matters into their own hands. It is not uncommon for the Commission to 
warn the European social partners that, if  they fail to reach an agreement 
on a specific subject, the Commission will propose legislation itself. In order 
to prevent this and to remain in control as to the content of such legislation, 
the social partners have, on occasions, been eager to conclude agreements 
themselves. A good example of this is UNICE concluding the joint Agreement 
on 31 October 1991, because it (rightly) expected that the Intergovernmental 
Conference in Maastricht in 1992 would lead to decision-making in the field 
of social policy by a qualified majority of votes, instead of maintaining the 
rule of unanimity.736 If  the social partners are able to conclude transnational 
collective agreements resulting in fewer social problems than there are now, 
chances are that the social partners are confronted less frequently with 
proposals from the Commission for legislation on the field of social policy.737 
3.7 Creating power equilibrium
It is often argued that trade unions are somewhat lacking behind employers 
and employers’ organisations, especially at transnational (European) level. 
Employers have, as a rule, better resources, can substitute capital for labour and 
have a greater mobility (capital has, as set out above, a greater mobility than 
labour).738 This employers’ advantage could be countered by the trade unions 
through a well-oiled international network.739 This could also increase trade 
unions’ capacity to pressurise the employers or employers’ organisation(s). 
Creating a transnational counterpower against multinational employers is 
736  Reference is made to the first footnote of section 2.3.1 of chapter 3.
737  Reference is made to in d. Buda, On course for European labour relations? The 
prospects for the social dialogue in the European Union, page 32. See also E. 
Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 8.
738  h.W. Platzer, Industrial Relations and European Integration, page 95.
739  See also E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 7.
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often regarded as the most important reason for trade unions to engage in 
transnational collective bargaining.740
 
3.8 Conclusion
All in all, it seems that there are quite a number of advantages attached 
to concluding transnational (or even European-wide) collective labour 
agreements. 
4. Disadvantages connected to European collective bargaining 
A lot can be said in favour of (European) transnational collective bargaining 
and some is said above. That may not distract us from the counterarguments 
that certainly can be forwarded as well. These counterarguments can be 
divided into three categories: (i) fundamental arguments against collective 
bargaining in general, (ii) fundamental arguments against (European) 
transnational collective bargaining and (iii) practical arguments against 
(European) transnational collective bargaining. 
4.1 Fundamental arguments against collective bargaining in general
From an economical point of view, scholars have argued that “unions and 
collective bargaining diminish efficiency and hinder economic development, 
and in the process undermine the very purpose they aim to achieve: worker 
protection through high employment levels”.741 According to these scholars, 
collective bargaining keeps wages artificially high, leading to a diminishing 
demand for labour and higher costs for goods and services, resulting in less 
740  See, for instance, d. Gallin, International framework agreements: A reassessment, 
in: K. Papadakis, Cross-Border Social Dialogue and Agreements: An emerging 
global industrial relations framework?, International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 
2008, pages 16 and 25. See also K. Papadakis, Introduction, pages 1, 4 and 5. In 
order to overcome the mismatch in powers between the multinational employers 
on one hand and of the trade unions on the other, it has been argued that the 
Commission needs to be actively involved in transnational collective bargaining. 
See S. Smismans, The European social dialogue between constitutional and labour 
law, pages 356 and 357.
741  M. de Vos, Collective Labour Agreements and European Competition Law: an 
Inherent Contradiction?, page 55, in: M. de Vos (ed.), A Decade Beyond Maastricht: 
The European Social Dialogue Revisited, Kluwer Law International, The hague, 
2003.
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consumption, which affects production and its demand for labour. These 
scholars tend to favour a fully free market.742
It is beyond the scope of this thesis – and outside my field of expertise, being 
a lawyer and not an economist – to deal with this matter. I refer to chapter 
1, section 4. For the moment, I simply observe that, within the different 
Member States of the EU, there is (although different in nature and intensity) 
an industrial relations’ system that includes collective bargaining. Apparently, 
this system works, or at least is chosen over other systems. It must, given this 
European-wide practice, be assumed for the sake of this thesis that collective 
bargaining in general has advantages outweighing its disadvantages. I am 
strengthened in this view by the 2006 Industrial Relations in Europe report, 
which shows that cooperation between employers and trade unions plays 
an increasing role in the European workplace and can help create the right 
conditions for growth.743 
Another potential fundamental objection against collective bargaining in 
general, which problem may even be clearer at transnational level than at 
national level, is the declining representativity level of the social partners. If  
(trade union) membership density continues to decline and drops under a 
critical level upon which the social partners cannot be considered representative 
anymore for the employers and the employees they are supposed to represent, 
or if  for any other reason the same happens, collective bargaining as we 
know it will fail, both at national and transnational level. The social partners 
cannot become separated from the people and the business, as the latter 
justify the powers of the social partners. In other words: if  there are too 
few social partners’ members, these social partners lack legitimation to bind 
employers and employees.744 It is therefore imperative, when drafting a system 
on collective bargaining, to ascertain that there is an important material link 
between the social partners and the employers and employees they represent 
(representativity demands). Therefore, representativity will continue to be an 
742  M. de Vos, Collective Labour Agreements and European Competition Law: an 
Inherent Contradiction?, page 55.
743  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, chapter 8. Reference 
is also made to the press release of this report of 8 december 2006 (IP/06/1714), 
which states: “high quality industrial relations make a significant contribution to 
economic performance, from company-level to the economy as a whole.”
744  Bruun rightly argued that a mismatch between union density and coverage “cannot 
in the long run be a sustainable situation. Such arrangements might lend stability 
to the system, but the legitimacy of such a system might be vulnerable in a crisis 
situation”. N. Bruun, The Autonomy of Collective Agreement, page 11, as can be 
found on www.juridicum.su.se/stockholmcongress2002/bruun_english.pdf.
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important subject in this thesis, including in the proposal for a system on 
transnational bargaining. 
4.2 Fundamental arguments against (European) 
transnational collective bargaining
To a certain extent some of the above-mentioned arguments are used to 
challenge European collective bargaining as well. It is argued that European 
collective bargaining adversely affects competition in Europe, leading to a 
weakened economy and thus creating fewer jobs. This point of view is clearly 
set out by Reid, who argued:745
Seeing EC-level collective bargaining which will ultimately lead to common 
conditions throughout the EC as a goal is a dangerous illusion. It will hamper 
decision-making, remove competition, introduce rigidities and ultimately destroy 
jobs. It is the success of the market, or rather our success in competing in it, that 
has provided the living standards we now have in the EC. That has been achieved 
because of, not despite, diversity.
In my opinion, this argument is based on a false assumption. The goal of 
EC-level collective bargaining should not be fully levelling out employment 
conditions throughout Europe. It should, instead, recognise the differences 
in Europe and only interfere where needed. It should not be forgotten that 
ETUC wishes to maintain diversity. Two of ETUC’s representatives were very 
clear on that:746
The aim of European collective bargaining should not be to standardise all 
employment or social provisions in Europe. The issue is not one of a crude levelling, 
as is sometimes claimed polemically by the employers, and neither is it a matter 
of centralising negotiations at European level. And finally, it is not an objective 
of the ETUC to standardise wages from Palermo to Copenhagen. The aim must 
be to set about a harmonization of living and working conditions throughout 
Europe. This will involve more rapid progress for those countries were standards 
are presently lower, without obstructing social advance in countries with higher 
745  P. Reid, Collective bargaining at European level – A sectoral employer’s viewpoint, in 
W. E. Lecher and h. W. Platzer, European Union – European Industrial Relations? 
Global challenges, national developments and transnational dynamics, Routledge, 
London, 1998, page 125.
746  W. Buschak and V. Kallenbach, The European Trades Union Confederation, in W. E. 
Lecher and h. W. Platzer, European Union – European Industrial Relations? Global 
challenges, national developments and transnational dynamics, Routledge, London, 
1998, page 175.
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standards. This is the only method for achieving a step-by-step narrowing of the 
gulf  between Portugal and denmark – and between Greece and Portugal.
Although, on occasion, transnational collective bargaining may include the 
laying of a “minimum foundation” of employment conditions, in order to 
establish a socially acceptable minimum in countries where that otherwise 
would be absent, crudely harmonising all employment conditions in the EU 
is simply not the aim. Therefore, the fundamental argument against European 
collective bargaining posed above does, in my view, not fly.
4.3 Practical arguments against (European) 
transnational collective bargaining
There are many practical arguments that can be raised against (European) 
transnational collective bargaining. Some of these arguments are more 
convincing than others. Examples of these arguments are:747
•	 differences	in	the	organization,	ideology	and	interests	of	Europe’s	natio-
nal trade unions;
•	 limits	of	international	solidarity	of	workers	if 	strikes	are	needed;
•	 trade	unions	weaknesses	to	establish	an	autonomous	transnational	sys-
tem of industrial relations;
•	 a	lack	of	interests	of	employers	and	employers’	organisations;
•	 the	risks	and	costs	of	coming	to	European	collective	bargaining;	and
•	 differences	in	the	legal	systems	of	the	different	countries.
Although (some of) these disadvantages are real and not at all easily 
overcome, they do not fundamentally obstruct (European) transnational 
collective bargaining. All of these disadvantages are of a practical nature and 
are therefore potentially temporary. Especially when trade union membership 
remains on acceptable levels, the practical issues facing transnational 
collective bargaining can be tackled. Meaningful transnational collective 
bargaining may even give a boost to trade union membership, which could 
lead to stronger trade unions and more employees’ solidarity when needed. 
differences in legal systems in different countries could be resolved by new 
legislation. Employers and employers’ organisations may recognise in time the 
potential benefits of transnational collective bargaining, or might be forced 
747  These disadvantages derive to a large extent from h.W. Platzer, Industrial Relations 
and European Integration, page 86 and j. Rojot, A. Le Flanchec and C. Voynett-
Fourboul, European Collective Bargaining, new Prospects or much Ado about Little, 
The International journal Of Comparative Labour Law And Industrial Relations, 
Autumn 2001, page 346.
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to start bargaining by the trade unions. In other words, the disadvantages can 
change over time, and possibly could change faster when European legislation 
enabling real transnational collective bargaining enters into force. 
4.4 Conclusion
Given the above, including the assumption on the possible economic 
hurdles, there are no convincing fundamental arguments against (European) 
transnational collective bargaining, provided that representativity of the 
social partners remains within acceptable levels. There are practical arguments 
against transnational collective bargaining, but these arguments can change 
in time, possibly faster once European legislation on transnational collective 
bargaining enters into force.
5. The position of the possible participants on 
transnational collective bargaining in general
As can be derived from chapter 4, at least some participants in transnational 
collective bargaining recognise advantages of such a method of bargaining, 
as they choose to practice it. Apparently, there is a market for transnational 
collective bargaining. In this respect, deinert assessed the position of possible 
participants of (European) transnational collective bargaining in more detail. 
he found that European employees’ organisations, including ETUC,748 seem 
to be in favour of a transnational bargaining system. They would not opt to 
bargain on pay, but rather on topics like the prevention of social dumping, 
working time, employee representation, and more in general, topics that are 
relevant in the European social dialogue. European employees’ organisations 
see as problematic their lack of power at European level (in order to engage in 
collective actions) and the lacking rules on transnational collective bargaining. 
deinert concludes that, in summary, European employees’ organisations view 
European collective bargaining as an important tool to solve specific problems 
and are willing to promote such bargaining.749 The same level of enthusiasm 
748  ETUC reaffirmed its positive stance towards European collective bargaining in 
december 2005, although it also expressed it concerns on centralising European 
collective bargaining, including that the right to sign transnational agreements 
should be confined to trade unions and that European Works Councils are not 
appropriate bodies for negotiations. See EIRO website, Key EU industrial relations 
initiative in prospect, February 2006. 
749  O. deinert, Der europäische Kollektivvertrag [The European collective labour 
agreement], Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1999, pages 108 – 118.
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on transnational collective bargaining was found by national trade unions.750 
751
Things are different when the European employers’ organisations are involved. 
These organisations, including UNICE,752 seem not interested in developing 
a system of transnational collective bargaining at all. They either wish to 
focus on the European social dialogue, or view collective bargaining as a pure 
national affair. They consider transnational collective bargaining difficult and 
potentially hazardous. They are afraid that labour would try to bargain on pay, 
after which it will focus on the most favourable provisions in a transnational 
collective labour agreement, making that a standard (“cherry picking”). They 
furthermore consider that the particular points of interests where to bargain 
on will differ widely between all participants, that the organisational structure 
of trade unions in particular will make transnational collective bargaining very 
difficult, that transnational bargaining is insufficiently legitimised and that, 
within multinational companies, it will prove difficult to apply a transnational 
collective agreement to all subsidiaries, as some of these subsidiaries are 
already “taken” by national trade unions. Finally, they point out that rules on 
transnational collective bargaining are lacking.753 This position is particularly 
true when it involves large European employers’ organisations. deinert also 
assessed another European employers’ organisation, national employers’ 
organisations and multinational companies. They showed more interest in the 
possibility of transnational bargaining. One out of two European employers’ 
750  O. deinert, Der europäische Kollektivvertrag, page 130, table 1.
751  A cautious positive approach towards a transnational social dialogue can be 
found at the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), an 
organisation that was set up in 1949 and has 241 affiliated organisations (national 
trade union centres) in 156 countries and territories, with a membership of 155 
million. ICFTU maintains close links with the ETUC. ICFTU stresses that the 
employees must be represented by trade unions and that the transnational social 
dialogue may not undermine collective bargaining at other levels. On balance, 
however, ICFTU supports the conclusion of global framework agreements and 
the international social dialogue at the enterprise and sectoral level. See the final 
resolution of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, The Social 
Responsibilities of Business in a Global Economy, International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions Eighteenth World Congress, Miyazaki, 5 – 10 december 2004. 
The resolution is available at: http://congress.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index
=991220321&Language=EN. See also d. Bé, A report on the European Commission 
initiative for a European framework for transnational collective bargaining, pages 233 
and 234.
752  UNICE reaffirmed its negative stance towards European collective bargaining in 
the beginning of 2006. See EIRO website, Key EU industrial relations initiative in 
prospect, February 2006.
753  O. deinert, Der europäische Kollektivvertrag, pages 120 -124.
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organisations, three out of thirteen national employers’ organisations and 
all three multinational companies participating in deinert’s research showed 
such an interest.754 
Recently, the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) took a stance 
on international framework agreements.755 The IOE was created in 1920 and 
represents the interests of business in the labour and social policy fields at an 
international level. It consists of 146 national employer organisations from 
138 countries from all over the world. The IOE takes a cautious approach 
when it comes to international framework agreements.756 It acknowledges 
the development of such agreements at company level, but it is concerned 
about a possible mismatch in expectations of companies on the one hand 
and trade unions on the other. Companies may view concluding transnational 
agreements as a mere deepening of dialogue, while trade unions may see it as 
an industrial relations exercise.757 The IOE is furthermore concerned about 
the national impact of transnational agreements and considers that the legal 
status of international framework agreements is unclear.
The situation described above is confirmed by deGryse in his research on 
the European social dialogue. he observes that the European employees’ 
organisations are keen on a vivid European social dialogue, while in particular 
the cross-industry European employers’ organisations are not. This is, 
however, different when it concerns a number of sectoral European employers’ 
organisations. These organisations are showing a growing willingness to 
actively participate in the (sectoral) European social dialogue.758 
According to the participants of deinert’s research, the perceived advantages 
of European bargaining include, in order of importance, the following: 
prevention of border disputes, tackling common problems, preventing 
social dumping and improving competitiveness of the European Union. The 
perceived disadvantages of transnational bargaining, deriving from the same 
754  O. deinert, Der europäische Kollektivvertrag, page 130, table 1. 
755  International organisation of employers, International industrial relations, 20 
january 2008, available at: http://www.ioe-emp.org/en/policy-areas/international-
industrial-relations/index.html.
756  See also d. Bé, A report on the European Commission initiative for a European 
framework for transnational collective bargaining, pages 231 and 232.
757  A similar view has been forwarded by the Council of European Employers of the 
Metal, Engineering and Technology-Based Industries (CEEMET), in its position 
paper of 19 december 2006. This position paper is available at: http://www.wem.
org/positiondocs/CEEMET%20position%20-%20december%202006.doc.
758  C. deGryse, European social dialogie: a mixed picture, pages 5, 14 and 17.
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sources and in the same sequence, include: influencing the free market by 
equalising employment conditions, potential disagreements between the social 
partners, differing national legal systems and the lack of rules on transnational 
collective labour agreements. Over 50% of all participants consider drafting 
of rules on transnational collective labour agreements as “inevitable” when 
transnational collective bargaining is pursued, while another group states that 
the need for such rules is very probable.759
To summarise, on the side of labour there is a very positive stance towards 
transnational collective bargaining. European and national trade unions 
seem to be enthusiastic about the concept. On the employers’ side there is a 
much more negative stance, although it varies to a certain extent. A minority 
of national employers’ organisations and all participating multinational 
companies were, given deinert’s research, positive about transnational 
collective bargaining. By far most of the participants of deinert’s research 
noted that, should transnational collective bargaining be promoted, proper 
rules on transnational collective bargaining will have to be introduced.
6. Answering the preliminary questions
This chapter, combined with the previous chapters, leads to the following 
observations with regard to the preliminary questions:
6.1 Is there a need or demand for transnational collective agreements?
First, it is noted that since 2000 both the challenges for and the role of the 
social partners within the EU have changed significantly. The European social 
partners (i) are to play an important role in the year 2000 Lisbon Strategy, 
(ii) can contribute to proper European Governance, (iii) may “smooth” the 
enlargement process of the EU, and (iv) are faced with the “new” challenges 
globalisation, economic and monetary union, technological change and the 
transition to a knowledge based economy, changing employment and labour 
markets, demographic change and new balances between family, work and 
education. In the light hereof, the cross-industry European social partners 
announced to reposition their role and decided, among other things, to 
pursue a more autonomous social dialogue. Said developments apparently 
759  O. deinert, Der europäische Kollektivvertrag, pages 125 – 151.
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contributed to a demand for collective bargaining at a European level.760 
Second, Europeanisation of collective bargaining (and negotiations) can 
be observed both at national level and at European level. Transnational 
collective agreements are already concluded. Especially labour is enthusiastic 
about transnational collective bargaining while management is not, with 
the notable exception of some national employers’ organisations, possibly 
a number of sectoral European employers’ organisations and more in 
particular multinational companies. In any event, for some parties, cross-
border collective bargaining apparently seems to fulfil a certain need. Third, 
as set out above, transnational collective bargaining in Europe seems to offer 
important advantages, outweighing the (potential and real) disadvantages. 
This should lead to a(n) (increasing) need or demand for transnational 
collective agreements. All in all, the first preliminary question should be 
answered with: yes. 
6.2 Should a new system on transnational 
collective bargaining be developed?
The aforementioned answer legitimises answering the question of whether the 
current system of European social dialogue, as set out in the articles 136 – 139 
of the EC Treaty, suffices. This does not seem to be the case. Institutionalised 
collective bargaining, including its implementation techniques, seems to 
suffer from a number of flaws. General flaws relate to (i) the absence of 
important constitutional rights (freedom of association, right to collective 
bargaining and the right to strike), (ii) the participants of the European 
social dialogue (who are “management and labour”, are they representative 
and do they have full autonomy) and (iii) the lack of direct normative 
effect of the European agreements reached, leading to the lack of uniform 
applicability of the European collective labour agreements. Implementation 
of agreements by national mechanisms and practices can be viewed “weak” 
and “inconsequential” as it has little Community relevance. It furthermore 
suffers from the following flaws: (i) there is an unclear binding effect of the 
agreement reached, (ii) there are insufficient rules regarding the requirements 
the European social partners have to meet, (iii) potential difficulties exist 
with regard to the implementation of the agreement and (iv) difficulties are 
760  The cross-industry social partners already concluded a joint analysis on how to 
deal with key challenges facing European labour markets. The results of this joint 
analysis will guide and influence future initiatives of the cross-industry European 
social partners. See ETUC/CES, BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP, Key 
challenges facing European labour markets: a joint analysis of European social 
partners, October 2007 and ETUI-REhS, Benchmarking Working Europe 2007, 
page 116.
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in place concerning the effects, follow-up and enforcement of the agreement. 
Although implementation of agreements by a Council decision certainly has 
Community relevance, it also suffers from a number of flaws. These can be 
divided into (i) limitations concerning the content of the agreement and (ii) 
limitations imposed on the agreement by the implementation procedure. The 
implementation process by a Council decision seems to not really be meant as 
an instrument to assist the European social partners in entering into collective 
labour agreements on an autonomous basis, but should rather be considered 
as a regulatory technique.
To opt for concluding agreements “outside” articles 138-139 of the EC Treaty 
is not helpful; the distinction between concluding agreements “inside” or 
“outside” the scope of these articles 139 seems artificial for organisations 
that qualify as “labour” and “management” as referred to in articles 138 
and 139 of the EC Treaty. Collective labour agreements concluded by these 
organisations simply fall within the scope of these articles, which merely gives 
them additional rights which they are entitled to use or not. If  organisations 
do not meet that qualification, they can still enter into agreements that are 
subsequently implemented by themselves or their members in jurisdictions 
in accordance with the rules of those jurisdictions. These organisations are, 
however, not entitled to the additional rights set forth in articles 138 and 
139 of the EC Treaty. Apart from that, their position is not very different 
when compared to management and labour above. All flaws accompanying 
the implementation of agreements “in accordance with the procedures and 
practices specific to management and labour and the Member States” apply 
mutatis mutandis to this situation. Transnational collective labour agreements 
concluded between multinational companies and trade unions have no specific 
legal status; they simply do not exist in international law. They are agreements 
governed by national law, having effects in other countries, depending on the 
applicable law to that agreement and the national law of the countries in 
which they should have an effect. Transnational collective labour agreements 
outside the scope of the European social dialogue in fact lack Community 
relevance.
The above leads to the conclusion that a new system enabling genuine 
transnational collective bargaining is necessary, when such transnational 
bargaining indeed is pursued. This also appeared from the responses from the 
possible participants of transnational collective bargaining set out in section 
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5 above, but is equally recognised in the legal literature,761 and nicely put by 
Blanpain, who criticises the lack of proper principles on which (European) 
transnational collective bargaining could be based: “There is no doubt that 
there are insufficient European general principles of law to deal satisfactorily 
with the legal problems that accompany European collective agreements.”762 
Consequently, the second preliminary question should be answered with: 
yes. 
6.3 Towards a European system of transnational collective bargaining
The conclusion that a new system enabling transnational collective bargaining 
should be developed is shared by the Commission. In its 2002 and its 2005 
Communications it stated respectively:
Looking ahead and in the medium term, the development of the European social 
dialogue raises the question of European collective agreements as sources of law. 
The discussions on the forthcoming reform of the Treaty should take this into 
consideration. 763
 
Providing an optional framework for transnational collective bargaining at either 
enterprise level or sectoral level could support companies and sectors to handle 
challenges dealing with issues such as work organisation, employment, working 
conditions, training. 764
But it is not only the Commission that is keen on further developing 
transnational bargaining. This idea is also positively received by the European 
Economic and Social Committee. The Committee “supports the objective set 
out by the Commission of promoting the social dialogue at enterprise and 
761  See for example: M. Blank, Collective Bargaining in the European Union – The 
standpoint of IG Metall, in W. E. Lecher and h. W. Platzer, European Union 
– European Industrial Relations? Global challenges, national developments and 
transnational dynamics, Routledge, London, 1998, pages 166 – 167; W. E. Lecher 
and h. W. Platzer, Global trends and the European context, pages 7 and 8; F. 
Franssen, De Europese sociale dialoog, page 19; and A. Sobczak, Legal dimensions 
of international framework agreements in the field of corporate social responsibility, 
in: K. Papadakis, Cross-Border Social Dialogue and Agreements: An emerging 
global industrial relations framework?, International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 
2008, pages 127 and 128.
762  R. Blanpain, European Labour law, page 572.
763  Communication “The European social dialogue, a force for innovation and 
change”, COM (2002) 341, page 19.
764  Communication from the Commission on the Social Agenda, COM (2005) 33, 
page 8.
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sectoral level, whilst taking greater account than has hitherto been the case 
of the fact that enterprises operate on a cross-frontier basis, with the result 
that voluntary agreements accordingly assume a cross-border importance”. 
The Committee also urges the Commission to discuss its proposed framework 
provisions with the European social partners.765 As a consequence of these 
developments, a group of experts led by Ales won a tender to draft a report 
on, amongst other things, the future of transnational collective bargaining. 
This report, “Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future” 
(“the Report”), was completed in February 2006.
7. The report “Transnational Collective Bargaining: 
Past, Present and Future” 
drafting the Report was a far from easy task. It had to try to stay away from 
difficult questions relating to private international law, in order to design 
a workable system. But more importantly, the Report had to reconcile the 
interests of many parties, including the parties currently involved in the 
European social dialogue and the European Works Council. That in itself  
was a tremendous challenge. The Report is divided in two parts. The first part 
appraises the existing transnational tools in Europe; the second part defines 
the reasons and means to develop an optional framework for transnational 
collective bargaining at EU level. 
7.1 The first part of the Report
In the first part, the authors of the Report start to focus on the successes of the 
Sectoral Social dialogue (SSd) Committees. They attribute these successes 
to (i) the active presence of the EU institutions, (ii) the dialogue’s further 
development on a voluntary basis and (iii) the establishment of a structured 
and representative bipartite body. however, they also observe that the effects 
of agreements concluded within the SSd Committees (in the context of the 
European sectoral social dialogue) depend either on the initiative of European 
institutions or on social partners’ action at national level. According to the 
authors, these conditions can hinder the further development of the European 
sectoral social dialogue in the view of: (i) assuming an autonomous relevance 
from national collective bargaining or EU institutions, (ii) guaranteeing a 
direct and homogeneous impact of agreements on working conditions, and 
(iii) introducing in SSd Committees bargaining agendas on hard topics. This 
765  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication 
from the Commission on the Social Agenda COM (2005) 33 final, SOC/200, 13 
july 2005, paragraph 4.3.2.
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is not advantageous, especially since the social partners themselves seem keen 
on concluding agreements with transnational effects, as they have requested 
the Commission on occasion to propose to the Council to implement these 
agreements by a Council decision.766
Subsequently, the authors focus on company-level bargaining. They discuss 
the European Company and the European Works Council. They observe that 
the directives on these bodies may be an inspiring model for transnational 
collective bargaining. Strong points of these directives are: (i) the definition 
of a transnational dimension of collective negotiation leading to the 
establishment of a transnational contractual relation between the company 
and the Special Negotiating Body, (ii) the conclusion of an agreement which 
has a transnational dimension and whose scope of application goes beyond 
the signatory parties, and (iii) the establishment of transnational representative 
bodies on the side of the employees. Weak points, however, are that: (i) the 
negotiation process and the agreement itself  is limited to the establishment of 
an employees’ representative body and (ii) the composition of the European 
Works Council is likely to produce consequences on (a) the legitimacy to 
go beyond information and consultation and to go to negotiation with the 
company and (b) the relation between the European Works Council and 
the trade unions.767 The authors furthermore discuss framework agreements 
concluded between companies on the one hand and European Works Councils, 
international trade unions and/or national trade unions on the other. They 
observe that experience of transnational collective negotiations at company 
level show a need for a general legal framework in order to clarify: (i) the 
procedure, (ii) negotiating agents, and (iii) conditions for the binding effect of 
concluded agreements.768 Transnational collective bargaining could, according 
to the authors of the Report, be very useful with regard to transnational 
restructurings.769 Finally, EC directives may promote the use of transnational 
collective bargaining, principally with regard to restructuring, working time, 
equal treatment and information and consultation.770
 
766  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, pages 8 – 15.
767  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, pages 16 – 20.
768  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, pages 21 – 27.
769  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, pages 28 – 30.
770  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, pages 31 and 32.
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7.2 The second part of the Report
The second part of the Report begins with specifying the reasons for engaging 
in transnational collective bargaining. The authors state three general reasons. 
First, there is a lack of a specific and comprehensive legal framework with 
regard to transnational collective bargaining as far as (i) the procedure, 
(ii) the negotiating agents, and (iii) the conditions for the binding effect of 
concluded agreements. This lacuna is likely to hamper further developments 
of the transnational dimension in the view of: (a) the autonomous role of the 
social partners and (b) the direct and homogeneous impact of agreements 
signed at transnational level which may also stimulate the parties to 
introduce more normative topics in the transnational bargaining agenda. 
Second, the transnational level may likely be the most appropriate level for 
collective bargaining. Third, transnational collective bargaining may prevent 
competition on labour standards (social dumping).771 Subsequently, the authors 
discuss specific reasons for engaging in transnational collective bargaining. 
Basically, these specific reasons address the weaknesses of current, existing 
tools concerning transnational collective bargaining. First, there is a lack 
of rules concerning the legal status of a transnational collective agreement; 
such an agreement simply does not exist in international law. Furthermore, 
the international sources on which transnational collective bargaining is 
sometimes based are aimed at developing information and consultation rights 
through procedures or ad hoc bodies (SSd Committees and European Works 
Councils) rather than on transnational collective bargaining. Three, there is a 
variety of negotiating agents which all intend to play their role in transnational 
collective bargaining (SSd Committees, European Works Councils, European 
social partners and multinational companies). European social partners lack 
the disposal of legally binding and thus effective instruments, while European 
Works Councils lack the formal legitimacy to engage in (transnational) 
collective bargaining. Moreover, given the multitude of potential transnational 
collective bargaining agents, there is an unclear relationship among levels of 
decision making which will lead to overlapping agreements, and potentially 
even to competition or conflict. Five, the existing transnational tools have 
not established a legally binding system of transnational regulation (which 
could be repaired by an optional legal framework establishing a transnational 
collective bargaining system). And last, transnational collective bargaining 
cannot rely on self-regulation, as all social partners involved need either EU 
771  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, pages 33 and 34.
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institution intervention or national transposition in order to create a direct 
binding effect of their collective agreement.772 
7.3 The proposals on a legal framework on 
transnational collective bargaining
The authors of the Report propose to create joint negotiating bodies within 
which transnational collective labour agreements can be concluded. The 
agreements themselves would not have a legally binding effect, but acquire 
such an effect through implementation by managerial decision adopted by 
all national companies in the relevant sector. The system should be set out in 
a directive providing for an optional framework for transnational collective 
bargaining on the basis of article 94 of the EC Treaty. The authors state 
that transnational collective bargaining must be complementary to national 
collective bargaining and that the bargaining agents must be clearly mentioned 
in the directive. 
At sectoral-level, the initiative to set up a joint negotiating body activating 
transnational collective bargaining can be taken jointly by the European 
social partners that are considered representative in terms of the European 
social dialogue and that are representing both sides of the industry, either 
or not on the request of (i) national organisations, (ii) a European Works 
Council (or representative body in the case of a European Company) and 
the management of a multinational company on subjects submitted to 
information and consultation, or (iii) a European Works Council for the 
insertion in the bargaining agenda of subjects submitted to information and 
consultation. The European (sectoral and cross-industry) social partners 
must negotiate on the framework agreement for the constitution of a joint 
negotiating body at sectoral level, composed of said social partners. The 
agreement must be drafted in writing and must at least define the functioning 
of the body and its decision making procedure. The joint negotiating body 
should precisely define the bargaining agents and the bargaining procedures. 
In case the initiative to set up a joint negotiating body at sectoral-level derived 
from the European Works Council with or without the management of a 
multinational company, the body may integrate a role for a delegation of the 
European Works Council or the management in the joint negotiating body’s 
procedures. Once established, transnational sectoral collective agreements 
may be concluded within the joint negotiating body at sectoral-level. 
772  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, pages 34 – 36.
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At company-level, the initiative to set up a joint negotiating body activating 
transnational collective bargaining can be taken unilaterally by the European 
employees’ organisations on the request of (i) a European Works Council (or 
representative body in the case of a European Company) and the management 
of a multinational company on subjects submitted to information and 
consultation, or (ii) the management of the multinational company or a group 
of such companies. The European (sectoral and cross-industry) employees 
organisations must negotiate with the management of the multinational 
company involved on the framework agreement for the constitution of a joint 
negotiating body at company-level. This body is composed of (i) said employees 
organisations, said management and the European Works Council in a mere 
consultative role in the case the European Works Council was involved in the 
request of setting up the body, or of (ii) said employees organisations and 
said management without the European Works Council in case the European 
Works Council was not involved in the request of setting up the body. The 
agreement must be drafted in writing and must at least define the functioning 
of the body and its decision making procedure. The joint negotiating body 
should precisely define the bargaining agents and the bargaining procedures. 
Once established, transnational company collective agreements may be 
concluded within the joint negotiating body at company-level. 
At both levels, the procedures of the joint negotiating bodies must make clear 
how the transnational collective agreements can be transposed into “as many 
managerial decisions (binding according to the national laws or practices) as 
the companies of the sector adhering to employers’ Sectoral or Multi-sectoral 
Organisations represented within the joint negotiating bodies at sectoral-level 
or as the companies of the group represented within the joint negotiating bodies 
at company-level”.773 These procedures must also provide for a specific bipartite 
control system. Within the system of transnational collective bargaining a 
voluntary and bipartite transnational collective disputes resolution system (on 
rights) must be in place and provisions on adequate enforcement procedures 
in the case of non-compliance. All collective agreements must be concluded 
in writing. A copy of each collective agreement should be available to the 
parties that can activate the optional framework. For that purpose, copies of 
the agreements must be transmitted to the Commission which, in turn, has to 
publish these on a designated website.774 
773  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 40.
774  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, pages 37 – 41.
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8. Receipt of the Report by BUSINESSEUROPE and ETUC
The Report is received quite differently by BUSINESSEUROPE on the one 
hand and ETUC on the other.775 BUSINESSEUROPE formulated 6 reasons 
as to why the proposals outlined in the Report should not be adopted. 
First, it sees no need for an optional framework for transnational collective 
bargaining, as the European social dialogue already permits transnational 
collective bargaining. In connection, BUSINESSEUROPE denies the 
existence of problems when implementing transnational texts, as the parties 
involved can rely on national procedures and rules for implementation. 
Second, it states that the current transnational social dialogue taking 
place in multinational enterprises does not constitute genuine bargaining 
and that the results reached are really no agreements at all. Furthermore, 
BUSINESSEUROPE argues that the European level is not the appropriate 
level to tackle common problems, as these problems are global rather than 
European. Besides, the EC Treaty would not provide for a legal basis to base 
an optional framework for transnational collective bargaining on. Fourth, 
according to BUSINESSEUROPE, introducing an optional framework on 
transnational collective bargaining would hinder the bargaining process, 
as the absence of regulations provides the parties involved with the room 
needed to develop this process. That room should not be restricted. Fifth, 
BUSINESSEUROPE fears that the introduction of a framework agreement 
for transnational collective bargaining will interfere with national industrial 
relations. Last, Community priority should in BUSINESSEUROPE’s view 
rather be focussed on implementing social and employment policies than on 
debating a new framework that is not needed.776 
These arguments are in my opinion not overly convincing, and to some extent 
even inconsistent: on the one hand BUSINESSEUROPE denies the existence 
of transnational bargaining, while on the other it argues that the introduction 
of a framework agreement for transnational collective bargaining would 
hinder the further development of such bargaining.777 Both the Report and 
the recent ILO research establish a clear increase in transnational agreements 
775  This section is based on the article of d. Bé, A report on the European Commission 
initiative for a European framework for transnational collective bargaining, pages 221 
– 235.
776  A similar negative response on the Report can be found in the Position on 
discussions on an optional European framework for transnational collective 
bargaining, as published by the German Bundesvereinigung der deutschen 
Arbeitgebersverbände.
777  d. Bé, A report on the European Commission initiative for a European framework for 
transnational collective bargaining, page 231.
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concluded between multinational enterprises and (transnational) trade unions 
as of about the year 2000. Consequently, some kind of transnational collective 
bargaining apparently exists.778 Although it is true that the agreements reached 
in this process are not quite like national collective labour agreements, they 
are nonetheless considered relevant for the companies and the employees by 
the parties involved, and undeniably the result of bargaining or negotiating 
leading to an agreement. Furthermore, relying on national laws for 
implementation, as suggested by BUSINESSEUROPE, complicates matters 
severely, as is substantiated in the preceding part of this thesis. That makes the 
arguments one, two and six raised by BUSINESSEUROPE little convincing. 
That the introduction of a framework agreement for transnational collective 
bargaining will hinder the further development of transnational bargaining 
obviously depends on the content of that framework (it should give ample 
room to the parties involved) and is, apart from that, highly debatable. In fact, 
it has been argued that the absence of  a framework hinders the development 
of transnational collective bargaining.779 BUSINESSEUROPE’s fourth 
argument is therefore not overly strong. The same goes for the third argument. 
Although it may be true that the common problems facing the social partners 
are global rather than European in nature, but why not start in Europe to 
find a solution?780 With regard to the discussion on an appropriate European 
legal basis for a framework agreement for transnational collective bargaining, 
I refer to chapter 14, section 2. The fifth argument of BUSINESSEUROPE 
against the proposals in the Report – transnational collective bargaining 
should not interfere with national industrial relations – is an argument that 
should be taken seriously, although BUSINESSEUROPE fails to substantiate 
why there would be any of such unallowable interference when the proposals 
778  Chapter 4, section 3.
779  Gallin, for instance, stated: “International collective bargaining is only different 
in so far as there is no international framework, such as exists in most countries 
at national level, to provide a guaranteed legal status to any labour/management 
agreement reached at international level. Since such agreements are therefore 
entirely voluntary, they depend even more on the balance of power between the 
contracting parties at the time they are concluded. This is why there are strong and 
weak IFAs [international framework agreements; author], and this is also why there 
are so few of them” (emphasis added by author). d. Gallin, International framework 
agreements: A reassessment, page 26.
780  See Sobczak, who argues: “To guarantee greater legal certainty than at present, 
a legal framework for transnational collective bargaining is necessary. Ideally, it 
should be adopted at international level, but European-wide may constitute a 
first step and this seems more attainable in the medium term.” A. Sobczak, Legal 
dimensions of international framework agreements in the field of corporate social 
responsibility, page 128.
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in the Report were to be implemented. I, for one, do not see a real reason why 
such interference is to be expected.
ETUC supports the proposal for a framework on transnational collective 
bargaining. It should, according to ETUC, complement the existing 
framework for European social dialogue at inter-professional and sectoral 
level. ETUC views the framework on transnational collective bargaining as an 
initiative that meets an “unquestionable need”.781 ETUC did have a number 
of technical comments on the proposals set out in the Report, such as on the 
binding character of the legal framework, the possible sanctions and means 
of recourse and actions intended to deal with potential conflicts of interests 
during bargaining.782 
Given the mixed responses on the proposal for a framework on transnational 
collective bargaining, it is unlikely that the Commission proceeds at this point 
in time with the proposal. In is expected that the Commission takes stock of 
the situation, and indicates further steps in a communication.783
9. Evaluation of the Report and the way to proceed
In my view, the Report is very useful and gives a valuable analysis on 
transnational collective bargaining. As already follows from this and the 
previous chapters of this thesis, I agree with the analysis in the Report when 
it comes to transnational collective bargaining, as set out in sections 7.1 and 
7.2 above. Many of the findings in the Report have already been mentioned 
in this thesis. I therefore subscribe to the point of view that a new system 
on transnational collective bargaining should be pursued. I also agree that 
current tools are insufficient when it comes to developing proper transnational 
collective bargaining and that a new system should be introduced by the 
European legislator. The arguments of the authors forwarded on that subject 
are convincing. I do, however, have doubts on the proposals on a legal 
framework on transnational collective bargaining forwarded in the Report. I 
would not favour a system of transnational bargaining that – like the provisions 
on the European social dialogue – provides for an institutionalised collective 
781  European Trade Union Confederation, The coordination of collective bargaining 
2007, resolution adopted in the meeting on 7 and 8 december 2006, paragraph 5.1. 
The document is available at: http://www.etuc.org/a/3170.
782  d. Bé, A report on the European Commission initiative for a European framework for 
transnational collective bargaining, pages 232 and 233.
783  d. Bé, A report on the European Commission initiative for a European framework for 
transnational collective bargaining, page 234.
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bargaining system, not based on national industrial relations’ traditions of 
the Member States. 
In my opinion, the proposals “copy” many of the flaws of institutionalised 
collective bargaining into the new system of bargaining in joint negotiating 
bodies. The joint negotiating bodies are comprised of the same European social 
partners that are active in the European social dialogue. All the comments I 
forwarded in chapter 6, sections 3.2 and 3.3 on the position of “management 
and labour” in collective bargaining within the European social dialogue 
therefore apply mutatis mutandis to the transnational collective bargaining 
system as proposed by the authors of the Report. This choice is therefore, 
in my opinion, unfortunate (although understandable from the position 
of the authors of the Report, who needed to reconcile the interests of all 
parties currently involved in the European social dialogue). This is especially 
the case as all representativity issues that have arisen in the European social 
dialogue are even more “painfully” present in the proposed system than in 
the bargaining system within the European social dialogue.784 After all, in 
the European social dialogue the legitimacy of the collective agreements is 
partially founded on the fact that either (i) the Commission or the Council 
can deny implementation of a European collective agreement after running 
a series of tests, or (ii) the national social partners implement the European 
collective labour agreement in accordance with the procedures and practices 
specific to management and labour and the Member States, meeting each State’s 
specific representativity requirements. In the first case, part of the legitimacy 
of the European social dialogue is gained by the fact that two European 
institutions verify the agreement, in the second case, because the agreement 
is implemented in the same manner as national collective labour agreements. 
In the proposed system this additional legitimisation is not in place, as the 
transnational collective agreement is implemented by managerial decision. 
The entire legitimacy should therefore be derived from the representativity 
of the social partners, which seems not to be an overly solid foundation given 
the many critiques on that particular topic. Moreover, the facts that (i) the 
collective agreements concluded within the joint negotiating bodies have to be 
784  And all these representativity issues are fully in place in the proposed system, as the 
authors argue that the European employers’ and employees’ organisations in the 
proposed system must satisfy the representativity test according to the UEAPME 
case. E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés 
dal-Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 37.
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implemented by managerial decision785 and (ii) they lack uniform effect as they 
are binding “according to the national laws or practices”, which differ from 
country to country, are somewhat at odds with “typical” national collective 
bargaining practices. In fact, they are not easy to reconcile with one of the 
principles that the authors of the Report (rightfully) hold so dear: a direct 
and homogeneous impact of agreements.786 This is the same flaw that can be 
found in collective bargaining within the European social dialogue (chapter 
6, section 3.4).
The reason that these flaws are copied in is, in my view, because the authors 
of the Report wished to stick as closely to the European social dialogue as 
possible: the same parties (besides individual employers) can conclude collective 
labour agreements as in the European social dialogue, and bargaining in the 
proposed transnational bargaining system occurs in a similar surrounding as 
already existing in the sectoral European social dialogue (the joint negotiating 
body versus the SSd Committee). This is, in my view, an unfortunate choice. 
A new system of transnational collective bargaining should in my opinion not 
be based on a new form of the European social dialogue but should instead 
be more comparable to “classical” collective bargaining as is in place in the 
Member States.787 
Neither collective bargaining within the European social dialogue, nor 
transnational collective bargaining in the proposed new system resembles 
national collective bargaining. This is rather clear with regard to the European 
social dialogue: “Neither the Maastricht Treaty, nor its successor negotiated 
in Amsterdam in june 1997, offers any legal basis for collective bargaining 
in the ‘classical’ sense at European level.” 788 But this is also clear with regard 
to the proposed new system, as the Report neither touched on national laws, 
nor on the three classical rights recognised in national laws of the Member 
States: the freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and the 
right to strike. Because of the gap between the current European collective 
785  Implementing collective labour agreements by managerial decision is in itself  rather 
peculiar. Why should management have the sole power to implement a collective 
agreement which is the fruit of bargaining between two parties? To some extent, it 
negates the collective element of the agreement reached. The probable reason for 
this system is to circumvent private international law aspects. 
786  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, pages 15 and 34.
787  I also refer to chapter 1, section 3, in which the importance of taking into account 
national legislation when drafting European legislation on transnational collective 
bargaining is emphasised.
788  W. E. Lecher and h. W. Platzer, Global trends and the European context, page 8.
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bargaining system (within the European social dialogue) and the proposed 
new system on transnational collective bargaining on the one hand, and a new 
system somewhat comparable to the systems that exist in the Member States 
on the other, collective bargaining cannot fully offer all its advantages as set 
out above.789 That is not to say that the current system is of no relevance to 
“genuine” European collective bargaining, since it is. It may be considered as 
a first step to a more classical manner of collective bargaining, or, as Platzer 
puts it:790
Even if  the mode of regulation provided for in the Social Protocol cannot currently 
be interpreted as offering a path towards European collective bargaining in its 
classical sense (among other things, because there is no appropriate European law 
laying down a corresponding autonomous norm-setting power), these processes of 
interaction and decision-making may be regarded as a ‘playing ground’ (Lechner 
1996: 36ff) for further social and economic concertation and – in the longer term 
– for framework collective agreements.
Platzer thus pleads for a bargaining system that is comparable to national 
bargaining (“collective bargaining in its classical sense”), which is another 
system than is proposed in the Report. Equally, Blank is in favour of a 
transnational collective bargaining system based on the classical rights and 
procedures in place in Member States like Germany:791
If  one looks at the more long-term prospect of cross-border European collective 
bargaining with the aim of cross-border agreements, it is evident that one 
indispensable precondition is the anchoring of collective rights at European 
level. This includes freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and 
the right to strike, along with a legal framework – comparable with the German 
Collective Agreements Act (Tarifsvertragsgesetz) – to establish the way in which 
collective agreements are to be implemented.
Also Bercusson calls for European collective bargaining closer akin to 
the traditions of the Member States. he argues that the European social 
dialogue was developed as a consequence of the failure of the legislative 
process in developing EC labour law. Therefore, collective bargaining in the 
789  Or, as Lo Faro puts it with regard to the European social dialogue: “(…) the actual 
rules originally laid down by the ASP do not provide the conditions for fully 
developed bargaining activity by the social partners.” A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social 
Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, page 134.
790  h.W. Platzer, Industrial Relations and European Integration, page 85.
791  M. Blank, Collective Bargaining in the European Union – The standpoint of IG 
Metall, pages 166 and 167.
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European social dialogue is placed in a legislative perspective, rather than in 
the traditional perspective of industrial relations. he takes the opinion that 
such legislative perspective is erroneousness: “European labour law cannot 
afford to abandon national labour law systems, traditionally rooted also in an 
industrial relations model.”792 I have to agree with these opinions: a European 
collective bargaining model based on national traditions should be developed. 
That is the only way to tackle the problems surrounding collective bargaining 
within the European social dialogue, flaws which are also, at least partially, 
“copied in” in the proposals of the authors of the Report.793
10. Are there any suitable alternatives for Community 
legislation on transnational collective bargaining?
The above fully focuses on the introduction of European legislation on 
transnational collective bargaining in response of the current – in my view 
unsatisfactory – situation. Another way to proceed would be to look at 
alternatives for Community legislation. Are there any other appropriate 
means to support transnational collective bargaining without introducing 
Community legislation? In my view there are no such suitable alternatives. 
Below, I will discuss three possible alternatives, being the open method of 
coordination, mutual recognition and regulatory competition.
The open method of coordination, advocated during the Lisbon Summit in 
2000 in order to facilitate the EU’s strategic goals, does not provide for a real 
alternative for legislation on transnational collective bargaining. This method 
spreads best practice and helps to achieve greater convergence towards specific 
goals. The open method of coordination, according to the Crest report on 
its application,794 involves: (i) fixing guidelines for the Union combined with 
specific timetables for achieving the goals, (ii) establishing, where appropriate, 
indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the 
needs of the different Member States and sectors as a means of comparing 
best practice, (iii) translating these European guidelines into national and 
regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking 
792  B. Bercusson, Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law, pages 164 and 
165.
793  In order to avoid possible misunderstanding, the aforementioned does not mean 
that the Report is “without value”, because, on the contrary, it is highly valuable 
and will be used on several occasions in the chapters to come.
794  Scientific and Technical Research Committee of the European Union, CREST 
report on the application of the open method of coordination in favour of the 
Barcelona research investment objective, Council doc. 1206/04, 1 October 2004, page 
7.
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into account national and regional differences and (iv) periodic monitoring, 
evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning processes. Although 
applying the open method of coordination in the social policy field has 
attracted the interest of many,795 it is all about guidelines and best practice. It 
therefore fails to introduce a legally binding framework. As appears from the 
preceding sections, such a framework is required when transnational collective 
bargaining is concerned in order to embed transnational collective labour 
agreements. Consequently, reverting to the open method of coordination is 
not a suitable option.
Another solution may be mutual recognition, possibly combined with, or 
leading to, regulatory competition. Mutual recognition as a principle is 
introduced by the European Court of justice in the well-known Cassis de Dijon 
case.796 Under the principle of mutual recognition Member States must allow 
goods that are legally sold in another Member State to be sold within their 
own territory. Member States are only allowed to derogate from this principle 
if  they adopt their own national technical rules which are proportionate and 
which are justified by the EC Treaty or by overriding requirements of public 
interest.797 Briefly put, based on mutual recognition, Member States need 
to mutually recognise each other’s regulations.798 It must concern equivalent 
regulations. Member States retain their right to invoke their own legislation if  
the foreign regulation concerned is not an equivalent of their own regulation. 
If, for instance, a product deriving from a third country is imported in one 
Member State that has no authorisation or registration requirements in place 
in relation to that product, and is subsequently to be transported to another 
Member State that does have such requirements, those requirements can be 
applied. 799 In such a case there is no room for mutual recognition, because 
there are no equal regulations in place.800 The rationale of mutual recognition 
is that, within the Community, the opinions on topics such as what is safe, 
795  See for instance: P. Pochet, The Open Method of Co-ordination and the Construction 
of Social Europe. A Historical Perspective, in: j. Zeitlin and P. Pochet (eds.), The 
Open Method of Co-ordination in Action. The European Employment and Social 
Inclusion Strategies, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2005, chapter 3.
796  European Court of justice, 20 February 1979, C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon.
797  See on this principle for example: j.S. Watson, Wederzijdse erkenning binnen de 
interne markt: een nieuwe impuls [Mutual recognition within the Community: a new 
impulse], Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees recht, number 3, 2000, pages 41 ff.
798  S.K. Schmidt, Governance through Mutual Recognition, NewGov, Winter 
2007/2008, policy brief  number 10, page 1.
799  European Court of justice, 15 july 2004, C-443/02, Schreiber.
800  Y. hofhuis, Minimumharmonisatie in het Europees recht [minimum harmonisation in 
European law], Kluwer, deventer, 2006, page 20.
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healthy or environmental friendly do not differ that much. The goal of 
reaching these objectives is therefore more or less the same in all Member 
states. The methods for reaching these objectives, however, may differ, but that 
is considered inconsequential.801 Mutual recognition is strongly based on the 
trust that Member States have in each other’s regulatory regimes.802 This also 
implies that mutual regulation “is bound to work better under conditions of 
homogeneity than under conditions of heterogeneity”; 803 it is easier to accept 
other state’s rules if  they are similar to your own rules. Mutual recognition 
had originally just been applied to the free movement of goods, but today this 
principle is applied widely, including to the free movement of services, the 
freedom of establishment and the free movement of employees.804 Perhaps, 
it may also be applied to transnational collective bargaining. Regulatory 
competition can be defined as “the process where regulators deliberately set 
out to provide a more favourable regulatory environment, in order either to 
promote the competitiveness of domestic industries or to attract more business 
activity from abroad”. 805 It occurs in the presence of different geographical 
areas between which goods, services and factors move easily and in which 
rules and regulations are selected with a mind to the relative attractiveness for 
investors and residents.806 Regulatory competition is often used in relation to 
company mobility,807 and is based on a number of important rulings of the 
European Court of justice.808 A question that is frequently asked in relation 
to regulatory competition is whether it will lead to a race to the bottom (states 
compete with each other as each tries to underbid the others) or to a race to 
the top (competition leads to the progressive improvement of the subject – in 
this instance: the law on collective labour agreements – concerned).
801  See for instance: Y. hofhuis, Minimumharmonisatie in het Europees recht, page 19.
802  S.K. Schmidt, Governance through Mutual Recognition, page 2.
803  S.K. Schmidt, Governance through Mutual Recognition, page 2.
804  j.S. Watson, Wederzijdse erkenning binnen de interne markt: een nieuwe impuls, page 
41.
805  K. Gatsios and P. holmes, Regulatory Competition and International 
Harmonisation, Global Economic Institutions Working paper, number 36, August 
1997, page 2.
806  K. Gatsios and P. holmes, Regulatory Competition and International 
Harmonisation, page 2.
807  E.M. Kieninger, The Legal Framework of Regulatory Competition Based on 
Company Mobility: EU and US Compared, German Law journal, 2004, volume 6, 
number 4, pages 741 ff.
808  European Court of justice, 9 March 1999, C-212/97, Centros; European Court of 
justice, 5 November 2002, C-208/00, Überseering; and European Court of justice, 
30 September 2003, C-167/01, Inspire Art.
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In contrast to the open method of coordination, mutual recognition provides 
for a (national) legal framework. Member States may be obliged to recognise 
transnational collective labour agreements concluded in other Member States. 
here, there are two options. The Member States may either be obliged to 
“solely” recognise the transnational collective labour agreement as a proper 
collective labour agreement, by having to apply their own national rules on 
collective labour agreements to that agreement, or they should be obliged 
to recognise the entire transnational collective labour agreement, including 
the law applicable to that agreement deriving from the Member State in 
which the agreement is concluded. This may lead to regulatory competition, 
resulting in the conclusion of transnational collective labour agreements in 
that Member State which laws fit the purpose of the transnational collective 
labour agreement at hand best. 
Mutual recognition of transnational collective labour agreements would, in 
my view, be troublesome. If  the first option set out above would be chosen, one 
of the important goals of (transnational) collective labour agreements is not 
achieved, being uniform applicability. As explained in section 3.4 of chapter 6, 
uniform applicability leading to the elimination of social competition is “the 
quintessence” of collective agreements. Moreover, it would lead to serious 
legitimacy problems. As will be explained in part II of this thesis, the laws 
of the various Member States on collective bargaining differ considerably. In 
some countries a collective labour agreement has an erga omnes effect, binding 
all employees falling within the scope of that agreement. In these countries, 
the trade unions must normally meet strict representativity requirements in 
order to justify the strong effects of the collective labour agreement. In other 
countries, collective labour agreements only bind those employees who are 
member of the contracting trade unions. In these countries, trade unions 
normally have fewer requirements to meet with regard to representativity. 
This opens the possibility of a transnational collective labour agreement being 
concluded in a country with few (or even none) representativity requirements, 
which agreement subsequently needs to be recognised in another Member 
State which, by law, has to attribute erga omnes effects to that collective 
labour agreement. The results of this would, in my view, be unacceptable. The 
Member States cannot “trust” each other’s regulatory regimes in this respect, 
as they differ too much, which trust is a prerequisite for mutual recognition. 
It can even be argued that in this situation there cannot be “true” mutual 
recognition, because there are no equivalent regulations in place between the 
different Member States. If  the second option set out above would be applied, 
the aforementioned legitimacy issues would only partially be addressed. The 
trade unions that concluded the transnational collective labour agreement 
may have been representative in the Member State in which they entered 
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into that agreement, but they do not necessarily have to be representative in 
other Member States where the transnational collective labour agreement is 
to apply as well. Consequently, a collective labour agreement with “strong” 
effects, concluded in a Member State in which the contracting parties were 
clearly representative, would have the same strong effects in another Member 
State were it is to have force, but where the contracting parties may not be 
as representative. Furthermore, merely recognising the laws of the Member 
State in which the transnational collective labour agreement is concluded is 
not possible, or at least far from practical, as it would likely lead to two sets of 
laws applying to the employment agreement: one of the country in which the 
transnational collective labour agreement is concluded, and (in the “normal” 
situation) one of the country in which the employee habitually works. Mutual 
recognition would also fail to address issues such as the relation between 
the transnational collective labour agreement and a possible local collective 
labour agreement that may apply as well. In other words, in this scenario 
harmonisation is still needed, diminishing many of the possible advantages 
of mutual recognition. Besides, mutual recognition of specific laws of other 
Member States in the field of social policy has proven a difficult tool, as the 
history of the Service directive reveals.809 The original draft of this directive 
opted for the applicability of the so-called “country of origin principle”, 
entailing that providers of services were subject only to the national provisions 
of their Member State on topics that would fall in specific coordinated fields. 
These national provisions needed to be recognised by the Member State in 
which the services were to be provided (the host country). The country of 
origin principle would not apply with regard to posted workers, in order to 
prevent possible social dumping, but the host country was not to impose 
burdensome requirements on the service provider and the posted worker. 
This original proposal led to fierce opposition by labour in many Member 
States. The country of origin principle and the rules on posted workers were 
feared to lead to social dumping. The proposal needed to be watered down. 
This shows that mutual recognition of national employment regulations 
is feared to lead to social dumping.810 If  that fear has led the Community 
institutions to water down the Service directive, which directive has less of 
a direct impact on employment in the Member States than a (possibly) direct 
applicable transnational collective labour agreement, mutual recognition on 
transnational collective agreements will most likely not be achievable.
809  The Service directive and its history will be set out in further detail in chapter 8, 
section 6.3.3. 
810  See also S.K. Schmidt, Governance through Mutual Recognition, page 2.
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As the applicability of collective labour agreements as a general rule stop at 
the country’s border, introducing the possibility of regulatory competition 
alone will not work. There is simply no cross-border geographical area in 
which collective labour agreements move easily. In combination with mutual 
recognition, however, regulatory competition could work. Regulatory 
competition may lead to a race to the bottom, or to a race to the top. Given 
the fear of social dumping as set out above, a race to the bottom is possible 
and, in any event, feared.811 This is in particular the case, because at this 
moment there is an imbalance in power between multinational companies and 
trade unions, as set out in section 3.7 above. Multinational companies seem 
in a better position to bargain on a transnational collective labour agreement 
than trade unions. Such an unequal distribution of power would increase the 
chances of a race to the bottom, i.e. to social dumping. 
The above establishes that mutual recognition will not work with regard to 
transnational collective labour agreements, mainly because the differences 
in national laws on collective labour agreements are too great. Regulatory 
competition is not feasible, as there is no cross-border geographical area in 
which collective labour agreements move easily. Because, as said, also the 
open method of coordination is not a suitable option in order to deal with 
transnational collective labour agreements, there are, in my opinion, no 
suitable alternatives for Community legislation on transnational collective 
bargaining. 
11. Towards a European system of 
transnational collective bargaining
The observations of this and previous chapters lead to the conclusion that a 
proper system, enabling genuine transnational collective bargaining, may very 
well be worthwhile to pursue. As explained above, European legislation on 
transnational collective bargaining would be best based on national industrial 
relations traditions of the Member States. This thesis tries to give a modest 
start to research on such a system. 
Notwithstanding the opportunities transnational collective bargaining can 
offer, the advantages it can bring etc., it is good to touch base again for a 
while. It must be admitted that it is, at this moment, very unlikely that intense 
collective bargaining will occur at transnational (let alone European) level, 
811  Ironically, one of goals of a collective labour agreement is to prevent a race to the 
bottom. M.S. Wirtz, Collisie tussen CAO’s en mededingsingsrecht [Collision between 
CLA’s and competition law]. Kluwer, deventer, 2006, page 2.
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even if  legislation accommodating this was in place. There are many obstacles 
to surmount prior to vivid transnational bargaining being a reality. I refer 
to sections 4.3, 5 and 8 above. The time is not (yet) ripe to expect that much. 
Moreover, it should be duly noted that (European) transnational collective 
bargaining is not the “holy Grail” in employment law,812 instantly overcoming 
all of Europe’s social problems. It is an element that could assist Europe, 
and particularly its employers and employees, in the mid-term, though. If  the 
goals are realistic and the participants are not too impatient, it could, in my 
view, do well. A logical step that could be taken now is to consider supporting 
legislation in order to make genuine transnational collective bargaining 
possible in time.
12. Summary
Transnational collective bargaining offers certain advantages, which can be 
divided into (i) institutional advantages and (ii) advantages for the parties and 
their members involved.
On an institutional level, it has at least five advantages. (European) 
transnational collective bargaining may: (i) prove useful in case Community 
institutions are unable to make decisions; (ii) help to overcome regulatory 
shortcomings; (iii) help to overcome the democratic deficit; (iv) prove to be an 
important tool for proper European Governance; and (v) be a proper method 
for horizontal subsidiarity.
Apart from these institutional advantages, transnational collective bargaining 
may also benefit the social partners themselves, and ultimately the employers 
and employees. Transnational collective bargaining may i.a.:
•	 be	a	proper	response	to	the	Europeanisation	and	internationalisation	of	
markets, simplifying cross-border labour and enabling the “European 
Social State” better to compete with the rest of the world;
•	 prevent	 social	dumping	and	be	a	proper	 tool	 for	maintaining	a	 social	
Europe;
•	 prove	a	necessity	in	order	to	cope	with	the	consequences	of	the	EMU;
•	 form	a	good,	broad	basis	to	deal	witch	common	problems	at	the	appro-
priate level;
•	 have	specific	advantages	for	European	multinationals;
812  Nor is it a “miracle drug”, as rightly stated by Buschak and Kallenbach. W. 
Buschak and V. Kallenbach, The European Trades Union Confederation, page 177.
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•	 enable	the	European	social	partners	to	take	matters	in	their	own	hands	
instead of leaving it up to the European legislator;
•	 help	creating	a	power	equilibrium	between	trade	unions	on	the	one	hand	
and employers and employers’ organisations on the other.
Naturally, there are also (potential and real) disadvantages attached to 
(European) transnational collective bargaining. These can be divided into 
three categories: (i) fundamental arguments against collective bargaining 
in general, (ii) fundamental arguments against (European) transnational 
collective bargaining and (iii) practical arguments against (European) 
transnational collective bargaining.
First, from an economical point of view, scholars have argued that trade 
unions and collective bargaining hinder economic development and lead 
to higher unemployment. These scholars favour a fully free market. They 
fundamentally object to any kind of collective bargaining. Since assessing 
these arguments in depth is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is simply 
assumed that, given the European-wide practice of collective bargaining, 
collective bargaining in general has advantages outweighing its disadvantages. 
Another potential fundamental objection against collective bargaining is 
the declining representativity level of the social partners. If  (trade union) 
membership density continues to decline and drops under a critical level, 
upon which the social partners cannot be considered representative anymore 
for the employers and the employees they are supposed to represent, or if  
for any other reason the same happens, collective bargaining as we know it 
will fail, both at national and transnational level. Therefore, representativity 
must continue to be of great importance in any proposal for a system on 
transnational bargaining.
Second, some authors consider that European collective bargaining has 
inherent, fundamental disadvantages. They argue that European collective 
bargaining adversely affects competition in Europe, since it leads to common 
employment conditions throughout Europe, resulting in a weakened economy 
that creates fewer jobs. This argument is based on a false assumption, 
since the goal of European-level collective bargaining is not fully levelling 
out employment conditions throughout Europe. Instead, it recognises the 
differences in Europe and only interferes where needed. 
Last, there are many practical arguments raised against transnational 
(European) collective bargaining, such as:
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 7
282
•	 differences	in	the	organisation,	ideology	and	interests	of	Europe’s	natio-
nal trade unions;
•	 limits	of	international	solidarity	of	workers	if 	strikes	are	needed;
•	 trade	unions	weaknesses	to	establish	an	autonomous	transnational	sys-
tem of industrial relations;
•	 a	lack	of	interests	of	employers	and	employers’	organisations;
•	 the	risks	and	costs	of	coming	to	European	collective	bargaining;	and
•	 differences	in	the	legal	systems	of	the	different	countries.
Although (some of) these disadvantages are real and not easily overcome, 
they do not fundamentally obstruct transnational collective bargaining. All 
of these disadvantages are of a practical nature and are therefore potentially 
temporary. These disadvantages can change over time, and possibly change 
faster when legislation enabling real transnational collective bargaining enters 
into force. 
deinert assessed the position of possible participants of transnational 
(European) collective bargaining on such bargaining. he found that, on 
the side of labour, there is a positive stance towards transnational collective 
bargaining: European and national trade unions seem to be enthusiastic about 
the concept. On the employers’ side, there is a much more negative stance, 
although it varies to a certain extent. A minority of national employers’ 
organisations and all participating multinational companies were positive 
about transnational collective bargaining. By far most of the participants of 
deinert’s research noted that, should transnational collective bargaining be 
promoted, proper rules on transnational collective bargaining will have to be 
introduced.
The observations of this (and previous) chapter(s) lead to the following 
conclusions with regard to the preliminary questions. 
As from 2000 both the challenges for and the role of the social partners 
within the EU have changed significantly, causing them to reposition and to 
pursue a more autonomous social dialogue. Apparently, these developments 
contributed to a demand for collective bargaining at a European level. In fact, 
Europeanisation of collective bargaining can be observed both at national level 
and at European level. Consequently, for some parties, cross-border collective 
bargaining apparently seems to fulfil a certain need. Finally, transnational 
collective bargaining in Europe seems to offer important advantages, 
outweighing the (potential and real) disadvantages. This should lead to a(n) 
(increasing) need or demand for transnational collective agreements. All in all, 
there seems to be a need or demand for transnational collective agreements.
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The current system of European social dialogue, as laid down in the articles 
136 – 139 of the EC Treaty, seems not to suffice. Institutionalised collective 
bargaining, including its implementation techniques, seems to suffer from a 
number of flaws. To opt for concluding agreements “outside” articles 138-139 
of the EC Treaty is not helpful. All flaws accompanying the implementation 
of agreements “in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to 
management and labour and the Member States” apply mutatis mutandis 
to collective bargaining outside these articles. Furthermore, transnational 
collective labour agreements concluded between multinational companies 
and trade unions have no specific legal status and lack Community relevance. 
This leads to the conclusion that a new system enabling genuine transnational 
collective bargaining is necessary, when such transnational bargaining indeed 
is pursued. 
These above conclusions are shared by the Commission, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and a group of experts led by Ales who 
drafted the Report on, among other things, the future of transnational 
collective bargaining.
This group of experts proposed to create joint negotiating bodies within 
which transnational collective labour agreements can be concluded. The 
agreements themselves would not have a legally binding effect, but acquire 
such an effect through implementation by managerial decision adopted by all 
national companies in the relevant sector (or the national company involved 
in company-level collective bargaining). The system should be set out in a 
directive providing for an optional framework for transnational collective 
bargaining. 
The proposal is received quite differently by the social partners. I myself  
highly value the Report, but have doubts on this content of the proposal. The 
proposal “copies” many of the flaws of institutionalised collective bargaining 
into the new system of bargaining in joint negotiating bodies. The joint 
negotiating bodies are comprised of the same European social partners that 
are active in the European social dialogue. All the comments I forwarded on 
the position of “management and labour” in collective bargaining within the 
European social dialogue therefore apply mutatis mutandis to the proposed 
transnational collective bargaining system. Moreover, the facts that (i) the 
collective agreement concluded within the joint negotiating bodies has to 
be implemented by managerial decision and (ii) lacks uniform effect as it 
is binding “according to the national laws or practices”, which differ from 
country to country, are somewhat peculiar and to some extent at odds with 
one of the principles of the authors of the Report: a direct and homogeneous 
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impact of agreements. The reason that these flaws are copied in is because 
the authors of the Report wished to stick as close to the European social 
dialogue as possible. A new system of transnational collective bargaining 
should, however, not be based on a new form of the European social dialogue 
but should instead be more comparable to “classical” collective bargaining as 
is in place in the Member States. 
Coomunity legislation on transnational collective bargaining seems the best 
way to proceed, as there are in my view no suitable alternatives.
To summarise, the observations of this and previous chapters lead to the 
conclusion that a proper European system enabling genuine transnational 
collective bargaining may very well be worthwhile to pursue. European 
legislation on transnational collective bargaining should best be based on 
national industrial relations’ traditions of the Member States. This thesis tries 
to give a modest start to research on such a system. This is not to say that, 
at this moment, it is likely that intense collective bargaining would occur at 
transnational (let alone European) level even if  legislation accommodating 
this would be in force. There are many obstacles to surmount before vivid 
(European) transnational bargaining will become reality. Moreover, 
transnational collective bargaining should not be considered the “holy Grail” 
in employment law, instantly overcoming all of Europe’s social problems. 
It is “merely” an element that could assist Europe, and its employers and 
employees in particular, in the mid-term.
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ChAPTER 8
IN SEARCh OF A NEW SYSTEM ON 
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
1. Introduction
In the first part of this thesis it was concluded that it may be worthwhile to 
investigate the possibilities of drafting European legislation on transnational 
collective bargaining, based on national industrial relations’ traditions of 
the Member States. There are many ways to start research on suggesting 
possible criteria for realising European legislation on transnational collective 
bargaining. As argued in chapter 1, and as appears from the basis on which a 
system of transnational collective bargaining should rest (national traditions), 
comparative law is a useful tool in this respect. Part II will therefore focus 
on national collective bargaining systems. As also explained in chapter 
1, the systems of the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Britain will be 
scrutinised. Section 7 of this chapter outlines exactly which parts of the 
collective bargaining systems of these countries will be subject to research. 
Reading the chapters on these countries is not a necessity to understand the 
subsequent steps made in this thesis, although it will make it easier to follow 
the line of reasoning. In any event, chapter 13 will bring the chapters on the 
national systems together. It analyses and compares the aforementioned four 
different legal systems, but it also gives a broader view on collective labour 
agreements in Europe, including other Member States. Reading chapter 13 is 
imperative for a proper understanding of part III of this thesis.
Before analysing the national systems, the three classical rights that are deemed 
crucial in the collective bargaining process will be discussed from a European 
point of view. It obviously concerns (i) the freedom of association, (ii) the 
right to collective bargaining and (iii) the right to strike. These rights will be 
scrutined. during the writing process, matters have changed considerably in 
respect of the protection of these (and other) rights in the EU. Therefore, 
there will be a division in time or, phrased more accurately, in legal source. In 
sections 2, 3 and 4 the aforementioned three classical rights will be discussed, 
without taking into consideration the European Constitution, the Treaty 
of Lisbon and the enactment of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the 
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European Union. The (possible) changes resulting from the adoption of (part 
of) these sources will be discussed in section 5. Section 6 touches on the subject 
of the reach of the social partners in EU perspective. Within Europe, there 
are a number of rights, freedoms and prohibitions that could possibly limit 
the “free” exercise of collective labour law, such as rules on (i) competition 
(ii), equal treatment, and (iii) market freedoms. Section 8 summarises this 
chapter.
2. The freedom of association
The freedom of association is held by the ILO as “the most basic of all 
principles underlying the work of ILO and the activities of those who toil for 
social justice”.813 A general definition of freedom of association is “a general 
capacity for the citizens to join without interference by the State in associations 
in order to attain various ends”.814 When applied to employment law, the 
freedom of association encompasses in its core the right of all employees 
and employers to form and join organisations of their own choosing without 
prior (state) authorisation. This is often referred to as the positive freedom of 
association. The negative freedom of association entails the right to refrain 
from joining or to withdraw from such associations. In a broader employment 
law related definition, freedom of association also encompasses free collective 
bargaining and autonomy of the parties involved.815 These aspects of freedom 
of association will be discussed separately in section 4.
The freedom of association is extensively protected by several international 
instruments, some of which will be set out hereunder. These instruments 
primarily bind individual states and not so much the EU as such. Whether 
freedom of association exists on a European level will be discussed in section 
2.2. 
2.1 International instruments protecting the freedom of association
There are many treaties that aim to protect the freedom of association. 
however, when discussing this topic, the Council of Europe and the ILO 
come to mind first. 
813  http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/whatare/fundam/foa.htm.
814  See the Commission decision in the context of the European Convention on 
human Rights of 6 july 1977, Association X/Sweden. All the case law in this 
context can be found on: http://www.echr.coe.int/EChR/EN/header/Case-Law/
hUdOC/hUdOC+database/.
815  R. Blanpain, European Labour law, page 571.
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The Council of Europe is a political organisation, founded in 1949. Its goal 
is to defend the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 
Membership is open to all European states which undertake to abide by the 
Council’s principles. Two documents of the Council of Europe are particularly 
relevant for the subject at hand, being the Convention for the Protection of 
human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) and the 
European Social Charter (“ESC”).
The ILO is the United Nation’s specialised agency which seeks to promote 
social justice and internationally recognised human and labour rights. The 
ILO’s Social dialogue Sector’s operational objectives are to (i) promote 
social dialogue, (ii) strengthen institutions, machinery and processes of social 
dialogue, and (iii) strengthen representation, capacity and services of the 
parties to social dialogue. An important function of the ILO is to adopt by the 
tripartite International Labour Conference (comprised of both sides of the 
industry816 and the government) Conventions and Recommendations, setting 
out international standards. Important ILO Conventions with regard to the 
freedom of association are the Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention from 1948, Convention number 87 (“C87”) 
and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949, 
Convention number 98 (“C98”). An important ILO Recommendation is the 
Collective Bargaining Recommendation of 1981, Recommendation number 
163 (“R163”).817
Besides the ILO, the United Nations themselves also drafted general 
instruments protecting the freedom of association. In that respect, the United 
Nations’ Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (the “Covenant”), the 
United Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“Ecosoc”) and the Universal declaration of human Rights (the 
“declaration”) come to mind. 
Of course, (the combined countries of) the European Community (have) has 
also directed attention to the subject freedom of association. In that respect, 
the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 
(“Community Charter”) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (“EU Charter”) are of relevance. 
816  The role of the social partners is not only important when drafting ILO standards, 
but also when it comes to the enforcing these standards. See N. Valticos, De 
invloed van internationale arbeidsverdragen en –aanbevelingen van de internationale 
arbeidsorganisatie [The Impact of International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations], Kluwer, deventer, 1979, page 74 (translation). 
817  The Conventions and Recommendations are accessible on www.ilo.org.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 8
290
2.1.1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Upon establishment, one of the first actions of the Council of Europe was to 
draft and execute the Convention in 1950, as amended from time to time. The 
Convention aims to protect fundamental rights and freedoms. Parties to the 
Convention undertake the securing of these rights and freedoms for everyone 
within their jurisdiction. 
The Convention has international enforcement machinery. Two organs of 
the Council of Europe play an important role therein. First, there is the 
Committee of Ministers, the Council of Europe’s decision-making body. It 
comprises the Foreign Affairs Ministers of all the contracting states, or their 
permanent diplomatic representatives in Strasbourg. Second, there is the 
European Court of human Rights in Strasbourg. This Court has, pursuant 
to article 19 of the Convention, been set up to ensure the observance of 
the engagements undertaken by the contracting states. The Court deals not 
only with applications from a contracting state on alleged breaches of the 
provisions of the Convention by another contracting state, article 33 of the 
Convention, but also with applications from any person, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by 
one of the contracting states of the rights set forth in the Convention (article 
34). The contracting state must, given article 46.1 of the Convention, abide 
by the final judgement of the Court in any case to which it is a party. The final 
judgement of the Court shall, on the basis of article 46.2 of the Convention, be 
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution. 
Pursuant to article 47 of the Convention, the Court may also give advisory 
opinions concerning the interpretation of the Convention and the protocols 
thereto. 
The Convention is of relevance with regard to the freedom of association. 
Article 11 of the most recent version of the Convention protects this freedom 
and reads as follows:
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for 
the protection of his interests.
2 No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on 
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the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of 
the administration of the State.
Although not explicitly stated, this right not only regards the (positive) 
freedom to establish and join associations, but also the negative aspect of 
that freedom, being the right to refrain from joining or to withdraw from 
such associations. The European Court of human Rights in Strasbourg 
acknowledged this “negative freedom” on several occasions.818 
2.1.2 European Social Charter
The Council of Europe complemented the Convention in 1961 with the 
ESC. The ESC sets out rights and freedoms and establishes a supervisory 
mechanism guaranteeing their respect by the contracting states.819 
The European Committee of Social Rights (“the Committee”) ascertains 
whether the contracting states abide by the provisions as set out in the ESC. 
The Committee comprises fifteen independent, impartial members which are 
elected by the Committee of Ministers.820 The Committee determines whether 
or not national law and practice in the contracting states conform to the ESC 
(article 24 of the ESC). This monitoring procedure is pursuant to article 21 of 
the ESC based on national reports, which the contracting states should submit 
to the Committee each year. These reports indicate how the contracting states 
have implemented the ESC in law and in practice. The Committee examines 
these reports and decides whether or not the situations in the countries 
concerned conform to the ESC. Its decisions, referred to as “conclusions”, 
are published on an annual basis. Under the 1995 Additional Protocol to the 
European Social Charter providing for a system of Collective Complaints, the 
Committee may also receive complaints on alleged violations of the provisions 
818 See for example European Court of human Rights, 30 june 1993, Sigurjonnson/
Iceland; European Court of human Rights, 25 April 1996, Gustafsson/Sweden; 
and European Court of human Rights, 11 january 2006, Sorensen and Rasmussen/
Denmark. See also: j. hendy and K.d. Ewing, Trade Unions, Human Rights 
and the BNP, Industrial Law journal, 2005, volume 34, number 3, page 206. 
See furthermore: T. Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right 
to Strike: A Comparative Study of Standards Set by the International Labour 
Organization, the Council of Europe and the European Union, pages 232 – 237.
819  The ESC is normally deemed rather important as can be derived from the fact 
that the Community and Member States should, pursuant to article 136 of the EC 
Treaty, have the fundamental social rights of the ESC in mind. 
820  Reference is made to the: Digest of the case law of the ESCR, prepared by the 
Secretariat of the Council of Europe, december 2006, page 7. The digest is 
available at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/esc/7_Resources/digest_en.pdf.
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of the ESC by specific parties, including ETUC and UNICE. If  the complaint 
is admissible, a procedure is set in motion, at the end of which the Committee 
makes a decision on the merits of the complaint. This decision is forwarded 
to the parties concerned and the Committee of Ministers in a report, which is 
made public within four months of its being forwarded. If  a contracting state 
takes no action on a Committee decision, to the effect that it does not comply 
with the ESC, the Committee of Ministers addresses a recommendation to 
that state, asking it to change the situation in law and/or in practice. 
The ESC also deals with the freedom of association. The revised version states 
in article 5 the following:
 
With a view to ensuring or promot ing the freedom of workers and employers 
to form local, national or internation al organ isati ons for the pro tection of their 
economic and social interests and to join those organi satio ns, the Parties undertake 
that national law shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to 
impair, this freedom. The extent to which the guarantees provided for in this article 
shall apply to the police shall be deter mined by national laws or regulations. The 
principle govern ing the application to the members of the armed forces of these 
guarantees and the extent to which they shall apply to per sons in this category 
shall equally be determined by national laws or regulations.
This article basically guarantees the right of workers and employers to 
organise. Trade unions and employer’s organisations must be free to form 
without prior authorisation.821 Besides this positive obligation, directed at the 
contracting states, to ensure the freedom to associate, article 5 of the ESC also 
entails the negative freedom of association: no employee may be compelled to 
join or remain in a trade union.822
 
2.1.3 International Labour Organisation
The ILO, as mentioned above, adopted by the tripartite International Labour 
Conference Conventions and Recommendations, setting out international 
standards. Through ratification by the ILO’s member states, the Conventions 
create binding obligations to implement their provisions, whilst the 
821  Secretariat of the Council of Europe, Digest of the case law of the ESCR, page 64.
822 On the negative freedom of association, in particular in connection with trade 
union security clauses and practices (notably the closed shop), reference is made to: 
L. Samuel, Fundamental Social Rights, Council of Europe, 1997, pages 116 ff. See 
also the Secretariat of the Council of Europe, Digest of the case law of the ESCR, 
page 65. 
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Recommendations provide guidance on policy, legislation and practice.823 All 
the EU Member States have ratified the ILO Conventions C87 and C91, and 
should therefore apply these.
Article 5 of C87 states the following with regard to the freedom of 
association:
Workers’ and employers’ organisations shall have the right to establish and 
join federations and confederations and any such organisation, federation or 
confederation shall have the right to affiliate with international organisations of 
workers and employers.
According to the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body 
of the ILO, the right of workers to establish and join organisations of their 
own choosing “cannot be said to exist unless such freedom is fully established 
and respected in law and in fact”. 824 Article 5 is especially relevant, as it also 
confirms the right for trade unions and employers’ organisations to affiliate 
with international organisations, such as the European social partners.825 In 
addition to this provision, article 2 of C98 is relevant as well, as it aims to 
guarantee fully independent organisations, in particular trade unions. This 
article states:
1. Workers’ and employers’ organisations shall enjoy adequate protection against 
any acts of interference by each other or each other’s agents or members in 
their establishment, functioning or administration. 
2.  In particular, acts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers’ 
organisations under the domination of employers or employers’ organisations, 
or to support workers’ organisations by financial or other means, with the object 
823  For a more detailed explanation of the difference between Conventions and 
Recommendations, reference is made to N. Valticos, De invloed van internationale 
arbeidsverdragen en -aanbevelingen van de internationale arbeidsorganisatie, pages 7 
and 8. 
824 Freedom of Association, Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of 
Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO, International Labour 
Office, Geneva, fourth (revised) edition, paragraph 271. 
825 According to Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the 
ILO: “International trade union solidarity constitutes one of the fundamental 
objectives of any trade union movement and underlies the principle laid down 
in Article 5 of the Convention No. 87 that any organization, federation or 
confederation shall have the right to affiliate with international organizations of 
workers and employers.” See: Freedom of Association, Digest of decisions and 
principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the 
ILO, paragraph 622. 
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of placing such organisations under the control of employers or employers’ 
organisations, shall be deemed to constitute acts of interference within the 
meaning of this Article. 
The Conventions C87 and C98 are considered important in Europe. The 
Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and the Working Environment 
advised that both Conventions should be applied at Community level.826 
Besides these Conventions, ILO Recommendation R163 urges states to 
(actively) facilitate “the establishment and growth, on a voluntary basis, of 
free, independent and representative employers’ and workers’ organisations” 
(article 2.1).
2.1.4 The UN’s instruments
The Covenant, Ecosoc and the declaration all protect the freedom of 
association as well. Article 22 of the Covenant protects the positive freedom 
of association. It furthermore prohibits restrictions on the exercise of this 
right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. Article 8 Ecosoc undertakes, among others, 
to ensure (i) the right to form and join trade unions, (ii) the right of trade 
unions to establish national federations or confederations and the right of 
the latter to form or join international trade-union organisations, and (iii) the 
right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations. Article 20 of 
the declaration recognises everyone’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association and states that no one may be compelled to belong to an 
association. Given the content of these different instruments, it is easy to 
conclude that the freedom of association is considered very valuable by the 
United Nations.
2.1.5 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers
The combined countries of the European Community have also given 
attention to fundamental social rights. In the light of the European Single 
Market, highlighting economic aspects, the social aspects of Europe were also 
to be affirmed. The introduction of the Community Charter, adopted by the 
826  Report of Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Report on transnational 
trade union rights in the European Union, page 5, paragraph 2.
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heads of State or Government on 9 december 1989, was part thereof.827 The 
UK originally opted out, but in 1998 it also signed the Community Charter.
The legal status of the Community Charter is a merely political one, as can 
be derived from its preamble.828 This is affirmed by Advocate-General jacobs 
in his opinion in the joint cases Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken, in 
which he stated: “the Charter has very limited legal effects. It is not a legal act 
of the Community but a solemn political declaration adopted by heads of 
State or Government of 11 of the then 12 Member States, and it has not been 
published in the Official journal.”829 This recently has been re-affirmed by 
Advocate-General Mengozzi.830 This mere political status notwithstanding, 
the Community Charter has at least some Community significance, as article 
136 of the EC Treaty provides that the Community and the Member States 
should have in mind fundamental social rights such as those set out in the 
Community Charter.831 In any case, the Community Charter refers to the 
(positive and negative) freedom of association. Article 11 hereof states the 
following:
Employers and workers of the European Community shall have the right of 
association in order to constitute professional organisations or trade unions of 
their choice for the defence of their economic and social interests.
Every employer and every worker shall have the freedom to join or not to join 
such organisations without any personal or occupational damage being thereby 
suffered by him.
827  B. Bercusson, European Labour Law, page 599.
828  This is generally accepted by scholars. See, for instance, T. Blanke, The Viking 
Case 1, ARA 2006/2, page 45; B. Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – summary version - , ETUI, Brussels, 2002, 
page 13; and M. Fuchs, The Bottom Line of European Labour Law (Part I), The 
International journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
Summer 2004, page 168.
829 Opinion of 28 january 1999 in the joined cases C-115/97 to C-117/97, paragraph 
137.
830  Opinion of 23 May 2007 in the case C-341/05, Laval, paragraph 66.
831  The (indirect) relevance of the Community Charter can be witnessed at two levels: 
it has a function of catalyst for Community lawmaking in the field of European 
labour law and it is an instrument for interpretation, in particular applied by the 
European Court of justice. See M. Fuchs, The Bottom Line of European Labour 
Law (Part I), page 169.
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2.1.6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
The Community Charter is not the sole “European initiative”. The EU Charter, 
as signed and proclaimed by the Presidents of the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission at the European Council meeting in Nice on 7 
december 2000, also sets out a range of civil, political, economic and social 
rights of European citizens and all persons resident in the EU. Article 12.1 
hereof guarantees the freedom of association as follows:
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, 
which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his or her interests.
The original goal of the EU Charter was to make the fundamental rights more 
visible. This goal can be derived from the preamble of the EU Charter, which 
states: “it is necessary to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in 
the light of changes in society, social progress and scientific and technological 
developments by making those rights more visible in a Charter”. The EU 
Charter was therefore – at least until recently, as will be explained further in 
section 5 – a mere political declaration, without legal force.832
2.2 Freedom of association within a European context
The above instruments were directed at the Member States (and other 
countries), as opposed to the European Community itself. This raises the 
question whether the freedom of association is protected at a European 
level. 
2.2.1 General remarks with regard to fundamental 
social rights within the European Union
Without any doubt, the Community values fundamental rights. After all, 
article 136 of the EC Treaty states that the Community shall have in mind 
“fundamental social rights such as those set out in the European Social 
Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in the 1989 Community 
832  B. Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights – summary version - , page 13; and M. Fuchs, The Bottom Line of European 
Labour Law (Part I), page 170. See also the opinion of Mengozzi of 23 May 2007 
in the case C-341/05, Laval, paragraph 68.
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Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers”. having these rights 
in mind, however, does not equate guaranteeing them.833
Article 6.2 of the Treaty on European Union states that the Union shall respect 
fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Convention as general principles of 
Community law. The Convention therefore seems to play an important role 
in Community law. does that mean that the EU (and with it the European 
Community) is bound by the Convention? The answer to this question is: 
no.834 Both the Commission of human Rights and the Court of human 
Rights have held that, since the European Communities are not a party to the 
Convention, any application directed against the European Communities lies 
outside their jurisdiction.835 Moreover, the European Court of justice and the 
Court of First Instance also take the opinion that the European Communities 
are not bound by the Convention. The Court of First Instance ruled:836
It must be emphasised at the outset that the Court of First Instance has no 
jurisdiction to apply the Convention (…) inasmuch as the Convention as such is 
not part of Community law (…).
(…) the applicant cannot directly invoke the Convention before the Community 
courts.
The fact that the European Communities are not bound by the Convention has 
raised the question whether the Communities should accede to the Convention. 
As negotiations on this subject failed within the European Community,837 the 
833  Which also can be derived from the report of the Committee on Social Affairs, 
Employment and the Working Environment, in which it was advised to enshrine 
fundamental trade union rights in the EC Treaty. See the report of the Committee 
on Employment and Social Affairs, Report on transnational trade union rights in the 
European Union.
834  Novitz considers this article in combination with article 7 of the Treaty on 
European Union “symbolic”. T. Novitz, International and European Protection 
of the Right to Strike: A Comparative Study of Standards Set by the International 
Labour Organization, the Council of Europe and the European Union, page 162.
835  See for the first time: European Commission of human Rights, 10 july 1978, 
Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail/European Communities. For 
subsequent case law with the same content see: R.A. Lawson, Het EVRM en 
de Europese Gemeenschappen [The Convention and the European Communities], 
Kluwer, deventer, 1999, pages 49 ff.
836  Court of First Instance, 20 February 2001, T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke / 
Commission, paragraphs 59 and 75.
837  Reference is made to R.A. Lawson, Het EVRM en de Europese Gemeenschappen, 
pages 21 and 22.
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Court of justice was asked to render its opinion whether such an accession 
would be compatible with the EC Treaty. The Court answered the question 
negatively: the EC Treaty gives no basis for such an accession.838
That is not to say that the Convention is entirely irrelevant for the European 
Community (and has gained further importance recently, as will be set 
out in section 5 below). The European Court can uphold certain rights as 
fundamental within the Community’s legal order. The Convention plays an 
important role in that respect.839 This principle is confirmed in article 6.2 of 
the Treaty on European Union. 
2.2.2 Freedom of association as such within the European Union
It should be noted that the EC Treaty itself  does not formally acknowledge 
the freedom of association.840 Quite on the contrary, this right is explicitly 
excluded from the scope of (article 137 of) the EC Treaty given article 137.5 
of it.841 however, this is not necessarily to say that the freedom of association 
is not recognised as such, as article 137.5 must be interpreted narrowly in 
order to leave room for the EU protection of the freedom of association.842 
Lo Faro explicitly denies the principle of freedom of association in the 
Community context.843 It should be noted, however, that his definition of 
freedom of association is a very broad one. he includes in the freedom of 
association the right to collective bargaining and the capability of collective 
838  European Court of justice, 28 March 1996, Opinion 2/94.
839  See for example: European Court of justice, 18 june 1991, C-260/89, Tiléorassi e.a. 
/ Pliroforissis, paragraph 41 and European Court of justice, 18 december 1997, 
C-309/96, Annibaldi / Sindaco del Comune di Guidonia and Presidente Regione 
Lazio, paragraph 12. The European Court also referred to the ESC and the 
Community Charter in the past. See the opinion of Mengozzi in the case C-341/05, 
Laval, paragraph 66, including notes 17 and 18 of that opinion.
840  See in this respect also E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, 
pages 18 and 27.
841  The Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and the Working Environment 
advised to repeal this provision. See the Report of the Committee on Employment 
and Social Affairs, Report on transnational trade union rights in the European Union, 
page 6, paragraph 13.
842  This was suggested already by Bercusson for some time. See B. Bercusson (ed.), 
European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – summary 
version - , page 27. As set out in chapter 6, section 5.1, this is recently confirmed by 
the European Court of justice.
843  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
pages 92 ff.
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labour agreements to have direct normative effects.844 Given this wide definition, 
Lo Faro’s denial of a Community’s principle of freedom of association is 
hardly shocking. Other scholars do recognise the freedom of association 
at European level.845 deinert derives this freedom from case law from the 
European Court of justice, international treaties, and the recognition of it 
in the different Member States.846 his definition of freedom of association, 
however, is much narrower than that of Lo Faro and mainly focuses on the 
individual freedom to form, join and remain in organisations.847 Franssen also 
takes the view that the freedom of association is recognised at Community 
level. She relies on case law from the European Court of justice and on an 
opinion of Advocate-General jacobs in that respect. 848 Franssen also seems to 
focus on the right to form and join trade union and employers’ organisations.849 
Given the apparent importance of the case law of the European Court of 
justice in this respect, let us now turn thereto. 
In its 1974 decision in the case Union Syndicale, the European Court of 
justice recognised the freedom of association as a “general principle of labour 
law”.850 This point of view was affirmed in the 1990 Maurissen decision (a 
staff  case).851 In the 1995 Bosman decision, the European Court of justice 
even went a step beyond as it considered:852
844  A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, 
page 100.
845  See for example T. Blanke, The Viking Case 1, ARA 2006/2, page 45. See also C. 
Barnard, EC Employment law, pages 753 ff.
846  O. deinert, Der europäische Kollektivvertrag, pages 256 ff.
847  O. deinert, Der europäische Kollektivvertrag, page 426.
848  E. Franssen, De uitoefening van collectieve werknemersrechten door het individu op 
basis van het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie, pages 6 – 8.
849  E. Franssen, De uitoefening van collectieve werknemersrechten door het individu op 
basis van het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie, page 8.
850 European Court of justice, 8 October 1974, C-175/73, Union Syndicale e.a./
Commission.
851  European Court of justice, 18 january 1990, C-193/87 and C-194/87, Maurissen/
Court of auditors. As said, this decision concerned a so-called “staff  case” and 
therefore regards a complaint brought before the Court by an EU official who 
claims that there has been a breach of the “Staff  Regulations” which form the 
basis of that official’s employment contract. It is therefore not necessarily a 
rule of Community law. See on this and on the difference between staff  cases 
and “fundamental rights jurisprudence” T. Novitz, International and European 
Protection of the Right to Strike: A Comparative Study of Standards Set by the 
International Labour Organization, the Council of Europe and the European Union, 
pages 245, 250 and 256.
852 European Court of justice, 15 december 1995, C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des 
Sociétés de Football Association ASBL/Bosman, paragraph 79.
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As regards the arguments based on the principle of freedom of association, it 
must be recognized that this principle, enshrined in Article 11 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and resulting from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, is 
one of the fundamental rights which, as the Court has consistently held and as is 
reaffirmed in the preamble to the Single European Act and in Article F(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union, are protected in the Community legal order.
Advocate-General A. jacobs also takes the view that freedom of association 
is recognised in the Community legal order: “the Community legal order 
protects the right to form and join trade unions and employers’ associations 
which is at the heart of freedom of association”.853 Advocate-General Poiares 
Maduro affirmed this point of view in the Viking case, as he maintained 
that “the rights to associate (…) are of a fundamental character within the 
Community legal order”.854
Relatively recently, the European Court of justice also ruled that the negative 
freedom of association is protected in the Community legal order, with 
reference to article 6.2 of the Treaty on European Union. It ruled:855
Freedom of association, which also includes the right not to join an association 
or union (…) is enshrined in Article 11 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 
November 1950 and is one of the fundamental rights which, in accordance with 
the Court’s settled case-law, are protected in the Community legal order (…) as is 
restated in Article 6(2) EU.
In summary, the European Court of justice recognises the (positive and 
negative) freedom of association and considers it a fundamental right that is 
protected in the Community legal order. It is obvious that this definition of 
freedom of association is much narrower than the one that Lo Faro used.
853  Paragraph 158.
854  Opinion of Advocate-General Poiares Maduro, 23 May 2007, in case C-438/05, 
International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s union / Viking 
Line, paragraph 60.
855  European Court of justice, 9 March 2006, C-499/04, Werhof/Freeway Traffic, 
paragraph 33.
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2.3 Conclusion
It can be derived from the above that many international treaties acknowledge 
and promote the freedom of association. This freedom includes the right of 
workers and employers to organise themselves free of intervention, as well as 
the right not being forced to join or to remain in such an association. These 
treaties do not have a formal legal status in the European Community. There 
is no formal acknowledgement of the freedom of association at European 
level; at least not set out in any of the Community treaties, and the freedom of 
association is even (to some extent) excluded from the scope of the EC Treaty 
given article 137.5. This notwithstanding, the European Court of justice 
recognises the (positive and negative) freedom of association and considers it 
a fundamental right which is protected in the Community legal order.
3. The right to collective bargaining
The right to collective bargaining should at a minimum encompass the 
freedom of the social partners to enter into negotiations in order to reach a 
binding agreement on employment topics. A broader interpretation of this 
right would include the obligatory and normative effects a collective agreement 
may have, and possibly even the direct normative effects of the agreement.856 
As already mentioned in section 2 above, the right to collective bargaining 
is often seen as a part of the freedom of association. The same applies to 
collective autonomy,857 a topic that will be discussed in section 3.3 below.858
As is the case with the aforementioned freedom of association, the right 
to collective bargaining (in its “narrow” and sometimes even in its “broad” 
sense), is protected by international instruments, which bind individual states. 
These instruments will be discussed below. Whether the right to collective 
bargaining exists on a European level will be scrutinised as well. 
856  An even broader definition would include all processes of interest accommodations, 
such as tripartite consultation. For the difficulties concerning a proper definition 
of collective bargaining, reference is made to j. Rojot, The Right to Bargain 
Collectively: an International Perspective on its Extent and Relevance.
857  K. Boonstra, Government Responsibility and Bargaining Scope within Article 4 of 
ILO Convention 98, page 455.
858  Although deinert takes the view that collective autonomy does not derive from the 
freedom of association. O. deinert, Der europäische Kollektivvertrag, page 431.
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3.1 International instruments protecting the right to collective bargaining
Many of the instruments outlined in section 2 above are relevant with regard 
to the right to collective bargaining as well. This list is, however, to be amplified 
with ILO Recommendation R91 (on collective agreements).
3.1.1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
The Convention does not refer to the right to collective bargaining. Case law 
from the European Court of human Rights, however, recognises specific 
aspects of the right to collective bargaining as a part of the freedom of 
association (article 11 of the Convention). According to this case law, trade 
unions have the right to be heard and to represent the occupational interests 
of their members.859 
The European Court of human Rights’ case law furthermore emphasises 
the voluntary nature of collective bargaining and the conclusion of collective 
agreements; article 11 of the Convention does not provide for an actual right 
to have any such agreement actually concluded.860 On the other side of the 
coin, said article does not guarantee a right not to enter into a collective 
agreement either; trade unions may legitimately exercise ample pressure on 
an individual employer in order to persuade it to enter into a collective labour 
agreement.861 Free collective bargaining includes in the view of the European 
Court of human Rights a prohibition of employers to use financial incentives 
to induce employees to surrender important union rights.862
859  See, for example, European Court of human Rights, 27 October 1975, National 
Union of Belgian Police/Belgium. See also European Court of human Rights, 6 
February 1976, Swedish Engine Drivers/Sweden and European Court of human 
Rights, 2 july 2002, Wilson and National Union of journalists and others/UK.
860  European Court of human Rights, 6 February 1976, Swedish Engine Drivers/
Sweden.
861  European Court of human Rights, 25 April 1996, Gustafsson/Sweden.
862  European Court of human Rights, 2 july 2002, Wilson and National Union of 
journalists and others/UK. In this decision, briefly put, the employer offered the 
employees individual employment contracts with the option to denounce union 
representation or to accept a slower salary increase. This was held to violate article 
11 of the Convention.
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Notwithstanding these rulings, the European Court of human Rights 
seems very reluctant to recognise a general right to collective bargaining.863 
All of the aforementioned rulings were placed in the key of article 11 of 
the Convention, recognising the freedom of association, but not the right 
to collective bargaining. It may even be argued that the European Court of 
human Rights goes to great lengths not to touch upon the subject whether 
this latter right exists.864
3.1.2 European Social Charter
The ESC does explicitly recognise the right to collective bargaining. Article 
6.2 hereof reads as follows:
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the 
Parties undertake (…) to promote, where necessary and appropri ate, machinery 
for voluntary negotia tions between employers or employers’ organi sations and 
workers’ organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of 
employment by means of collective agreements.
On the basis of this provision, domestic law should not only recognise that 
employers’ and employees’ organisations may regulate the terms and conditions 
of employment by collective labour agreements, but positive measures should 
be taken to facilitate and encourage collective bargaining as well.865 This 
does not exclude that states may demand a certain level of representativity 
from the social partners in the collective bargaining process, as long as these 
requirements are not excessive. These requirements should “be prescribed 
by law, should be objective and reasonable and subject to judicial review 
which offers appropriate protection against arbitrary refusals”.866 It should 
furthermore be noted that article 6.2 ESC refers to the normative effects 
of the collective labour agreements (“with a view to the regulation of terms 
863  F. dorssemont, De vakverenigingsvrijheid ex artikel 11 EVRM, méér dan een 
sequeel van de vrijheid van vereniging? [The freedom of association of article 11 of 
the Convention of the Ptotection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, more 
than a consequence of the freedom of association?], ARA 2006/2, pages 22 ff. See 
also K.d. Ewing, the Implications of Wilson and Palmer, Industrial Law journal, 
2003, volume 32, number 1, page 3.
864  See, convincingly, Advocate-General A. jacobs in his opinion in the joined cases 
C-115/97 to C-117/97. See also T. Novitz, International and European Protection 
of the Right to Strike: A Comparative Study of Standards Set by the International 
Labour Organization, the Council of Europe and the European Union, page 225.
865 L. Samuel, Fundamental Social Rights, Council of Europe, page 148. 
866 Secretariat of the Council of Europe, Digest of the case law of the ESCR, page 69.
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and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements”), without 
dealing with the topic of possible direct normative effects of the collective 
labour agreements. Finally, collective bargaining as protected by article 6.2 
ESC must be free and voluntary.867 
3.1.3 International Labour Organisation
Also the ILO deals with the issue “right to collective bargaining” in the 
aforementioned Convention C98. This convention states the following in 
article 4:
Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, 
to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery 
for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers’ organisations and 
workers’ organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of 
employment by means of collective agreements.
It should be noted that this article “merely” obliges that the contracting 
states encourage and promote collective bargaining, while no right as such 
is granted.868 According to the Freedom of Association Committee of the 
Governing Body of the ILO, however, the right for trade unions to bargain 
freely with employers with respect to conditions of work constitutes an 
essential element in freedom of association. Trade unions have the right, 
through collective bargaining or other means, to improve the living and 
working conditions of those whom the trade unions represent.869 Besides 
Convention C98, the 1981 Convention C154 concerning the Promotion of 
Collective Bargaining also promotes collective bargaining, as article 5.1 
thereof states that “measures adapted to national conditions shall be taken 
to promote collective bargaining”. The same promotion can be read in 
Recommendation R163.
The above-mentioned Conventions and Recommendation do not deal with 
the possible direct normative effects a collective labour agreement may have. 
This is, however, arranged in ILO Recommendation R91 (a Recommendation 
which also arranges the so-called “principle of favour”). Article 3 thereof 
stipulates:
867  Secretariat of the Council of Europe, Digest of the case law of the ESCR, page 69.
868  See the opinion of Advocate-General jacobs in the joined cases C-115/97 to 
C-117/97. See also E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, 
page 22.
869 Freedom of Association, Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of 
Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO, paragraph 782. 
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(1) Collective agreements should bind the signatories thereto and those on whose 
behalf  the agreement is concluded. Employers and workers bound by a 
collective agreement should not be able to include in contracts of employment 
stipulations contrary to those contained in the collective agreement. 
(2) Stipulations in such contracts of employment which are contrary to a collective 
agreement should be regarded as null and void and automatically replaced by 
the corresponding stipulations of the collective agreement. 
(3) Stipulations in contracts of employment which are more favourable to the 
workers than those prescribed by a collective agreement should not be regarded 
as contrary to the collective agreement. (…)
As this Recommendation is logically merely a recommendation, it does not 
lay down any rights concerning these direct normative effects of collective 
labour agreements.870
3.1.4 The UN’s instruments
The Covenant, Ecosoc and the declaration do not mention the right to 
collective bargaining.
3.1.5 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers
The Community Charter specifically refers to the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective labour agreements. Article 12 states:
Employers or employers’ organisations, on the one hand, and workers’ 
organisations, on the other, shall have the right to negotiate and conclude 
collective labour agreements under the conditions set out by national legislation 
and practice.
The dialogue between the two sides of industry at European level which must be 
developed, may, if  the parties deem it desirable, result in contractual relations, in 
particular at inter-occupational and sectoral level.
This provision merely entails the right to negotiate and conclude agreements; 
nothing more, nothing less. It does not refer to any (direct) normative effects 
of the collective labour agreements. It does arrange, however, for the right to 
negotiate and enter into collective labour agreements at European level. The 
870  Although Recommendations also influence the laws of the various states. See N. 
Valticos, De invloed van internationale arbeidsverdragen en -aanbevelingen van de 
internationale arbeidsorganisatie, pages 77 ff. 
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wording of this right is comparable to the wording of article 139.1 of the EC 
Treaty.
3.1.6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
The EU Charter does not add a lot to the aforementioned provision of the 
Community Charter when it concerns the right to collective bargaining. 
Article 28 hereof stipulates:
Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance 
with Community law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of 
interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.
Although article 28 of the EU Charter recognises the steps to come to a 
collective labour agreement (from initiating negotiations, to actual negotiation, 
to the conclusion of the collective labour agreement), it does not include topics 
like the binding nature of the agreement, the internal structure (normative 
and obligatory provisions) and possible erga omnes effects the agreement may 
have.871 What strikes as odd in article 28 is that it actually gives workers the 
right to collective bargaining. In all other international instruments discussed 
above, this right is, on the side of labour, solely attributed to workers’ 
organisations.872 
3.2 Right to collective bargaining within a European context
 
As is the case with regard to the freedom of association, the aforementioned 
instruments are directed at the Member States (and other countries), and 
not to the European Community itself. Is the right to collective bargaining 
existent at a European level as well? here, the EC Treaty is not silent. 
As set out in chapter 3 hereof, from a European perspective frequent reference 
is made to collective bargaining. In 1987, article 118B if  the EC Treaty 
acknowledged that – at European level – the two sides of industry may enter 
into agreements. This entitlement was further enhanced in the 1992 Protocol 
871  B. Veneziani, in B. Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights – summary version - , page 57.
872  With the exception of ILO Recommendation R91. The definition of a collective 
labour agreement which derives from that Recommendation also attributes the 
right to conclude collective labour agreements to “the representatives of the 
workers duly elected and authorised by them in accordance with national laws and 
regulations” in case of the absence of representative workers’ organisations.
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on Social Policy, and enshrined in the EC Treaty in 1997 at the summit in 
Amsterdam. At present, article 138.4 of the EC Treaty permits management 
and labour to initiate negotiations on the occasion of consultation. This 
dialogue may, on the grounds of article 139 of the EC Treaty, lead to 
contractual relations, including agreements, which can either be implemented 
by a Council decision or in accordance with procedures and practices specific 
to management and labour and the Member States.
As noted in chapter 6, section 4.1 of this thesis, the aforementioned provisions 
“merely” set out that (i) European social partners may enter into agreements 
which (ii) can be implemented nationally or through European legislation. It 
therefore in fact only constitutes the recognition of these parties to enter into 
negotiation and to conclude contracts. It does not deal with the normative and 
obligatory effects of collective labour agreements, let alone with possible direct 
normative effects. On the contrary: the effects of the collective agreements 
should either be obtained through specific European legislation or specific 
national legislation (after national implementation). Article 139 of the EC 
Treaty simply does not arrange for any binding effects.
In a “narrow” sense of the definition of collective bargaining – social partners 
are free in European context to conclude agreements on employment topics 
– this right is, given the above, guaranteed in the EC Treaty. In a broader 
sense – including the obligatory and normative effects a collective agreement 
may have, and possibly even the direct normative effects – this right is not 
guaranteed in the EC Treaty.
But what about the jurisprudence of the European Court of justice? This 
Court never recognised nor denied the right to collective bargaining. Advocate-
General jacobs did consider this subject and held that “it cannot be said that 
there is sufficient convergence of national legal orders and international legal 
instruments on the recognition of a specific fundamental right to bargain 
collectively”. he continued, however, that “the collective bargaining process, 
like any other negotiation between economic actors, is (…) sufficiently 
protected by the general principle of freedom of contract. Therefore, a more 
specific fundamental right to protection is not needed”.873 Franssen agrees 
with this point of view and derives here from that “the freedom to bargain 
collectively and conclude collective labour agreements is thus protected by 
 
873  Opinion in the joined cases C-115/97 to C-117/97, paragraph 161.
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private law and it is therefore not necessary to have it explicitly protected by 
Community law”.874
This entire exercise puzzles me. If  the point of view is followed that the EC 
Treaty does not guarantee the right to bargain at a European level, one 
automatically has to take the view that the right to collective bargaining 
encompasses more than the right to negotiate and conclude agreements alone. 
In the end, these latter rights are protected in the EC Treaty for European 
social partners; the specific effects of the collective agreements are not 
protected. It is conflicting to subsequently argue that the right to collective 
bargaining is sufficiently protected by the general principle of freedom of 
contract, as that freedom only arranges for the freedom to negotiate and to 
conclude contracts, which is already arranged in the EC Treaty.
Still, the freedom of contract has a role to perform in connection with the 
freedom of collective bargaining. The right to negotiate and to enter into 
agreements as set forth in the EC Treaty only applies to the European social 
partners that are entitled to participate in the article 139 EC Treaty collective 
bargaining process.875 It therefore does not apply to other (European) social 
partners or employers. here, the freedom of contract comes into play. These 
parties are – as jacobs and Franssen rightly point out – also free to negotiate 
and conclude contracts on employment topics. These parties are, on the same 
foot as the European social partners that can participate in the article 139 EC 
Treaty collective bargaining process, free to enter into collective bargaining 
and conclude collective labour agreements.876
There are no indications – as jacobs and Franssen also rightly point out – 
that there is any recognition of a fundamental right to collective bargaining 
that goes beyond a mere freedom of contract, i.e. a right that includes the 
normative and obligatory effects of the collective labour agreement, or 
perhaps even a direct normative effect.877
874 E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 23.
875  Reference is made to section 3.2 of chapter 5.
876  For which reason it was concluded in section 4.1 of chapter 6 that article 139.1 
in combination with the first part of article 139.2 of the EC Treaty did not add 
anything to the already existing rights of the European social partners.
877  As already mentioned in chapter 5, section 7.3.1, deinert would not subscribe 
to this point of view as he takes the opinion that European collective labour 
agreements have direct normative effect. As set out in the same section, I do not 
agree with deinert on this. 
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3.3 The right to collective autonomy
Collective autonomy entails the social partners’ power to autonomously 
determine working conditions and terms and conditions of employment.878 
If  merely the possibility for the social partners to negotiate and to conclude 
agreements with each other is at stake, both article 139 of the EC Treaty and 
the freedom of contract give the social partners’ room to deal with matters of 
their liking in freedom. deinert also takes the view that collective autonomy 
is recognised at Community level.879 In any event, all Member states are in 
favour of an autonomous organisation of trade unions, thus stressing the 
importance of autonomous positions of social partners.880 If, however, the 
effects of  European collective agreements concluded within the European 
social dialogue are scrutinised, the autonomy of the European social partners 
falls short. As a consequence of the lack of direct normative effect of the 
European agreements concluded, and the consequent European social 
partners’ dependability on third parties to implement the agreement, the 
European Social Partners have a less evolved autonomy when compared 
to the social partners’ typical situation in Member States.881 The European 
social partners’ autonomy is especially limited should they wish to have their 
agreement implemented by a Council decision. In such a case, their agreements 
must concern matters covered by article 137 of the EC Treaty, and may, to 
some extent, not deal with pay, the right of association, the right to strike and 
the right to impose lock-outs.882 Obviously, this is quite the opposite of a right 
to collective autonomy.
878  A useful definition of collective autonomy is the “power of autonomous 
determination of working conditions and terms and conditions of employment, 
the exercise of which is the typical and fundamental, though not exclusive, function 
of the trade union organisation”. See: European Employment Industrial Relations 
Glossary: Italy, Sweet&Maxwell/Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, London/Luxembourg, 1991, as mentioned in A. Lo Faro, Regulating 
Social Europe: reality and myth of collective bargaining, page 75. See also:  
O. deinert, Der europäische Kollektivvertrag, page 430. A more general definition 
of autonomy of collective bargaining that applies to most Member States is “the 
development of collective agreements as sources for the free definition of wage 
policies and working conditions”. See: European Commission, Industrial Relations 
in Europe 2006, page 41.
879  O. deinert, Der europäische Kollektivvertrag, page 430.
880  B. Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights – summary version - , page 26.
881  Reference is made to chapter 6, section 3.5.
882  Reference is made to chapter 6, section 5.1.
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3.4 Conclusion
The right to enter into negotiations and to conclude collective labour 
agreements is recognised in many international instruments. These treaties do 
not have a formal legal status in the European Community. however, articles 
138.4 and 139 of the EC Treaty also award these rights to a specific group of 
European social partners. The freedom of contract seems to protect exactly 
the same rights to other (European) social partners and employers as well. 
This part of collective bargaining – a narrow sense of collective bargaining – 
is therefore protected at a European level. In this narrow sense the social 
partners also have a right to collective autonomy.
Some of the international instruments also arrange for the (normative and 
obligatory) effects of the collective labour agreement. ILO Recommendation 
R91 even arranges for the direct normative effects of a collective labour 
agreement. There are no indications that these parts of the right to collective 
bargaining – in its broad sense – are recognised at European level. Collective 
autonomy is definitely not recognised in this broad sense. On the contrary, 
since European agreements lack direct normative effect and the European 
social partners depend on third parties to implement these agreements, 
their autonomy is less evolved than that of the national social partners in 
the Member States. The European social partners’ autonomy is limited by 
law should they wish to have their agreement implemented by a Council 
decision.
4. The right to strike
Strike itself  is normally considered as being a (very important) specius of  
the genus collective actions. Black’s Law dictionary defines strike as “an 
organised cessation or slowdown of work by employees to compel the 
employer to meet the employees’ demands; a concerted refusal by employees 
to work for their employer, or to work at their customary rate of speed, until 
the employer grants the concessions that they seek”.883 The right to strike is, as 
will be shown below, sometimes considered as being a part of the freedom of 
association.884 It is widely held as “one of the essential means through which 
883  B.A. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition 2004.
884  In any event, the right to strike may in some cases be considered to be inextricably 
linked to the conclusion of collective labour agreements. See European Court of 
justice, 11 december 2007, C-438/05, Viking, paragraph 36. 
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workers and their organisations may promote and defend their economic and 
social interests”.885 
4.1 International instruments protecting the right to strike
The right to strike is protected by various instruments already mentioned 
above.
4.1.1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
The Convention does not arrange for the right to strike as such. The European 
Court of human Rights, however, did have to establish whether article 11 
EChR (the protection of freedom of association) contains a right to strike as 
well. In the Schmidt & Dahlström case the applicants argued that the right to 
strike is an “organic right” included in article 11 of the European Convention.886 
The Court considered that the Convention safeguards freedom to protect the 
occupational interests of trade union members by trade union action. It is at 
the individual state’s discretion to choose the means to be used to this end. 
According to the Court, the grant of a right to strike represents the most 
important of these means, but it considers that there are other means as well. 
The right to strike is not expressly enshrined in article 11 and may be subject, 
under national law, to regulation of a kind that limits its exercise in certain 
instances. The Court’s considerations seem to imply that limitations on the 
right to strike do not normally limit the freedom of association protected by 
article 11 of the Convention. The trade unions basically seem to have to rely 
on “other means” to safeguard the occupational interests of their members, 
safeguarding which is, in itself, protected by article 11 of the Convention.
The European Court of human Rights seemed to nuance its opinion in the 
2002 decision in the Unison case.887 This case related to the transfer of activities 
from a state run hospital to a private consortium. The trade union wished to 
protect its members’ employment upon transfer. It requested the state hospital 
to demand from the transferees to guarantee specific minimum employment 
conditions for 30 years upon transfer. The hospital refused this request. The 
trade union subsequently intended to call for a strike forcing the hospital to 
885  Quote from ILO, as referred to in: P. Gemanotta and T. Novitz, Globalisation and 
the right to strike: The Case for European-Level Protection of Secondary Action, 
The International journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 
Volume 18, Issue 1, 2002, page 68.
886  European Court of human Rights, 6 February 1976, Schmidt & Dahlström/
Sweden.
887  European Court of human Rights, 10 january 2002, Unison/United Kingdom.
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grant the request. This strike, however, was prohibited by the UK high Court, 
as the strike did not concern a “dispute wholly or mainly related to current 
terms and conditions but instead a dispute about future terms and conditions 
with an unidentified future employer,”888 as is prescribed in the Trade Union 
and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. The trade union argued that 
this decision disproportionately interfered with its right under article 11 to 
take effective action to protect its members’ interests. The UK Government 
denied that article 11 was relevant at all, as that strike did not concern the 
occupational interests of the trade union’s members but merely concerned 
protection of yet unidentified individuals to be employed by yet unidentified 
transferee companies. The Court noted that the members of the trade union 
could be affected by the transfers of activities. The guarantee, if  obtained by 
the union, could benefit these members. The proposed strike was therefore 
to be regarded as concerning the occupational interests of the trade union’s 
members and was covered by article 11 of the Convention. Consequently, 
the right to strike formed a part of article 11 of the Convention. This can 
be considered as a turnaround in the European Court’s case law.889 What 
the European Court of human Rights gave on the one hand, however, it 
took on the other. The Court examined whether the restriction imposed by 
the UK high Court was in compliance with the requirements of article 11.2 
of the Convention. In other words, it assessed whether the restriction was 
“prescribed by law”, pursued one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 
2 and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of those 
aims. Clearly, the restriction was prescribed by the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. The restriction furthermore protected 
the right of a third party, being the state hospital. In that respect it was argued 
that the state hospital could claim that its ability to carry out its functions 
effectively, including the securing of contracts with other bodies, might be 
adversely affected by the actions of the trade union. Lastly, the prohibition on 
the trade union’s ability to strike can be regarded as a proportionate measure 
given the state hospital’s financial position and the trade union’s possibility 
to revert to other methods than strike. At first glance, this seems to be a fairly 
light justification of the prohibition to strike.890 The aforementioned line 
888  Consideration on page 3 of this ruling.
889  F. dorssemont, De vakverenigingsvrijheid ex artikel 11 EVRM, méér dan een sequeel 
van de vrijheid van vereniging?, page 28. See also K.d. Ewing, the Implications of 
Wilson and Palmer, Industrial Law journal, page 5.
890  See also F. dorssemont, De vakverenigingsvrijheid ex artikel 11 EVRM, méér dan 
een sequeel van de vrijheid van vereniging?, page 29. 
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of arguing was affirmed in the Federation of offshore workers’ trade unions 
case.891 
Also in another case the European Court of justice seems to acknowledge 
that, at least in some circumstances, article 11 of the Convention guarantees 
a right to strike:892
The grant of the right to strike, while it may be subject to regulation, represents one 
of the most important of the means by which the State may secure a trade union’s 
freedom to protect its members’ occupational interests (…). The Court agrees 
with the [UK] Government that the essence of a voluntary system of collective 
bargaining is that it must be possible for a trade union which is not recognised 
by an employer to take steps including, if  necessary, organising industrial action, 
with a view to persuading the employer to enter into collective bargaining with it 
on those issues which the union believes are important for its members’ interests.
These statements come, to say the least, “close to the European Court of 
human Rights recognising the right to strike”.893 To sum up, article 11 of the 
Convention seems to protect the right to strike at least to a certain extent, 
but the right can fairly easy be restricted by individual states on the basis of 
paragraph 2 of that article.894 
4.1.2 European Social Charter
The ESC explicitly recognises the right to strike. Article 6.4 hereof states the 
following:
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, 
the Parties recognise the right of workers and employers to collec tive action in 
891  European Court of human Rights, 27 june 2002, Federation of offshore workers’ 
trade unions/Norway.
892  European Court of human Rights, 2 july 2002, Wilson, National Union of 
Journalists and Others / United Kingdom. See also European Court of human 
Rights, 17 july 2007, Affaire Satilmis et autres / Turquie.
893  C. Barnard, EC Employment law, page 771. Novitz refers to a “partial recognition 
of a right to strike”; T. Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right 
to Strike: A Comparative Study of Standards Set by the International Labour 
Organization, the Council of Europe and the European Union, pages 229 – 232.
894  Advocate-General Mengozzi, however, takes the opinion that article 11 of the 
Convention does not imply a right to strike. See the opinion of Mengozzi in case 
C-341/05, Laval, paragraph 72.
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cases of conflicts of interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations 
that might arise out of col lective agreements previously entered into.
The right to strike can be restricted on the basis of article G of the revised 
ESC (article 31 of the original ESC). This article stipulates:
1 The rights and prin ciples (…) shall not be subject to any restric tions or 
limitations not specified in those parts, except such as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others or for the protection of public interest, national security, 
public health, or morals.
2 The restric tions permitted under this Charter to the rights and obliga tions set 
forth herein shall not be applied for any purpose other than that for which they 
have been prescribed.
The above makes clear that the right to strike is recognised, but limited. Article 
6.4 itself  provides for a double limitation by referring to the right to take 
collec tive action “in cases of conflicts of interest” and “subject to obligations 
that might arise out of col lective agreements previously entered into”.895 Article 
G (31) limits the right even further if, briefly put, such a limitation is prescribed 
by law and necessary in a democratic society. The right to strike may, on the 
basis of the ESC, not be reduced by state courts in such a manner that it 
becomes ineffective though. Limiting the right to strike to trade unions that 
are (most) representative is considered excessive.896 As will be set out in the 
following chapters, the ESC was of importance for the development of the 
right to strike in specific European countries.
4.1.3 International Labour Organisation
The ILO Conventions and recommendations themselves do not directly 
protect the right to strike. however, the right to strike is regarded as a 
universal right and is tacitly inferred from the freedom of association and the 
895  See S. Clauwaert, International / transnational primary and secondary collective 
action, an overview of international, European and national legislation, page 9. See 
also L. Samuel, Fundamental Social Rights, Council of Europe, pages 162 and 172.
896  Secretariat of the Council of Europe, Digest of the case law of the ESCR, page 70.
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ILO Constitution.897 It never was explicitly set out in any ILO Convention not 
because the right as such was not recognised, but mainly because it proved 
very difficult to agree on the limitations of said right.898
4.1.4 The UN’s instruments
The Covenant and the declaration remain silent on the right to strike. Article 
8 Ecosoc, however, does deal with this right as it stipulates:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: (…) the right to 
strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular 
country. 
This gives an international basis to the right of strike, although it equally 
makes clear that countries may limit this right (which article 4 Ecosoc does as 
well). This obviously limits the potential of the right to strike, as no restrictions 
are set for an individual state’s limitation of the right to strike.
4.1.5 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers
The Community Charter also protects the right to strike. Article 13 hereof 
stipulates:
The right to resort to collective action in the event of a conflict of interests 
shall include the right to strike, subject to the obligations arising under national 
regulations and collective agreements. 
In order to facilitate the settlement of industrial disputes the establishment and 
utilisation at the appropriate levels of conciliation, mediation and arbitration 
procedures should be encouraged in accordance with national practice.
This article confirms the rights to strike, but also permits national legislation 
(and collective labour agreements) to limit this right, without imposing 
restrictions on such a limitation. Besides this, article 13 of the Community 
897  Reference is made to R. Ben-Israel, International labour Standards: The case 
of freedom to strike, Kluwer, 1988, page 70. Also Veneziani states that the right 
to strike has been affirmed in the case law developed by the ILO’s Freedom 
of Association Committee, interpreting Convention C87. B. Veneziani, in B. 
Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
– summary version - , page 58.
898  R. Ben-Israel, International labour Standards: The case of freedom to strike, page 
46.
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Charter encourages states to arrange for alternative dispute resolution in 
order to settle industrial disputes.
4.1.6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
Article 28 of the EU Charter concerns the “right of collective bargaining and 
action” and stipulates:
Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance 
with Community law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of 
interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.
This right to collective action can be limited on the basis of article 52 of the 
EU Charter if  provided for by law and if  this limitation respects the essence 
of the right to strike. 
4.2 Right to strike within a European context
Is the right to strike protected at a European level? The EC Treaty does not 
acknowledge the right to strike. This right is explicitly excluded from the scope 
of the EC Treaty given article 137.5. From this, as is the case with regard to 
the freedom of association, it cannot be concluded that the right to strike is 
not recognised. 
Until recently, the European Court of justice never ruled whether a 
Community right to strike is in place. Advocate-general jacobs concluded 
in his already frequently mentioned opinion in the Albany case that such a 
Community right to strike is in place. he considered that “the right to take 
collective action in order to protect occupational interests in so far as it is 
indispensable for the enjoyment of freedom of association is also protected 
by Community law”.899 he seems to deduce this right from the freedom of 
association, as, when substantiating the right to strike, he refers to the same 
court decisions as mentioned with regard to the freedom of association and 
which are further discussed below. 
The European Court of justice first ruled in a number of staff  cases on issues 
concerning the right to strike. As previously mentioned, staff  cases concern 
actions taken by EU officials against their employers, EU institutions. Staff  
cases need to be distinguished from jurisprudence of the European Court of 
899  Paragraph 159.
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justice concerning fundamental rights.900 The first relevant staff  case is the 
1973 ruling in the case Union Syndicale, in which the European Court of 
justice had to decide on a claim of this union, representing the interests of 
certain staff  members of the Council of European Communities.901 A topic 
that was reviewed by the European Court of justice was whether this union 
could institute legal proceedings following a decision from the Council of 
European Communities. In that context the Court ruled the following:
Under the general principles of labour law, the freedom of trade union activity 
recognized under article 24A of the Staff  Regulations means not only that officials 
and servants have the right without hindrance to form associations of their own 
choosing, but also that these associations are free to do anything lawful to protect 
the interests of their members as employees. 
The right of action is one of the means available for use by these associations.
Under the Community legal system, however, the exerciser of this right is subject 
to the conditions determined by the system of forms of action provided for under 
the treaties establishing the Communities.
In the Maurissen decision – also a staff  case – the Court of Auditors of the 
European Communities refused to grant trade union members the possibility 
to use an internal messenger system in order to convey trade union information 
to other employees. The question arose whether this was permitted given the 
freedom of association. The European Court of justice affirmed that the 
freedom of trade union activity is recognised, which means “not only that 
officials and servants have the right without hindrance to form associations 
of their own choosing but also that such associations are free to do anything 
lawful to protect the interests of their members as employees”.902 The court 
ruled that the trade union freedom, however, does not entail a right to use 
the internal messenger system, where other options for communication were 
available as well. In the already mentioned Bosman case, not being a staff  
case, the European Court of justice also emphasised the Community right to 
freedom of association, without mentioning the right to strike. 
900  See T. Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike: A 
Comparative Study of Standards Set by the International Labour Organization, the 
Council of Europe and the European Union, page 245.
901  European Court of justice, 8 October 1974, C 175/73, Union Syndicale/Council of 
European Communities, paragraphs 14 – 16.
902  Paragraph 13.
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These rulings led advocate-general jacobs to conclude that there is a collective 
right to strike.903 he continued by stressing that the European court of human 
Rights views that the freedom of association includes rights that are inherent 
elements of the freedom of association. he noted that, according to the 
European Court of human Rights, the freedom of association safeguards 
“the freedom to protect the occupational interest of the trade union members 
by trade union action”.904 jacobs also noted, given the already mentioned 
Schmidt & Dahlström case, that article 11 of the Convention not necessarily 
implies a right to strike, since the trade union can further the interests of its 
members by other means.905
Franssen refutes jacobs opinion. She takes the view that, where the European 
Court of justice used the term “right to action” in the case Union Syndicale, 
the Court referred to its right to institute legal actions, and not so much 
other actions, such as strike. Moreover, she states that the right to strike was 
not explicitly mentioned in the Maurissen and Bosman decisions. Franssen 
therefore concluded that there is no Community right to strike.906 
Franssen is, in my view, right that the case Union Syndicale primarily 
concerned the right to institute legal proceedings, for which reason the “right 
to action” as used in that case specifically related to these legal proceedings. 
however, I doubt whether the term “right to action” was limited to these 
legal proceedings. After all, if  this was the case, why should the court 
refer to the right to action at all, and not simply limit itself  to the right to 
institute proceedings? Moreover, the European Court of justice stated in the 
Maurissen case that the freedom of trade union activity not only entails the 
right without hindrance to form associations, but also the right for the union 
to do anything lawful to protect the interests of their members as employees. 
The court definitely did not limit this latter right to the right to institute 
legal proceedings. Apparently, the court takes the view that the freedom of 
association is a broad right, a freedom which should, given the Bosman case, 
be taken seriously. I therefore understand jacobs’ opinion to view the right to 
strike as a part of the broader freedom of association. That was, in my opinion, 
also the reason why jacobs referred to the European Court of human Right’s 
case law on the freedom of association, which also showed a broad definition 
of the freedom of association. At the time of jacobs’ opinion in the Albany 
903  Paragraph 139.
904  Paragraph 144. 
905  Paragraph 145.
906  E. Franssen, De uitoefening van collectieve werknemersrechten door het individu op 
basis van het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie, pages 9 and 10.
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case, this Court had not yet ruled that the freedom of association of article 11 
of the Convention indeed (at least partially) incorporated the right to strike, 
as it ruled in the above-mentioned Unison case. It therefore seems plausible 
to me that the European Court of justice would recognise, at least to some 
extent, a Community right to strike. This view, which was already forwarded 
by dorssemont in the past,907 is again refuted by Franssen. She claims that 
if  the right to strike is a part of another all-embracing right, it should be the 
right to collective bargaining.908 This is in contrast with standing practice of 
the ILO and the European Court of human Rights, as mentioned above, and 
the common opinion in the legal doctrine.909 
Also Barnard views that there is a right to strike. She considers this a 
fundamental right which serves to limit the activities of the Community 
institutions when legislating.910 The same view is expressed by Advocate-
General Poiares Maduro in his opinion in the Viking case, as he stated that 
“the rights (…) to collective action are of a fundamental character within the 
Community legal order”.911 Advocate-General Megozzi also took this stance 
in the Laval case where he argued that “the right to resort to collective action 
to defend trade union members’ interests is a fundamental right (…) a general 
principle of Community law”.912 
Recently, the European Court of justice ended this insecurity. In the Viking 
case, which will be discussed in depth in section 6.3.1.2., it ruled that the right 
to take collective action, including the right to strike, must be recognised as 
“a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles of 
Community law the observance of which the Court ensures (…)”.913 Shortly 
thereafter this ruling was confirmed in the Laval case, which will be discussed 
907  See F. dorssemont, ‘Met de vlam in de pijp…’. Vrijheid van vergadering 
en meningsuiting, recht op collectieve actie versus vrij verkeer: primaat of 
belangenafweging [‘Met de vlam in de pijp…’. Freedom of association and speech, 
right to collective action versus free movement: primate or balancing of interests?], 
ARA 2004/1, page 90.
908  E. Franssen, De uitoefening van collectieve werknemersrechten door het individu op 
basis van het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie, page 10.
909  jacobs already stated in 1986 that it is a common view among scholars that the 
freedom of association encompasses to a certain extent the right to collective 
bargaining and the right to strike. Reference is made to A.T.j.M. jacobs, Het recht 
op collectief onderhandelen in rechtsvergelijkend en Europees perspectief, page 66.
910  C. Barnard, EC Employment law, page 774.
911  Opinion of Advocate-General Poiares Maduro, 23 May 2007, in case C-438/05, 
Viking, paragraph 60.
912  Opinion of 23 May 2007 in the case C-341/05, Laval, paragraph 78.
913  European Court of justice, 11 december 2007, C-438/05, Viking, paragraph 44. 
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in section 6.3.2.914 The right to strike is therefore protected on European 
level. 
4.3 Conclusion
The right to strike is recognised in many international instruments. These 
instruments do not have a formal legal status in the European Community. 
The right to strike is to some extent explicitly excluded from the scope of the 
EC Treaty given article 137.5. This, however, does not entail that the right as 
such cannot be protected on European level. Case law of the European court 
of justice, in combination with case law of the European Court of human 
Rights, already for some time gave ground to argue that the right to strike 
should be regarded as a part of the freedom of association. This latter right 
is recognised on Community level. In the Viking case the European Court 
of justice indeed confirmed that the right to strike forms an integral part of 
the general principles of Community law the observance of which the Court 
ensures.
5. Recent changes in the protection of 
fundamental rights at EU level
The above shows that the three classical rights are at least partially recognised 
at EU level. This recognition did not flow from treaties directly binding the 
European Community. however, there have been a number of developments 
that (aim(ed) to) change that.
At first there was the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The 
EU Charter was to be incorporated into the European Constitution. As a 
consequence, (i) article II-72 of the European Constitution guaranteed the 
freedom of association in equal wording as article 12.1 of the EU Charter 
does, (ii) article II-88 arranged the right to collective bargaining in the same 
wording as article 28 of the EU Charter, and (iii) articles II-88 and II-112 of 
the European Constitution dealt with the right to collective action the same 
way as articles 28 and 52 of the EU Charter do. As is known, the European 
Constitution was not ratified by France and the Netherlands due to the “no” 
votes of their citizens. during the meeting of the European Council of 21 and 
914  European Court of justice, 18 december 2007, C-341/05, LavalSvenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, paragraph 91. 
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22 june 2007 in Brussels, it became clear that the European Constitution will 
not be ratified.915 
This, however, was not the end of the legislative implementation of 
fundamental rights at EU level. Instead of the ratification of the European 
Constitution, the Member States seemed inclined to recognise fundamental 
freedoms in another way during the aforementioned Brussels meeting. They 
agreed on a precise mandate for an Intergovernmental Conference to finalise 
a Reform Treaty, aiming to change parts of the Treaty on European Union 
and the EC Treaty. These changes were indeed agreed on during the Lisbon 
informal European Council of 18 and 19 October 2007. The Treaty of Lisbon 
was subsequently signed on 13 december 2007.916
The Treaty of Lisbon formally introduces fundamental rights and freedoms 
in Community law.917 With that in mind, the EU Charter was executed by 
the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council on 12 december 
2007 in order to give it legally binding force.918 The EU Charter will have 
the same value as the Treaties. Furthermore, the Union shall accede to the 
Convention. This is all set out in the new article 6 of the Treaty on European 
Union, which can be found in the Treaty of Lisbon:919
1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of 7 december 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 
december 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. 
 The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of 
the Union as defined in the Treaties. 
 The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in 
accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing 
915  Presidency Conclusions to the Brussels European Council 21/22 june 2007 
(11177/07), page 15. 
916  For the chronological order of events, reference is made to www.euramis.net/
institutional_reform /chronology/ index_en.htm.
917  Although the Treaty of Lisbon does not refer to the word “constitution”, it is 
in fact very close to one. See R. Barents, De Europese Gronwet is dood – Leve de 
Europese Grondwet, [The European Constitution is dead – Long live the European 
Constitution], Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht, 2007/9, pages 174 – 
184.
918  Oj C 303, 14 december 2007, pages 1 – 16.
919  Oj C 306, 17 december 2007, pages 1 – 271.
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its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations 
referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.
2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of 
human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect 
the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union’s law.
The consequence of the above is that the institutions of the Union must respect 
the rights established in the Charter and the Convention. That also means that 
the freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and the right to 
strike become Community rights. The same obligations will be incumbent 
upon the Member States when they implement the Union’s legislation.920 The 
Court of justice would, in turn, ensure that the EU Charter and Convention 
are applied correctly.921 This sounds good for European fundamental rights, 
perhaps even too good to be true. And so it seems. 
The protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom (in the consolidated 
version protocol 30) restricts the above analysis with regard to Poland and the 
United Kingdom. Pursuant to articles 1 and 2 of said Protocol, the Charter 
does not extend the ability of the European Court of justice, or any court or 
tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom in fact, to find that the laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or of 
the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms 
and principles that are reaffirmed in the Charter. In particular nothing in 
Title IV of the Charter (which title includes the right to collective bargaining 
and to collective action) creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or 
the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has 
provided for such rights in its national law. To the extent that a provision 
of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, it shall only apply to 
Poland or the United Kingdom to the extent that the rights or principles that 
920  Which follows from article 51 of the EU Charter and established case law, as set 
out in Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, pages 337 – 349. 
921  Reference is made to: Questions and Answers on the Treaty of Lisbon, as can be 
found on http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/faq/index_en.htm. 
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it contains are recognised in the law or practices of Poland or of the United 
Kingdom.
This protocol was to be expected following the Presidency Conclusions to 
the Brussels European Council. At that time, two delegations – Ireland and 
Poland – reserved their right to join the then proposed changes.922 The United 
Kingdom also made clear it was not willing to fully cope with the suggested 
change. The United Kingdom, in particular, fears the recognition of the 
right to strike.923 Poland and the United Kingdom, therefore, insisted on the 
conclusion of the protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom.
But even without this protocol, the impact of the EU Charter, in particular 
in respect of the right to strike, remains somewhat limited. Besides the EU 
Charter itself, explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
have been published at EU level.924 The EU Charter recognises the right to 
strike, but at the same time permits the restriction of this right “in accordance 
with Community law and national laws and practices”. depending on the 
interpretation of this restriction, it may give the Member States ample of room 
to limit the right to strike. That this restriction is to be interpreted broadly, 
was made clear in the explanatory notes accompanying the EU Charter: “the 
modalities and limits for the exercise of collective action, including strike 
action, come under national laws and practices, including the question of 
whether it may be carried out in parallel in Several Member States”.925 
This apparently was not comfort enough for some Member States. An official 
declaration concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union made clear that, although the Charter has legally binding force, it 
“does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers 
of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify 
powers and tasks as defined by the Treaties”.926
922  Presidency Conclusions to the Brussels European Council 21/22 june 2007, page 
25, footnotes 17 and 20, and the article “Ireland and Poland get ‘opt-out’ on EU 
rights Charter”, as published on the EUobserver on 26 june 2007.
923  See the above-mentioned article “Ireland and Poland get ‘opt-out’ on EU rights 
Charter”.
924  Oj C 303, 14 december 2007, pages 17 - 35.
925  Explanatory notes regarding article 28 of the EU Charter.
926  declarations concerning provisions of the Treaties, Oj C 115, 9 May 2008, page 
337.
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In addition to the above, the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon – and with 
that, the accession to the Convention – is uncertain. In order to enter into 
force, the Treaty of Lisbon has to be ratified by all twenty-seven Member 
States. Each individual Member State has to decide whether, according to its 
own constitutional rules, ratification will be through a referendum or through 
a parliamentary vote. The original goal was that the Treaty, once ratified, 
would come into force by 1 january 2009, to allow its provisions to apply 
before the European Parliament elections in june 2009. Ireland opted for a 
referendum on the question whether or not to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon. The 
outcome of the referendum was negative. Consequently, it is at this moment 
far from clear whether the Treaty of Lisbon will be ratified and enter into 
force (without amendments being made) in the end. The European Council 
needed time to analyse the situation.927
In summary, the current status is that the EU Charter is executed at EU 
level, respecting the three classical rights with regard to the conclusion of 
collective labour agreements. The EU institutions must therefore abide by 
these classical rights. The same obligations will apply to the Member States 
when they implement the Union’s legislation, with the notable exception of 
the United Kingdom and Poland due to the protocol on the application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the 
United Kingdom. The explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights make clear that the right to strike can be limited rather extensively by 
laws and practices at national level. Whether the EU will in fact accede to the 
Convention remains to be seen, as the Treaty of Lisbon is not yet ratified.
6. The reach of the social partners in Community perspective
Within national laws, social partners are confined to specific national 
boundaries such as mandatory law, equal treatment rules etc. Social partners 
are therefore, as any participant in legal interaction, limited by the law. 
Within Europe, there are a number of rights, freedoms and prohibitions 
that could possibly limit the “free” exercise of collective labour law. The 
European court already had to rule on the position of collective labour law 
in the light of competition (section 6.1), equal treatment (section 6.2) and the 
market freedoms (section 6.3). Without aiming to be complete, these possible 
restrictions on the social partners when exercising their collective rights in the 
Community will be discussed.
927  Reference is made to the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European 
Council, 19/20 june 2008, 11018/08, page 1.
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6.1 Collective labour law versus free competition
An inherent part, if  not an explicit goal, of collective bargaining is to 
limit competition between the different companies that participate in that 
agreement. Collective labour agreements set minimum and sometimes even 
maximum standards. This elimination of a part of the free competition has 
even more impact if  the collective labour agreements are extended, which 
is practice in many Member States.928 It is therefore not surprising that the 
content of a collective labour agreement can clash with the Community rules 
on free competition. In the end, the Community strives pursuant to article 3.1 
under g of the EC Treaty for a system ensuring that the competition in the 
internal market is not distorted. Furthermore, article 81.1 of the EC Treaty 
prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may effect trade between Member 
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the common market.929
 
It therefore makes sense that the European Court of justice had to decide 
on the validity of extended collective labour agreements in specific branches, 
which it did for the first time in three separate cases.930 These extended 
collective labour agreements obliged all employers falling within its scope of 
applicability (being all employers active in a specific sector) to participate in 
a sectoral, compulsory pension scheme. The three companies opposing these 
collective labour agreements argued that the extension of these agreements 
violated the Community’s rules on freedom of competition.
The European Court of justice noted that the activities of the Community 
not only included a “system ensuring that competition in the internal market 
is not distorted” (article 3.1 under g of the EC Treaty) but also “a policy in 
the social sphere” (article 3.1 under j of the EC Treaty).931 The importance of 
a high level of employment and social protection was stressed by the Court. 
It subsequently noted that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in 
collective agreements. The social policy objectives that are pursued by such 
agreements would be undermined if  the social partners were subject to the 
928  See chapter 13, section 9.
929  See on this M.S. Wirtz, Collisie tussen CAO’s en mededingsingsrecht.
930  The three decisions of the European Court of justice on 21 September 1999, in the 
cases C-67/96, Albany, joined cases C-115/97, C-116/97 and C-117/97, Brentjens 
and C-219/97, Drijvende Bokken. hereinafter, I will only quote from the Albany 
case, as that was the first case brought before the European Court of justice. The 
other two cases are materially the same. 
931  Paragraph 54 of the Albany case.
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norms of article 81 of the EC Treaty, should they seek to improve working 
and employment conditions in a collective labour agreement.932 The European 
Court of justice concluded:933
It therefore follows from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a 
whole which is both effective and consistent that agreements concluded in the 
context of collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of 
such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling 
outside the scope of article 85(1) [the current article 81.1; author] of the Treaty.
In other words, the social partners have considerable room to manoeuvre 
when negotiating a collective labour agreement in pursuit of social policy 
objectives.934 They are in such case not hindered by European competition 
rules.935
6.2 Collective labour law versus equal treatment
European law plays an important role when it comes to equal treatment 
legislation. Or, as Barnard puts it: “the quest for equality – and in particular 
sex equality – has been the central and most highly developed pillar of the 
European Union’s social policy”.936 Many European instruments prohibit 
different forms of discrimination. 
The traditional core stipulation on equality law is set out in the current article 
141 of the EC Treaty. This article aims to ensure that the principle of equal 
pay for male and female workers for equal work is applied. The same holds 
true for article 3.2 of the EC Treaty. The impact of the principle of equal pay 
showed clearly in the cases Defrenne. 
The European Court of justice held in the second Defrenne case937 that article 
119 (the current article 141) of the EC Treaty has a double aim: undertakings 
in a Member State that already had implemented equal treatment laws should 
932  Paragraph 59 of the Albany case.
933  Paragraph 60 of the Albany case.
934  See on this ruling and its implications: M.S. Wirtz, Collisie tussen CAO’s en 
mededingsingsrecht, pages 188 ff.
935  This rule has been confirmed later on in, for example, European Court of justice, 
12 September 2000, joined cases C-180/98 – C184/98, Pavlov and European Court 
of justice, 21 September 2000, C-222/98, Van der Woude.
936  C. Barnard, EC Employment law, page 297.
937  European Court of justice, 8 April 1976, C-43/75, Defrenne/Sabena.
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on the one hand not suffer a competitive disadvantage when compared with 
undertakings in Member States that had not implemented such laws and 
on the other hand this provision forms part of the social objectives of the 
Community. This double aim shows, according to the Court, that the principle 
of equal pay forms part of the foundations of the Community.938 Moreover, 
the Court ruled that article 119 of the EC Treaty has a direct, horizontal effect. 
Consequently, this article directly affects (collective) labour agreements. The 
court summarised this as follows:939
(…) the principle of equal pay contained in article 119 may be relied upon before 
the national courts and that these courts have a duty to ensure the protection of 
the rights which this provision vests in individuals, in particular as regards those 
types of discrimination arising directly from legislative provisions or collective 
labour agreements, as well as in cases in which men an women receive unequal pay 
for equal work which is carried out in the same establishment of service, whether 
private or public.
In the third Defrenne case the Court even ruled that the elimination of 
discrimination based on sex forms a fundamental human right.940 The 
European social partners should therefore abide this principle, which is set 
out in more detail in multiple directives.941 Besides sex discrimination, article 
13 of the EC Treaty entitles the Council to take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation. This article is used as a basis for a number of anti-
discrimination directives.942
As a mere example of the relevance of equal treatment law in relation to 
collective labour agreements, reference is made to the ruling of the European 
938  Paragraph 12.
939  Paragraph 40.
940  European Court of justice, 15 june 1978, C-149/77, Defrenne/Sabena, paragraphs 
26 and 27.
941  To name a few: directive 75/111/EEC on equal pay for male and female workers, 
Oj 1975 L 45, pages 19 and 20; directive 76/207/EEC on equal treatment with 
regard to access to employment, vocational training, promotion and working 
conditions, Oj 1976 L 39, pages 40 – 42; and directive 79/7/EEC on the progressive 
implementation of equal treatment with regard to statutory social security schemes, 
Oj 1979, L 6, pages 24 and 25.
942  See for example: directive 2000/43/EC on equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Oj 2000 L 180, pages 22 – 26; and directive 
2000/78/EC on equal treatment in employment and occupation, Oj 2000 L 303, 
pages 16 – 22.
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Court of justice in the case Krüger.943 Ms Krüger was employed full-time by 
a German hospital as a nurse. her employment relationship was governed by 
a collective agreement for public sector employees. The collective agreement 
arranged, among other things, for an end-of-year bonus. At one stage, Ms 
Krüger switched from her full-time employment into a small part-time 
employment (“minor employment”). Subsequently, she lost her entitlement 
to the bonus, as minor employment workers did not fall within the scope of 
applicability of the collective agreement. Ms Krüger took the opinion that 
this constituted indirect sex discrimination. The European Court of justice 
ruled as follows:944
 
The exclusion of persons in minor employment from a collective agreement 
providing for the grant of a special annual bonus constitutes treatment which is 
different from that for full-time workers. If  the national court, which alone has 
jurisdiction to assess the facts, were to find that that exclusion, although it applies 
independently of the sex of the worker, actually affects a considerably higher 
percentage of women than men, it would have to conclude that the collective 
agreement concerned constitutes indirect discrimination within the meaning of 
Article 119 of the Treaty. 
Given the above, collective labour agreements may very well clash with 
European equality law.
6.3  Collective labour law versus market freedoms
Free movement of goods, persons, capital and services – the so-called market 
freedoms – are corner-stones of the European Community.945 They have 
enhanced the European integration to quite an extent. One of their effects is 
that they make it easier for companies to move from one part of the EU to 
another, while still providing services throughout the entire Union.
The market freedoms are directly effective. In other words: these rights may 
directly be enforced by individuals vis-à-vis the Member States.946 This was 
first held with regard to the free movement of persons, as set out in article 
39 of the EC Treaty. The European Court of justice ruled in the beginning 
943  European Court of justice, 9 September 1999, C-281/97, Krüger/Kreiskrankenhaus.
944  Paragraph 26.
945  T. Blanke, The Viking Case 1, page 36.
946  direct effect of articles of the EC Treaty was recognised for the first time 
in: European Court of justice, 5 February 1963, C-26/62, Van Gend & Loos/
Netherlands Inland Revenue.
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of 1974 that the first two subparagraphs of this article imposed a sufficiently 
precise obligation to confer direct effect.947 Later that year the European 
Court of justice also recognised the direct effect of the right of establishment 
(article 43 of the EC Treaty)948 and the freedom to provide services (article 49 
of the EC Treaty).949 In 1977 the European Court of justice ruled that the free 
movement of goods (articles 28 and 29 EC Treaty) also has direct effect.950 
Besides having direct effect as against the state (vertical direct effect), at least 
some freedoms have direct effect against private bodies as well (horizontal 
direct effect). The European Court of justice already ruled on 12 december 
1974 that not only states, but also non-public actors must abide by the rules 
of equal treatment with regard to nationality when regulating in a collective 
manner gainful employment and the provisions of services. According to the 
European Court of justice, the abolition between Member States of obstacles 
to freedom of movement for persons and to freedom to provide services 
would be compromised if  the abolition of barriers of national origin could be 
neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by 
associations or organisations which do not come under public law.951 Articles 
39 and 49 of the current EC Treaty thus also apply to private associations 
or organisations that collectively regulate employment and the provisions of 
services. The same applies to article 43 of the EC Treaty, as will be discussed 
separately in section 6.3.1.2. It also became apparent that individual employees 
may call upon article 39 of the EC Treaty directly vis-à-vis their employer (not 
being an association or organisation collectively drafting regulations).952 It is 
not certain whether horizontal direct effect applies to all freedoms.953
947  European Court of justice, 4 April 1974, C-167/73, Commission/France, as 
confirmed in European Court of justice, 4 december 1974, C-41/74, Van Duyn/
Home Office.
948  European Court of justice, 21 june 1974, C-2/74, Reyners/Belgian State.
949  European Court of justice, 3 december 1974, C-33/74, Van Binsbergen/Bestuur van 
de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de metaalnijverheid.
950  European Court of justice, 22 March 1977, C-74/76, Iannelli/Meroni, as confirmed 
in European Court of justice, 5 April 1984, C-177/82, Van de Haar.
951  European Court of justice, 12 december 1974, C-36/74, Walrave and Koch. 
952  European Court of justice, 6 june 2000, C-281/98, Angonese/Cassa di Risparmio di 
Bolzano.
953  C. Barnard, EC Employment law, page 180. Advocate-General Poiares Maduro 
is inclined to award a limited horizontal effect to the freedom of movement. See 
his opinion of 23 May 2007, in case C-438/05, Viking, paragraphs 31 ff. This line 
of reasoning, although less detailed, has been followed by the European Court of 
justice in the Viking case paragraphs 33 – 37. 
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just like the rules on free competition, the market freedoms have a potential 
to clash with (collective) employment law.954 As will be set out below, this 
already happened in the past.
6.3.1 Free movement of persons
Free movement of persons encompasses (i) the freedom of movement of 
workers and (ii) the right of establishment.
6.3.1.1 Freedom of movement of workers955
Article 39 of the EC Treaty guarantees the freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community. That freedom entails the abolition of any 
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States 
as regards to employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and 
employment. Pursuant to article 39.3, this freedom entails the right, subject 
to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health: (a) to accept offers of employment actually made; (b) to move freely 
within the territory of Member States for this purpose; (c) to stay in a Member 
State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions 
governing the employment of nationals of that State set out by law, regulation 
or administrative action; and (d) to remain in the territory of a Member 
State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which 
shall be embodied in implementing regulations. Article 39 does, pursuant to 
subparagraph 4, not apply to employment in the public service.
This freedom of movement of workers has been called upon on several 
occasions in the past with regard to employment. It has been ruled, for 
example, that employees deriving from one Member State may not be 
hindered within the territory of another Member State to pick up an activity 
as an employed person.956 Such a hindrance may also derive from a collective 
labour agreement, as the following case shows. A clause in a German collective 
954  This is since long recognised. See for example S. Clauwaert, International / 
transnational primary and secondary collective action, an overview of international, 
European and national legislation, page 14, on the relation between right to strike 
and the freedom of movement.
955  For a general overview of the freedom of movement of workers, reference is made 
to Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, chapter 17; and 
Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, part 5 of chapter VII. 
956  See European Court of justice, 15 december 1995, C-415/93, Union royale belge des 
sociétés de football association/Bosman. 
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agreement providing for a salary rise on grounds of seniority for employees of 
that service after a certain period of employment without taking any account 
of previous periods of comparable employment completed in the public 
service of another Member State was held to manifestly work to the detriment 
of migrant workers who have spent part of their careers in the public service 
of another Member State.957 This clause violated article 39 of the EC Treaty.
The 2004 directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 
further establishes, among other things, the freedom of movement of EU 
citizens.958 These EU citizens, who are also workers, are pursuant to article 7.1 
free to reside in any Member State for a period longer than three months. This 
right also extends to family members.
6.3.1.2 The right of establishment959
Article 43 of the EC Treaty prohibits restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another 
Member State. Establishment is defined as “the actual pursuit of an 
economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State 
for an indefinite period”.960 The aforementioned prohibition also applies to 
restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals 
of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State. The 
freedom of establishment includes the right to take up and pursue activities 
as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings under the 
conditions set out for its own nationals by the law of the country where such 
an establishment is effected. This article 43 of the EC Treaty does not only 
prohibit the host country to restrict the establishment of non-nationals and 
non-national undertakings, but equally prohibits the Member State of origin 
to prevent its nationals and undertakings from establishing themselves in 
another Member State.961 
957  European Court of justice, 15 january 1998, C-15/96, Kalliope Schöning-
Kougebetopoulou/ Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg.
958  directive 2004/38/EC, Oj L 158, 30 April 2004, pages 77 - 123.
959  For a general overview of the freedom of establishment, reference is made to Craig 
and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, chapter 18; and Kapteyn and 
VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities, part 
6 of chapter VII. 
960  European Court of justice, 25 july 1991, C-221/89, The Queen / Secretary of State 
for Transport, paragraph 20.
961  European Court of justice, 27 September 1988, C-81/87, The Queen / H. M. Treasury 
and Commissioners of Inland Revenue.
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The right of establishment has played a relatively marginal role in the past in 
relation to employment law. It was invoked, for example, to counter an Italian 
law stipulating that only private security firms holding Italian nationality were 
allowed to carry out private security work in respect of movable property and 
buildings. This law was held to (also) violate article 43 of the EC Treaty.962 
Recently, this stipulation played an important role in the Viking case.963 This 
is the first decision of the European Court of justice that dealt on the relation 
between the right to strike and the market freedoms.964 
Viking Line, a Finnish passenger shipping company, operates a ferry named 
Rosella between Finland and Estonia. Rosella sails the Finnish flag and has 
a predominantly Finnish crew. A collective labour agreement concluded with 
the Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) applies to this crew. The Rosella has been 
operating at a loss, being in competition with Estonia-flagged vessels on the 
same route between Finland and Estonia. Viking Line intended to re-flag 
the Rosella and register the vessel in Estonia, with an aim of entering into 
a (cheaper) collective labour agreement with an Estonian trade union and 
applying Estonian law on the employment agreements of the crew working on 
the Rosella. The FSU was opposed to the proposal to re-flag the Rosella. The 
FSU asked the assistance of the International Transport Workers’ Federation 
(ITF), a federation of 600 transport workers’ unions in 140 countries. The ITF 
has a policy of coordinating the national unions so as to promote a certain 
level of rights for seafarers. In this matter, the ITF issued a circular, in which 
it called upon its members not to enter into negotiations with Viking Line, in 
result precluding Viking Line to circumvent the FSU and deal directly with an 
Estonian union. The FSU forced Viking Line into concluding a subsequent 
collective labour agreement by threatening industrial action, an agreement 
in which Viking Line agreed not to commence re-flagging. The collective 
labour agreement expired in February 2008. In the meantime the ITF did 
not withdraw its circular. Viking Line started proceedings in England against 
ITF (having its head quarters in London) and FSU, in order to prevent these 
organisations from taking any action to stop the re-flagging of the Rosella. 
In the first instance, the claims of Viking Line were granted. The Court of 
Appeal, however, referred 10 questions to the European Court of justice. 
In essence, these questions relate to the right to collective actions versus the 
right of freedom of establishment. The first question seeks to clarify whether 
collective actions fall within the scope of reach of article 43 of the EC Treaty 
962  European Court of justice, 31 May 2001, C-283/99, Commission/Italy.
963  European Court of justice, C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation 
and Finnish Seamen’s union / Viking Line.
964  T. Blanke, The Viking Case 1, page 46.
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(right of establishment), or whether such actions are exempted from that 
reach (by analogy of the European Court of justice’s reasoning in the Albany 
case). The second, related, question is whether this right of establishment has 
a horizontal direct effect, as a consequence whereof it would apply between 
private undertakings. The third, fourth and fifth questions basically try to 
establish whether the policy and actions applied by the trade unions in this 
case violate article 43 of the EC Treaty. The sixth question intends, among 
other things, to establish whether the threatened or actual collective actions 
undertaken by a trade union or association of trade unions violate the freedom 
to provide services.965 The last questions basically concern – should the 
collective actions not be exempted from the aforementioned market freedoms 
– the possible justification of the violation of these freedoms. In other words, 
can the right to collective action prevail over these freedoms? 
The first question
There are reasons to argue that collective actions have to be exempted from 
the reach of article 43 of the EC Treaty, just as collective labour agreements 
have been exempted from the reach of competition law in the Albany case. 
Collective actions may be the trigger for companies to enter into collective 
labour agreements. Collective actions and collective labour agreements are 
therefore closely linked to each other. Not exempting collective actions from 
the reach of the market freedoms could deprive the ruling given in the Albany 
case some of its effects, because limiting the right to collective action limits the 
possibilities to enter into collective labour agreements.966 The European Court, 
following Advocate-General Poiares Maduro’s opinion, ruled differently. It 
stated that the right to collective action, including the right to strike, must be 
recognised as a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general 
principles of Community law. Still, the exercise of this right may be subject 
to restrictions. It does not fall outside the scope of the provisions of the EC 
Treaty. This matter cannot be compared to the Albany case, as restrictions in 
competition are inherent in collective labour agreements, whereas restrictions 
965  The European Court of justice ruled that this question can only arise after the 
re-flagging of the Rosalla. Therefore, as on the date on which the questions were 
referred to the Court this vessel had not yet been re-flagged, the question was 
hypothetical. Consequently, the question was inadmissible. European Court of 
justice, paragraph 30.
966  F. dorssemont, (25 jaar) Belgisch Stakingsrecht, (Enkele) Europese Perspectieven 
[(25 years of) Belgian Law on Strikes, (Some) European perspectives], in: C. deVos 
and P. humblet, Arbeid vs. Kapitaal, een kwart eeuw stakingsrecht [Labour vs. 
Capital, a quarter of a century of law on strikes], Academia Press, Gent, 2007, page 
170.
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in freedom of establishment are not inherent in the right to strike. Moreover, 
the Court already ruled in previous cases that the exercise of fundamental 
rights does not fall outside the scope of the EC Treaty. It considered that such 
exercise must be reconciled with the requirements relating to rights protected 
under the Treaty and in accordance with the principle of proportionality. 
This is evidenced by the Schmidberger case and the Omega case.967 Finally 
the Court noted that the submission that the Community has no competence 
in the field of strike due to article 137.5 of the EC Treaty, for which reason 
the right to strike is solely a national affair, does not change this. Even if  that 
submission would hold true, Member States must, according to the Court, 
still comply with Community law. In summary, the fundamental nature of 
the right to take collective action is not such as to render article 43 of the EC 
Treaty inapplicable to the collective action at issue.
The second question
With regard to the possible horizontal effects of market freedoms, the Court 
already ruled in the past that “non-State actors” may distort the proper 
functioning of the common market (see the cases Commission/France and 
Schmidberger, which will be discussed in section 6.3.2 below). The question is 
whether this also applies to the FSU and the ITF in relation to article 43 of the 
EC Treaty. It took Poiares Maduro several steps to conclude that the actions 
of the FSU and the ITF, taken together, are capable of effectively restricting 
the exercise of the right to freedom of establishment of an undertaking 
such as Viking, for which reason article 43 of the EC Treaty applies to this 
matter. The European Court arrived at the same conclusion with fewer words. 
The fact that certain provisions of the EC Treaty are formally addressed to 
the Member States does, according to the Court, not prevent rights from 
being conferred at the same time to any individual who has an interest in 
compliance with the obligations thus laid down. Furthermore, the prohibition 
on prejudicing a fundamental freedom laid down in a mandatory provision 
of the EC Treaty applies in particular to all agreements intended to regulate 
paid labour collectively. The collective action taken by FSU and ITF is aimed 
at the conclusion of an agreement which is meant to regulate the work of 
Viking’s employees collectively. It follows that article 43 of the EC Treaty 
must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those in this 
967  Which will be discussed in section 6.3.2 below. 
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matter, it may be relied on by a private undertaking against a trade union or 
an association of trade unions.968
The third to tenth questions
After it had ruled that article 43 of the EC Treaty applies directly to the case at 
hand, the European Court had to establish whether there is any existence of a 
restriction of freedom of establishment. According to the Court, (i) it cannot 
be disputed that collective action such as that envisaged by FSU has the effect 
of interfering with Viking’s exercise of its right to freedom of establishment, 
while (ii) the collective action taken in order to implement ITF’s policy of 
combating the use of flags of convenience, which seeks to prevent shipowners 
from registering their vessels in a State other than that of which the beneficial 
owners of those vessels are nationals, must be considered to be at least liable 
to restrict Viking’s exercise of its right of freedom of establishment. 
But is there any justification for limiting Viking’s right? The Court noted that a 
restriction on freedom of establishment can be justified by overriding reasons 
of public interest, provided that it is established that the restriction is suitable 
for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and must not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to attain that objective. The right to take collective 
action for the protection of workers is such a legitimate interest. 
With regard to the action of FSU, the Court stated that, at first sight, it can 
reasonably be regarded as to protect the workers. however, this view would 
no longer be tenable if  it were established that the jobs or conditions of 
employment at issue were not jeopardised or under serious threat. The latter 
would be the case if  (the parent company of) Viking would have promised in 
a legally binding fashion that the reflagging will not lead to the loss of jobs or 
to the deterioration of employment conditions. Whether that has been done, 
is something for the national court to establish. If  the action is protecting jobs 
or employment conditions that are threatened, it must be ascertained whether 
the collective action initiated by FSU is suitable for ensuring the achievement 
of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain 
that objective. Again, this is for the national court to decide. Poiares Maduro 
also considered that alleviating adverse consequences that the re-flagging of 
968  These considerations have been criticised. FSU wanted to enter into a collective 
labour agreement with Viking that would only bind Viking (and not any others). 
Is that truly a regulation that collectively arranges pay that is relevant for the 
enjoyment of the freedom of establishment? Van Peijpe, for one, argues it is not.  
T. van Peijpe, De arresten Laval en Viking en hun gevolgen [The cases Laval and 
Viking and their consequences], Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid 2008-4, page 178.
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the Rosella will have on its current crew, is a legitimate restriction of the right 
of establishment of an undertaking.
With regard to the collective action of ITF, seeking to ensure the 
implementation of its aforementioned policy of combating the use of flags of 
convenience, the Court ruled as follows. To the extent that said policy results 
in shipowners being prevented from registering their vessels in a State other 
than that of which the beneficial owners of those vessels are nationals, the 
restrictions on freedom of establishment resulting from such action cannot be 
objectively justified. Nevertheless, the objective of that policy is also to protect 
and improve seafarers’ terms and conditions of employment. however, ITF 
is required to automatically initiate solidarity action against the beneficial 
owner of a vessel which is registered in a State other than that of which that 
owner is a national, irrespective of whether or not that owner’s exercise of 
its right of freedom of establishment is liable to have a harmful effect on the 
work or conditions of employment of its employees. Therefore, the policy of 
reserving the right of collective negotiations to trade unions of the State of 
which the beneficial owner of a vessel is a national is also applicable where the 
vessel is registered in a State which guarantees workers a higher level of social 
protection than they would enjoy in the first State. Would the ITF in such a 
case still enter into a collective action, this action would be unlawful. 
With regard to the above, Poiares Maduro noted that, if  ITF’s policy is 
operated on the basis of an obligation imposed on all national unions to 
support collective action by any of their fellow unions, it could lead to abuse 
and in effect violate Community law. If, by contrast, national unions were 
free to choose in a given situation whether or not to participate in collective 
action, then the danger of discriminatory abuse of a coordinated policy would 
be prevented, and Community law would in principle not be violated.
Conclusions 
The above gives rise to the following conclusions. The right to collective action 
is a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles 
of Community law the observance of which the Court ensures. This right 
may even justify a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, 
even under the fundamental right of establishment. The right to collective 
action, however, is not excluded from the scope of article 43 of the EC Treaty, 
an article that is capable of conferring rights on a private undertaking which 
may be relied on against a trade union or an association of trade unions. 
The exercise of the right to collective action which seeks to induce a private 
undertaking (whose registered office is in a Member State) to enter into a 
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collective agreement with a trade union established in that State and to apply 
the terms set out in that agreement to the employees of a subsidiary of that 
undertaking established in another Member State, constitutes a restriction 
of article 43 of the EC Treaty. That restriction may, in principle, be justified 
by an overriding reason of public interest, such as the protection of workers, 
provided that it is established that the restriction is suitable for ensuring the 
attainment of the legitimate objective pursued and does not go beyond what 
is necessary to achieve that objective.969
6.3.2 Free movement of goods970
Free movement of goods is set out in articles 23 ff of  the EC Treaty. Given 
article 23, the Community is based upon a customs union which covers all 
trade in goods and which involves the prohibition between Member States of 
customs duties on imports and exports (and of all charges having equivalent 
effect). Articles 28 and 29 of the EC Treaty prohibit quantitative restrictions 
on imports and exports between Member States.
The fact that free movement of goods may clash with other rights or interests is 
not new. Past clashes that made it to the European Court of justice concerned 
fundamental rights that were not connected with collective employment law, 
but very well could have been. Two cases are are a good example hereof.
The first case concerned acts committed by French individuals and action 
groups against fruits and vegetables from other Member States.971 These 
fruits and vegetables were destroyed by French Farmers during transport into 
France, and even when they were at display in shops in France. The French 
farmers concerned insisted on French agricultural products in the shops and 
on fixed minimum prices. The French government hardly intervened. The 
Commission took the view that the French authorities, by failing to take 
adequate measures in order to prevent the free movement of agricultural 
969  See on these conclusions B. Bercusson, Implementation and monitoring of cross-
border agreements: The potential role of cross-border collective industrial action, in: 
K. Papadakis, Cross-Border Social Dialogue and Agreements: An emerging global 
industrial relations framework?, International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 2008, 
pages 151 ff.
970  For a general overview of the free movement of goods, reference is made to Craig 
and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, chapters 14 and 15; and 
Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, parts 2 and 3 of chapter VII. 
971  European Court of justice, 9 december 1997, C-265/95, Commission/French 
Republic.
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products being obstructed, had failed to comply with its obligations under 
the common organisations of the markets in agricultural products and the 
then article 30 of the EC Treaty (the current article 28 of the EC Treaty). The 
European Court of justice subscribed to this point of view and held France 
in violation.
The second case concerned a demonstration by environmentalists in Austria, 
blocking the Brenner motorway for 30 consecutive hours.972 This demonstration 
was carefully planned and executed with the proper governmental permits. 
The government did not want to withhold its consent, as that would, in 
its opinion, violate the protesters’ freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly. As a result of the demonstration (and other restrictions of national 
legislation on heavy traffic on bank holidays and during weekends) the 
German transport company Schmidberger claimed that five of its lorries were 
unable to use the Brenner motorway for 4 consecutive days. As the Brenner 
motorway is needed for overland transportation of goods between Germany 
and Italy, Schmidberger claimed that the Austrian government violated the 
free movement of goods by allowing the demonstration to take place. The 
European Court of justice ruled that not banning a demonstration resulting 
in a complete closure of a major transit route such as the Brenner motorway 
is capable of restricting intra-Community trade in goods and is therefore 
incompatible with the Community law obligations on free movement of 
goods, unless the failure to ban can be objectively justified. 973 In that regard 
the Court noted that the reason not to ban the demonstration was inspired by 
the aforementioned fundamental rights of the demonstrators. That raises the 
question whether the principle of free movement of goods prevails over these 
fundamental rights. The Court noted that fundamental rights form an integral 
part of the general principles of law which observance the Court ensures. The 
Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common in the 
Member States and from guidelines supplied by international human rights 
treaties, particularly from guidelines from the Convention.974 Measures that are 
incompatible with observance of the human rights recognised by the European 
972  European Court of justice, 12 june 2003, C-112/00, Schmidberger. The decision 
was confirmed by European Court of justice, 14 October 2004, C-36/02, OMEGA/
Bonn.
973  Paragraph 64 of the Schmidberger case.
974  Paragraph 71 of the Schmidberger case.
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Court of justice, are not acceptable in the Community.975 The human rights 
can, in principle, justify a restriction of the fundamental freedoms of the EC 
Treaty. As neither the freedom of expression nor the freedom of assembly are 
absolute and must always be viewed in relation to their social purposes, these 
rights should be balanced against the freedom of movement of goods. Given 
(i) the authorisation of the demonstration, (ii) the fact it concerned a single 
demonstration on one route, (iii) the indisputable exercise of fundamental 
rights of the demonstrators, (iv) the measures that were taken to limit the 
disruption, (v) the lack of a general climate of insecurity accompanying the 
action, and (vi) the impossibility to impose stricter rules on the demonstrators 
while not losing the effect of the demonstration, the Austrian government 
had not violated (the then applicable) articles 30 and 34, in conjunction with 
article 5 of the EC Treaty.976 
It is clear that these cases are not related to collective employment law. Still, 
the actions as described in these cases could, to some extent, have been a 
part of collective actions. In other words, this “freedom” of the European 
Community could clash with the right to collective action. This possibility was 
explicitly taken into account when drafting the Regulation on the functioning 
of the internal market in relation to the free movement of goods among the 
Member States.977 Article 2 and recital 4 hereof state: “this regulation may 
not be interpreted as affecting in any way the exercise of fundamental rights 
as recognised in Member States, including the right or freedom to strike”. 
This line of arguing – the right or freedom to strike is exempted from the 
scope of the regulation – is closely connected to the Albany case, in which 
collective bargaining was exempted from competition law. It is not so much 
975  This seems to imply that human rights prevail over fundamental Community 
rights. however, the European Court of justice subsequently balances the rights. 
Apparently, there is no automatic prevailence of human rights over fundamental 
Community freedoms. See F. dorssemont, ‘Met de vlam in de pijp…’. Vrijheid van 
vergadering en meningsuiting, recht op collectieve actie versus vrij verkeer: primaat 
of belangenafweging, page 82. One can even argue that fundamental Community 
freedoms in principle prevail over human rights. In the Viking and Laval cases, for 
instance, the Community freedoms are taken as a basis and the Court subsequently 
assessed whether these freedoms may be restricted by human rights. The test 
could also have been performed the other away around, taking the human rights 
as a basis and subsequently assessing whether these rights may be restricted 
by Community freedoms. The European Court of justice did not do the latter, 
therefore ranking the Community freedoms higher than the human rights. T. van 
Peijpe, De arresten Laval en Viking en hun gevolgen, page 185.
976  See on this case also: B.j. drijber, Botsende vrijheden op de Brenner [Colliding 
freedoms on the Brenner], Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht, 2003/9, 
pages 229 ff.
977  Regulation 2679/98, Oj L 337, 12 december 1998, pages 8 and 9.
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in line with the Schmidberger case, which balanced the freedom of expression 
and freedom of assembly on one hand with the free movement of goods on 
the other.
6.3.3 Free movement of capital and services978
The free movement of capital and services can be discussed together. Both 
freedoms make it possible for employers to perform cross-jurisdiction work 
within the EU. Article 56 of the EC Treaty prohibits all restrictions on the 
movement of capital and on payments between Member States and between 
Member States and third countries. Article 49 of the EC Treaty prohibits 
restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community in 
respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the 
Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended. 
Services shall, pursuant to article 50 of the EC Treaty, be considered to be 
“services” within the meaning of the Treaty where they are normally provided 
for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating 
to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons. They include: (a) 
activities of an industrial character; (b) activities of a commercial character; 
(c) activities of craftsmen; and (d) activities of the professions. The person 
providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his activity 
in the State where the service is provided, under the same conditions as are 
imposed by that State on its own nationals. Principally the freedom of services 
has given rise to case law in the field of employment law.979 Two examples that 
made it to the European Court of justice will be discussed.
A landmark ruling in this respect was the 1990 ruling in the case Rush 
Portuguesa.980 The Portuguese company Rush Portuguesa entered into a 
subcontract with a French undertaking for the carrying out of works for 
the construction of a railway line in France. For these activities it brought 
its Portuguese employees from Portugal. however, the French Labour Code 
stipulated that only the Office national d’ immigration was entitled to recruit 
978  For a general overview of the free movement of capital and services, reference is 
made to Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, chapters 16 
and 18; and Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the 
European Communities, parts 7 and 8 of chapter VII. 
979  See on this M.S. houwerzijl, De Detacheringsrichtlijn. Over de achtergrond, inhoud 
en implementatie van Richtlijn 96/71/EG [The Posted Workers Directive. About the 
background, contents and implementation of Directive 96/71/EC], Kluwer, deventer, 
2005.
980  European Court of justice, 27 March 1990, C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa/Office 
national d’immigration.
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in France nationals of third countries.981 Because of the breach of this Code 
the director of the Office national d’ immigration notified Rush Portuguesa 
of a decision by which he required payment of a special contribution. Rush 
Portuguesa sought to annul this decision and submitted that it had freedom to 
provide services within the Community and that accordingly, the provisions 
of articles 49 and 50 of the EC Treaty precluded the application of national 
legislation having the effect of prohibiting its staff  from working in France. 
The European Court of justice subsequently ruled that these articles:982
preclude a Member State from prohibiting a person providing services established 
in another Member State from moving freely on its territory with all his staff and 
preclude that Member State from making the movement of staff  in question subject 
to restrictions such as a condition as to engagement in situ or an obligation to 
obtain a work permit. To impose such conditions on the person providing services 
established in another Member State discriminates against that person in relation 
to his competitors established in the host country who are able to use their own 
staff  without restrictions, and moreover affects his ability to provide the service.
Not much later, the European Court of justice maintained that the same rule 
applied to an undertaking situated in a Member State, lawfully and habitually 
employing employees with a nationality of a non-Member State (Morocco), 
an undertaking which provides services with these employees in another 
Member State.983 
To summarise, the European Court allows companies from one Member 
State to render services in another Member State with “cheaper” labour costs. 
This raised the concern of countries with a relatively developed but expensive 
social system to be flooded by cheap migrant labour. These concerns were 
recognised in the Rush Portuguesa ruling, as the Court noted:984
Community law does not preclude Member States from extending their legislation, 
or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry, to any 
person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no matter in 
981  Portugal had just acceded to the European Community. The workers from Portugal 
were subject to transitional provisions as a result whereof they were considered 
workers from a non-member country as regards the freedom of movement for 
workers. Reference is made to paragraph 4 of the Rush Portuguesa case.
982  Paragraph 12, emphasis added.
983  European Court of justice, 9 August 1994, C-43/93, Van der Elst/Office de 
Migration Internationales.
984  Paragraph 18.
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which country the employer is established; nor does Community law prohibit 
Member States from enforcing those rules by appropriate means.
The threat of social dumping could consequently be prevented by Member 
States, either through legislation or through collective labour agreements. 
These two aspects (free movement of services and the prevention of social 
dumping) have, after the Rush Portuguesa case, been developed further 
by the European Court of justice. Basically, the Court follows a four-step 
approach. The Court establishes (i) whether the requirements imposed by 
the host state on the undertaking that provides services restricts the freedom 
to provide services. If  this is the case, the Court subsequently examines (ii) 
whether the requirement can be justified by overriding requirements relating 
to the public interest, most notably on the grounds of protection of the 
posted worker.985 If  so, the court will verify (iii) whether this protection is 
already granted in the state of establishment and (iv) whether the steps that 
are taken are proportionate.986 These steps can be clearly recognised in the 
case Mazzolini.987
The French based company Surveillance Assistance SARL (ISA) operated a 
security firm on the border between France and Belgium. Some of its employees 
worked (partially) in Belgium. In Belgium, a collective labour agreement was 
extended covering all security firms. This collective labour agreement arranged 
for a higher minimum wage than ISA paid to its employees. ISA took the view 
that the collective labour agreement hindered the free movement of services. 
It submitted that it did not have to apply this collective labour agreement and 
merely had to comply with French legislation providing for minimum wages. 
ISA noted that although the wages paid to its employees were lower than the 
wages set forth in the collective labour agreement, the net amount received by 
these employees was in fact higher due to a less burdensome tax and social 
security regime that applied in France. 
The European Court of justice noted (i) that the application of the collective 
labour agreement to service providers was liable to “prohibit, impede or 
render less attractive the provision of services to the extent that it involves 
expenses and additional administrative and economic burdens”. The 
collective labour agreement thus restricted the freedom to provide services. 
The Court then (ii) remarked that this freedom might be restricted by rules 
985  See for example European Court of justice, 23 November 1999, joined cases 
C-369/96 and C-376/96, Arblade and Leloup.
986  C. Barnard, EC Employment law, page 278.
987  European Court of justice, 15 March 2001, C-165/98, Mazzolini/Guillaume.
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justified by overriding requirements relating to the public interest, such as 
the protection of workers. however, the application of the national rules of 
a Member State to providers of services established in other Member States 
must (iii) be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which 
they pursue and must (iv) not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain 
it. Belgium’s objective of ensuring the same level of welfare protection in 
its territory for the employees working in the security sector may, according 
to the Court, be regarded as attained if  all the workers concerned enjoy an 
equivalent position overall in relation to remuneration, taxation and social 
security contributions in the host Member State and in the Member State 
of establishment. Furthermore, the application of the collective labour 
agreement may prove to be disproportionate where the workers involved are 
employees of an undertaking established in a frontier region who are required 
to carry out, on a part-time basis and for brief  periods, a part of their work in 
the territory of one, or even several, Member States other than that in which 
the undertaking is established. The European Court of justice left it to the 
competent authorities of the host Member State to establish whether, and if  
so to what extent, application of national rules imposing a minimum wage 
on such an undertaking is necessary and proportionate in order to ensure the 
protection of the workers concerned.
The above shows that on one hand, the freedom to provide services sets limits 
on employment law and collective labour agreements. On the other, national 
legislation and collective labour agreements may prevent social dumping. 
The importance of the collective labour agreements in that respect was 
also recognised in the Posted Workers directive,988 which is closely related 
to the cases just discussed. Given its recitals, the Posted Workers directive 
aims at both the abolition between Member States of obstacles to the free 
movement of persons and services and a climate of fair competition and 
measures guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers.989 Basically, the 
directive ensures that a “hard core” of clearly defined protective rules of the 
host country have to be observed by the provider of transnational services, 
regardless of the duration of the worker’s posting. These protective rules are 
set out by law, regulation or administrative provision of that host country. 
however, they can also be set out by that country’s collective agreements or 
arbitration awards which have been declared universally applicable, in as far 
it concerns construction related services (article 3 in conjunction with article 
8 and the annex of the Posted Workers directive). Pursuant to article 3.10 
988  Oj L 18, 21 january 1997, pages 1 – 6.
989  See also M.S. houwerzijl, De Detacheringsrichtlijn. Over de achtergrond, inhoud en 
implementatie van Richtlijn 96/71/EG, pages 86 ff.
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of the directive Member States may opt to additionally apply generally 
binding collective agreements or arbitration awards to sectors other than just 
the construction sector. Employment terms other than the above-mentioned 
“hard core” terms may only be made applicable to posted workers in the case 
of public policy provisions (article 3.10 of the directive).
The introduction of the Posted Workers directive did not bring about the 
end of collective employment rights clashing with free movement of services, 
as appears from the recent Laval case. 990 In this case, the European Court 
needed to give its decision on the relation between the right to strike on the 
one hand and the Posted Workers directive and article 49 of the EC Treaty on 
the other. The Latvian company Laval posted workers from Latvia to work on 
a Swedish building site. The works were undertaken by a subsidiary company 
(Baltic Bygg) and involved construction work. A Swedish trade union wanted 
to start negotiations with Laval and Baltic Bygg in order to conclude a so-
called tie-in agreement to the collective agreement for the building sector. 
By signing a tie-in agreement, the employer undertakes to comply with the 
collective agreements generally applied in the sector to which it belongs. This 
tie-in agreement is basically a substitute for extension of collective labour 
agreements, as extension as such is not possible in Sweden. Laval, Baltic Bygg 
and the Swedish trade union were unable to reach agreement on the tie-in 
agreement. Instead, Laval signed two collective agreements with the building 
sector’s trade union in Latvia. Collective action by the Swedish union 
followed and other Swedish trade unions joined in to express solidarity.991 The 
collective action was “successful”, Baltic Bygg became subject of liquidation 
proceedings and the Latvian workers posted by Laval to Sweden returned to 
Latvia. Laval subsequently commenced proceedings in Swedish court seeking, 
among other things, a declaration as to the illegality of the collective action. 
The Swedish court concluded that its examination of such legality raised 
questions of interpretation of Community law and referred these questions 
to the European Court of justice. In essence, the Swedish court wished to 
ascertain whether, in circumstances where a Member State cannot extend 
collective agreements, the Posted Workers directive and article 49 of the EC 
Treaty must be interpreted as preventing trade unions of a Member State 
from taking, in accordance with the domestic law of that State, collective 
action designed to compel a service provider of another Member State to 
subscribe, by means of a tie-in agreement, to a collective agreement for the 
990  European Court of justice, 18 december 2007, C-341/05, LavalSvenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet.
991  Boycotts are not uncommon in Sweden “to persuade” an employer to enter into a 
collective labour agreement. Reference is made to T. van Peijpe, De arresten Laval 
en Viking en hun gevolgen, page 176. 
IN SEARCH Of A NEW SYSTEM ON TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
345
benefit of workers posted temporarily by that provider to the territory of the 
first Member State, including cases where that provider is already bound by a 
collective agreement entered into in the Member State where it is established.
The European Court of justice applied a two step approach. First it analysed 
whether the collective action undertaken by the Swedish trade union complied 
with the Posted Workers directive. When that appeared not to be the case, the 
Court subsequently established whether the action was in violation of article 
49 of the EC Treaty.992 
With regard to the Posted Workers directive the European Court had to 
assess, phrased in the words of Advocate-General Mengozzi, whether the 
directive precludes that terms and conditions are determined by a collective 
agreement that (i) is applicable in practice to domestic undertakings operating 
in the Swedish building sector, (ii) is “extended” through a tie-in agreement 
to a foreign service provider that temporarily posts workers in that sector, (iii) 
a tie-in agreement which is concluded as a result of the exercise of collective 
action, while (iv) the provider of services is already bound by a collective 
agreement concluded in the Member State of establishment. The Court 
observed that the “hard core” employment terms as referred to in the Posted 
Workers directive, save for minimum rates of pay, were laid down in Swedish 
legislation. There was therefore no need to impose on Baltic Bygg the minimum 
“hard core” employment terms set out in the collective agreement for the 
building sector. That collective agreement furthermore did not apply to Baltic 
Bygg on the basis of the (implementation) of the Posted Workers directive, as 
the collective agreement was not extended in the manner as prescribed in that 
directive. Swedish legislation did, as said, not arrange for statutory minimum 
wages. Consequently, it was according to the European Court of justice in 
principle allowed to fall back on other mechanisms setting out minimum wages 
– even mechanisms not mentioned in the Posted Workers directive – possibly 
including collective labour agreements such as the collective agreement for 
the building sector that was not extended in the manner as required in the 
Posted Workers directive. Nevertheless, the collective agreement for the 
building sector arranged for collective bargaining on a case-by-case basis in 
992  The Court did not make clear what the exact relation is between the Posted 
Workers directive and article 49 of the EC Treaty. The mere fact that the Court 
first analysed whether the collective action is permitted under the Posted Workers 
directive, and only after having established that it is not, continued to assess the 
action against article 49 of the EC Treaty, seems to imply that the host country may 
limit the freedom to provide services further than prescribed in the Posted Workers 
directive. That also follows from paragraph 68 of the Court’s ruling. Reference is 
made to T. van Peijpe, De arresten Laval en Viking en hun gevolgen, page 185. 
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order to set out minimum wages. Minimum wages established by case-by-case 
bargaining cannot be considered minimum wages as referred to in the Posted 
Workers directive.993 In consequence, the Posted Workers directive did not 
condone the collective action undertaken by the Swedish trade union with 
regard to the “hard core” employment terms, including pay. The same applies 
to the other employment terms. These other terms may be imposed on the 
service provider on the basis of article 3.10 of the Posted Workers directive, 
provided that these terms are public policy provisions. That, however, was not 
the case according to the European Court of justice. Terms that are agreed on 
by the social partners cannot be considered public policy provisions, because 
these provisions need to be generated by bodies governed by public law.994 
Consequently, the Posted Workers directive does not allow the collective 
action undertaken by the Swedish trade union.
Subsequently, the European Court of justice analysed article 49 of the 
EC Treaty. It first recognised, in line with the Viking case, the right to take 
collective action as a fundamental right, which exercise may be subject to 
restrictions. The protection of a fundamental right may, according to the 
Court, under circumstances justify a restriction of the obligations imposed 
by Community law: the exercise of fundamental rights needs to be reconciled 
with the requirements relating to rights protected under the EC Treaty. The 
European Court of justice subsequently established that individuals may 
invoke article 49 of the EC Treaty against associations or organisations not 
governed by public law that obstruct the freedom to provide services. In this 
case, Swedish trade unions restricted Laval’s freedom to provide services. 
This is normally in violation of article 49 of the EC Treaty. A restriction on 
the freedom to provide services is, however, allowed if  it pursues a legitimate 
objective compatible with the EC Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons 
of public interest. If  that is the case, it must be suitable for securing the 
attainment of the objective it pursues and not go beyond what is necessary 
in order to attain it. According to the European Court of justice, preventing 
possible social dumping may constitute such an overriding reason of public 
993  Mengozzi took another opinion on the “hard core” employment terms as provided 
for in the first subparagraph of article 3.1 of the Posted Workers directive (most 
notably pay). Mengozzi argued that the Posted Workers directive does not 
preclude that these terms are determined in accordance with a collective agreement 
made applicable through a tie-in agreement.
994  here again Mengozzi took another approach. Mengozzi too stated that, where 
it concerns other employment terms than the aforementioned “hard core” 
employment terms, these terms can only be applied if  they are public policy 
provisions. he, however, did not take the formal approach that these provisions 
need to be generated by bodies governed by public law, as the European Court of 
justice did. 
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interest. Blockading action by a trade union of the host Member State aimed 
at ensuring that workers posted on the basis of a transnational provision of 
services have their employment conditions fixed at a certain level falls within 
the objective of protecting workers. however, actions with an aim of having 
Baltic Bygg sign the tie-in agreement cannot be justified by this objective, 
according to the Court of justice. The content of the collective agreement 
for the building sector goes beyond the “hard core” employment terms as 
referred to in the Posted Workers directive. It furthermore forces Baltic Bygg 
to negotiate on pay, not setting out fixed minimum wages. Article 49 of the 
EC Treaty therefore precludes the collective action undertaken by the Swedish 
trade union.
It is interesting to note that Mengozzi arrived at a different conclusion. 
just like the European Court, he argued that the collective action at stake 
restricted the freedom of services. This restriction is allowable if  the collective 
action is justified by overriding requirements relating to the public interest, 
provided that (i) that interest is not safeguarded by the rules of the Member 
State in which the service provider is established and (ii) the collective action 
is appropriate for securing attainment of the objective which it pursues and 
does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. But then Mengozzi 
gave the trade unions some room to manoeuvre. When assessing the above, 
it should according to Mengozzi be borne in mind that article 49 of the 
EC Treaty cannot impose obligations on trade unions which might impair 
the very substance of the right to take collective action. The goal of the 
collective action in the case at hand was the protection of workers and the 
fight against social dumping, which in itself  is a legitimate goal relating to 
the public interest. Where the collective action was intended to impose on the 
service provider the rate of pay (a “hard core” employment term) determined 
in accordance with a collective agreement that is applicable in practice to 
domestic undertakings operating in the Swedish building sector, that action is 
allowed unless the service provider already had to pay identical or essentially 
similar wages to its employees on the basis of regulations applicable in the 
Member State of establishment. Where the collective action was intended to 
impose on the service provider other employment terms, these terms should be 
governed by public policy provisions in Sweden within the meaning of Article 
3.10 of the Posted Workers directive, and the subjection of Laval to those 
conditions should not go further than was necessary to attain the objectives 
pursued by the collective action concerned. Finally, where the collective 
action was intended to impose on the service provider terms other than those 
relating to employment these terms should involve a real advantage making 
a significant contribution to the social protection of posted workers, and 
should not duplicate any identical or essentially similar protection offered 
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to them by the legislation and/or collective agreement applicable to Laval in 
the Member State in which it is established.995 Mengozzi finally argued that a 
number of conditions of the collective agreement that is applicable in practice 
to domestic undertakings operating in the Swedish building sector relate to 
mandatory contributions. These mandatory contributions did not all display 
connection with the protection of workers or offered any real advantage 
significantly contributing to the social protection of posted workers, and 
collective action with a view of imposing these conditions was therefore not 
permissible.
In summary, the Laval case established that article 49 of the EC Treaty and 
the Posted Workers directive preclude a trade union, in a Member State in 
which the terms and conditions of employment covering the “hard core” 
employment terms as provided for in article 3 of the Posted Workers directive 
are contained in legislative provisions, save for minimum rates of pay, from 
attempting, by means of collective action in the form of a blockade of sites, 
to force a provider of services established in another Member State to enter 
into negotiations with it on the rates of pay for posted workers and to sign a 
collective agreement the terms of which lay down, as regards some of those 
matters, more favourable conditions than those resulting from the relevant 
legislative provisions, while other terms relate to matters not referred to in 
Article 3 of the directive.
The Laval case makes clear that article 49 of the EC Treaty and the Posted 
Workers directive are to be taken seriously. Recently, this was confirmed 
again by the European Court of justice in the Rüffert case.996 Following a 
public invitation to tender, Land Niedersachsen awarded the company Objekt 
und Bauregie a contract for the building of a prison. The contract contained a 
clause stipulating that the collective labour agreement as in force at the place 
where the service is to be provided had to be observed, and that all employees 
working on the building site had to be paid a minimum wage in accordance 
with that collective labour agreement. The same obligation was incumbent 
on possible subcontractors. Violation of the aforementioned clause would 
lead to payment of penalties. This clause was the result of a national act, 
which aimed, among other things, to prevent the use of cheap labour. The 
contractor, Objekt und Bauregie, used a subcontractor when building the 
prison, a Polish company. That subcontractor did not pay its employees 
working on the site the minimum wages as laid down in the collective labour 
agreement. As a consequence, Land Niedersachsen terminated the agreement 
995  Opinion, paragraphs 220 – 284.
996  European Court of justice, 3 April 2008, C-346/06, Rüffert/Land Niedersachsen.
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and claimed payment of penalties. That gave rise to the question whether a 
public contracting authority violates article 49 of the EC Treaty if  it demands, 
when lodging a tender, that contractors undertake to pay their employees at 
least the remuneration prescribed by the collective agreement in force at the 
place where those services are to be performed. 
The European Court ruled that the national act, obliging public contracting 
authorities to demand the contractor to apply a collective labour agreement, 
is not an act fixing minimum rates of pay and other “hard core” employment 
terms as referred to in the Posted Workers directive. It is merely an act referring 
to the collective labour agreement in force at the place where activities needed 
to be performed. Furthermore, the collective labour agreement that had to be 
applied by the contractor and its subcontractors was not declared universally 
applicable within the meaning of German collective labour law. In other 
words, apart from the obligation in the contract to observe the collective 
labour agreement, there was no legal obligation to apply the terms of that 
collective labour agreement. Therefore, the Posted Workers directive did not 
entitle the public contracting authority to impose on undertakings established 
in another Member State a rate of pay set out in the aforementioned collective 
labour agreement.
By requiring undertakings performing public works contracts and their 
subcontractors to apply the minimum wages set out in the above-mentioned 
collective labour agreement, a law such as the national law at stake may, 
according to the Court, impose on service providers established in another 
Member State where minimum rates of pay are lower an additional economic 
burden that may prohibit, impede or render less attractive the provision of 
the services in the host Member State. Therefore, the measure is capable of 
constituting a restriction within the meaning of article 49 of the EC Treaty. 
According to the Court, this restriction cannot be justified by the objective 
of ensuring the protection of workers. The rate of pay fixed by the collective 
labour agreement only applies to public works and is not universally applicable. 
There is no evidence to support the conclusion that the protection resulting 
from such a rate of pay is necessary for a construction sector worker only 
when he is employed in the context of a public works contract, but not when 
he is employed in the context of a private contract. Other justifications did 
not convince the European Court of justice. As a result, the national law 
concerned violated the Posted Workers directive, interpreted in the light of 
article 49 of the EC Treaty. 
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6.3.4 Reconciliation of (collective) employment law and 
market freedoms: the Service Directive
The above makes clear that the market freedoms may clash with (collective) 
labour law. The delicate balance between the European social model and 
the market freedoms – specifically the right to establish and the freedom of 
service – also appeared in full force during the long period before the Service 
directive was adopted on 12 december 2006.997 The Service directive aims 
at providing a legal framework that intends to eliminate obstacles to the 
freedom of establishment for service providers and the free movement of 
services between Member States. 
The original proposal of March 2003 basically proposed the following matters 
on the freedom of establishment for service providers to be introduced:998 
•	 An	administrative	simplification	for	establishment.	This	would	include	
the recognition of documents from the country of origin and the esta-
blishment of a “single point of contact”. This single point of contact 
would be the contact for the completion of procedures and formalities 
in relation to the rendering of service, and would be the most important 
source of information. Procedures and formalities were to be completed 
by electronic means.
•	 The	prohibition	of	making	access	to	a	service	activity	subject	to	an	aut-
horisation scheme, unless specific conditions were satisfied.
•	 The	prohibition	of	a	number	of	restrictive	legal	requirements	that	are	in	
force in some Member States, such as discriminatory requirements based 
directly or indirectly on nationality or the location of the registered of-
fice.
The original proposal basically proposed the following matters on the free 
movement of services to be introduced:
•	 The	applicability	of	the	country	of	origin	principle.	That	would	entail	
that providers of services were subject only to the national provisions of 
their Member State on topics that would fall in the coordinated fields. 
This would cover provisions relating to access to and the exercise of a 
service activity, in particular requirements governing the behaviour of 
997  directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
december 2006 on services in the internal market, Oj L 376, 27 december 2006, 
pages 36 - 68.
998  COM (2004) 2 final, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on services in the internal market, page 3.
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the provider, the quality or content of the service, advertising, contracts 
and the provider’s liability. The country of origin would also be respon-
sible for supervision and enforcement. The country of origin principle 
was to be accompanied by a number of derogations.
•	 The	prohibition	of	a	number	of	restrictive	legal	requirements	that	are	in	
force in some host Member States, such as the obligation of the provider 
to have an establishment or representative in that Member State, to ob-
tain authorisation to provide the services and the obligation to comply 
with requirements relating to the exercise of a service activity applicable 
in the territory of the Member State.
•	 The	exclusion	of	the	applicability	of	the	country	of	origin	principle	with	
regard to posted workers. These posted workers would remain to fall 
within the scope of the Posted Workers directive. The host country, ho-
wever, was not to impose burdensome requirements on the service provi-
der and the posted worker, such as registration of the posted worker and 
having a representative present.
This original proposal was based on far-reaching recognition by the host 
state of the rules of the country of origin.999 That basic principle led to 
fierce opposition. The country of origin principle and the rules on posted 
workers were feared to lead to social dumping.1000 The European Parliament 
watered the proposal down and the Commission drafted a new proposal.1001 
This new proposal, although marginally adapted again by the European 
Parliament, was, as said, adopted on 12 december 2006. The final version did 
not contain the country of origin principle anymore, which was replaced by 
an arrangement providing for the freedom to provide services. Article 16 of 
the Service directive now stipulates that Member States will respect the right 
of providers to provide services in a Member State other than that in which 
they are established. Furthermore, the Member State in which the service is 
provided has to ensure free access to, and free exercise of, a service activity 
within its territory. The articles on posted workers were withdrawn altogether. 
It was stressed that the Service directive would not affect labour law (article 
1.6 of the Service directive). It was even noted that the directive neither affects 
the exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in the Member States and by 
999  B.j. drijber, Van democratie en bureaucratie: de Dienstenrichtlijn is er door, [From 
democracy to bureaucracy: The Services Directive pulled through], Nederlands 
Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht, 2007/1-2, page 1.
1000  Whether it indeed would lead to social dumping is questioned by many. See for 
instance: R. Blanpain, Bolkestein: Sociale dumping? Fabel of Waarheid?, Arbeid 
Integraal, 2005/2, pages 99 and 100.
1001  COM (2006) 160, amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on services in the internal market.
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Community law, nor the right “to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective 
agreements and to take industrial action in accordance with national law and 
practices which respect Community law” (article 1.7 of the Service directive). 
Whether the Service directive truly leaves the fundamental (employment) 
rights unimpaired, remains to be seen.1002 In any event, the above illustrates the 
delicate balance between the market freedoms and (collective) labour law. 
7. Framework for the topics of the research of the 
national collective bargaining systems
So far, this chapter has focused on transnational collective bargaining 
instruments and topics. The following 4 chapters will focus on the laws on 
collective bargaining in the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Britain 
respectively. In order to be able to compare the findings of that research, the 
same topics will be subject to research in each of these countries. Although 
I will try to research each topic with the same level of scrutiny in each of 
these 4 countries, some topics will nevertheless receive more attention in one 
country when compared with another country. After all, certain topics may 
be considered more troublesome in one country than in another country. 
Consequently, these topics may have received more attention in the first 
country when compared with the second.1003 
The first section of each of the following four chapters sets out a general 
overview of the industrial relations of that country, including key-figures on 
the importance of collective labour agreements and high-level information 
on specific trends. It will furthermore discuss the level at which collective 
bargaining takes place (company, sectoral, inter-professional). Thereafter, the 
national history of collective bargaining will be set out in section 2. As this 
second section will not be used as a tool for comparing the different systems, 
but is “merely” useful to understand the national laws on collective bargaining 
1002  The Regulation on the functioning of the internal market in relation to the free 
movement of goods among the Member States also states that it does not affect 
the right to strike. Reference is made to section 6.3.2 above. Still, some scholars 
expressed doubt whether this statement would prove to be correct, as they feared 
that market integration would actually limit the right to collective action, the 
aforementioned comforting statement notwithstanding. See T. Novitz, International 
and European Protection of the Right to Strike: A Comparative Study of Standards 
Set by the International Labour Organization, the Council of Europe and the 
European Union, page 162. The same doubt may be expressed in relation to the 
Service directive.
1003  And, to be perfectly honest, occasionally I may dwell a bit more on collective 
labour law in the Netherlands. As a dutch lawyer, I may not always find it easy to 
restrain myself  when it comes to dutch law, for which I apologise in advance.
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better, the topics discussed in that section may very well differ from country 
to country. 
Section 3 deals with the classical rights that are deemed crucial in collective 
bargaining, and which are discussed above in a European context: (i) the 
freedom of association, (ii) the right to collective bargaining, and (iii) the 
right to strike.
Section 4 explains the definition of a collective labour agreement, where 
appropriate the different sorts of collective labour agreements, and the 
different sorts of provisions they can contain. Thereafter, section 5 scrutinises 
the parties involved in the collective bargaining process. Subsequently, the 
bargaining process itself, possibly leading to the conclusion of a collective 
labour agreement, will be set out in section 6.
Section 7 is the core section of each chapter, as it sets out the effects of the 
collective labour agreement, once concluded, on all parties involved. This 
section discusses which parties are bound by the collective labour agreement, 
which legal effects this agreement has on these parties and how the agreement 
can be enforced. This will be done with regard to 4 different positions, also 
referred to as scenarios, being the position between: 
1. the contracting parties. It depends on the national legislation at hand 
exactly which parties are concerned, but broadly speaking this relates to, 
on the one hand, one or more employers or associations of employers 
and on the other, one or more employees’ organisations. 
2. on the one hand the employer who is either bound by the collective la-
bour agreement due to his membership of the contracting employers’ 
association, or due to it signing that agreement itself  (“the bound em-
ployer”) towards, on the other hand, the individual employee employed 
by that employer who is a member of a contracting employees’ organisa-
tion (“the bound employee”).
3. the bound employer towards the individual employee employed by that 
employer who is not a member of a contracting employees’ organisa-
tion. In this same scenario the position vice versa (the employer is not 
bound by the collective labour agreement while the individual employee 
employed by that employer is bound) will be discussed.
4. the members (and under some national systems even certain non-mem-
bers) of the contracting associations towards “collectivities”. This con-
cerns in particular (i) the position of the bound employer towards its 
entire personnel and (ii) the position of the bound employer and its em-
ployees towards other collective entities.
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Section 7 deals with the term and termination of the collective labour 
agreement, its possible after-effects and the role of alternative dispute 
resolution in collective bargaining. Section 8 sets out the possibility to extend 
a collective labour agreement. It discusses which (provisions of) collective 
labour agreements can be extended, which legal effects they have and how 
they are enforced. It also deals with the term and termination of the extended 
collective labour agreement, as well as its possible after-effects.
The reach of the social partners when concluding collective labour agreements 
will be set out in section 9. This section, named after the thesis of A. Stege,1004 
focuses on three specific aspects of the reach of the social partners, in relation 
to the conclusion of collective labour agreements: (i) what can the social 
partners regulate in a collective labour agreement, (ii) are they in any way 
limited by representativity demands, and (iii) are there any limitations with 
regard to independence? Representativity is a term that can have different 
meanings, as will be set out in more detail in chapter 15, section 3. Unless 
stipulated otherwise, representativity demands, as discussed in the chapters 9 
though 13, relate to requirements that the social partners involved in collective 
bargaining should satisfy, with regard to minimum size (including a minimum 
number of members), a certain level of power or a specific status (apart from 
independence of the social partners, as that topic is discussed separately).1005 
Finally, section 10 summarises each chapter. 
8. Summary
Three classical rights are often deemed crucial for the development of 
collective bargaining: (1) the freedom of association, (2) the right to collective 
bargaining and (3) the right to strike. These rights should therefore be further 
explored.
Many international treaties acknowledge and promote the freedom of 
association. This freedom includes the right of workers and employers to 
organise themselves free of intervention, as well as the right not being forced 
to join or to remain in such an association. These treaties did, until recently, 
not have a formal legal status in the European Community. There was no 
formal acknowledgement of the freedom of association for the European 
1004  A. Stege, De CAO en het regelingsbereik van de sociale partners [The collective 
labour agreement and the reach of the social partners], Kluwer, 2004.
1005  This is not to say that these topics are the only topics relevant for representativity, 
but these are the topics that can be traced back to many Member States as will be 
shown in the following chapters. Other topics relevant for representativity will be 
set out in chapter 15, section 3.4.
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Community; at least not set out in any of the Community treaties, and the 
freedom of association is (at least to a certain extent) even excluded from 
the scope of the EC Treaty given article 137.5. This notwithstanding, the 
European Court of justice recognises the (positive and negative) freedom of 
association and considers it a fundamental right which is protected in the 
Community legal order.
The right to collective bargaining is difficult to define. In any event it 
encompasses the freedom for the social partners to enter into negotiations 
in order to reach a binding agreement on employment topics. A broader 
defenition of this concept would include the obligatory and normative effects 
a collective agreement may have, and possibly even the direct normative 
effects of the agreement. The mere right to enter into negotiations and to 
conclude collective labour agreements is recognised in many international 
instruments. These treaties did, until recently, not have a formal legal status 
in the European Community. however, article 138.4 and 139 of the EC 
Treaty also award these rights to a specific group of European social partners. 
The freedom of contract seems to protect exactly the same rights to other 
(European) social partners and employers as well. This part of collective 
bargaining – a narrow sense of collective bargaining – is therefore protected 
at a European level. In this narrow sense the social partners also have a right 
to collective autonomy. Some of the international instruments also arrange 
for the (normative and obligatory) effects of the collective labour agreement. 
ILO Recommendation R91 even arranges for the direct normative effects of 
a collective labour agreement. There are no indications that these parts of 
the right to collective bargaining – in its broad sense – are recognised on a 
European level. Collective autonomy is also not fully recognised in this broad 
sense. On the contrary, since European agreements lack direct normative effect 
and the European social partners depend on third parties to implement these 
agreements, their autonomy is less evolved than that of the national social 
partners in the Member States. The European social partners’ autonomy is 
(at least to a certain extent) limited by law, should they wish to have their 
agreement implemented by a Council decision.
The right to strike is also recognised in many international instruments. These 
treaties dit, until recently, not have a formal legal status in the European 
Community. The right to strike is (at least to a certain extent) explicitly excluded 
from the scope of the EC Treaty given article 137.5. This notwithstanding, the 
European Court of justice confirmed that the right to strike forms an integral 
part of the general principles of Community law the observance of which the 
Court ensures.
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The three classical rights are, given the above, at least partially recognised at 
EU level. Recently, there have been a number of developments that (aim to) 
further enhance these rights. The EU charter has recently been given legally 
binding force. Should the Treaty of Lisbon be ratified and enter into force, the 
Union shall accede to the Convention. In consequence, the institutions of the 
Union must respect the rights written into the Charter and the Convention, 
including the right on the freedom of association, the right to collective 
bargaining and the right to strike, which become Community rights. The same 
obligations will be incumbent upon the Member States when they implement 
the Union’s legislation. Unfortunately, a protocol exempts Poland and the 
United Kingdom from important obligations deriving from the EU Charter.
Within Europe, there are a number of rights, freedoms and prohibitions that 
could possibly limit the “free” exercise of collective labour law. The European 
court already had to rule on the position of collective labour law in the light 
of (1) competition, (2) equal treatment and (3) market freedoms. 
Collective labour agreements limit competition between the different 
companies that (have to) participate. In any case, collective labour agreements 
set minimum and sometimes even maximum standards. Therefore, the content 
of a collective labour agreement can clash with the Community rules on 
competition. The European Court of justice had to decide on the validity 
of extended collective labour agreements in specific branches, obliging all 
employers falling within its scope of applicability to participate in a compulsory 
pension scheme. The companies opposing these collective labour agreements 
argued that the extension of these agreements violated the Community’s 
rules on freedom of competition. however, the European Court of justice, 
referring to the social policy objectives that are pursued by collective labour 
agreements, ruled that collective labour agreements concluded in pursuit of 
such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as 
falling outside the scope of European competition law.
Collective labour agreements might also violate the highly developed European 
equal treatment legislation. The EC Treaty directly prohibits discrimination 
on the ground of pay for male and female workers. The EC Treaty furthermore 
entitles the Council to take appropriate action to combat discrimination 
based on racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. The European Court of justice has held several stipulations in 
collective labour agreements to contravene European equality law.
Free of movement of goods, persons, capital and services – the market 
freedoms – may also limit collective labour law.
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Free movement of persons encompasses both the freedom of movement of 
workers and the right of establishment. Employees deriving from one Member 
State may not be hindered within the territory of another Member State to pick 
up an activity as an employed person. This prohibition also affects collective 
labour agreements. The right of establishment blocks protective stipulations 
prohibiting foreign companies to deploy certain activities and may, in specific 
circumstances, even limit the right to strike. 
Free movement of goods has not (yet) clashed with fundamental employment 
rights, but very well could have. The free movement of goods has clashed with 
the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. The European Court 
of justice subsequently balanced the rights involved. It is easy to imagine a 
situation in which collective actions could be at odds with the free movement 
of goods, for example due to road blocks. This possibility was explicitly taken 
into account when drafting the Regulation on the functioning of the internal 
market in relation to the free movement of goods among the Member States, 
which states that the Regulation may not be interpreted as affecting the 
exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in Member States, including the 
right or freedom to strike.
The free movement of capital and in particular of services may be on bad 
terms with collective labour law. Service providers may temporarily pursue 
their activities in the Member State where the service is provided, under the 
same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals. Restrictive 
conditions of the host state are not allowed, unless these conditions can 
be justified by overriding requirements relating to the public interest, most 
notably on the grounds of protection of the posted worker. If  that is the case, 
the European Court of justice will verify whether this protection already is 
granted in the state of establishment and whether the steps that are taken are 
proportionate. The freedom to provide services may even limit the right to 
strike. 
 
Free movement of services involves the danger of social dumping. These 
two topics – the abolition between Member States of obstacles to the free 
movement of persons and services and a climate of fair competition and 
measures guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers – have led to the 
adoption of the Posted Workers directive. The potential clash between on the 
one hand these market freedoms and on the other the European social model 
led to heated discussions in relation to the Service directive. The Service 
directive has been adapted in such a manner that all interests are served as 
much as possible.
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The following 4 chapters deal with the collective bargaining systems of the 
Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Britain respectively. In order to be able 
to compare the findings of that research, the same topics, as described in the 
section above, will be subject to research in each of these countries. 
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ChAPTER 9
COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS 
IN ThE NEThERLANdS
1. Industrial relations in the Netherlands in a nutshell
In this chapter the collective labour agreements (collectieve arbeids-
overeenkomsten) in the Netherlands will be discussed, applying the framework 
set out in section 7 of chapter 8.
1.1 The Dutch consultation model
Industrial relations play an important role in the Netherlands. Consultation 
is considered key and the dutch consultation model (Poldermodel) is well 
known. This consultation takes place on different levels and normally in a 
rather harmonious atmosphere. Good examples of the consultation model 
are the roles of the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid) and the 
Social and Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad). 
The Labour Foundation is a national consultative body organised under 
private law. Its members are the three largest trade unions and the three largest 
employers’ confederations in the Netherlands (which will be introduced in 
section 6). The Foundation provides a forum in which its members discuss 
relevant issues in the field of labour and industrial relations. Some of these 
discussions result in memorandums, statements or other documents in which 
the Foundation recommends courses of action for the employers and trade 
unions that negotiate collective labour agreements in a specific industry or 
within individual companies. Upon request, the Foundation also advises the 
government on labour-related topics.1006
The Social and Economic Council is the main advisory body to the dutch 
government and the parliament on national and international social 
and economic policy. The Council is financed by industry and is wholly 
independent from the government. It represents the interests of trade unions 
1006  Reference is made to the website of the Labour foundation: www.stvda.nl. 
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and industry, advising the government (upon request or at its own initiative) 
on all major social and economic issues. The Social and Economic Council 
consists of three groups, a composition which reflects social and economic 
relations in the Netherlands. The first group consists of members representing 
employers, the second of members representing trade unions, and the third of 
independent or “Crown” members appointed by the dutch government.1007
The dutch government relies, to a certain extent, on the opinion of both 
institutions. This enabled the dutch social partners to play an important role 
in the decision making process in the field of social and economic policy.
One of the best examples of the willingness of labour and management 
to cooperate harmoniously dates back to 1982. In that year, both sides of 
the industry, represented in the Labour Foundation, reached an important 
agreement, generally referred to as the “Wassenaar Agreement”. Faced with 
increasing unemployment, the parties agreed on wage restraint in return for 
working hours’ reduction. It is believed by many that this policy has enhanced 
the dutch economy over the years, and it is even considered by some to be 
“historic”.1008
In recent years, the consultation model is somewhat losing its predominance 
and has received critique. Notwithstanding this, consultation is still a precious 
commodity in the Netherlands. 
1.2 Statistics
The number of collective labour agreements concluded in the Netherlands rose 
steadily from 81 in 1911, to 984 in 1920 and 1544 in 1940, to drop again to 1200 
in 2002.1009 The number of employees covered by collective labour agreements 
has risen in these years from 23,000, to 273,000, to 350,000, to 5,000,000. The 
numbers for the years 1920 and 2002 represent respectively about 15% and 
about 72% of the total working population in the Netherlands.1010 According 
1007  Reference is made to the website of the Social and Economic Council: www.ser.nl.
1008  E. Verhulp, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Netherlands, page 27. The report can be found on: http://www.unifi.
it/polo-universitario-europeo/ricerche/collective_bargaining.html. 
1009  W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan [CLA law. The 
law concerning CLA’s and the declaring binding and unbinding thereof], Kluwer, 
deventer, 2004, page 22.
1010  W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 22.
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to the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment (Minister van Sociale Zaken 
en Werkgelegenheid, “the Minister”), this last number is even higher; and he 
states that in the year 2000 about 85% of all employees in the Netherlands 
were bound by a collective labour agreement.1011 Approximately 9% of the 
employees are bound to a collective labour agreement merely due to it being 
declared generally applicable.1012 
In contrast to the increasing number of employees covered by a collective 
labour agreement, there is a declining rate of membership of trade unions 
amongst the dutch working population. Whilst in 1978 36% of the working 
population was member of a trade union, this number dropped to 28% in 1986 
and even to 26% in 2002.1013 There are no numbers known on the organisation 
rate of employers in the Netherlands.1014 however, in general it is assumed 
that this organisation rate is well over 50% in virtually all sectors, and its total 
is around 85%.1015
1.3 Trends
There is a small focus shift in the Netherlands from sectoral towards enterprise 
level collective labour agreements.1016 Furthermore, when compared to the 
past, collective labour agreements leave more room to fill in general clauses 
and concepts at enterprise level. This leads to decentralisation of the shaping 
of employment conditions. Likewise, collective labour agreements leave more 
1011  Reference is made to the letter of the Minister of Social affairs and Employment 
(W.A. Vermeend) to the member of the Lower house Mr. Wilders dated 8 
February 2001. The same figure is used in C.j. Loonstra and W.A. Zondag, 
Arbeidsrechtelijke themata, [Employment law themes], Boom, den haag, 2006, page 
501.
1012  E. Verhulp, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Netherlands, page 39.
1013  Reference is made to the 2004 Social and Cultural Report [Sociaal en Cultureel 
rapport] of  the dutch Social and Cultural Planning Board [Sociaal and 
Cultureel Planbureau], page 193. According to the Minister of Social affairs and 
Employment the number of trade union membership was 27% in 2000. See the 
letter of the Minister of Social affairs and Employment (W.A. Vermeend) to the 
member of the Lower house Mr. Wilders dated 8 February 2001.
1014  Reference is made to the letter of the Minister of Social affairs and Employment 
(W.A. Vermeend) to the member of the Lower house Mr. Wilders dated 8 
February 2001.
1015  E. Verhulp, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Netherlands, page 25.
1016  Reference is made to the report of the Labour Foundation, De CAO: Wat en hoe 
[The CLA: What and how?], 2004, page 11.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 9
362
room for employers and employees to choose a package of applicable clauses 
in the collective labour agreement that fits their situation best ( “à la carte” 
provisions).1017 Company level agreements increasingly tend to leave room 
for Works Councils to further shape employment conditions by means of 
allocation of specific tasks.1018 Finally, more non-affiliated unions, representing 
the interests of specific groups of employees, make their entrance in the field 
of industrial relations.1019
1.4 Bargaining levels 
In the Netherlands, collective bargaining takes place at several levels. Three 
levels can be distinguished (although it can be disputed whether on the highest 
level “real” collective bargaining takes place).1020
The first and highest level of collective bargaining in the Netherlands is 
national level. As noted above, the Labour Foundation recommends courses 
of action for the employers and trade unions that negotiate collective labour 
agreements. These recommendations are often set out in central agreements. 
These central agreements remain mere recommendations and not “real” 
collective labour agreements, as defined in section 4.1 below. Still, the social 
partners tend to follow these recommendations to a certain extent in collective 
bargaining.1021 Therefore, these recommendations could be regarded as the 
highest bargaining level in the Netherlands. The second bargaining level, 
where employers’ associations and trade unions meet in order to conclude 
collective bargaining, is sectoral level. These sectoral agreements apply to 
an entire industry or branche. The last level is enterprise level and concerns 
collective labour agreements that merely apply to a specific employer.1022 
1017  Labour Foundation, De CAO: Wat en hoe, page 17.
1018  E. Verhulp, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Netherlands, page 38.
1019  A.Ph.C.M. jaspers, ‘Gele bonden’ in Nederland [‘Yellow unions’ in the Netherlands], 
Sociaal Recht, 2004-1, page 3.
1020  E. Verhulp, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Netherlands, pages 34 ff.
1021  E. Verhulp, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Netherlands, page 34.
1022  C.j. Loonstra and W.A. Zondag, Arbeidsrechtelijke themata, page 504.
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2. A brief history of collective bargaining in the Netherlands
As a result of the French occupation of the Netherlands, dutch law prohibited, 
since 1811, coalitions of employers and employees to use their collective 
powers to, amongst others, adjust wages. This prohibition hindered (the 
formation of) trade unions significantly.1023 Its abolishment in 1872 opened the 
way to trade unions and, as a consequence, to collective labour agreements. 
It was in 1894 that the first collective labour agreement was concluded in the 
Amsterdam construction sector. More collective labour agreements followed 
shortly after.1024
dutch scholars experienced difficulties in placing collective labour agreements 
in a proper legal setting (what is their status?) and determining their legal 
effects. Opinions on these subjects varied widely. By means of example, the 
differing opinions of two scholars – Van Zanten and Eyssel – on these subjects 
are set out in sections 3.1 and 3.2. Section 3.3 briefly describes the route from 
factual collective bargaining without specific statutory back-up towards acts 
on collective labour agreements.
2.1 The status of the collective labour agreement
Pioneering work was done by Van Zanten. In his opinion, collective labour 
agreements could not be understood through the concept of mandate. 
After all, trade unions concluded the collective labour agreements on their 
own account and not on behalf  of their members. Moreover, even if  it was 
assumed that they concluded the collective labour agreement on behalf  
of their members, the agreement itself  would be impossible to define as it 
neither constituted an employment agreement nor an agreement preceding an 
employment agreement (voorovereenkomst). The collective labour agreement 
could, according to Van Zanten, also not be understood as an agreement 
setting out third-party clauses. This would not only be peculiar – as in such 
a case the core elements of the agreement were to be considered third-party 
clauses – but it would also lead to legal difficulties should a member of the 
contracting parties fail to comply with the clauses of the collective agreement. 
Van Zanten pointed out that the employer, as a member of a contracting 
employers’ organisation, first had to hire an employee, in order for that 
employee to call upon a possible third-party clause. Therefore, it depended 
1023  L.G. Kortenhorst and Mac. M.j. van Rooy, De collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst [The 
collective labour agreement], Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1939, page 10.
1024  For an overview of these first collective labour agreements reference is made to 
j.h. van Zanten, De zoogenaamde collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst [The so-called 
collective labour agreement], Rechtgeleerd Magazijn, 1903, pages 450 ff.
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on the free will of the employer whether or not an employee would be able 
to call upon a third-party clause, which was, according to Van Zanten, at 
odds with the dutch statutory provisions on third-party clauses. According 
to Van Zanten, a collective labour agreement had a sui generis character, 
but was an agreement nonetheless. The uniqueness of the collective labour 
agreement particularly followed the circumstance that the execution of the 
agreement is mainly left to the members of the contracting parties, while the 
contracting parties were responsible (and liable) for the proper execution of 
the agreement.1025
Eyssel puts forward a compleyely different opinion. In his view, the collective 
labour agreement was not even an agreement. According to Eyssel, a 
collective labour agreement concluded between a collectivity of employees 
on the one side and one employer or a collectivity of employers on the other 
did not arrange for obligations between the contracting parties themselves, 
but merely for the members of  the collectivity of employees vis-à-vis the 
employers. An agreement, however, should arrange the obligations between 
the contracting parties themselves.1026 An agreement merely laying down 
rights for third parties (the members of the collectivity or collectivities) lacks 
sufficient ground and can therefore not be considered an agreement.1027 The 
collective labour agreement should, in the view of Eyssel, be considered a 
social/economical phenomenon as opposed to a legal institution. 
Eyssel remained relatively isolated in his opinion. Many scholars agreed to the 
position that the collective labour agreement should be considered a “proper” 
agreement.1028 Some scholars even went a step further arguing that a collective 
agreement was not a mere obligatory agreement, but a mutual act stipulating 
objective law.1029
1025  j.h. van Zanten, De zoogenaamde collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, pages 461 ff.
1026  A.P. Th. Eyssel, De “collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst”: regtsinstituut of sociaal 
verschijnsel [The “collective labour agreement”: legal institute or social phenomenon], 
Themis, 1905, pages 82 ff.
1027  A.P. Th. Eyssel, De “collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst”: regtsinstituut of sociaal 
verschijnsel, page 91.
1028  For a list of these scholars reference is made to W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van 
drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot CAO’s en de verbindend-
verklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 23. See also C.j. Loonstra and 
W.A. Zondag, Arbeidsrechtelijke themata, page 498.
1029  For an overview of the scholars taking this view reference is made to W.j.P.M. 
Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot CAO’s en de 
verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 23.
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2.2 The effects of a collective labour agreement
Not only did the opinions on the status of the collective labour agreement 
differ, the same was the case with regard to its possible effects.
Van Zanten summarised the effects of a collective labour agreement as 
follows:1030
1. A collective labour agreement, concluded between a “collectivity of em-
ployees” on the one hand and one employer or a “collectivity of employ-
ers” on the other, is only valid as a collective agreement, if  the collecti-
vity of employees has legal personality. Should this not be the case, only 
multiple individual agreements between on the one side the employer or 
a “collectivity of employers” and on the other the members of the col-
lectivity of employees have been concluded, setting out the conditions 
of the employment agreement, under the condition precedent that an 
employment agreement will exist. In this scenario there are no collective 
rights, which obviously does not coincide with the goal of the contrac-
ting parties.
2. Should both contracting parties have legal personality, the legal effects 
of the collective labour agreement are as follows:
a. the contracting parties are liable for the correct execution of the collec-
tive labour agreement;
b. if  the members of the contracting parties have not arranged specific to-
pics in their employment agreement that are arranged in the collective 
labour agreement, these latter arrangements apply to the employment 
agreement;
c. the members of the contracting parties are, just as the contracting par-
ties themselves, obliged to execute the collective labour agreement, but 
such an obligation merely exists towards their own collectivity. Should a 
member agree on provisions deviating from the content of the collective 
labour agreement in an individual employment agreement, the collecti-
vity of this member is liable, but that collectivity can recover its damages 
from that member. That latter can, however, escape performance under 
the collective agreement, provided that it terminates its membership of 
the collectivity.
Not surprisingly, Eyssel countered the above. According to him, even if  
a collective agreement were to be an agreement, it would not have the 
consequences expressed by Van Zanten. his view on the consequences of 
1030  j.h. van Zanten, De zoogenaamde collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, pages 470 ff.
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the collective labour agreement compared to the effects this agreement has, 
according to Van Zanten, is the following:
2. Should both contracting parties have legal personality and should the 
collective labour agreement be a valid agreement, the legal effects of this 
agreement are as follows:
a. the collective agreement sets out the rights between the members of  the 
collectivity of employees vis-à-vis the employers and does not lead to 
any obligations between the contracting parties. The contracting parties 
are therefore not liable for the correct execution of the collective labour 
agreement.1031 
b. if  the members of the contracting parties have not arranged specific sub-
jects in their employment agreement that are arranged in the collective 
labour agreement, these latter arrangements do not, in principle, apply. 
The members of the contracting parties cannot derive any rights from 
the collective labour agreement, as the agreement only has effect between 
the contracting parties and not third parties, such as the members of the 
contracting parties.1032 
c. should a member of the contracting parties in the individual employ-
ment agreements agree on provisions deviating from the content of the 
collective labour agreement, the collectivity of this member is – as said 
under a – not liable. Not only does the collective labour agreement itself  
give insufficient basis for such liability, but it should also be noted that 
members of both sides have agreed on a deviating employment agree-
ment. If, however, there would be any liability, there is no escape possible 
by simply terminating the membership of the collectivity.1033 
2.3 Towards acts on collective labour agreements
Although the publications on the legal status and consequences of collective 
labour agreements in the early years of the 20th century diverged on many 
occasions, most scholars did acknowledge that collective labour agreements 
should receive their place in the dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek; 
1031  A.P. Th. Eyssel, De “collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst”: regtsinstituut of sociaal 
verschijnsel, pages 83 ff.
1032  A.P. Th. Eyssel, De “collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst”: regtsinstituut of sociaal 
verschijnsel, pages 107 ff.
1033  A.P. Th. Eyssel, De “collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst”: regtsinstituut of sociaal 
verschijnsel, pages 110 ff.
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“dCC”), but that no part of the dCC could cope with the peculiarities of 
these agreements.1034 
2.3.1 Article 1637n DCC 
The dutch legislator responded to this in 1907 by introducing a provision 
in the dCC on collective labour agreements: article 1637n. This provision 
introduced a definition of a collective labour agreement and (only) one 
consequence of violation of the collective labour agreement in the individual 
employment relation:1035 
Any stipulation between the employer and the employee, in violation of a collective 
labour agreement, which binds both, shall upon demand of any of the parties to the 
collective labour agreement with the exception of the employer itself, be declared 
void. A collective labour agreement is an arrangement, concluded between one or 
more employers or associations of employers having legal personality, and one or 
more associations of employees having legal personality, concerning the terms of 
employment to be observed when concluding individual employment agreements. 
2.3.2 Act on the Collective Labour Agreement 
It does not take a visionary to predict that this provision alone would not 
suffice to completely clear all the fog surrounding the (effects of a) collective 
labour agreement: too many matters were left untouched.1036 There was 
a call for a better, more inclusive statutory arrangement of the subject at 
hand.1037 Notwithstanding this, it took the legislator until 1927 to repeal 
article 1637n dCC and replace it with a proper act: the Act on the Collective 
Labour Agreement (Wet op de Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomst; “ACLA”).1038 
Basically, this act describes the private law aspects on concluding collective 
labour agreements and its consequences, as will be set out in detail in section 
8 below. The reason for drafting this Act was, according to the legislator, the 
development of the collective labour agreement to an important institute. This 
institute needed further regulation on its conclusion, its legal consequences, 
1034  L.G. Kortenhorst and Mac. M.j. van Rooy, De collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, 
page 55.
1035  This is an informal translation only.
1036  See for problems arising from article 1637n dCC C.j. Loonstra and W.A. Zondag, 
Arbeidsrechtelijke themata, pages 499 ff.
1037  L.G. Kortenhorst and Mac. M.j. van Rooy, De collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, 
pages 18 ff.
1038  Act of 24 december 1927, Bulletin of Acts and decrees (Staatsblad; “Stb.”) 1927, 
415. The act entered into force on 1 September 1928.
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its term and its termination. More importantly, it should be further clarified 
which parties were bound by the collective labour agreement.1039
2.3.3 Act on declaring binding and not binding of provisions 
of Collective Labour Agreements
Already before and during the introduction of the ACLA, there was a 
vivid discussion on the necessity of an instrument extending the scope of 
application of collective labour agreements. In the explanatory memorandum 
of the ACLA, the legislator simply noted that it had not yet defined its 
position on this matter.1040 It would take the legislator years to finally make 
up its mind. Only in december 1936 did the legislator publish its proposal of 
what has become the Act on declaring binding and not binding of provisions 
of Collective Labour Agreements (Wet op het algemeen verbindend en 
onverbindend verklaren van bepalingen van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten; 
“Extension Act”).1041 This act enabled the Minister, under specific conditions, 
to declare collective labour agreements binding within specific sectors. 
In the legal history of the Extension Act the legislator extensively explained 
the reasons for this Act. The legislator praised the benefits the ACLA has 
brought for the Netherlands, most notably its positive effects on the order and 
rest in the dutch trade and industry. however, it also noted that employers 
and employees could easily evade collective labour agreements by simply not 
joining the agreement, or terminating their memberships of the contracting 
employers’ or employees’ associations. According to the legislator, this evasion 
undermined the further development of collective bargaining and led to 
severe competition on employment conditions. As the legislator deemed this 
undesirable, it intended to implement an act enabling the relevant parties to 
extend the scope of application of a collective labour agreement to employers 
and employees who would otherwise not be bound by this agreement, 
consequently preventing the aforementioned competition on employment 
conditions.1042
The original driving forces behind the Extension Act were therefore (i) the 
support of collective bargaining and (ii) the prevention of competition on 
1039   Explanatory Memorandum (Memorie van Toelichting; “MvT”) ACLA, exhibits to 
the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 3.
1040  MvT ACLA, exhibits to the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 3. 
1041  Act of 25 May 1937, Stb. 1937, 801 and Stb. 1937, 892. The act entered into force 
on 1 October 1937.
1042  MvT Extension Act, exhibits to the official report II, 1936/1937, 274, page 3.
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employment conditions. Another advantage of the Extension Act, which has 
been emphasised after the Act itself  came into force, is (iii) the possibility 
of decentralising employment legislation, by permitting the social partners 
to draft pseudo-legislation in a specific sector via binding collective labour 
agreements.1043 Although the Extension Act has been criticised on many 
occasions, it still forms, combined with the ACLA, the heart of the dutch 
collective bargaining system.
3. The classical rights concerning collective bargaining
dutch law acknowledges the three rights deemed crucial for the conclusion of 
collective agreements: (i) the freedom of association, (ii) the right to collective 
bargaining, and (iii) the right to strike. 
Article 8 of the dutch Constitution (Grondwet) guarantees the right of 
association. This right includes the freedom to establish trade unions.1044
The right to collective bargaining is not embedded in the Constitution, but 
the entitlement to bargain derives from the ACLA. In the end, the mere fact 
that the legislator drafted this Act enabling the social partners in a statutory 
fashion to conclude collective labour agreements, sufficiently establishes this 
entitlement in the Netherlands. A right to collective bargaining, within the 
meaning that one party can always oblige another party to enter into such 
bargaining, is not accepted in the Netherlands as such.1045
The right to collective action (or the right to strike for that matter) is not 
embedded in any statute or in the Constitution. This right, nevertheless, exists 
in the Netherlands and is judge-made. The Supreme Court derived the right to 
strike from article 6.4 of the European Social Charter,1046 a stipulation which, 
according to the Supreme Court, has direct effect through our monistic regime 
1043  M.M. Olbers, ‘Wet op het algemeen verbindend en onverbindend verklaren van 
bepalingen van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten’ [Act on declaring binding and 
not binding provisions of collective labour agreements], in: ‘Arbeidsovereenkomst’ 
[Employment Agreement], Kluwer, volume 3, Considerans [preamble], comment 2. 
1044  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht [Collective employment law], Kluwer, 
deventer, 2005, page 32.
1045  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht, page 176. however, in some situations 
case law entitles a trade union a place at the negotiation table, even if  that trade 
union was not invited, in fact awarding a right to collective bargaining to that 
member. Reference is made to section 7.
1046  dutch Bulletin of Treaties (Tractatenblad; “Trb.”) 1963, 90.
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set out in articles 93 and 941047 of the Constitution.1048 Many scholars consider 
the right to strike a “fundamental right”, albeit not embedded in the dutch 
constitution.1049 The Supreme Court has affirmed this point of view.1050 
4. Collective labour agreements
Before discussing the collective bargaining process in the Netherlands, it 
should be defined exactly what constitutes a collective labour agreement 
(section 4.1). Thereafter, the different types of provisions of collective labour 
agreements will be discussed (section 4.2).
4.1 What constitutes a collective labour agreement?
Pursuant to article 1.1 ACLA, a collective labour agreement is (i) an agreement 
concluded between (ii) one or more employers, or associations of employers, 
and one or more trade unions, (iii) principally or exclusively setting out the 
terms of employment applicable to individual employment agreements. This 
definition shows that at least three elements are of relevance.
First, there must be an agreement. Pursuant to article 3 ACLA, this 
agreement must be set out in an authentic deed or written contract. This same 
demand applies to alterations and extensions of terms of collective labour 
agreements (article 5 ACLA). In practice, collective labour agreements and 
their amendments and extensions are written agreements duly executed by all 
contracting parties.1051
Furthermore, it should be noted that not every party is capable of concluding 
collective labour agreements. The contracting parties should, on the one hand, 
be one or more employers or associations of employers, and on the other, one 
or more trade unions. These associations must meet specific demands. For a 
further discussion of the parties involved reference is made to section 6.
1047  Some claim that the dutch monistic system does not derive from the Constitution 
but from case law (Supreme Court, 3 March 1919, Nj 1919, page 371). This, 
however, does not change the fact that the monistic regime applies in the 
Netherlands.
1048  Supreme Court, 11 November 1994, Nj 1995/152, Havenstaking. See also Supreme 
Court, 30 May 1986, Nj 1986/688, NS.
1049  L.A.j. Schut, Internationale normen in het Nederlandse stakingsrecht [International 
norms in the Dutch right to strike], SdU, den haag, 1996, page 34.
1050  Supreme Court, 28 january 2000, Nj 2000/292, Douwe Egberts.
1051  C.j. Loonstra and W.A. Zondag, Arbeidsrechtelijke themata, page 514.
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The third demand requires the collective labour agreement to principally 
or exclusively set out the terms of employment applicable to employment 
agreements. This requirement should be interpreted broadly. According to 
the dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), an agreement that merely contains 
provisions that are not employment conditions as such, but provisions which 
do relate to employment agreements, still meets this requirement.1052 Such 
an agreement can therefore be considered a collective labour agreement 
(provided, of course, that the other demands are satisfied as well).
A further requirement, which cannot be found in the ACLA, is that a collective 
labour agreement should be reported to the Minister (article 4 of the Act on 
Wage Formation (Wet op de Loonvorming)).1053 Although this requirement is 
imposed for administrative reasons only,1054 without such a notification an 
agreement cannot be considered a collective labour agreement.1055
4.2 Different types of provisions 
The above explains, from a formal point of view, what constitutes a collective 
labour agreement. It does not distinguish between the different types of 
provisions a collective labour agreement can contain. In the Netherlands, 
it is common to differentiate between obligatory, normative and collective 
normative provisions.1056 One should bear in mind that this systemisation, 
although useful to better understand collective labour law, is not statutory 
and has no direct legal consequences.
So-called obligatory provisions lay down the rights and obligations between 
the parties concluding the collective employment agreement. Examples 
of statutory obligatory provisions are the obligation for the contracting 
associations to inform their members of the conclusion and content of 
the collective labour agreement (article 4 ACLA) and their obligation to 
take those reasonable measures that are conducive for their members to 
perform under the collective labour agreement (article 8 ACLA). Examples 
of contractual obligatory provisions are the manner of termination of the 
1052  Supreme Court, 30 january 1987, Nj 1987/936, Van Velden.
1053  Stb. 1970, 69.
1054  E. Verhulp, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Netherlands, pages 5.
1055  Supreme Court, 13 April 2001, jAR 2001/82, Duzgun.
1056  F. Koning, De obligatoire, diagonale en normatieve bepalingen van de CAO [The 
obligatory, diagonal and normative provisions of the collective labour agreement], 
Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid 1988-3, pages 174 ff. 
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collective labour agreement, possible obligations to consult the counterparty 
in specific circumstances and a possible peace obligation.1057
Normative (also known as horizontal) provisions create rights and obligations 
between the contracting parties to an individual labour agreement (the 
employers and employees) that fall within the scope of application of the 
collective labour agreement. These provisions are the quintessence of collective 
labour agreements. Examples of such provisions are stipulations that regulate 
the type and amount of remuneration, allowances related to qualifications, 
rates for payment by results, working time, holiday, conditions and provisions 
governing termination of the employment relationship etc.
The collective normative1058 (also known as diagonal) provisions set out the 
rights and obligations of the employers and employees towards “collectivities”, 
being (i) the parties to the collective labour agreement1059 or (ii) other collective 
entities.1060 Examples of the first mentioned collective normative provisions 
are the obligation for the employer to pay a contribution to the contracting 
trade union and (although uncommon) the obligation of the employee to 
refrain from entering into service with an employer who is not bound by the 
collective labour agreement. An important example of the latter collective 
normative provision is the establishment of funds, usually paid for by the 
individual employers.
5. The players in the collective bargaining process
The parties who take part in the dutch bargaining system are the government, 
the employers’ confederations and trade union confederations, separate 
employers’ associations, trade unions and individual employers. 
The government has little direct involvement in the bargaining process 
anymore. In the period from 1945 until 1982 the government did intervene in 
1057   This is a stipulation that prohibits collective actions aimed at (changing) a 
collective labour agreement that still is in force. A.Ph.C.M. jaspers, Nederlands 
stakingsrecht op een nieuw spoor? [Dutch law on strike on a new track?], Kluwer, 
deventer, 2004, page 50.
1058  R. Blanpain, European Labour law, page 688.
1059  It should be noted that an enterprise level agreement does not have a collectivity at 
the employer’s side.
1060  W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 76.
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the results of collective bargaining by making wage moderation decisions.1061 
Since the aforementioned Wassenaar Agreement, the government intervention 
was moderated significantly. Today, the government is involved in the Labour 
Foundation and the Social and Economic Council to further government’s 
interests, but this is only indirect involvement in collective bargaining. Its 
further involvement is restricted to enact legislation on collective agreements 
and, when it comes to extending collective labour agreements, making this 
possible. 
The confederations have hardly any direct influence on the collective bargaining 
process either. The main confederations on the side of the employees are the 
Federatie Nederlandse Vakverenigingen, the Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond 
and the Vakcentrale voor middengroepen en hoger personeel. They are umbrella 
organisations, a cooperative of trade unions. It is these trade unions that 
enter into collective labour agreements and conduct the prior negotiations. 
The trade union confederations “merely” coordinate this process. The main 
confederations on the side of the employers are VNO-NCW, MKB-Nederland 
and LTO-Nederland. VNO-NCW and MKB-Nederland coordinate the 
negotiating process, but are not a contracting party. The actual contracting is 
the task of their members. LTO-Nederland does enter directly into collective 
labour agreements. 
The trade unions and employers’ organisations are the most interesting 
parties in the collective bargaining process, as they, besides the employers 
themselves, are the ones that actually conclude collective labour agreements. 
The trade unions and employers’ organisations typically operate in their 
own specific field, such as manufacturing, construction, transport, health 
care or education. Trade unions in particular are still divided on the basis of 
ideology.1062 Neither trade unions nor employers’ organisations have strong 
connections with political parties. Trade unions and employers’ organisations 
must, by law, meet two specific requirements in order to be able to conclude 
collective labour agreements.
First, organisations should, pursuant to article 1.1 ACLA, be associations 
which have legal personality. When drafting the “old” article 1637n dCC 
(reference is made to section 2.3 above), there was a vivid discussion whether 
it was necessary to demand legal personality. When drafting the ACLA, 
1061  E. Verhulp, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Netherlands, page 31.
1062  E. Verhulp, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Netherlands, page 17.
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the legislator considered this indispensable. The legislator argued that 
the collective labour agreement also entails rights and obligations for the 
contracting parties. Only entities that have legal personality are capable of 
carrying these rights and obligations themselves.1063 
Second, the articles of association of these associations must specifically 
stipulate their power to conclude collective labour agreements (article 2 
ACLA). The reason for this requirement is (i) to ensure that the association 
really commits itself  to collective bargaining and (ii) to emphasise to aspirant 
members that the association can bind its members by a collective labour 
agreement.1064
The associations do not have to meet specific statutory requirements 
concerning representativity or independence when concluding collective 
labour agreements. The possible role these topics play will be discussed in 
section 9. 
6. The negotiation process / conclusion of 
a collective labour agreement
The ACLA is rather silent about the collective bargaining process. Consequently, 
this process is governed by general concepts of law, most notably the law of 
contract. This entails, amongst other things, that the parties involved are free 
to choose whether they wish to enter into a collective labour agreement and, 
if  so, with whom.1065
The freedom to choose whether or not to enter into a collective labour agreement 
does not include the “right to be left alone”. One party may obviously try to 
persuade the other party to start negotiations. Trade unions, for example, may 
exercise pressure on the employer through collective actions in order to force 
the latter to enter into a collective labour agreement.1066 Furthermore, in rare 
cases the freedom to freely choose the negotiation partner is limited. Once an 
employer or employers’ association has started negotiations with one or more 
1063  MvT ACLA, exhibits to the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 4.
1064  M.M. Olbers, Wet op de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, in: Arbeidsovereenkomst, 
Kluwer, volume 3, article 2, comment 1.
1065  C.j. Loonstra and W.A. Zondag, Arbeidsrechtelijke themata, page 507.
1066  Only incidentally special statutes oblige the employer to consult trade unions. 
This is, for example, the matter in case of collective dismissals and some types of 
mergers, Reference is made to the Collective dismissal Act (Wet Melding Collectief 
Ontslag) and the Social and Economic Council Merger Code (SER-Besluit 
Fusiegedragsregels).
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trade unions, another (sufficiently or even evidently representative)1067 trade 
union may, in specific circumstances, demand a place at the negotiation table 
as well.1068 
Once the negotiations turned out successful, the parties can conclude the 
collective labour agreement. In practice, the trade unions will first give 
their members the opportunity to either accept or deny the outcome of the 
negotiations, prior to making the agreement final.1069 This final approval, 
however, is not a statutory requirement.
7. The effects of the collective labour agreement
Sections 7.1 through 7.4 will analyse, applying the 4 standard scenarios, (i) 
to whom the collective labour agreement applies, (ii) the effects which such 
an application has, and (iii) how the parties involved can enforce their rights. 
Section 7.5 sets out which other enforcement methods are in place in case of 
a breach of the collective labour agreement. Section 7.6 describes a “special” 
consequence that the collective labour agreement has, regarding provisions of 
so-called ¾ mandatory law. Section 7.7 will subsequently focus on the term 
and termination of the collective labour agreements. Section 7.8 will discuss 
the collective labour agreement’s possible after-effects. Finally, section 7.9 sets 
out the role of alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining.
7.1 Scenario 1
The contracting parties – that is, one or more employers or associations of 
employers and one or more trade unions – are bound to each other by the 
(obligatory provisions of the) collective labour agreement, upon conclusion 
of that agreement. This is, according to the legislator, self-evident. A specific 
provision in the ACLA to this effect was even deemed superfluous.1070 
Although the collective labour agreement may be a special type of agreement; 
it is an agreement (under private law) nonetheless. The signatory parties 
1067  depending on the court, sometimes “sufficient representativeness” is required and 
other times “evident representativeness”.
1068  See for example the Court of Appeal in Arnhem, 14 March 1995, jAR 1995/96, 
RCC. See also district Court in Utrecht, 31 december 1986 and 4 November 1987, 
Nj 1988/676, NCHP. See furthermore Supreme Court, 8 june 2007, jAR 2007/162, 
AbvaKabo.
1069  A. Stege, De CAO en het regelingsbereik van de sociale partners, page 240.
1070  Memorandum of Reply (Memorie van Antwoord; “MvA”) ACLA, exhibits to the 
official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 22.
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are therefore bound by the agreement like any other contracting party.1071 
Consequently, these parties need, by law, to perform under the contract; 
taking into consideration the reasonableness and fairness that all contracting 
parties should take into account (article 6:248 dCC).1072
Should a contracting party breach an obligatory provision of the collective 
labour agreement, the counterparty may instigate proceedings against that 
party.1073 The counterparty may resort to the “usual” remedies following a 
breach of contract.1074 This normally leads to claims on damages or specific 
performance (articles 6:74 ff dCC). The aggrieved party may even dissolve 
the collective labour agreement (article 6:265 dCC), although that recourse 
will normally, given its far-reaching consequences, be used reticently.1075
Another matter is whether the contracting parties, should they be associations, 
are liable for the non-performance of their members under the collective labour 
agreement. In other words: are these associations liable if  their members 
fail to perform under the collective labour agreement? Article 8.1 ACLA 
opts for a nuanced approach in this respect. The contracting association is 
obliged to promote that its members fulfil the obligations arising from the 
collective labour agreement. The association must therefore attempt, to the 
best of its abilities, to make sure that its members follow the collective labour 
agreement; though it does not have to guarantee this. The contracting parties 
may, however, pursuant to article 8.2 ACLA, stipulate that the association has 
to guarantee the proper performance of its members of the collective labour 
agreement. This exception is only rarely applied.1076
7.2 Scenario 2
The position of the individual employer and employee towards each other is 
what matters most in collective labour law. Pursuant to article 9.1 ACLA, the 
1071  MvT ACLA, exhibits to the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, pages 4 and 5.
1072  MvA ACLA, exhibits to the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 16.
1073  Should the obligatory provision have sufficient normative elements, the party or 
parties that are aggrieved by this non-performance – being the individual employers 
and/or employees – may also instigate proceedings themselves. Reference is made to 
the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam, 31 October 1996, jAR 1996/246, Grot/KLM.
1074  The counterparty may also invoke article 15 ACLA, which will be discussed in 
section 7.5, but that article is not frequently used in such a situation as it adds 
nothing to the already existing remedies specified in the dCC.
1075  M.M. Olbers, Wet op de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, article 9, comment 4.
1076  M.M. Olbers, Handhaving van de CAO [Enforcement of the collective labour 
agreement], Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid 1988-3, page 217.
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collective labour agreement should be applied to the employers and employees 
that (i) are both bound by and (ii) fall within the scope of application of that 
agreement.
7.2.1 Which employers and employees are bound by 
the collective labour agreement?
The employer who either is a member of an employers’ association that is a 
party to the collective labour agreement, or entered into the collective labour 
agreement itself, is bound by that agreement. The employee who is a member 
of a trade union that is a party to the collective labour agreement is bound by 
that agreement as well (article 9 ACLA).
This binding power is strong. It not only applies if  the employer/employee 
is a member of a contracting association at the moment of concluding the 
agreement, but also if  he becomes a member during the term of the collective 
labour agreement (articles 9.1 and 7.2 ACLA). Furthermore, termination of 
this membership has no effect on the binding power of the collective labour 
agreement on that member, up to the date that the collective labour agreement 
is either adapted or extended (article 10 ACLA). Even the dissolution of a 
contracting association has, given article 11 ACLA, no impact on the rights 
and obligations arising from the collective labour agreement. The association 
must, during its liquidation, continue to fulfil the collective labour agreement’s 
obligations until the date that such an agreement is either adapted or 
extended.1077
7.2.2 Which employers and employees fall within the collective 
labour agreement’s scope of application?
The collective labour agreement provides for its own scope of application.1078 
When determining this scope, four aspects should be taken into 
consideration:
i. the group of employees falling under the collective labour agreement;
ii. the employer or group of employers falling under the collective labour 
agreement;
iii. the geographical territory; and
iv. the duration.
1077  M.M. Olbers, Wet op de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, article 11, comment 1.
1078  E. Verhulp, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Netherlands, page 7.
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Many collective labour agreements only apply to certain groups of employees 
or exclude certain groups of employees (often higher level employees). If  an 
employee is bound by the collective labour agreement (through his membership 
of a contracting trade union), but is excluded from the scope of application 
of the agreement by the agreement itself, the collective labour agreement does 
not apply to the employment agreement of that employee.
The employer or group of employers should also fall within the scope of 
application of the collective labour agreement. This demand can raise 
questions if  a collective labour agreement is extended. Unless the collective 
labour agreement itself  stipulates otherwise, the core business of the employer 
is decisive when determining which collective labour agreement applies to the 
employer.1079
Although this is uncommon in practice,1080 it should be noted that the collective 
labour agreement may be limited in geographical territory. A collective labour 
agreement could, for example, apply solely to employees working in the 
harbour of Rotterdam. Moreover, the collective labour agreement is limited 
in time. Matters on term and termination of the collective labour agreement 
will be set out in section 7.8.
7.2.3 What are the legal consequences?
An applicable collective labour agreement has, pursuant to the ACLA, two main 
consequences for the individual employment agreement: (i) every provision 
in the individual employment agreement deviating from the collective labour 
agreement is null and void and is replaced by the corresponding provision 
in the collective labour agreement (article 12 ACLA) and (ii) any provision 
arranged for in the collective labour agreement, but not in the individual 
employment agreement, automatically applies (article 13 ACLA). In other 
words, the normative provisions in the collective labour agreement have a self-
executing (direct normative) effect on the individual employment agreement.
The nullity as mentioned in article 12 ACLA is absolute: the provision in the 
individual employment agreement deviating from the content of the collective 
labour agreement will be considered not to exist.1081 Consequently, nobody has 
to invoke the nullity in order for it to have effect. This also means that every 
1079  Supreme Court, 6 january 1995, Nj 1995, 549, Derksen/Iselmar.
1080  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Labour law & social security in the Netherlands, an introduction, 
BookWorks Publications, 1997, p. 25.
1081  MvT ACLA, exhibits to the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 6.
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interested party may call upon the nullity should it wish so. This entitlement 
is explicitly set out in article 12.2 ACLA for the contracting parties. As a 
result, these parties may request a court to declare for law that a provision in 
an employment agreement is null and void, as it deviates from the collective 
labour agreement, without substantiating their interest in this claim.1082
Article 13 ACLA completes article 12 ACLA. The employer cannot escape 
from the provisions of the collective labour agreement by simply not arranging 
anything in the individual employment agreement, as these provisions of the 
collective labour agreement apply, pursuant to article 13, in such a situation 
as well.
7.2.4 Deviation from the collective labour agreement in 
the individual employment agreement
It should be noted that not every provision in an individual employment 
agreement that is different from the corresponding provision in the collective 
labour agreement always deviates from the collective labour agreement. In 
that respect three different sorts of normative provisions that could be found 
in a collective labour agreement should be distinguished: provisions can be 
“standard”, “minimum”, or even “maximum”. If  a provision is standard, any 
variation of that provision in individual employment contracts, falling within 
the scope of that collective labour agreement, will be null and void. Whether 
a provision is standard can be inferred from (the wording of) the text.1083 Most 
provisions (and entire collective labour agreements) in the Netherlands are, 
however, minimum provisions, which allow departure from the provision 
in individual contracts in favour of the employee. Maximum provisions in 
collective labour agreements may not be exceeded in individual employment 
agreements. A single collective labour agreement may contain minimum, 
maximum and standard provisions.1084
When comparing provisions, each individual provision of the individual 
employment agreement needs to be assessed against each individual 
provision in the collective labour agreement in order to establish whether the 
first provision is more favourable.1085 A package comparison – i.e. the entire 
individual employment agreement is compared with the entire collective 
1082  W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 87.
1083  C.j. Loonstra and W.A. Zondag, Arbeidsrechtelijke themata, pages 515 and 516.
1084  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht, page 116.
1085  Supreme Court 14 january 2000, jAR 2000/43, Boonen/Quicken.
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labour agreement – is not allowed, unless the collective labour agreement 
specifically permits this.
7.2.5 Enforcement
As already mentioned, the normative provisions of the collective labour 
agreement have a self-executing effect: they “automatically” adapt the 
individual employment agreement. As a consequence, the individual employer 
or employee, who does not oblige the normative provisions of the collective 
labour agreement, is in breach of the individual employment contract. The 
aggrieved party can subsequently claim specific performance and/or damages 
following this breach of contract. This party cannot claim the dissolution 
of the collective labour agreement, as such an action is only available to the 
contracting parties.1086
7.3 Scenario 3
The above-mentioned only applies if  both the employee and the employer 
are bound by the collective labour agreement (and fall within the scope of 
application of that agreement). But what if  (i) the employer is (neither through 
membership of a contracting association nor through executing the contract 
itself) not bound by the collective labour agreement while the employee 
(through membership of the contracting trade union) is and (ii) vice versa?
In the first situation the collective labour agreement does not apply to the 
employment agreement.1087 Should this have been different, the employee 
could, according to the legislator, become isolated. After all, in such a situation 
the employer could opt to only hire employees that are not a contracting trade 
union’s member in order to be able to determine the employment conditions 
itself, without collective labour law interference.1088
The second situation is governed by article 14 ACLA. Pursuant to this article, 
the employer (who is bound by the collective labour agreement) is, during the 
term of the collective labour agreement, obliged to apply the employment 
conditions set out in the collective labour agreement to employees who are not 
1086  MvA ACLA, exhibits to the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 22.
1087  This is different if  the employer agreed on the applicability of the collective labour 
agreement with the employee. See Supreme Court 20 december 2002, jAR 2003/19, 
Bollemeijer/TPG.
1088  MvT ACLA, exhibits to the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 7.
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bound by the collective labour agreement (so-called article 14 employees1089). 
This obligation does not apply should the collective labour agreement stipulate 
so. The reason for this construction is that the legislator wished to prevent the 
employer who is bound by the collective labour agreement to escape from the 
content of that agreement, by simply not hiring employees who are members 
of the contracting trade union.1090 This construction is not intended to protect 
article 14 employees.1091
7.3.1 Article 14 ACLA
It should be noted that article 14 ACLA does not automatically bind the 
article 14 employee; it “merely” obliges the employer to apply the relevant 
employment conditions1092 stipulated in the collective labour agreement to the 
article 14 employee. In basic terms, article 14 ACLA means that the employer 
should (i) only hire new employees on the basis of the aforementioned 
employment conditions and (ii) offer the article 14 employees that were 
already employed by him the same employment conditions.1093
If  the employer (i) refuses to apply the employment conditions of the collective 
labour agreement to its (current or new) article 14 employees or (ii) if  a (current) 
employee does not accept the employer’s offer to apply these employment 
conditions, the collective labour agreement’s employment conditions do not 
apply and the (already) agreed on individual employment conditions (remain) 
are in force. In other words, the collective labour agreement’s employment 
1089  Article 14 employees are either employees who are not member of any trade union 
or who are member of a trade union that is not a party to the collective labour 
agreement. M.M. Olbers, ‘Wet op de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst’, article 14, 
comment 1. When the position of the article 14 employee is discussed hereinafter, it 
should be presumed that the employer of that employee is bound by the collective 
labour agreement, unless specifically stipulated otherwise.
1090  MvT ACLA, exhibits to the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 7.
1091  E. Verhulp, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Netherlands, page 6.
1092  Whether these employment conditions include collective normative provisions will 
be discussed in section 7.4.
1093  The exact wording of article 14 ACLA seems to suggest that the employer is 
only obliged to apply the employment conditions set out in the collective labour 
agreement to newly hired employees (not bound by the collective labour agreement) 
during the term of the collective labour agreement. however, most scholars and 
lower courts argue that the employer should apply these employment conditions 
to all (current and new) employees that are not bound by the collective labour 
agreement. This is also common practice in the Netherlands. Reference is made to 
A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht, page 124. See also M.M. Olbers, ‘Wet op 
de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst’, article 14, comment 4.
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conditions do not prevail over the individual employment conditions of article 
14 employees (it has no direct effect); articles 12 and 13 ACLA do not apply. 
In these situations the employer nonetheless violates article 14 ACLA.1094
The article 14 employee cannot, according to the Supreme Court, oblige 
the employer to apply the collective labour agreement to his employment 
agreement himself.1095 The reason for this originates from the legal history 
of the ACLA: the legislator did not intend to grant the article 14 employee 
entitlements arising from the collective labour agreement, entitlements which 
were established without participation of that employee’s trade union. The 
legislator merely wished to prevent the situation that the employer would 
escape from the content of the applicable collective labour agreement by 
simply not hiring employees who are a member of the contracting trade union. 
If  the article 14 employee would have the same benefits as the employees who 
are member of the contracting trade unions, there would not be any incentive 
for the article 14 employees to join the contracting trade union.1096 Should 
the article 14 employee wish the collective labour agreement’s employment 
conditions to apply, he could become a member of a contracting trade union, 
after which the second of the above scenarios applies. The Supreme Court 
therefore saw no reason to grant the article 14 employee the right to enforce 
article 14 ACLA.1097
7.3.2 Acceptance of collective labour agreement / incorporation clause
Of course, an article 14 employee could also accept the employer’s offer to 
apply the collective labour agreement’s employment conditions. Should 
this be the case, these conditions apply (and the employer complies with 
article 14 ACLA). In practice, the employer does not want to depend on the 
article 14 employee’s cooperation to accept the conditions of the collective 
labour agreement. For that reason, many employers explicitly stipulate in 
the employment agreement that a specific collective employment agreement 
1094  Although it is disputable whether the employer truly violates article 14 ACLA in 
the second situation (the employer offers to the article 14 employee the employment 
conditions set out in the applicable collective labour agreement, but the employee 
refuses to accept this). If  it should be accepted that article 14 ACLA applies to 
both current and newly hired employees, the employer does in such an event 
violate the exact wording of article 14 ACLA, but he cannot really be blamed. 
See W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 94.
1095  Supreme Court 7 june 1957, Nj 1957/527, Suk/Brittania.
1096  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht, page 125.
1097  That this construction is somewhat peculiar will be set out in section 9.2.
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applies. Such a stipulation is usually referred to as an “incorporation clause” 
(incorperatiebeding). In such an event the employer does not have to depend 
on the decision of the article 14 employee whether or not to accept the 
employment conditions of the new collective labour agreement; this employee 
is bound by the new collective labour agreement by contract.1098 
If  the article 14 employee is bound by the collective labour agreement – 
through acceptance or through an incorporation clause1099 – his situation is 
very similar to scenario 2.1100 The collective labour agreement’s employment 
conditions apply, “adapting” the already existing employment conditions if  
necessary. Both parties may also enforce these employment conditions upon 
each other, as they agreed on the applicability thereof.
7.4 Scenario 4
Employers and employees who are both bound by the collective labour 
agreement (see scenario 2 above) are, if  provided for in the collective labour 
agreement, also bound to collectivities by the (collective normative provisions 
of) this agreement. These collectivities can be the contracting parties and third 
entities, most notably funds.
In case the employer is also the contracting party, he has no “collective 
normative” obligation towards the contracting parties; any such obligation 
is obligatory. This employer can, nonetheless, still have collective normative 
obligations towards third entities. It is rather self-evident that this employer is 
bound to this third entity, as he committed to the contract. It is, however, less 
evident that the members of the contracting associations are bound via the 
collective labour agreement vis-à-vis the collectivities (both the contracting 
parties and third collective entities), as agreements usually arrange rights and 
obligations between the signatory parties themselves. 
1098  The incorporation clause is also practical for other reasons. As a general rule, the 
employer does not know which of his employees are member of the contracting 
trade unions as article 16 of the data Protection Act (Wet Bescherming 
Persoonsgegevens) prohibits the employer to process sensitive data, including data 
on trade union memberships. An incorporation clause can save the employer quite 
some difficulties in this situation, because this mere stipulation normally suffices to 
bind all of the employees.
1099  These are the most important manners for an article 14 employee to be bound 
by the collective labour agreement. however, they could also be bound by usage, 
reasonableness and fairness and other manners. Reference is made to A.T.j.M. 
jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht, pages 132 and 133.
1100  W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 97.
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here article 9.2 ACLA comes into play. This article stipulates that each 
member of a contracting association is obliged to fulfil the collective labour 
agreement’s obligations that concern that member towards each contracting 
party of the collective labour agreement, as if  that member itself  were party 
to the collective labour agreement. This provision makes it clear that the 
members (employer and employees) are bound to the contracting associations. 
Article 9.2 ACLA makes less clear that these members are also bound to third 
collective entities; still, they are. The Supreme Court decided that this article 
also regulates the relation between the members vis-à-vis funds.1101 This 
relation should be considered a contractual one.1102
If  a member of a contracting organisation fails to comply with a collective 
normative obligation, the collectivities (both the contracting parties and third 
collective entities) can claim damages and/or specific performance on the basis 
of article 9.2 ACLA. This article is that broadly put, that the contracting 
association can even oblige its own members to fulfil collective normative 
obligations on this basis.
The above applies to employees and employers that are bound by the 
collective labour agreement. But what about the article 14 employee? Is the 
employer obliged by law to ensure that the article 14 employee also fulfils 
collective normative provisions? Article 14 ACLA refers only to the normative 
provisions of the collective labour agreement. however, most scholars argue 
that article 14 ACLA also concerns (most) collective normative provisions 
of the collective labour agreement.1103 In any case, the Supreme Court ruled 
that collective normative obligations should surely be applied to article 
14 employees who are bound by a collective labour agreement through an 
incorporation clause.1104
7.5 Other statutory means of enforcement
The above-mentioned scenarios discuss, amongst other things, whether or not 
the parties whose rights are concerned are entitled to enforce these rights. 
The ACLA and other acts also have specific clauses enabling the enforcement 
1101  Supreme Court 30 january 1987, Nj 1987/936, Van Velden. See also R.A.A. duk, 
De Hoge Raad en fondsenbepalingen [The Supreme Court and provisions on funds], 
Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid 1988-3, pages 198 ff.
1102  M.M. Olbers, Wet op de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, article 9, comment 4.
1103  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht, page 123, and W.j.P.M. Fase and 
j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot CAO’s en de 
verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, pages 95 – 96.
1104  Supreme Court 17 january 2003, jAR 2003/40, ABN/Teisman.
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of collective labour agreements. These will be discussed below, after which 
the enforcement methods of obligatory, normative and collective normative 
provisions will be summarised.
7.5.1 General means of enforcement
The ACLA has, as said, specific clauses enabling the enforcement of collective 
labour agreements. Some of them have already been mentioned (articles 8, 9 
and 12 ACLA), others will be discussed below (articles 15 up to and including 
17 ACLA).
Pursuant to article 15 ACLA, a contracting association may, should any of 
the other contracting parties or their members contravene the collective labour 
agreement, demand payment of damages suffered by it, but also suffered by 
its own members. This article’s original aim was to assist the contracting 
associations to enforce collective normative clauses. If, for example, an 
employer would not fulfil a collective normative provision, for instance an 
obligation to have at least a x-percentage of women in its workforce, the 
members of, rather than the contracting association itself, suffer damages 
due to this breach. Consequently, the contracting associations are unable 
to claim damages on the grounds of article 9.2 ACLA from that employer. 
Under article 15 ACLA, however, they can claim such damages, as they are 
entitled to claim damages suffered by themselves and by their members. 
The contracting association cannot, given the wording of article 15 ACLA, 
claim specific performance on the basis of this article.1105 This original aim 
notwithstanding, the legislator drafted article 15 ACLA that broad that it 
also enables contracting associations to claim damages relating to breaches 
of normative and obligatory provisions.
If  the above-mentioned damages are other than merely financial losses, 
these losses will, pursuant to article 16 ACLA, be fixed on the principles of 
reasonableness. This article is mainly used by trade unions to claim losses from 
employers who do not comply with (the normative provisions of) the collective 
labour agreement. These trade unions argue that such non-compliance leads 
to the trade union’s loss of prestige and capability to attract new members.1106 
Finally, article 17 ACLA allows the contracting parties to stipulate in the 
collective labour agreement different rules with regard to damages/losses than 
provided for in the articles 15 and 16 ACLA. 
1105  W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 118.
1106  M.M. Olbers, Wet op de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, article 16, comment 2.
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Besides the ACLA, the Works Council Act (Wet op de Ondernemingsraden) 
may be of relevance as well. Based on article 28.1 of this Act, the Works 
Council (if  established) should promote the observance of employment 
conditions and of norms in the field of health and safety applicable to the 
company. These conditions and norms may derive form applicable collective 
labour agreements. As a consequence, the Works Council may play a role in 
the observance of collective labour agreements. 
7.5.2 Enforcement of obligatory provisions
The aggrieved party may, following a breach of an obligatory provision, revert 
to the general provisions of the dCC, which are already set out in scenario 1 
above, but may also resort to article 15 ACLA. This is, however, not common 
practice, as article 15 ACLA is more limiting than the general provisions of 
the dCC (it only entitles the aggrieved party to payment of damages and not 
to specific performance or dissolution of the collective labour agreement). 
7.5.3 Enforcement of (individual) normative provisions
When it comes to the enforcement of normative provisions, the position of 
(i) the employer and employee who are both bound by the collective labour 
agreement and (ii) the article 14 employee should be distinguished.
Should both the employer and the employee be bound by the collective labour 
agreement, both parties can enforce their rights through claims based on the 
individual employment agreement.1107 Reference is made to scenario 2 above.
The contracting parties are also entitled to establish the nullity of a provision 
in the individual employment agreement, without having to establish their 
interest in such an action (article 12.2 ACLA). The contracting parties may 
also, on the basis of article 9.2 ACLA, demand specific performance and/
or payment of damages from both their own members and the members of 
the other contracting parties, should such members breach the (normative) 
obligations applicable to them under the collective labour agreement.1108 It 
should be noted that the contracting parties have their own right to do so. 
In other words, if, for example, a contracting trade union demands specific 
performance from an employer bound by the collective labour agreement, 
that trade union is under no obligation whatsoever to establish that he acts 
1107  Or even directly on the collective labour agreement. See for example: Supreme 
Court, 19 March 1976, Nj 1976/407, Kip. 
1108  M.M. Olbers, Wet op de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, article 9, comment 4.
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on behalf  of its members.1109 The contracting parties may also revert to article 
15 ACLA to demand payment of damages/losses suffered by themselves or 
their members from the members of the other contracting parties, should 
these latter be in breach of the (normative) provisions of the collective labour 
agreement.
The Supreme Court even allowed a trade union that was not a party to the 
collective labour agreement to demand specific performance (but not payment 
of damages) from the employer who breached the normative provisions of the 
collective labour agreement.1110 The trade union was allowed legal standing 
in court on the basis of article 3:305a dCC, which entitles associations 
to serve the interests of a group of persons, provided that their articles of 
association stipulate so. In this matter the trade union successfully argued 
that the provisions in the individual employment agreements of the employees 
deviated from the provisions in the applicable collective labour agreement, 
and were therefore null and void, given article 12 ACLA. 
The position of the article 14 employee differs somewhat from the above-
mentioned situation. Such an employee is not entitled to enforce the normative 
provisions of the applicable collective labour agreement himself, unless the 
collective labour agreement forms a part of his employment agreement (most 
notably through an incorporation clause). Should the latter be the case, the 
topic of enforcement is dealt with along similar lines as is mentioned above. 
Should the employer, however, refuse to apply the (normative) provisions of 
the collective labour agreement to the article 14 employee, whilst this collective 
labour agreement does not form a part of the employment agreement, no one 
can resort to article 12 ACLA, as this article does not apply in such a situation 
(reference is made to scenario 3). Apart from that, the same parties (not being 
the employee) as mentioned above may demand specific performance and/or 
payment of damages on the same grounds as mentioned above.
7.5.4 Enforcement of collective normative provisions
Collective normative provisions can, as already explained in scenario 4, be 
enforced by the signatory parties on the basis of article 9.2 ACLA. Third 
collective entities, such as funds, may also enforce collective normative 
provisions relating to themselves on the same ground. The contracting 
association may, pursuant to article 15 ACLA, demand payment of damages 
from the other contracting parties should they breach the (collective normative) 
1109  Supreme Court, 19 december 1997, jAR 1998/39, CNV/Pennwalt Holland.
1110  Supreme Court 27 March 1998, jAR 1998/99, FNV/Kuypers.
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provisions. The same applies to the contracting association towards the 
other contracting associations’ members, should they violate the (collective 
normative) provisions. These claims can relate to damages/losses suffered by 
the plaintiff  and/or its members.
7.6 Special legal consequences of a collective 
labour agreement: ¾ mandatory law
The collective labour agreement has another legal effect, not set out in 
the ACLA and not yet mentioned. To explain this effect it is important to 
understand that most systems of law have at least two types of statutory 
provisions, being provisions of directory and of mandatory law.1111 Parties to 
an agreement may deviate, by agreement, from provisions of directory law; 
this type of law only applies if  said parties have not arranged anything else.1112 
Mandatory law is law from which parties cannot derogate at all (neither by 
oral agreement nor by contract).
Since 1953, so-called provisions of ¾ mandatory law have been introduced 
in the Netherlands:1113 the employers and employees may only deviate from 
specific statutory provisions if, as far as relevant for this thesis, an applicable 
collective labour agreement specifically permits them to do so. In other 
words, collective labour agreements can allow employers and employees to 
arrange specific matters in an individual employment contract that could 
not be arranged without that collective labour agreement. Provisions of ¾ 
mandatory law relate to, amongst others, the obligation to continue paying 
wages, the probationary period, and the notice period.1114
Clearly, the aforementioned arrangement on ¾ mandatory law applies to 
the employer and employee that are both bound by the collective labour 
agreement. For many years it was questionable whether it also applied to the 
article 14 employee. In 2002 the Supreme Court ruled that this is the case.1115 
1111  The Rome Convention, for example, clearly differentiates between directory law 
and mandatory law. Reference is made to article 3.3 of the Rome Convention. 
1112  here, a further distinction can be made. Some of these provisions parties can be 
deviated from by any agreement – even an oral agreement – while other provisions 
can only be deviated from by contract (semi mandatory law). Reference is made to 
C.j. Loonstra and W.A. Zondag, Arbeidsrechtelijke themata, page 35.
1113  C.j. Loonstra and W.A. Zondag, Arbeidsrechtelijke themata, page 35.
1114  E. Verhulp, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Netherlands, page 15.
1115  Supreme Court 20 december 2002, jAR 2003/19, Bollemeijer/TPG.
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7.7 Term and termination
As collective labour agreements are private law agreements, it is primarily 
at the contracting parties’ discretion to establish the term of the agreement, 
including the date upon which the agreement comes into force. Still, the 
legislator arranged certain topics as well. hereinafter, the date upon which 
it comes into force, the term and termination of collective labour agreements 
will be discussed.
7.7.1 The date of coming into force
Parties to the collective labour agreement can arrange when the agreement 
comes into force. Should they have omitted to do so, the agreement comes 
into force starting the 15th day after its conclusion (article 7.1 ACLA). In 
this respect I recall that the collective labour agreement must be reported to 
the Minister (see section 4.1 above). Without this notification, the collective 
labour agreement does not qualify as such, but merely as a “normal” 
agreement. Only from the day after the Minister has sent an acknowledgement 
of the notification to the contracting parties, a collective labour agreement 
can be qualified as such (article 4.3. of the Wage Formation Act). If  such a 
notification is sent after the 15th day following the conclusion of the collective 
labour agreement, the day after sending the notification is the date on which 
the agreement comes into force. These acts, however, do not preclude the 
collective labour agreement’s possible retro-effect, if  specifically arranged by 
the contracting parties in the agreement.1116
7.7.2 Term
The contracting parties may also stipulate the term of the collective labour 
agreement. This term, however, may not exceed five years (article 18 ACLA). 
Should the contracting parties agree on a term exceeding five years, this 
term is automatically converted into five years.1117 Should the parties have 
not stipulated the term of the collective labour agreement at all, this term is 
pursuant to article 19.2 ACLA fixed on one year.
The legislator deliberately chose only to allow collective labour agreements 
for a fixed period of time. It argued that collective labour agreements arrange 
future situations, while it is only possible to foresee the near future. Collective 
labour agreements of indefinite duration would therefore be undesirable 
– they would still apply in times that had changed in an unforeseeable 
1116  Supreme Court 27 March 1998, jAR 1998/99, FNV/Kuypers.
1117  MvT ACLA, exhibits to the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 7.
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manner - unless the parties involved could terminate these agreements. If  
the contracting parties would not arrange provisions on the termination of 
the agreement themselves, the court should be able to dissolve the collective 
labour agreement. This legislator did not want to introduce such an option, 
as (i) it would be rather difficult for the court to decide whether the collective 
labour agreement should be dissolved and (ii) the contracting parties would, in 
such a case, have the opportunity to consistently try to dissolve the collective 
labour agreement, which would interrupt the stability that the collective 
labour agreement was intended to bring.1118
7.7.3 Termination
The collective labour agreement, unless stipulated otherwise, does not 
terminate by operation of law. Pursuant to article 19.1 ACLA, an agreement 
is to be considered (tacitly) renewed after termination of its original term for 
the same term, but not exceeding one year. The agreement will not be renewed 
once it is terminated by notice. The notice term is 1/12 of the collective labour 
agreement’s total term, unless stipulated otherwise in the agreement.
Article 19.1 ACLA does not make clear whether this termination only 
concerns termination by notice at the end of the collective labour agreement’s 
term, or that it also concerns interim termination. Strangely enough, neither 
the legal history of the ACLA nor the dutch literature has awarded attention 
to this issue. It seems logical that the collective labour agreement cannot be 
terminated prematurely for at least two reasons. First, a fixed term continuing 
performance contract can, as a general rule, not be terminated prematurely by 
notice, unless specifically stipulated otherwise by the contracting parties.1119 
Second, in the legal history of the ACLA it was discussed whether a provision 
should be introduced in the ACLA enabling the contracting parties to 
request the court to dissolve the collective labour agreement due to changed 
circumstances. The legislator deemed such an article unwanted, as it feared, 
as just set out above, that the signatory parties would frequently use the 
article, which would lead to instability in the sector concerned.1120 This entire 
discussion would obviously have been theoretical should the parties be able 
to terminate the collective labour agreement prematurely by notice. After all, 
why go to court to dissolve a collective labour agreement, if  that agreement 
might as well be terminated by notice? Consequently, the signatory parties 
are only entitled to terminate the collective labour agreement by notice at the 
1118  MvT ACLA, exhibits to the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 7.
1119  Supreme Court, 21 October 1988, Nj 1990/439, Mondia/Calanda.
1120  MvT ACLA, exhibits to the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 7.
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end of its term. Given the contracting parties’ freedom of contract, this will 
be different if  the collective labour agreement permits interim termination by 
notice.1121
Apart from termination by notice, the collective labour agreement can be 
dissolved upon breach of the obligatory provisions (see scenario 1). It can 
also be terminated at any time by mutual consent of the contracting parties 
involved.
7.8 After-effects
It used to be unclear whether the collective labour agreement remained to 
have effect once it had expired. To phrase the question differently, does the 
collective labour agreement have any after-effects (nawerking)? 
This is not the case with regard to obligatory and collective normative 
provisions. After expiration of the collective labour agreements, these 
provisions have lost their force.1122 This is different with regard to normative 
provisions. After all, should both the employer and employee be bound by 
the collective labour agreement, the individual employment agreement is 
automatically converted by the collective labour agreement through articles 
12 and 13 ACLA. Or, in other words, the employment contract has simply 
been altered by the collective labour agreement. This alteration does not end 
at the moment the collective labour agreement has expired;1123 the stipulations 
of the collective labour agreement that were incorporated in the individual 
employment agreement remain in force. Obviously, these stipulations can be 
adapted by a new arrangement between the employer and employee (after 
all, the stipulations concerned are after the expiration of the collective labour 
agreement “merely” contractual obligations) and after a new collective 
labour agreement entered into force. These after-effects are also in place 
with regard to article 14 employees who have agreed upon the applicability 
of the collective labour agreement; the stipulations of that collective labour 
agreement have become part of the individual employment agreement due to 
1121  This notice should be given either by letter sent by registered mail or by a bailiff ’s 
notification (article 20 ACLA). Pursuant to article 21 ACLA, the collective 
labour agreement’s termination by notice by one party automatically involves that 
the agreement terminates for all parties involved, unless specifically stipulated 
otherwise.
1122  W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, pages 106 and 
107.
1123  Supreme Court, 19 june 1987, Nj 1988/70, Aruba.
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the acceptance of the collective labour agreement. This effect is not nullified 
due to the expiration of the collective labour agreement itself.
7.9 The role of alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining
Many collective labour agreements have introduced some sort of alternative 
dispute resolution mechanism upon breach of the agreement.1124 These 
methods are primarily intended for individual conflicts and their range differs 
considerably. Some collective labour agreements merely urge the employer, 
the employee and the contracting parties to solve their disputes as much in 
good harmony as possible. Other collective labour agreements have a detailed 
mechanism, obliging these parties to bring their disputes to a commission 
empowered to make binding decisions.1125 In general, conciliation, mediation 
and (although rare) arbitration are used as alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms.1126 
8. Extending collective labour agreements
Basically, the Extension Act is an instrument that enables the Minister, by 
decree, to declare an existing collective labour agreement,1127 which already 
applies to an important majority of  the employees within a specific industrial 
sector, binding upon all employers and employees within that sector. This 
decree constitutes a material act of law,1128 extending, in a mandatory fashion, 
private collective labour agreements. 
The extension process is surrounded by a number of important demands and 
safeguards. These can be divided in (i) demands concerning (the provisions of) 
the collective labour agreements that are to de declared binding, (ii) procedural 
1124  It is estimated that about 25% of the collective labour agreements provide for 
a dispute resolution mechanism. See R. van het Kaar, EIRO Thematic Feature 
on Collective dispute Resolutions in an enlarged European Union – case of the 
Netherlands. This report can be found on the EIRO-website.
1125  M.M. Olbers, Handhaving van de CAO, pages 220 and 221.
1126  R. van het Kaar, EIRO Thematic Feature on Collective dispute Resolutions in an 
enlarged European Union – case of the Netherlands.
1127  To be more precise, not the entire collective labour is declared binding, but merely 
provisions thereof (see section 8.1.1). Normally, by far most provisions of the 
collective labour agreement are extended, for which reason it is common in the 
Netherlands to simply refer to extending a collective labour agreement instead 
of extending provisions of a collective labour agreement. On occasion, although 
admittedly not entirely correct from a legal perspective, I also simply refer to 
extending a collective labour agreement. 
1128  Supreme Court, 16 March 1962, Nj 1963, 222, Bakker/Grafische Industrie.
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demands and safeguards and (iii) statutory limitations on the duration of 
the binding collective labour agreement. These demands and safeguards will 
be discussed in section 8.1. Moreover, there are specific grounds upon which 
the Minister can refuse the application for extension of the collective labour 
agreement (section 8.2). In both sections, frequent reference is made to the 
so-called Framework for assessing declaring binding provisions of a collective 
labour agreement (Toestsingskader algemeen verbindend verklaring CAO-
bepalingen; “the Extension Framework”).1129 This Framework lays down the 
Minister’s policy in the extension process.
Once declared binding, the collective labour agreement has important 
consequences for all parties that fall within the scope of the (by then, binding) 
agreement. These consequences will be discussed in section 8.3. Some employers 
that fall within the scope of application of the binding collective labour 
agreement would rather be exempted from this application. The grounds on 
which these companies can be exempted from the application of the binding 
collective labour agreement will be set out in section 8.4. Finally, section 8.5 
deals with the enforcement of binding collective labour agreements. 
8.1 The demands and safeguards surrounding the Extension Act
8.1.1 Demands concerning (the provisions of) the collective labour agreement 
Neither all collective labour agreements, nor all provisions thereof can be 
declared binding. Once the Minister receives a request to extend a collective 
labour agreement, he will first verify whether the agreement in fact is a proper 
collective labour agreement. The criteria of a collective labour agreement are 
a bit stricter in the Extension Act than in the ACLA. The collective labour 
agreement (a) should be concluded between employers, or associations 
of employers, and one or more trade unions, and (b) must principally 
or exclusively concern the terms of employment applicable to individual 
employment agreements. The articles of association of the associations of 
employers and employees must (c) entitle these parties to conclude collective 
labour agreements and (d) they must have at least one member that falls 
within the scope of application of the collective labour agreement.1130 The 
contracting employers or the association(s) of employers on the one side and 
the trade union(s) on the other must (e) be independent from each other. In 
other words, they must be free of each other’s intervention with regard to 
1129  Governmental Gazette (Staatscourant; “Stcrt.”) 1998, 240, as amended from time 
to time. 
1130  This demand is not in place in the ACLA, as will be set out in section 9 below.
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the establishment, the performance of tasks and the administration of their 
organisations.1131 
Subsequently, the Minister has to assess whether the collective labour agreement 
applies to an important majority of  employees working in an industry (in fact: 
an industrial sector)1132 in the Netherlands or in a part thereof. Only those 
collective labour agreements can pursuant to article 2.1 of the Extension Act 
be declared binding. The reason for this “important majority rule” is that, 
according to the legislator, only a majority can bind a minority.1133 
Exactly what constitutes an “important majority” is set out in the 1998 
Extension Framework. This Framework makes clear – following a ruling 
of the Supreme Court1134 – that all employees to whom the collective labour 
agreement is applied, including employees who are “merely” bound by the 
collective labour agreement through article 14 ACLA, are to be considered 
when assessing the important majority rule.1135 The Framework Agreement 
explains that the number of employees to which the collective labour agreement 
applies is to be set off  against the total number of employees that fall within 
the scope of application of the collective labour agreement. As a result of 
this test the “representativity” of a collective labour agreement is placed in a 
specific percentage.1136 If  this representativity percentage is:1137
•	 60%	 or	more,	 the	 important	 majority	 rule	 is	 automatically	 complied	
with; 
1131   Extension Framework, section 4.2.
1132   A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht, page 179.
1133  MvT and MvA Extension Act, exhibits to the official report II, 1936/1937, 274, 
pages 4 and 16.
1134  Supreme Court 10 june 1983, Nj 1984/147, Fabricom.
1135  In other words, not only the number of employees that are bound by the collective 
labour agreement through their membership of the contracting trade union(s) are 
to be taken into consideration when determining whether an important majority 
exists.
1136  An example makes this clear. In a specific sector 1,000 employers are, through 
their membership of a contracting employers’ organisation, bound by a collective 
labour agreement. These employers employ in total 10,000 employees. The 
collective labour agreement could, considering its scope of application, apply to 
a total of 2,000 employers employing together 15,000 employees. The percentage 
of employees bound by the collective labour agreement in this example (the 
representativity of this collective labour agreement) is therefore 10,000 : 15,000 =  
66.7%.
1137  Extension Framework, section 4.1.
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•	 55%	up	to	(and	not	including)	60%,	the	important	majority	rule	is	com-
plied with, unless the collective labour agreement’s public support is in-
sufficient or if  this majority is not equally divided over the entire scope 
of application of the agreement (which, for example, could be the case 
if  there is an important difference in applicability between big and small 
companies);
•	 over	50%	but	under	55%,	the	important	majority	rule	is	not	complied	
with, unless there are in the opinion of the Minister special circumstan-
ces bringing forth that this rule is still complied with;
•	 50%	or	less,	there	is	not	a	majority	let	alone	an	important	majority.
When requesting the Minister to extend a collective labour agreement, the 
requesting party, or parties, must submit information on (i) the number of 
employers and employees actually bound by the collective labour agreement 
and (ii) the total number of employers and employees who fall within the 
scope of application of the collective labour agreement. This party, or these 
parties, must also explain how these numbers are fixed.1138 
Third, it is a common misunderstanding in the Netherlands that an entire 
collective labour agreement can be declared binding. The Minister is, in 
fact, only empowered to extend certain provisions of the agreement. Most 
importantly, normative provisions can be extended. This follows from the 
wording of article 2.1 of the Extension Act. Collective normative provisions 
can be extended as well.1139 Obligatory provisions can, as a general rule, not 
be extended. This makes sense, as these provisions are intended to “merely” 
arrange the mutual rights and obligations of the contracting parties.1140 Some 
provisions cannot, by law, be declared binding. Pursuant to article 2.5 of the 
Extension Act this applies to provisions restricting the competence of the 
courts, exerting pressure on individuals to join trade unions, which brings 
1138  Reference is made to the decree notification of collective labour agreements 
and requesting an extension declaration [Besluit aanmelding collectieve 
arbeidsovereenkomst en het aanvragen van algemeen verbindend verklaring], stcrt. 
1998, 240, most recently changed on 23 August 2004, Stcrt. 2004, 166.
1139  See for example Supreme Court 10 june 1983, Nj 1984, 147, Fabricom. See also 
W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 142.
1140  Framework Agreement, section 4.3. however, exceptions to this rule exist. 
Obligatory provisions that do not arrange the relation between the contracting 
parties themselves can be declared binding. An example hereof is the obligation 
for the contracting social partners to establish and maintain a commission that can 
exempt employers and employees from specific normative obligations. See W.j.P.M. 
Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot CAO’s en de 
verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, pages 142 and 143.
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forth unequal treatment of union and non-union members, and involves 
employees in keeping price arrangements.
Fourth, it is of importance that the provisions on the scope of application 
of the collective labour agreement that is to be declared binding are clear 
and unambiguous. The Supreme Court ruled that these provisions determine 
the scope of application of the binding collective labour agreement.1141 Given 
the wording of article 2.1 of the Extension Act, the Minister is not entitled 
to change the scope of application of the collective labour agreement that 
is to be declared binding. This is a matter that is at the contracting parties’ 
discretion.1142 however, if  the provisions on the scope of application of the 
collective labour agreement are unclear, or if  this scope coincides in whole or in 
part with the scope of another (binding) sectoral collective labour agreement, 
the Minister normally refuses to declare the collective labour agreement 
binding.1143 Subsequently, it is up to the contracting parties whether or not to 
change the scope of application of the collective labour agreement.
8.1.2 Procedural demands and safeguards 
The Minister may not declare a collective labour agreement binding on his 
own initiative. Pursuant to article 4.1 of the Extension Act, at least one of 
the contracting parties must request such an extension. It is common practice 
that one of the contracting parties, most frequently being the employers’ 
organisation, requests the extension on behalf  of all contracting parties.1144
This request is subsequently published in the Government Gazette (article 
4.3 of the Extension Act). Every party affected by the requested declaration 
is entitled to raise objections, as a rule within a 3 weeks’ term following the 
publication.1145 The objections are forwarded to the contracting parties with 
1141   Supreme Court, 6 january 1995, Nj 1995/549, Derksen/Iselmar. 
1142  he is, however, entitled to declare a collective labour agreement binding for only a 
part of the Netherlands, even if  the parties applying for extension wish it to cover 
the entire Netherlands, if  only in that part of the Netherlands the “important 
majority rule” is met. See W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het 
recht met betrekking tot CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring 
ervan, page 152.
1143  Framework Agreement, section 6.2. Reference is made to section 8.2 hereof.
1144  M.M. Olbers, ‘Wet op het algemeen verbindend en onverbindend verklaren van 
bepalingen van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten’, in: ‘Arbeidsovereenkomst’, 
Kluwer, volume 3, article 4, comment 1.
1145  Extension Framework, section 3.
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the request to respond. Only after this response, which is not limited by any 
term, the Minister can decide on these objections. 
Pursuant to article 4.4 the Minister can, in this process, consult the Labour 
Foundation. The Minister will normally do so should he have received material 
objections against the requested extension, or if  the scope of application of 
the collective labour agreement (partially) coincides with the scope of another 
collective labour agreement (in which case the Labour Foundation could 
decide whether its intervention is desirable).1146
If  all formalities are complied with, all material demands are met and the 
Minister sees no reason to refuse the application, he should publish his decree 
making binding the collective labour agreement in the Government Gazette 
(article 5.2 of the Extension Act). This decree includes, given article 5.1 of the 
Extension Act, (a) a statement which provisions are declared binding, (b) the 
period in which these provisions are binding, and (c) if  necessary, a description 
of the territory and type of business to which the binding provisions apply.
8.1.3 Statutory limitations in duration of the declaration
With regard to the term of the binding collective labour agreement, it should 
be noted that it may not have any retro-effect (article 2.3 of the Extension 
Act). This serves the legal certainty of the system.1147 Furthermore, the decree 
must be limited in duration. Pursuant to article 2.2 of the Extension Act, 
the extension decree (a) may not exceed the term of the collective labour 
agreement itself  and (b) has a maximum duration of 2 years, with the 
exception of provisions on funds.1148 These provisions have, according to said 
stipulation, a more permanent character. As collective labour agreements 
cannot have a duration exceeding 5 years (article 18 ACLA), provisions on 
funds can ultimately be declared binding for that period. 
If  the contracting parties prematurely end their collective labour agreement, 
these parties should notify the Minister thereof on grounds of article 4.1 of 
the Act on Wage Formation. If  that collective labour agreement was extended, 
the Minister will withdraw the extension decree upon said notification.1149
1146  Extension Framework, section 3.
1147  MvT Extension Act, exhibits to the official report II, 1936/1937, 274, page 6.
1148  Such as funds on travelling expenses, education etc.
1149  Extension Framework, section 4.4.
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8.2 Grounds for refusal of the application for extension 
of the collective labour agreement
Article 2.1 of the Extension Act stipulates that the Minister can (as opposed 
to shall) declare binding a collective labour agreement that meets the relevant 
requirements. The Minister has therefore a discretionary power whether or 
not to declare such collective labour agreement binding. Given the Act’s legal 
history1150 and the Extension Framework,1151 there are at least three valid 
reasons to turn down the request to declare the collective labour agreement 
binding.
First, the provisions of the collective labour agreement that are to be declared 
binding may not contravene dutch law. These provisions are assessed against 
four criteria. The provisions may (i) not violate dutch mandatory rules and 
regulations, including minimum wages, health and safety norms and statutory 
entitlements, such as the powers of a Works Council.1152 Furthermore, (ii) the 
Minister can refuse provisions to be declared binding that contravene general 
concepts of law. Provisions that are unclear or provide insufficient safeguards 
for the parties involved are, for instance, not to be extended. Provisions at 
odds with (iii) constitutional rights – such as the right on privacy, or the right 
to collective actions (strike) – are also not extended. Finally, (iv) the same 
applies to provisions that put forward unequal treatment, such as provisions 
promoting unequal treatment on the basis of religion, sex, nationality, age 
etc.
Second, the provisions of the collective labour agreement may not contravene 
dutch public interests. Obviously, this is a notion that is difficult to define. The 
Extension Framework allows the Minister to deny the extension declaration 
to provisions that, given social and economical developments, contravene the 
dutch public interest.1153
Last, the Minister may refuse to declare a provision of a collective labour 
agreement binding if  it insufficiently takes into account the valid interests 
of third parties. Third parties are employers and employees that fall within 
the scope of application of the collective labour agreement but are not 
bound by it, and “external” third parties whose interests are at stake. The 
1150  MvT Extension Act, exhibits to the official report II, 1936/1937, 274, page 6.
1151  Extension Framework, section 6.
1152  Extension Framework, section 5.1.
1153  Extension Framework, section 6.1.
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Extension Framework gives three examples on how the Minister may use this 
ground:1154
•	 the	collective	labour	agreement	that	is	to	be	declared	binding	may	not	
have an unclear scope of application, nor may this scope coincide in 
whole or in part with the scope of another (binding) sectoral collective 
labour agreement. Third employers and employees are preferably not to 
be bound by two collective labour agreements;
•	 if 	the	provisions	directly	or	indirectly	block	or	hinder,	in	a	disproporti-
onate manner, an effective entrance into a specific sector for bona fide 
companies, the Minister normally refuses to declare these provisions 
binding. Examples of such provisions are those that stipulate the exclu-
sivity of certain insurance companies or training institutes, or provisions 
prohibiting a company to hire external employees;
•	 provisions	 on	 paying	mandatory	 contributions	 to	 funds	must	meet	 a	
number of specific and detailed demands in order to be eligible to be 
extended. 
8.3 The consequences of a binding collective labour agreement
With regard to the consequences of a binding collective labour agreement, 
articles 2.1 and 3 of the Extension Act are relevant. 
Pursuant to article 2.1 of the Extension Act, the provisions of a binding 
collective labour agreement apply to all employment agreements concluded 
or to be concluded within the term of the extension decree that fall within the 
scope of the binding collective labour agreement. As already mentioned, the 
scope of a binding collective labour agreement is primarily arranged by the 
provisions of the collective labour agreement itself  (although the Minister’s 
declaration may be limited to only a part of the Netherlands, in which case 
only in that part are the provisions binding).1155
Every arrangement agreed on between the employer and employee that is in 
violation of a provision of an applicable binding collective labour agreement 
is void, and is automatically replaced by said provision (article 3.1 of the 
Extension Act). An applicable binding collective labour agreement also prevails 
over another applicable, non-binding, collective labour agreement.1156 In this 
1154  Extension Framework, section 6.2.
1155  MvT Extension Act, exhibits to the official report II, 1936/1937, 274, page 5.
1156  W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 162.
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respect, it should be noted that most (binding) collective labour agreements 
are collective labour agreements containing minimum provisions.1157 An 
arrangement applying to the employment agreement that differs from a 
minimum provision in an applicable binding collective labour agreement, in 
a manner that is favourable to the employee, does not violate that provision 
and is therefore not void. 
In the case that the employment agreement between the employer and employee 
does not arrange subjects that are arranged in provisions of an applicable 
binding collective labour agreement, these provisions automatically apply to 
that employment agreement on grounds of article 3.3 of the Extension Act.
Consequently, the collective labour agreement limits the individual and 
collective contractual freedom of the parties concerned. These parties are not, 
after all, entitled to agree on stipulations that violate provisions of a binding 
collective labour agreement. When it comes to minimum collective labour 
agreements this limitation is only partial. In such an event, the employers and 
employees (individually), and employers, associations of employers, and one 
or more trade unions may (collectively), agree on employment conditions that 
are more favourable to the employees.
As opposed to the provisions of “normal” collective labour agreements, the 
provisions of the binding collective labour agreements do not have after-effects 
on the employers and employees that are solely bound by these provisions due 
to the extension decree.1158 The employment conditions that applied before 
extending the collective labour agreement “revive” again after the binding 
collective labour agreement has ceased to have effect. This is different for 
employers and employees that are not only bound by these provisions due to 
that declaration, but also due to the ACLA (the employers had to apply the 
collective labour agreement anyway). For them, the provisions do have after-
effects on the basis of the rules set out in section 7.8 above. 
8.4 Exemptions granted to individual employers 
As set out above, the consequences of being governed by a binding collective 
labour agreement are far-reaching. This makes some employers seek 
1157  See section 7.2.4 above.
1158  Supreme Court 18 january 1980, Nj 1980/384, Hop/Hom. This rule has been 
nuanced a bit, especially with regard to acquired rights with limited duration, such 
as rights to receive supplementary payment when ill for a specific period of time. 
See for example Supreme Court 28 january 1994, Nj 1994/420, Beenen/Vanduho 
and Supreme Court 7 june 2002, Nj 2003/175, Luitjens/J.B. 
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possibilities for exemption from the extension decree. Employers that (i) are 
already bound by a non-binding collective labour agreement and (ii) who raise 
objections against the request to extend a collective labour agreement that 
would also apply to them, could receive a dispensation from the Minister.1159 
dispensation in such a situation is only granted if  (a) the employer involved 
cannot, in all reasonableness, follow the binding collective labour agreement 
and (b) the collective labour agreement that already applies to this employer 
is concluded with an independent trade union.1160
Apart from the above dispensation possibility, many (about 75%) of binding 
collective labour agreements introduce a possibility for third companies that 
fall within the scope of application to request a dispensation from a special 
committee.1161 This is another method of being exempted from the binding 
collective labour agreement.
8.5 Enforcement of the binding collective labour agreement
The enforcement of binding provisions of a collective labour agreement 
resembles the enforcement of “normal” (non-binding) collective labour 
agreements.
Although the extension decree is itself  an act of public law, it should be noted 
that the enforcement of binding collective labour agreements is a private 
matter. According to the legislator, the extension decree and the collective 
labour agreements envisage governing individual employment agreements, 
and are therefore part of private law. Consequently, violating provisions of 
applicable binding collective labour agreements should result in civil actions, 
as opposed to public sanctions.1162
1159  Prior to 1 january 2007, it was very easy to receive dispensation. Employers 
that were bound by another collective labour agreement would more or less 
automatically receive a dispensation from the Minister from the extended collective 
labour agreement. According to many, this lead to abuse: employers entered into 
a collective labour agreement with a trade union that could not be considered 
to actually represent the relevant employees, or even with yellow trade unions, 
in order to escape binding collective labour agreements. See for example F.B.j. 
Grapperhaus, Dispensatie van algemeenverbindendverklaring [dispensation of 
extention], Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid 2006-5, pages 193 ff. This was reason to 
change the Extension Framework as per 1 january 2007.
1160  Extension Framerwork, section 7.
1161  Labour Foundation, De CAO: Wat en hoe, page 18.
1162  MvT Extension Act, exhibits to the official report II, 1936/1937, 274, page 5.
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As set out in section 8.3 above, every provision of an applicable binding 
collective labour agreement automatically applies to the individual 
employment agreement (where necessary this replaces a deviating provision 
in an employment agreement). This entitles the individual employers and 
employees to directly call upon the binding collective labour agreement, 
and, if  needed, enforce their claims by starting litigation demanding specific 
performance and/or payment of losses.1163 
The Extension Act also has a specific arrangement for collective claims. 
Pursuant to article 3.2 of the Extension Act, associations of employees and 
employers, having members that are party to an individual employment 
agreement, falling within the scope of application of the binding collective 
labour agreement, may demand the nullity of provisions in these individual 
employment agreements that violate the binding collective labour agreement. 
These associations do not have to be contracting parties to the binding 
collective labour agreement: it could also be other associations, which could 
have been party to the collective labour agreement, as long as they have 
members that are party to an individual employment agreement falling within 
the scope of application of the binding collective labour agreement.1164 These 
associations are, pursuant to article 3.4 of the Extension Act, also entitled to 
claim damages suffered by the associations themselves or their members from 
employers or employees who violate the binding collective labour agreement, 
as well as specific performance of the binding collective labour agreement.
 
Although, as mentioned above, the enforcement of binding collective labour 
agreement is a private matter, some public intervention is still possible due 
to article 10 of the Extension Act. Should one of the parties that requested 
the extension of the collective labour agreement have reasonable suspicion 
that a company does not comply with the binding collective labour agreement 
and should it consider bringing the matter to court, it can request that the 
Minister investigate said company on such a compliance. This can assist the 
party’s furnishing of proof.
1163  W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 180.
1164  W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 181.
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9. The collective labour agreement and the 
reach of the social partners
9.1 What can the social partners regulate in a collective labour agreement?
As collective labour agreements are private agreements, the social partners 
enjoy contractual freedom. This contractual freedom is limited in the sense, 
that, as has already been noted, collective labour agreements should relate to 
employment conditions. Although, as explained, social partners are entitled 
to deviate from ¾ mandatory law, they may not contravene mandatory law, 
including mandatory international law, such as EU regulations. Collective 
labour agreements may furthermore not contravene public policy, nor may 
they violate good morals (article 3:40 dCC).
9.2 Collective labour agreements and representativity demands
The representativity of social partners is considered a delicate issue in the 
Netherlands. Representativity demands are drafted in connection with the 
question of which organisations (including social partners) are entitled to 
join specific public boards.1165 These requirements are, however, only relevant 
concerning the right of the social partners to participate in public boards. 
They do not apply to the entitlement to conclude collective labour agreements. 
In fact, there are no statutory respresentativity requirements social partners 
should meet in order to be entitled to conclude collective labour agreements.1166 
The legislator considered these requirements unnecessary, as collective labour 
agreements would only bind the members of the contracting parties.1167 The 
legislator apparently never anticipated that the role of the article 14 employees 
would be as relevant as it is today. Practice shows that collective labour 
agreements are applied to nearly all employees, primarily through the use of 
incorporation clauses.1168 This is evidenced by the fact that, in 2002, only 26% 
of the working population was a member of a trade union, whilst between 
72% and 85% (depending on which figures are used) of the total working 
population in the Netherlands fell under a collective labour agreement (see 
1165  See the Social and Economic Council’s “decree on the establishment of 
representativity of organisations of employers and employees with regard to the 
composition of public boards”. This decree can be found on: www.ser.nl.
1166   Reference is made to S. Sagel, Representativiteit van vakbonden en gebondenheid 
van werknemers aan cao’s [Representativity of trade unions and the binding power of 
collective labour agreements towards employees], ArbeidsRecht 2006- 8/9, pages 24 
ff.
1167  MvA ACLA, exhibits to the official report II, 1926/1927, 246, page 12.
1168  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht, page 125.
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section 1.2). The argumentation of the legislator has been caught up by 
practice.1169 
The lack of representativity requirements on the side of employers is not 
worrisome. The employers only have to apply the collective labour agreement 
should they be bound by it. Given article 14 ACLA, this is different on the 
employees’ side. A lot can be said for introducing specific representativity 
requirements for trade unions in order for them to conclude collective labour 
agreements, especially when these are standard or maximum agreements 
deviating from the individual employment agreements, to the detriment of the 
employees.1170 Some scholars have already argued this.1171 Others emphasise 
the contractual nature of the collective labour agreements.1172 Representativity 
demands would be at odds with this nature.
Courts have struggled with the (lack of) representativity demands as well. The 
County Court in hilversum, for example, ruled that an article 14 employee could 
not be bound by a collective labour agreement concluded with a small trade 
union, notwithstanding an incorporation clause in the employee’s individual 
employment agreement.1173 The President of the district Court in Amsterdam 
had to rule on the validity of a collective labour agreement.1174 In this case, 
the employer normally concluded two collective labour agreements: one for 
higher and one for lower personnel. The first collective labour agreement was 
to be concluded with a specific trade union (VhP), serving the interests of 
higher personnel only. Lower level employees could not become members of 
this trade union. The second collective labour agreement was to be concluded 
with two large trade unions (FNV and CNV), serving the interests of the lower 
level employees. FNV and CNV refused to accept the employer’s final offer. 
1169  I refer to chapter 7, section 4.1 and again to Bruun. he argued, as said, that 
a mismatch between union density and coverage “cannot in the long run be a 
sustainable situation. Such arrangements might lend stability to the system, but the 
legitimacy of such a system might be vulnerable in a crisis situation.” N. Bruun, 
The Autonomy of Collective Agreement, page 11.
1170  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht, page 120.
1171  See for example F.B.j. Grapperhaus, De wenselijkheid van een nieuwe regeling 
voor de verhouding van niet-gebonden werknemers tot een CAO [The desirability 
of new legislation on the relation of employees not bound by a CLA to a CLA], 
Sociaal Recht 2002-6, pages 184 ff. See also C.j. Loonstra and W.A. Zondag, 
Arbeidsrechtelijke themata, page 544.
1172  W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, pages 209 ff.
1173  County Court hilversum, 1 February 2006, jAR 2006/57, Ataya/Castellum. 
1174  President of the district Court in Amsterdam, 29 december 2005, jAR 2006/27, 
FNV/Hema.
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VhP, however, did accept this last offer, not only for the higher personnel, 
but also for the lower personnel. FNV and CNV commenced proceedings 
against the employer, claiming that the collective labour agreement for lower 
personnel was invalid. The President ruled that a trade union is supposed 
to represent its members that it – according to its articles of association – is 
entitled to represent. This does not automatically mean that the trade union 
should have sufficient members in the sector concerned in order to be entitled 
to conclude collective labour agreements. The sheer possibility to represent 
a specific group of employees entitles this trade union to do so, regardless 
of whether employees of this group are in fact members. In other words, the 
employee’s possibility to become a member of a trade union, entitles such a 
trade union to represent that employee in collective bargaining. This President 
refers to this concept as “fictitious representation”. In the underlying case 
there was no (fictitious) representation: VhP represented employees (the 
lower level employees) that could not become its member. This is in violation 
of article 2 ACLA. The collective labour agreement for lower personnel is 
therefore invalid.1175
The entire discussion on representativity and the entitlement of trade unions 
to conclude collective labour agreements for employees, who are not their 
members, is obviously closely related to article 14 ACLA. It must be admitted 
that this article is rather peculiar. This is caused by conflicting aims of the 
legislator: it did not want to entitle the article 14 employees with any rights 
that they did not “deserve” (they did not contribute to the collective labour 
agreement as they had not joined the contracting trade union), whilst it also 
wished to prevent employers from being able to escape from the provisions of 
the collective labour agreement by only hiring non-members as employees (in 
fact pushing aside the contracting trade union’s members). These conflicting 
aims have led to a strange consequence: on the one hand the ACLA does not 
bind the article 14 employees, whilst on the other the employer is obliged to 
apply the collective labour agreement to these employees. 
Given the above, it is not difficult to imagine that article 14 ACLA has been 
a source of legal uncertainty. For example: do collective labour agreement’s 
provisions have to be applied to all (current and new) article 14 employees or 
only to those (new) employees who enter into service of the employer who 
is bound by the collective labour agreement? And do only the normative 
provisions have to be applied, or the collective normative provisions as well?
1175  See on this case and similar cases A.Ph.C.M. jaspers, Representativiteit: 
representeren of vertegenwoordigen?, pages 4 ff.
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But regardless of this legal uncertainty, there are other consequences that 
article 14 ACLA has. This article makes the article 14 employees “free 
riders”, as they enjoy the collective labour agreements without making any 
sacrifices.1176 And when the collective labour agreements are unfavourable to 
them, they have much more chance of challenging the applicability of the 
collective labour agreements than employees that are directly bound by the 
collective labour agreement.1177 It may very well be argued, in fact, that article 
14 ACLA actually encourages employees not to join a trade union.1178
All in all, many scholars have argued to simply get rid of article 14 ACLA. 
They favour a more or less institutional model, applying collective labour 
agreements equally to all employees.1179 Some of these scholars wish to add 
representativity demands to a collective labour agreement with such binding 
power,1180 others whish to add such demands only to standard collective 
labour agreements,1181 and even others do not want to add any representativity 
demands at all.1182 Other scholars wish to maintain the current, contractual 
model.1183
1176  F.B.j. Grapperhaus, De wenselijkheid van een nieuwe regeling voor de verhouding van 
niet-gebonden werknemers tot een CAO, page 187.
1177  See for example County Court in den Bosch, 27 April 2006, jAR 2006/128, [no 
names]. 
1178  A. Stege, De CAO en het regelingsbereik van de sociale partners, page 508.
1179  Grapperhaus, De wenselijkheid van een nieuwe regeling voor de verhouding van niet-
gebonden werknemers tot een CAO, pages 188 and 189; A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief 
Arbeidsrecht, page 126; E. Verhulp, Maatwerk in het arbeidsrecht? [Tailor made 
employment law?], inaugural speech 2003, page 19.; and F. Koning, Het systeem 
van het collectieve arbeidsvoorwaardenrecht [The system of the law on collective 
employment conditions], Kluwer, deventer, 1987, pages 128 ff.
1180  F.B.j. Grapperhaus, De wenselijkheid van een nieuwe regeling voor de verhouding van 
niet-gebonden werknemers tot een CAO, page 188.
1181  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht, page 120. he deems representativity 
demands not necessary with regard to minimum collective labour agreements, as 
these do not really hurt the employees.
1182  E. Verhulp, Maatwerk in het arbeidsrecht?, pages 19 and 20 and F. Koning, Het 
systeem van het collectieve arbeidsvoorwaardenrecht, pages 144 and 145.
1183  W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, pages 216 ff. 
See also L.h. van den heuvel, CAO-binding en representativiteit [CLA-binding and 
representativity], Arbeid Integraal 2001-6, pages 219 ff.
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9.3 Collective labour agreements and independence of trade unions
As is the case with representativity, there are no statutory demands on the level 
of independence trade unions require (from the employer or other parties) in 
order to conclude legally valid collective labour agreements. In fact, in the 
past collective labour agreements were concluded with trade unions that were 
not independent from the employer. These collective labour agreements are 
commonly held valid.1184 however, as mentioned above, these collective labour 
agreements concluded with “yellow unions” (i.e. trade unions that are not 
independent from management) cannot exempt an employer anymore from 
the applicability of an extended collective labour agreement. The fact that 
the Minister actually had to draft rules in order to reach this result seems to 
confirm that the collective labour agreements concluded with yellow unions 
are indeed valid. Should these agreements not be considered valid collective 
labour agreements, supplementary rules would not have been necessary to 
filter out these agreements. Notwithstanding the above, a County Court in 
Utrecht has ruled in the past that collective labour agreements concluded with 
trade unions that were dependent from the employer, could not be regarded 
as proper and valid collective labour agreements.1185 Such agreements violate, 
in the County Court’s view, dutch employment law and ILO Convention 
C98.1186 All in all, it appears that the common view is that these collective 
labour agreements are undesirable and should be stopped.1187
10. Summary
10.1 Industrial relations: past and present
Industrial relations and collective bargaining play an important role in 
the Netherlands. Nowadays, between 72% and 85% of the total working 
population is bound by a collective labour agreement, depending on which 
figures are used. In contrast, only about a quarter of this population is a trade 
union member. Collective bargaining takes place at three levels: national, 
sectoral and company-level (although it can be disputed whether, on national 
level, “real” collective bargaining takes place).
1184  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht, pages 188 and 189.
1185  County Court in Utrecht, 3 November 1994, jAR 1995/39, Gaggenau.
1186  Also Fase and Van drongelen deem such collective labour agreements invalid. 
W.j.P.M. Fase and j. van drongelen, CAO-recht. Het recht met betrekking tot 
CAO’s en de verbindendverklaring en onverbindendverklaring ervan, page 212.
1187  jacobs, for example proposes to change the law in order to prevent these kinds of 
collective labour agreements. A.T.j.M. jacobs, Collectief Arbeidsrecht, page 215.
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In 1894 the first collective labour agreement was concluded; more collective 
labour agreements followed thereafter. dutch scholars experienced difficulties 
in placing collective labour agreements in a proper legal setting and determining 
their legal effects. Opinions on these subjects differed widely. Most scholars in 
the early years of the 20th century did argue that collective labour agreements 
deserve a place in the dCC, but no part of the dCC could cope with the 
peculiarities of these agreements. 
The legislator responded to this in 1907 by introducing a provision in the 
dCC on collective labour agreements. This provision introduced a definition 
of a collective labour agreement and only one consequence of violation of 
the collective labour agreement. This provision did not suffice: too many 
matters were left untouched. It took the legislator until 1927 to introduce the 
ACLA, an act that describes the private law aspects of concluding collective 
labour agreements and its consequences. In 1937 the Extension Act entered 
into force, an act which enables the Minister to declare collective labour 
agreements binding within specific sectors. 
10.2 The collective labour agreement
A collective labour agreement is an agreement concluded between one or 
more employers, or associations of employers, and one or more trade unions, 
principally or exclusively setting out the terms of employment applicable 
to individual employment agreements. Trade unions and associations of 
employers should have legal personality and their articles of association must 
specifically stipulate their power to conclude collective labour agreements. 
There are no other statutory requirements that these organisations should 
meet in order to conclude valid collective labour agreements. 
A collective labour agreement can contain obligatory, normative and collective 
normative provisions. Obligatory provisions set out the rights and obligations 
between the parties concluding the collective employment agreement. 
Normative provisions create rights and obligations between the employers and 
employees. Collective normative provisions set out the rights and obligations 
of the employers and employees towards “collectivities”, being the parties to 
the collective labour agreement or other collective entities.
The collective bargaining process is governed by the law of contract. This states 
that the parties involved are free to choose whether they wish to enter into a 
collective labour agreement and, if  so, with whom. This latter freedom is not 
unlimited. Once an employer or employers’ association has started collective 
bargaining, a non participating trade union may, in specific circumstances, 
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demand a place at the negotiation table as well. That trade union should be 
sufficiently or evidently representative in the company or sector concerned. 
10.3 The consequences of a collective labour agreement
Once a collective labour agreement is concluded, it should be established to 
whom it applies, what its consequences are and how the rights arising from it 
can be enforced.
10.3.1 The contracting parties
The contracting parties are bound by the collective labour agreement. 
Consequently, these parties need, by law, to perform under the contract. Should 
a contracting party breach an obligatory provision of the collective labour 
agreement, the counterparty may instigate proceedings against that party, 
leading to claims on damages or specific performance, or even dissolution 
of the collective labour agreement. The contracting associations should also 
urge their members to fulfil the obligations arising from the collective labour 
agreement. 
10.3.2 The members of the contracting associations
The collective labour agreement applies to the members of the contracting 
parties (employers and employees) that are both bound by and fall within 
the scope of application of that agreement. The employer who is either a 
member of an employers’ association that is a party to the collective labour 
agreement, or entered into the collective labour agreement itself, is bound 
by that agreement. The employee who is a member of a trade union that is 
a party to the collective labour agreement is also bound by that agreement. 
The collective labour agreement provides for its own scope of application. It 
should be derived from that agreement whether the employer and employee 
fall within that scope. If  not, the collective labour agreement does not apply.
An applicable collective labour agreement has two consequences on the 
individual employment agreement: (i) every provision in the individual 
employment agreement deviating from the collective labour agreement is 
null and void and is replaced by the corresponding provision of the collective 
labour agreement and (ii) any provision arranged for in the collective labour 
agreement, but not in the individual employment agreement, automatically 
applies. due to this self-executing effect of the collective labour agreement, 
the individual employment agreement is automatically adapted. Not every 
provision in an individual employment agreement that is different from the 
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corresponding provision in the collective labour agreement always deviates 
from the collective labour agreement; this depends on whether the provisions 
in the collective labour agreement are of a “standard”, “minimum” or 
“maximum” nature. As a consequence of the aforementioned direct normative 
effect, the individual employer and employee who do not oblige the individual 
normative provisions of the collective labour agreement, are in breach of the 
individual employment contract. The aggrieved party can subsequently claim 
specific performance and/or damages. 
10.3.3 Members vs. non-members
The above-mentioned only applies if  both the employee and the employer 
are bound by the collective labour agreement. If  the employer is not bound 
by the collective labour agreement whilst the employee is, the collective 
labour agreement does not apply. Should it be the other way around, article 
14 ACLA comes into play. Pursuant to this article, the employer (who is 
bound by the collective labour agreement) is, during the term of the collective 
labour agreement, obliged to apply the employment conditions set out in the 
collective labour agreement to employees who are not bound by the collective 
labour agreement, the article 14 employees. This article does not bind the 
article 14 employee but it merely obliges the employer to apply the collective 
labour agreement’s employment conditions to the article 14 employee; the 
employer should only hire new employees on the basis of the aforementioned 
employment conditions and offer the article 14 employees who were already 
employed by him the same employment conditions. 
If  the employer refuses to apply the aforementioned employment conditions 
to its (current or new) article 14 employees or if  his (current) employee does 
not accept the employer’s offer to apply these employment conditions, the 
collective labour agreement’s employment conditions do not apply and the 
individual employment conditions remain in force. If  the article 14 employee 
accepts the employer’s offer, whether or not as a result of an incorporation 
clause, the collective labour agreement’s employment conditions apply. The 
article 14 employee cannot oblige the employer to apply the collective labour 
agreement to his employment agreement himself, unless he has either accepted 
the aforementioned offer, or has an incorporation clause. In these latter 
circumstances, the employee has a contractual entitlement to the application 
of the collective labour agreement’s employment conditions.
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10.3.4 The collectivities
Employers and employees who are bound by the collective labour agreement 
are also bound to collectivities, being the contracting parties and third entities. 
In the case that the employer is also the contracting party, it is rather self-
evident that he is bound to the other contracting parties and third entities, 
as he committed hereto by contract. This is, however, less evident with 
regard to the members of  the contracting associations. These members are, 
by law, bound by collective normative provisions; the ACLA stipulates that 
each member is obliged to fulfil the collective labour agreement’s obligations 
towards each contracting party of the collective labour agreement, as if  that 
member itself  were party to the collective labour agreement. This provision 
binds that member to both the contracting parties and third collective entities. 
If  a member fails to comply with a collective normative obligation, the 
collectivities can claim damages and/or specific performance. Most scholars 
argue that this regime also applies to article 14 employees who are bound by 
the collective labour agreement. In any event, collective normative obligations 
should be applied to article 14 employees who are bound by a collective labour 
agreement through an incorporation clause.
10.3.5 Special means of enforcement
A contracting association may, should any of the other contracting parties or 
their members contravene the collective labour agreement, demand payment 
of damages suffered by it, but also suffered by its own members. If  these 
damages are other than merely financial losses, these losses will be fixed on 
the principles of reasonableness. 
10.3.6 ¾ Mandatory law
In the Netherlands provisions of ¾ mandatory law exist. On this basis, the 
parties of an individual employment agreement may deviate from specific 
statutory provisions if, as far as is relevant for this thesis, an applicable 
collective labour agreement permits them to do so. This arrangement applies 
to the bound employer in his relation to both the employee who is directly 
bound by the collective labour agreement and to the article 14 employee. 
10.3.7 Term and termination
The contracting parties may determine the date on which their collective 
labour agreement becomes effective. Should they have omitted to do so, the 
agreement enters into force on the 15th day after its conclusion, or the day 
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after the Minister sends an acknowledgement of his receipt of the notification 
reporting the conclusion of the collective labour agreement, if  this day is 
later than that 15th day. The contracting parties may also stipulate the term 
of the collective labour agreement. This term, however, may not exceed five 
years. Should the parties not have stipulated the term of the collective labour 
agreement, this term is fixed on one year. The collective labour agreement, 
unless stipulated otherwise, does not terminate by operation of law; it is 
considered to be (tacitly) renewed after termination of its original term for 
the same term, but not exceeding one year. The agreement will not be renewed 
once it is terminated by notice upon the end of the original term. The notice 
term is 1/12 of the collective labour agreement’s total term, unless stipulated 
otherwise in the agreement.
10.3.8 After-effects
After expiration of the collective labour agreement, the obligatory and 
collective normative provisions have lost their force. The normative 
provisions, however, remain applicable as they have been incorporated 
into the employment agreement. These stipulations can be adapted by new 
arrangements between the employer and employee and after a new collective 
labour agreement entered into force. These after-effects also occur in the 
employment relation with an article 14 employee who has agreed on the 
applicability of the collective labour agreement.
10.3.9 The role of alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining
Many collective labour agreements have introduced some sort of alternative 
dispute resolution mechanism upon breach of the agreement. In general, 
conciliation, mediation and (although rare) arbitration are used as alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms.
10.4 Extending collective labour agreements
The Extension Act enables the Minister to declare an existing collective labour 
agreement, which applies to an important majority of the employees within 
a specific industrial sector, binding upon all employers and employees within 
that sector. The extension process is surrounded by a number of important 
demands and safeguards, being: (i) demands concerning (the provisions of) the 
collective labour agreements that are to de declared binding, (ii) procedural 
demands and safeguards, and (iii) statutory limitations on the duration of the 
binding collective labour agreement. 
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The Minister should (a) establish whether the agreement that is to be declared 
binding, in fact is a proper collective labour agreement. This collective labour 
agreement should (b) apply to an important majority of the employees in the 
relevant industrial sector. Basically, a collective labour agreement that applies 
to 60% or more employees in the relevant sector automatically complies with 
this demand. Furthermore, (c) only specific provisions of the collective labour 
agreement can be declared binding, most notably normative and collective 
normative provisions. Special attention should be given to (d) the scope of 
application of the collective labour agreement; this scope must be clear and 
unambiguous.
Besides these demands, many formalities must be observed. There should be 
(e) a formal request to extend the collective labour agreement, (f) a request 
which is to be published, (g) upon which third parties can raise objections 
against this request, which in turn must be addressed by the contracting parties 
of the collective labour agreement. The Minister may (h) ask the Labour 
Foundation’s advice on the request and, if  applicable, on any objections raised. 
If  all formalities are complied with, all material demands are met and the 
Minister sees no reason to refuse the request, the Minister’s decree extending 
the collective labour agreement must (i) be published in order to have effect.
Finally, the extension (j) may not have retro-effect and (k) should have a limited 
duration: the extension decree may not exceed the term of the collective labour 
agreement itself  and has a maximum duration of 2 years, with the exception 
of provisions on funds.
Even if  all of the above demands and safeguards are met and complied with, 
the Minister can refuse the extension application; he has a discretionary 
power whether or not to extend. There are at least three valid reasons to turn 
down the request to declare the collective labour agreement binding. First, the 
provisions of the collective labour agreement that are to be declared binding 
may not contravene dutch law. Second, they may, given social and economic 
developments, not contravene the dutch public interests. Last, the Minister 
may refuse to declare a (provision of a) collective labour agreement binding if  
it insufficiently takes into account the valid interests of third parties. 
Once declared binding, the collective labour agreement has important 
consequences. The provisions of such a collective labour agreement apply to 
all employment agreements concluded or to be concluded within the term 
of the extension decree that fall within the scope of the binding agreement. 
Every arrangement between the employer and employee that is in violation of 
a provision of an applicable binding collective labour agreement is void, and 
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is automatically replaced by said provision. An applicable binding collective 
labour agreement also prevails over another applicable, non-binding collective 
labour agreement. In case the employment agreement between the employer 
and employee does not arrange subjects that are arranged in provisions of an 
applicable binding collective labour agreement, these provisions automatically 
apply to that employment agreement. As opposed to the provisions of 
“normal” collective labour agreements, the provisions of the binding collective 
labour agreements do not, in principle, have after-effects.
Given these consequences, some employers would rather be exempted from 
the application of a binding collective labour agreement. An employer that 
is already bound by a non-binding collective labour agreement and raises 
objections against the request to extend a collective labour agreement that 
would also apply to him, is granted dispensation from the Minister if  (a) it 
cannot, in all reasonableness, follow the binding collective labour agreement 
and (b) the collective labour agreement that already applies to this employer is 
concluded with an independent trade union. As a consequence, this employer 
is exempted from the binding agreement. Apart from this dispensation 
possibility, many binding collective labour agreements stipulate that a third 
company falling within the scope of application of that agreement can request 
a special committee a dispensation.
The enforcement of binding provisions of a collective labour agreement 
resembles the enforcement of normal, non-binding collective labour 
agreements. As every provision of an applicable binding collective labour 
agreement automatically applies to the individual employment agreement, 
the individual employers and employees are entitled to directly call upon 
the binding collective labour agreement, and, if  needed, enforce their claims 
by starting litigation demanding specific performance and/or payment of 
damages. Moreover, associations of employees and employers, having members 
that are party to an individual employment agreement falling within the scope 
of application of the binding collective labour agreement, may demand the 
nullity of provisions in these individual employment agreements that violate 
the binding agreement. These associations can also claim damages suffered 
by themselves or their members from employers or employees who violate the 
binding collective labour agreement, as well as specific performance of the 
binding collective labour agreement. The Extension Act also contains a more 
or less public enforcement method. Should one of the parties that requested 
the extension of the collective labour agreement have reasonable suspicion 
that a company does not comply with the binding collective labour agreement 
and should it consider bringing the matter to court, it can request that the 
Minister investigate that company on such compliance. 
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10.5 The reach of the social partners
As collective labour agreements are private agreements, the social partners 
enjoy contractual freedom, limited by the statutory demand that these 
agreements should relate to employment conditions. Moreover, social partners 
are obviously not entitled to deviate from mandatory (international) law, to 
contravene public policy, or to violate good morals.
There are no statutory representativity demands social partners should meet 
in order to be entitled to conclude collective labour agreements. The legislator 
considered these demands not necessary, as collective labour agreements only 
bind the members of the contracting parties. The legislator apparently never 
anticipated that the role of the article 14 employees would be as relevant as it 
is today. Its argumentation seems to be caught up by practice. 
The lack of representativity demands, on the side of employers, is not 
worrisome; the employers only have to apply the collective labour agreement 
should they be bound by it. Given article 14 ACLA, this is different on 
the employees’ side. A lot can be said to introduce specific representativity 
requirements for trade unions in order for them to conclude collective labour 
agreements, especially when these are standard agreements deviating from the 
individual employment agreements to the detriment of the employees. 
The discussion on representativity is closely related to article 14 ACLA. This 
article is rather peculiar, as the legislator’s aims were conflicting: it did not 
want to entitle the article 14 employees to any rights that it did not deserve, 
whilst it also wished to prevent that employers would be able to escape from 
the provisions of the collective labour agreement by only hiring non-members 
as employees. These conflicting aims have led to the strange consequence that 
on the one hand, the ACLA does not bind the article 14 employees, whilst 
on the other the employer is obliged to apply the collective labour agreement 
to these employees. This article makes the article 14 employees “free riders”, 
as they enjoy the collective labour agreements without making any sacrifices. 
And when the collective labour agreements are unfavourable to them, they 
have a better chance of challenging the applicability of the collective labour 
agreements than employees that are directly bound by the collective labour 
agreement. It may be argued that article 14 ACLA encourages employees not 
to join a trade union. All in all, many scholars have argued that to simply 
get rid of article 14 ACLA. They favour a more or less institutional model, 
applying collective labour agreements equally to all employees. 
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As is the case with representativity, there are no statutory demands on the level 
of independence trade unions require from the employer in order to conclude 
legally valid collective labour agreements. Collective labour agreements have 
been concluded with trade unions that were not independent. These collective 
labour agreements are commonly held valid. Notwithstanding this, a County 
Court ruled that collective labour agreements concluded with trade unions 
that were independent from the employer, could not be regarded as proper 
and valid collective labour agreements. Such agreements, in the County 
Court’s view, violate dutch employment law and ILO Convention C98. It 
appears that the common view is that these collective labour agreements are 
undesirable and should be stopped.
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ChAPTER 10
 COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS IN GERMANY
1. Industrial relations in Germany in a nutshell
In this chapter the collective labour agreements (Tarifsverträge) in Germany 
will be discussed, applying the framework set out in section 7 of chapter 8.
1.1 The three pillars of the German industrial relations
German industrial relations rely heavily on three pillars: (i) a dual structure, 
(ii) a “high degree of juridification” and (iii) centralisation.1188
The dual structure refers to the two institutions that play a role in the 
representation of employees, the trade unions on the one hand, and the 
Works Councils on the other. Both of them have a strong legal basis and 
a good opportunity to influence management decisions.1189 They have their 
own, separate roles. Trade unions, unlike the Works Councils, are capable 
of collective bargaining and, consequently, of defining wage levels and 
structures.1190 The main focus in this chapter will be on them.
German industrial relations are “juridificied” extensively; that is, the law 
on industrial relations is set out in detail in specific acts. This is the case, 
in particular, with regard to Works Councils. Their position and role are 
scrutinised in the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). 
Although not as inclusive as with regard to the Works Council, the position and 
role of the trade unions in the collective bargaining process are also outlined 
1188  T. Blanke and E. Rose, Erosion or renewal? The crisis of collective wage formation 
in Germany, in R. Blanpain (ed.), Collective bargaining and Wages in Comparative 
Perspective, Kluwer, den haag, 2005, pages 5 and 6.
1189  T. Blanke and E. Rose, Erosion or renewal? The crisis of collective wage formation in 
Germany, page 6. 
1190  Although the Works Council still has some influence herein on the basis of article 
87.10 and 87.11 of the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesatz) and on 
the basis of so-called opening clauses.
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in acts. This is mainly done in the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) and 
the Collective Agreement Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz).
German industrial relations have been fairly centralised, although in recent 
years this has been somewhat in decline, as will be explained in section 1.3 
below. Three circumstances cause this level of centralisation. First, most 
employment relations are arranged for on sectoral level, as opposed to 
enterprise level. Second, there is only very little “trade union competition”, 
since 90% of all unionised employees are member of sectoral organisations 
which fall under the umbrella of the German Trade union Confederation 
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund; “dGB”).1191 Lastly, there is a high degree 
of coordination in collective bargaining between the regions in specific 
industries. It is not unusual to agree upon a collective labour agreement in 
a specific region, which is subsequently used as a model for other collective 
labour agreements in other regions or other sectors.
1.2 Statistics
In 2004, 61,772 collective labour agreements were in place in Germany.1192 A 
study shows that in that year collective labour agreements fully or substantially 
govern the employment agreements of approximately 84% of all German 
employees.1193 Approximately 2.5% of the German employees are bound by a 
so-called Pay Agreement (see section 4.2 below) merely due to the extension 
of that collective labour agreement.1194 Not much “old data” is available about 
the coverage of collective labour agreements, but traditional estimations 
from the 1960s indicate that around 80% of all companies and 90% of all 
employees are covered by collective bargaining, although recent voices say 
that these numbers may be somewhat overestimated.1195 In Germany, about 
24% of the workforce was unionised (in 2002).1196 German trade unions are 
1191  T. Blanke and E. Rose, Erosion or renewal? The crisis of collective wage formation in 
Germany, page 9.
1192  Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Tarifvertragliche Arbeitsbedingungen 
im Jahr 2004 [Employment conditions in collective labour agreements in 2004], 
February 2005, page 6. 
1193  Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Tarifvertragliche Arbeitsbedingungen 
im Jahr 2004, page 12.
1194  T. Blanke and E. Rose, Erosion or renewal? The crisis of collective wage formation in 
Germany, page 21. 
1195  S. Zagelmeyer, Collective bargaining coverage in Western Germany, 28 december 
1997, EIRO, page 1.
1196  T. Blanke and E. Rose, Erosion or renewal? The crisis of collective wage formation in 
Germany, page 18.
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struggling to keep as many members as possible. There has been a decline of 
union membership in recent years (trade union density was estimated around 
40% in 19901197), which seems to be stabilising or at least slowing down in 
2005.1198 On the employers’ side the organisation rate is substantial. The most 
important employers’ organisation, the Confederation of German Employers’ 
Associations (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände; “BdA”) 
comprises approximately 2 million undertakings which employ around 70 – 
80% of the entire German workforce.1199 This rate is under pressure, as small 
and medium sized enterprises in particular tend to terminate their membership 
with employers’ organisations.1200
1.3 Trends
There is a clear trend towards decentralisation in German collective bargaining. 
First, there is an important shift from sectoral collective labour agreements 
towards enterprise level collective labour agreements.1201 Second, sectoral level 
agreements tend to leave more room for arranging matters at enterprise level, 
most notably by using opening clauses. Opening clauses allow companies 
(under certain conditions and to a certain extent) to modify or to diverge 
from collectively agreed standards. These modifications are normally agreed 
with either the trade unions or the Works Council.1202 Third, to a considerable 
extent, employers and Works Councils have concluded works agreements that 
deviate from multi-employer collective labour agreements (and that in fact 
contravene the Works Constitution Act).1203
1197  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 16. The report can be found on: http://www.unifi.it/
polo-universitario-europeo/ricerche/collective_bargaining.html.
1198  Institute of Economic and Social Research, Union membership decline slows down, 
16 May 2006, EIRO.
1199  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 23.
1200  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 22.
1201  S. Zagelmeyer, Company-level bargaining gains importance, 28 March 1998, EIRO.
1202  T. Schulten, Opening clauses increase in branch-level collective agreements, 28 
September 1997, EIRO.
1203  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 30.
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1.4 Bargaining levels
Germany has, just like the Netherlands, several levels of collective bargaining. 
At the highest, national level, the social partners agree on social pacts with 
the German government. Important is the 1996 establishment of the alliance 
for work (Bündnis für Arbeit und Standortsicherung). however, the agreements 
concluded by this alliance are not binding by law and can therefore not be 
considered real collective labour agreements, as discussed in section 4.1 
below. Nonetheless, the participating social partners do exert influence 
on their organisations and members to comply with these agreements.1204 
The second level is the sectoral level in which trade unions and employers’ 
associations conclude collective labour agreements that apply to an industry 
or sector (Verbandstarifvertrag).1205 These are proper, binding collective 
labour agreements. These agreements may apply nationwide, although that 
is exceptional. Most frequently their scope is limited to a state (Land) in 
the federation or to a part thereof (a district).1206 As previously stated, such 
sectoral collective labour agreements may contain opening clauses, making 
tailor-made adjustments at enterprise-level possible. This brings us to the last 
level, the company or enterprise-level. Also in Germany there are collective 
labour agreements that merely apply to one specific employer, the enterprise 
level agreement (Firmentarifvertrag). 
2. A brief history of collective bargaining in Germany
The Loi le Chapelier of  1791 prohibited the formation of coalitions of 
employers and employees, as such a formation would constitute an attack 
on “freedom and humanity”.1207 This prohibition was abolished in 1869 by 
the Trade Resolution (Gewerbeordnung) of the North German Federation. 
Although this abolishment by no means introduced a complete freedom of 
association, it did, in a moderate manner, pave the way to collective bargaining. 
The first important collective labour agreement was subsequently concluded 
1204  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 30.
1205  Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Tarifvertragliche Arbeitsbedingungen 
im Jahr 2004, page 6.
1206  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, pages 8 and 31.
1207  R. Richardi and O. Wlotzke e.a, Münchener Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht [Munich 
Handbook on Employment Law], part 3 collective labour law, Verlag C.h. Beck, 
München, 2000, page 42.
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in 1873 in the book printing industry.1208 More collective labour agreements 
followed shortly thereafter.
due to the aforementioned abolishment of the prohibition on forming 
coalitions, the coalitions were tolerated, but still restricted. The coalitions 
needed, for example, permits for their establishment. Besides these restrictions, 
many employers, particularly those in the core industrial areas such as 
mining, heavy industries and chemicals, strongly opposed collective labour 
agreements. In their view, these agreements were at odds with their managerial 
powers.1209 Some employees even challenged the collective labour agreements. 
The orthodox socialistic employees considered collective bargaining as an 
unwanted collaboration with management.1210 The First World War, however, 
urged management and employees to work together. This resulted in the Act 
on Patriotic Services (Gesetz über den vaterlandischen Hilfsdienst) of december 
1916. As this Act formally recognised trade unions for the first time, it entailed 
a step from mere tolerance to a genuine freedom of association. 
But it was not only the lack of full freedom of association that hindered the 
collective bargaining process. Collective labour agreements suffered from one 
particular weakness, pointed out by many German scholars: the collective 
labour agreements that were concluded had merely obligatory effects. As a 
consequence, they only bound the contracting parties involved, and did not 
directly apply to the individual employment agreements (in other words, 
the collective labour agreements lacked direct normative effect). Although 
the collective labour agreement contained third-party clauses for the benefit 
of the individual employees, these employees and their trade unions could 
only enforce these rights vis-à-vis the contracting employers’ organisation 
and not vis-à-vis the actual employer. This hindered collective labour 
agreements reaching their actual goal: arranging the individual employment 
agreements.1211
The next steps in overcoming this weakness, to guarantee the freedom of 
association and, more in general, to acknowledge and regulate collective 
bargaining were taken in 1918, following that year’s November Revolution. 
The central organisations of both management and labour entered into an 
important agreement, establishing a Central Employment Organisation 
1208  R. Richardi and O. Wlotzke e.a, Münchener Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, page 231.
1209  T. Schulten, Collective Agreement Act celebrates its 50th anniversary, 28 May 1999, 
EIRO, page 1.
1210  R. Richardi and O. Wlotzke e.a, Münchener Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, page 231.
1211  R. Richardi and O. Wlotzke e.a, Münchener Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, page 233.
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(Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft) comprising both sides of the industry. In 
this agreement, the trade unions were acknowledged again, limitations to 
trade unions were stated as invalid, and collective labour agreements were 
recognised.1212 This agreement was basically repeated in the Collective 
Agreement Ordinance (Tarifvertragsverordnung) of the same year, setting 
out the principle of collective bargaining autonomy, which entitled the 
social partners to determine their own working conditions, free of state 
interference.1213 Moreover, the Ordinance stipulated that the collective labour 
agreements had a direct and mandatory effect (Unmittelbare und Zwingende 
Wirkung) to an individual employment agreement governed by that collective 
labour agreement (direct normative effect). The Ordinance also enabled the 
Minister of Labour (Reichsarbeitsminister) to extend a collective labour 
agreement.1214 Shortly after, in 1919, the freedom of association was embedded 
in the Constitution of the Weimar Republic (Weimarer Reichsverfassung).1215
In 1923, however, the Ordinance on Arbitration (Verordnung über das 
Slichtungswesen) was passed, which enabled the state to use compulsory 
arbitration in specific “collective” situations, in fact limiting the social partners’ 
collective bargaining autonomy. With the rise of National Socialism, the 
trade unions and employers’ organisations were dissolved in 1933, obviously 
terminating the free collective bargaining process entirely. A governmental 
central organisation substituted the social partners in 1934, which, on the 
basis of the Act on the Regulation of National Labour (Gesetz zur Ordnung 
der nationalen Arbeit), replaced freely negotiated collective agreements with 
governmental ordinances.
After the Second World War, the military government that was set up by the 
Allies froze the wages in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). 
In the meantime, trade unions and employers’ organisations were founded 
again in West Germany. National states started to introduce the freedom 
of association in their constitutions. Once the aforementioned wage freeze 
was lifted in 1948, the social partners could enter into collective bargaining 
again.1216 The government stimulated this, as in 1949 it introduced article 9 of 
the German Constitution, setting out the freedom of association. In the same 
year, the Collective Agreement Act was introduced. This Act did change over 
1212  R. Richardi and O. Wlotzke e.a, Münchener Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, page 43.
1213  T. Schulten, Collective Agreement Act celebrates its 50th anniversary, page 2.
1214  R. Richardi and O. Wlotzke e.a, Münchener Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, page 233.
1215  R. Richardi and O. Wlotzke e.a, Münchener Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, page 43.
1216  T. Schulten, Collective Agreement Act celebrates its 50th anniversary, page 2.
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time, but its basic elements, which will be discussed shortly, remain unaltered 
to date.
In the entire period following the Second World War, the development of 
“free labour law” in the German democratic Republic (East Germany) was 
severely hindered by the Communist regime. The German unification in 
1990, however, brought about that the West German “system”, including the 
Collective Agreement Act, was extended to the former East Germany, and 
was now applied to the unified Germany.1217 
3. The classical rights concerning collective bargaining
The classical triptych of rights - the freedom of association, the right to 
collective bargaining, and the right to strike – is protected in Germany.
Article 9.3 of the German Constitution guarantees the right of association. 
Pursuant to this article, associations that protect and advance employment 
and economic conditions may be established, without state or other parties’ 
interference. Every individual is free to establish such an association and/or to 
join it. Equally, this article guarantees the individual’s right not to join such 
an association.1218
The entitlement to collective bargaining obviously derives from the Collective 
Agreement Act. But apart from that, this right is also (implicitly) embedded 
in article 9.3 of the German Constitution. The Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) ruled that the state is obliged to establish a core 
arrangement on collective bargaining for private employees (as opposed to 
civil servants).1219 This right to collective bargaining, however, does not entail 
an obligation to bargain. A party is free to refuse to bargain.1220 Of course, a 
trade union can “persuade” an employer into bargaining through collective 
actions.1221
1217  T. Schulten, Collective Agreement Act celebrates its 50th anniversary, page 2.
1218  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz [Collective Agreement 
Act],Verlag Franz Vahlen, München, 2004, page 12.
1219  Federal Constitutional Court, 18 November 1954, Arbeidsrechtlige Praxis (“AP”) 
no. 1 to art. 9 German Constitution.
1220  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, pages 22 and 24.
1221  In exceptional circumstances case law awards a trade union an entitlement to 
bargain. This exception will be discussed in section 6 below.
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The right to collective action (the right to strike) is embedded in article 9.3 of 
the German Constitution. In order to be legal, the strike must meet formal 
requirements and pursue a legitimate purpose. The latter requirement states 
that a strike should be aimed at altering working conditions. This puts forward 
the view that a strike during the term of a collective labour agreement is held 
illegal, as in this period the working conditions have already been arranged 
(Friedenspflicht).1222
4. Collective labour agreements
Before discussing in detail the consequences of a collective labour agreement, 
section 4.1 first establishes how such an agreement is defined in Germany. 
Section 4.2 will introduce different types of collective labour agreements and 
different types of provisions therein.
4.1 What constitutes a collective labour agreement?
Pursuant to article 1.1 of the Collective Agreement Act, a collective labour 
agreement governs the rights and obligations of the contracting parties and 
contains legal norms on the content, the commencement and the termination 
of employment agreements and on matters pertaining to the operation of 
works and legal aspects of the works’ constitution (Betriebsverfassung).
First, it derives from this article that a collective labour agreement can cover 
different legal relations. As a rule, German scholars distinguish between the 
obligatory part of the collective labour agreement, arranging the relation 
between the contracting parties, and the normative part, setting out the 
relation between the employer and employee as well as organisational and 
co-determination matters.1223 This difference will be set out in more detail in 
section 4.2 below.
1222  S. Lingemann, R. von Steinau-Steinrück and A. Mengel, Employment & Labor 
Law in Germany, Verlag C.h. Beck and Ant. N. Sakkoulas, Athens, 2003, page 58.
1223  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz [Collective Agreement Act], in 
T. dieterich, R. Müller-Glöge, U. Preis and h.C.G. Schaub, Erfurter Kommentar 
zum Arbeitsrecht [Erfurter Commentary on Employment Law], Verlag C.h. Beck, 
München, 2006, page 2597.
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Second, the definition makes it clear that the social partners’ freedom to 
regulate the aforementioned normative part is only limited.1224 Regarding 
the relation between the employer and employee, the collective labour 
agreement may arrange the content, the commencement and the termination 
of employment agreements. As far as the content is concerned, the collective 
labour agreement may arrange the same topics that can be arranged in the 
individual employment agreement.1225 Arrangements on the commencement 
of employment agreements concern the conclusion of the employment 
agreement with new and former employees and the continuation of lapsed 
employment agreements.1226 Arrangements on termination of the employment 
agreement relate to the entitlements of the parties to terminate the employment 
agreement (is termination allowed and, if  so, under which conditions?).1227 
The collective labour agreement may also arrange the relation between the 
employer and its “entire personnel” (Belegschaft). After all, it may contain 
legal norms on matters pertaining to the operation of works and legal aspects 
of the works’ constitution. Works are, briefly put, “organisational labour 
units”.1228 The company forms the economical unit and can be comprised of 
several works. In practice, it is not always easy to define the exact reach of the 
social partners in this respect. It is evident that the arrangement should deal 
with collective, as opposed to individual, norms. These arrangements should 
involve matters that can only be applied in a uniform manner.1229 Such matters 
could include security checks at the company’s entrance, a prohibition to 
smoke in the company’s premises, dress codes, and closure of the business on 
a specific date. The collective labour agreement can also deal with the Works 
Council’s co-determination rights, provided that the Works Constitution Act 
permits these arrangements.
1224  With regard to the obligatory provisions, the contracting parties enjoy freedom of 
contract and are therefore – obviously within the limits of the law – free to decide 
what they want to arrange. h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, 
page 162.
1225  Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), 16 September 1986, AP no. 17 to 
article 77 of the 1972 Works Constitution Act. This case concerned an agreement 
concluded with the Works Council, but the Court also referred to collective labour 
agreements.
1226  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2602.
1227  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2602.
1228  S. Lingemann, R. von Steinau-Steinrück and A. Mengel, Employment & Labor 
Law in Germany, page 44. See also article 4.1 of the Works Constitution Act.
1229  Federal Labour Court, 17 june 1997, AP no. 2 to article 3 of the Collective 
Agreement Act, Betriebsnormen.
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Third, it should be noted that the collective labour agreement is an agreement, 
to which the common German rules, pertaining to agreements, apply.1230 
Article 1.2 of the Collective Agreement Act prescribes that the agreement has 
to be set out in writing. The same rule applies to alterations of the collective 
labour agreement. Furthermore, the agreement should be duly executed by 
the contracting parties.1231
Fourth, not every party is entitled to conclude collective employment 
agreements. The contracting parties should be, on the one hand, one or 
more employers or associations of employers, and on the other, one or more 
trade unions (article 2.1 of the Collective Agreement Act).1232 Also central 
organisations (Spitzenorganisationen), being federations of trade unions and 
of associations of employers, are capable of entering into collective labour 
agreements, either on behalf  of their members, or on their own account (article 
2.2 and 2.3 of the Collective Agreement Act respectively). The contracting 
parties should meet specific demands, which are to be discussed in section 5.
A last requirement is that a collective labour agreement should be registered 
at the Federal Ministry for Economy and Labour (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Arbeit; “the Ministry”) on the basis of articles 6 and 7 of 
the Collective Agreement Act. Without such a notification, the contracting 
parties risk payment of a fine (article 7.2).
4.2 Different types of collective labour agreements and of provisions
It is not unusual in Germany to distinguish between different types of collective 
labour agreements which mirror the content of that agreement.1233 Some 
collective labour agreements only arrange the primary employment conditions, 
the so-called Pay Agreements (Entgelttarifverträge or Vergütungstarifverträge). 
These collective labour agreements set out the amount of remuneration (wage, 
wage increase, and other sorts of compensation). Other collective labour 
agreements only deal with general employment conditions, the so-called 
1230  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2597. See also h.C.M. 
Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz , page 175.
1231  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2599.
1232  It is clear that on both sides (labour and management) multiple parties can enter 
into the collective labour agreement. It is not as clear whether such an agreement 
should be regarded as one agreement, or as multiple agreements with the same 
content between the different contracting parties. Reference is made to h.C.G. 
Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2598.
1233  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 37.
 COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS IN GERMANY
427
Framework Agreements (Manteltarifverträge). These agreements arrange 
topics like hiring and firing policies, working hours, working overtime, 
holidays, payment during illness, notice periods, classification of employees 
etc.1234 Of course, some collective labour agreements are mixes of these two. 
Lastly, there is a relative new type of collective labour agreement, the collective 
labour agreement “on special issues”. Such an agreement only covers a single 
topic, such as working time, part-time work for the elderly, vocational training 
and restructuring.1235
Besides the above distinction, it is also common in Germany to differentiate 
between obligatory and normative provisions in a collective labour agreement. 
Unlike the Netherlands, the distinction between “individual” and “collective” 
normative provisions is not often made, although it does exist in practice.
Article 1.1 of the Collective Agreement Act already makes clear that obligatory 
provisions exist. It states: “a collective labour agreement arranges the rights and 
obligations of the contracting parties”. For instance, an employer is obliged, 
by law, to make the content of an applicable collective labour agreement 
known to its personnel (article 8 of the Collective Agreement Act). Another 
example of an obligatory provision is the mandatory peace obligation; the 
social partners may not revert to collective actions during the term of the 
collective labour agreement and should promote that their members refrain 
from such actions as well.1236 The social partners are furthermore under the 
obligation to take adequate means to ensure that their members abide by the 
collective labour agreement (Einwerkungspflicht).1237 Obviously, the social 
partners are also free to agree on (other) contractual obligatory provisions.
Article 1.1 of the Collective Agreement Act makes equally clear that collective 
labour agreements can contain individual normative provisions as it also 
stipulates: “a collective labour agreement (…) contains regulations on the 
content, the conclusion and the termination of employment agreements”. The 
1234  Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Tarifvertragliche Arbeitsbedingungen 
im Jahr 2004, page 8.
1235  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 38.
1236  Federal Labour Court, 8 February 1957, AP no. 1 to article 1 Collective Agreement 
Act, Friedenspflicht; Federal Labour Court, 21 december 1982, AP no. 76 to article 
9 German Constitution, Arbeitskampf; and Federal Labour Court, 12 September 
1984, AP no. 81 to article 9 German Constitution, Arbeitskampf. 
1237  Federal Labour Court, 9 june 1982, AP no. 1 to article 1 Collective Agreement 
Act, Durchführungspflicht and Federal Labour Court, 29 April 1992, AP no. 3 to 
article 1 Collective Agreement Act, Durchführungspflicht. 
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collective labour agreement can thus create norms between the employers and 
employees that fall within the scope of application of the collective labour 
agreement.
The collective labour agreement may, given the aforementioned article 1.1, 
also contain collective normative provisions. After all, pursuant to this article, 
a collective labour agreement “contains regulations (…) on matters pertaining 
to the operation of works and legal aspects of the works’ constitution”. These 
collective normative provisions may set out rights and obligations of the 
employers and employees towards “collectivities”, such as funds (article 4.2 
of the Collective Agreement Act) or the works (article 1.1 of the Collective 
Agreement Act). 
5. The players in the collective bargaining process
There are a number of parties in Germany that are relevant for the collective 
bargaining system: the government, the employers’ confederations and trade 
union confederations, separate employers’ associations, trade unions and 
individual employers. 
The government’s involvement in the collective bargaining process is mainly 
indirect, although it does play a part in the aforementioned social pacts which 
are tripartite. One of the government’s important indirect roles is obviously 
to enact legislation on collective labour agreements. It furthermore makes the 
extension of collective labour agreements possible, as will be set out in section 
8 below. 
The confederations, referred to as central organisations, can have a direct 
influence on the collective bargaining process. Pursuant to article 12 of the 
Collective Agreement Act, central organisations are such federations of trade 
unions or of employers’ associations that are of major importance for the 
representation of employees’ and employers’ interests in gainful activities in 
the Federal Republic. Article 2.2 of the Collective Agreement Act entitles 
these organisations to conclude collective labour agreements on behalf  of their 
members, should they be empowered to do so. Article 2.3 of the Collective 
Agreement Act even allows the central organisations to conclude collective 
labour agreement on their own account, should their articles of association 
allow them to do so. 
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By far the most important central organisation on the side of the employees 
is the aforementioned dGB, established in 1949. It is a trade union umbrella 
organisation comprising 8 trade unions, including the powerful IG Metall and 
ver.di. dGB represents German trade unions in dealings with the government, 
political parties, employers’ organisations and other groups in society. It also 
coordinates joint demands, themes and campaigns for its members. dGB 
itself  does not conclude collective labour agreements. As mentioned, almost 
90% of all unionised employees are member of sectoral trade unions under 
the umbrella of dGB.1238
There are a number of German employers’ organisations, with more or 
less similar tasks (but in their case serving the interests of employers) and a 
similar organisational structure as dGB. The most important organisation 
on the side of the employers is the aforementioned BdA. It represents the 
interests of German employers in the social policy field and is the spokesman 
of German employers in this field vis-à-vis the government, parliament, trade 
unions, public and international organisations. BdA’s main tasks are rendering 
services to its members (information, advice, coordination) and influencing 
the policy-makers. BdA is a central organisation within the meaning of article 
12 of the Collective Agreement Act, but does not conclude collective labour 
agreements itself. It does coordinate the joint demands of its members.1239
The trade unions and employers’ organisations are the most interesting 
parties in the collective bargaining process, as they, besides the employers 
themselves, in fact conclude the collective labour agreements. The trade 
unions and employers’ organisations typically operate in their own specific 
field, such as manufacturing, construction, services or metal. Some trade 
unions do not organise themselves down the line of different fields, but rather 
of different occupations (pilots, civil servants, engine-drivers etc.).1240 Trade 
unions typically organise themselves on a multi-level basis; on national, state 
and district level.1241 The trade unions and employers’ organisations must 
meet specific requirements in order to be able to conclude collective labour 
1238  Reference is made to www.dgb.de.
1239  Reference is made to www.bda-online.de.
1240  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2622.
1241  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 17.
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agreements (they must be: tariffähig).These requirements are not statutory, 
but developed in case law,1242 and this will be discussed below.
Article 9.3 of the German Constitution states that organisations active in 
collective bargaining (i) should be associations (Vereinigungen) that protect and 
advance employment and economic conditions. Exactly how this association 
is shaped from a legal point of view falls under the freedom of association, 
although the organisations should be stable (and not ad-hoc coalitions).1243 
Trade unions tend to be associations not having legal personality, whilst 
employers’ organisations tend to be associations that have legal personality.1244 
Both types of associations have legal standing in German labour courts 
(article 10 Labour Court Act (Arbeitsgerichtgesetz)). Article 9.3 of the 
German Constitution also entails that the association is to be (ii) voluntarily 
established,1245 and (iii) independent from its social counterparty1246 and from 
state, church and political parties.1247 The association should furthermore (iv) 
surpass company level.1248
1242  Although a Protocol concluded between former East and former West Germany 
on 18 May 1990 did stipulate which requirements trade unions and employers’ 
organisations should meet in order to be eligible to conclude collective labour 
agreements. Under the heading “social union” this Protocol stipulated (freely 
translated): “Trade unions and employers’ organisations that are capable of 
concluding collective labour agreements should be freely established, their 
organisations should surpass company level, they should be independent and 
they should acknowledge positive collective labour law; furthermore, they should 
be in a position to pursue the conclusion of an agreement by pressuring their 
counterparty.”
1243  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 5.
1244  R. Richardi and O. Wlotzke e.a, Münchener Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, page 210.
1245  See for example Federal Labour Court, 15 November 1963, AP no. 14 to article 2 
Collective Agreement Act. 
1246  Federal Constitutional Court, 18 November 1954, AP no. 1 to article 9 German 
Constitution.
1247  See for example Federal Labour Court, 15 November 1963, AP no. 14 to article 2 
Collective Agreement Act. 
1248  Federal Labour Court, 15 November 1963, AP no. 14 to article 2 Collective 
Agreement Act and Federal Labour Court, 25 November 1986, AP no. 36 to article 
2 Collective Agreement Act.
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Moreover, the association should (v) have a democratic organisation.1249 
This includes the entitlement of an individual member to have “a voice” 
in the association. The association should also (vi) possess real powers 
(Mächtigkeit).1250 In other words, the association should be able to “persuade” 
the counterparty to enter into negotiations; it should be capable of coping 
with a genuine labour struggle and it should be willing, if  necessary, to take 
industrial action.1251 The trade unions should be, briefly put, a counterparty that 
is to be taken seriously. More in general, it is demanded from the association 
that it (vii) is sufficiently prepared to enter into collective bargaining, meaning 
that it should have adequate financial and organisational resources to be an 
effective party in the bargaining process.1252 
The association should also (viii) be committed to entering into a collective 
labour agreement, and its articles of association should specifically stipulate 
its power to conclude these agreements.1253 The articles of association of the 
trade unions and the employers’ organisation should establish whose interests 
are served. This demand is of importance with regard to the competence of 
the association to conclude a specific collective labour agreement, as will be 
discussed in section 6 below. Finally, (ix) the association should acknowledge 
the German laws on collective bargaining and collective action.1254 
It should be noted that, according to the Federal Labour Court, the 
above demands only fully apply to trade unions and not to employers’ 
organisations.1255 More in particular, this applies to the requirement that an 
1249  Federal Labour Court, 15 November 1963, AP no. 14 to article 2 Collective 
Agreement Act and Federal Labour Court, 25 November 1986, AP no. 36 to 
article 2 Collective Agreement Act. Löwisch and Rieble see this as a real demand in 
relation to Tariffähigkeit, h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 
329. Schaub and Franzen acknowledge its importance, although state that having a 
democratic organisation may be a demand in that respect. h.C.G. Schaub and M. 
Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2617.
1250  Federal Labour Court, 16 November 1982, AP no. 32 to article 2 Collective 
Agreement Act; and Federal Labour Court, 25 November 1986, AP no. 36 to 
article 2 Collective Agreement Act.
1251  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 6.
1252  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz , page 337.
1253  Federal Labour Court, 25 November 1986, AP Nos. 34 and 36 to article 2 
Collective Agreement Act.
1254  Federal Labour Court, 25 November 1986, AP Nos. 34 and 36 to article 2 
Collective Agreement Act.
1255  See also: M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 
2004; National Report Germany, page 6.
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association should have real powers to persuade the counterparty to conclude 
a collective labour agreement.1256 It would be, according to this Court, illogical 
to fully apply this demand to an employers’ association, as the same demand 
does not apply to individual employers (who are also entitled to enter into 
collective labour agreements). This ruling is challenged by some.1257
As appears from the above, German law has no real representativity demands 
in order for an association (trade union) to be eligible to collective bargaining. 
A trade union merely requires one member in a company, in order to be eligible 
to start bargaining with that company.1258 With regard to representativity, 
reference is made to section 9.2 below.
6. The negotiation process / conclusion of 
a collective labour agreement
As set out above, not every party may conclude collective labour agreements. 
The contracting parties should, on the one hand, be one or more employers 
or associations of employers, and on the other, one or more trade unions. 
The central organisations may also conclude collective labour agreements. 
Section 5 explains which demands these parties must satisfy in order to be 
capable concluding collective labour agreements. But merely being capable 
of concluding collective labour agreements in general (as mentioned: 
Tariffähigkeit) does not suffice in order to be entitled to conclude a specific 
collective labour agreement. The contracting parties involved should 
also be competent to enter into that specific collective labour agreement 
(Tarifzuständigkeit). Without Tariffähigkeit combined with Tarifzuständigkeit, 
no valid collective labour agreements can be concluded.1259 It is therefore of 
the utmost importance that the correct party negotiates with the correct 
counterparty. But whom to choose? Or to phrase the question differently, 
which party is competent to conclude a specific collective labour agreement, 
which party is tarifzuständig?
1256  Federal Labour Court, 20 November 1990, AP no. 40 to article 2 Collective 
Agreement Act.
1257  See for example, with further references, h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, 
Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 340.
1258  W.L. Keller, International Labor and Employment Laws, Bureau of national Affairs, 
Washington d.C., 1999, page 4-22.
1259  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, pages 379 - 381.
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6.1 The competence to conclude a specific collective labour agreement
In order to asses the competence of the parties to enter into a specific 
collective labour agreement, it should be noted that every party has its own 
field of interest. As mentioned, the articles of association of trade unions and 
of employers’ organisations establish whose interests they serve. Trade unions 
are normally either organised along the lines of field of activity (branch) or 
occupation, and they serve the interests of their members working in that 
branch or occupation. The members of the employers’ organisations are 
normally also active in one particular branch and their interests are served 
by the organisations. The central organisations serve the interests of their 
members (the trade unions and the employers’ organisations).
The trade unions, the employers’ organisations and the central organisations 
are only competent to conclude collective labour agreements within their 
own field of interest, as specified in their articles of association.1260 Every 
employer is, by law, able to conclude specific collective labour agreements 
pertaining to its own operation (article 2.1 of the Collective Agreement 
Act).1261 Consequently, a trade union serving, for instance, the interests of 
employees working in the metal industry may only conclude a collective 
labour agreement with an employers’ association or an individual employer 
in the metal industry. The mutual part of the field of interest of both sides 
of the contracting parties gives the actual area within which they may validly 
conclude a collective labour agreement.1262 
It is therefore very important that a party starts bargaining with a “matching” 
counterparty. To facilitate this process, dGB has drafted a register setting out 
which of its trade unions is entitled to conclude a collective labour agreement 
with which companies, given the nature of activities of such companies.1263
1260  Federal Labour Court, 25 September 1996, AP no. 10 to article 2 Collective 
Agreement Act, Tarifzüstandigkeit; Federal Labour Court, 12 November 1996, 
AP no. 11 to article 2 Collective Agreement Act, Tarifzüstandigkeit; and Federal 
Labour Court, 14 december 1999, AP no. 14 to article 2 Collective Agreement Act, 
Tarifzüstandigkeit.
1261  A holding company, however, is in itself  neither capable nor competent to conclude 
a collective labour agreement covering its subsidiaries, as these subsidiarities are 
all different employers. Reference is made to h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, 
Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 369.
1262  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 502.
1263  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, pages 351 ff.
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6.2 The bargaining process itself
The Collective Agreement Act does not describe the actual bargaining process. 
This process is primarily governed by general rules on concluding agreements, 
including rules on offer and acceptance. 
As already mentioned, there is a constitutional right to collective bargaining, 
not being an obligation to bargain. In other words, the party on the one 
side depends on the willingness of the party on the other side to accept the 
invitation to bargain (an invitation which can naturally be enhanced with 
collective actions). The Federal Labour Court in fact refused to oblige a party 
to participate in bargaining.1264 It ruled that such an obligation would be an 
empty formality, because article 9 of the German Constitution would obstruct 
a material obligation to bargain in order to try and reach an agreement. This 
decision is, however, disputed by some.1265 Only in exceptional circumstances, 
such as the termination of an existing collective labour agreement for material 
reasons while the consequences need to be addressed in a new collective 
labour agreement, are German courts willing to oblige a party to participate 
in bargaining.1266
6.3 The conclusion of the collective labour agreement
Once the bargaining turned out successful, the parties involved can conclude 
the collective labour agreement. In practice, the parties involved often agree 
on a period in which the outcome of the negotiations are offered to a special 
(internal) commission (Tarifkommission) for its approval or refusal, prior to 
making the agreement final.1267 This final approval, however, is not a statutory 
requirement.
As already mentioned, the collective labour agreement should after its 
conclusion be registered at the Ministry on the basis of article 6 of the 
Collective Agreement Act. The Ministry keeps a register of collective labour 
agreements concluded, altered, terminated and extended.
1264  Federal Labour Court, 14 july 1981, AP no. 1 to article 1 Collective Agreement 
Act, Verhandlungspflicht.
1265  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2598.
1266  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 93.
1267  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 176.
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7. The effects of the collective labour agreement; 
the Collective Agreement Act
Once able and competent parties have concluded a (valid) collective labour 
agreement, its consequences should be assessed. It is key to establish (i) to 
whom the collective labour agreement applies, (ii) which effects such an 
application has, and (iii) how the parties involved can enforce their rights. 
Sections 7.1 through 7.4 will apply these questions to the standard 4 scenarios. 
Section 7.5 sets out which other means of enforcement are in place in case of 
a breach of the collective labour agreement. Section 7.6 describes a “special” 
consequence the collective labour agreement has: it may set aside specific 
statutory provisions. Section 7.7 focuses on the term and termination of the 
collective labour agreements. The collective labour agreement’s possible after-
effects will be discussed in section 7.8. Finally, section 7.9 focuses on the role 
of alternative dispute resolution in German collective bargaining. 
7.1 Scenario 1
The contracting parties are, upon conclusion of the collective labour 
agreement, bound to each other by the (obligatory provisions of the) 
agreement. This more or less automatically follows from article 1.1 of the 
Collective Agreement Act, which states that a collective labour agreement 
governs the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. As a consequence 
hereof, the contracting parties need, by law, to perform under the contract, 
and may not endanger or harm the goals and consequences of the agreement 
(articles 275 ff German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch; “GCC”)). The 
contracting parties should furthermore act reasonable and fair towards each 
other in the execution of the collective labour agreement (article 241.2 GCC), 
but also in the bargaining process (article 311.2 GCC).
Should a contracting party breach an obligatory provision of the collective 
labour agreement, the counterparty may instigate proceedings against the 
party in breach (article 2.1.1 Labour Court Act). This counterparty may 
resort to the “usual” remedies following a breach of contract. This normally 
leads to claims on damages and/or specific performance (articles 280 ff GCC). 
The aggrieved party may, however, not suspend its obligations (articles 320 
and 326.1 GCC) or step back from the collective labour agreement (articles 
323 ff GCC).1268 
1268  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 169.
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just like a peace-obligation is immanent to a collective labour agreement in 
Germany, so is the so-called “obligation to influence” (Durchführungspflicht 
combined with Einwirkungspflicht): this obligation automatically applies to 
each collective labour agreement. This obligation obliges the contracting 
association to ensure that its members fulfil the obligations arising from the 
collective labour agreement. Consequently, the association has to act to the 
best of its abilities to pledge that its members follow the collective labour 
agreement; it does, however, not have to guarantee this.1269 From this, it 
automatically follows that the obligation to influence is only of relevance on 
the management side when it concerns a sectoral level agreement.
The association has a rather far-reaching discretion as to how it fulfils its 
obligation to influence.1270 As a rule, the association obliges its members, 
through its articles of association, to comply with all obligations arising 
from the collective labour agreement.1271 It can take disciplinary measures 
against a member who is not willing to apply the collective labour agreement, 
including the threat to remove that member from the association.1272 The 
aforementioned discretion notwithstanding, the counterparty may demand 
specific performance from the association of the obligation to influence, if  the 
latter refuses to act on this obligation.1273
Should the central organisations have concluded the collective labour 
agreement – either on behalf  of their members or on their own account – 
both the central organisations and their members are bound by the mutual 
obligations arising from the collective labour agreement on the basis of article 
2.4 of the Collective Agreement Act. 
7.2 Scenario 2
On the basis of article 3.1 of the Collective Agreement Act, the legal norms 
of the collective labour agreement should be applied to those employers 
and employees who (i) are both bound by and (ii) fall within the scope of 
application of that agreement. In other words, a collective labour agreement 
applies to the individual employment agreements of employees and employers 
1269  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 170.
1270  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2611.
1271  R. Richardi and O. Wlotzke e.a, Münchener Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, part 3 
collective labour law, pages 220, 221 and 224. 
1272  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2611.
1273  Federal Labour court, 29 April 1992, AP no. 3 to article 1 Collective Agreement 
Act, Durchführungspflicht.
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who are both bound by the collective labour agreement and both fall within 
its scope of application.1274
7.2.1 Which employers and employees are bound by 
the collective labour agreement?
Article 3.1 of the Collective Agreement Act makes it clear that members of 
the parties to a collective labour agreement, and the employer who is himself  
a party thereto, are bound by the collective labour agreement. This binding 
power starts at the moment the individual joins the association. This demand 
does not prevent a collective labour agreement from having retro-effect to a 
date on which the individual had not joined the association just yet; it suffices 
that the individual is a member on the date the collective labour agreement 
is concluded.1275 This binding power of the collective labour agreement is 
rather strong, as termination of the membership does not free an individual 
from the consequences of that agreement up to the date that the collective 
labour agreement has expired or is terminated (article 3.3 of the Collective 
Agreement Act).
7.2.2 Which employers and employees fall within the collective 
labour agreement’s scope of application?
The social partners themselves determine the scope of application of the 
collective labour agreement.1276 It is not entirely clear what the consequences 
are should the social partners fail to arrange for this scope of application. 
Some scholars argue that in such a case the collective labour agreement applies 
to all employees and employers that are bound by the agreement and fall 
within the mutual scope of competence of the contractual parties,1277 others 
1274  There are different opinions in Germany on the mechanism that grants direct and 
horizontal effect to the normative provisions of a collective labour agreement upon 
the parties that are bound by that agreement. On the one hand it is argued that 
collective bargaining is an expression of private autonomy collectively exercised. 
On the other hand it is argued that collective bargaining leading to the conclusion 
of collective labour agreements relies on the delegation of the state on the social 
partners the power to conclude agreements with a normative effect. This second 
position is dominant. See M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining 
in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Germany, page 9. 
1275  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2626.
1276  Federal Labour Court 19 November 1985, AP no. 4 to article 2 Collective 
Agreement Act, Tarifzüstandigkeit.
1277  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 502.
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take the view that this collective labour agreement is subject to interpretation 
or is even void.1278 
When determining the scope of application that has been agreed on in the 
collective labour agreement, five aspects should be taken into consideration:
i. the group of employees falling within the scope of the collective labour 
agreement;
ii. the employer or group of employers falling within the scope of the col-
lective labour agreement;
iii. the geographical territory; 
iv. the organisational territory; and
v. the duration.
As in the Netherlands, it is not uncommon in Germany to exempt specific 
groups of employees, most notably higher personnel, from the applicability of 
the collective labour agreement.1279 If  an employee is bound by the collective 
labour agreement (through his membership of a contracting trade union), but 
is excluded from the scope of application of the agreement by the agreement 
itself, the collective labour agreement does not apply to the employment 
agreement of that employee.
The employer or group of employers should also fall within the scope of 
application of the collective labour agreement (Fachlicher Geltungsbereich). 
The scope of application of sectoral-level collective labour agreements is 
normally based on the profession or industry of the companies concerned. As 
a rule, side-activities of a company sufficiently connected to that company (for 
example, the company’s “own” cafeteria or administration department) follow 
the primary activity of that company.1280 The company level collective labour 
agreement obviously only applies to the company concerned. Sometimes, the 
applicability of collective labour agreements is made dependent on the size of 
the company; it is not uncommon that small companies are exempted from 
the scope of application of (parts of) the collective labour agreement.1281
A collective labour agreement may be limited in geographical territory. A 
collective labour agreement could apply to the entire German federation, a 
1278  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2633.
1279  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 509.
1280  Federal Labour Court 31 March 1955, AP no. 1 to article 4 Collective Agreement 
Act, Geltungsbereich and Federal Labour Court 3 February 1965, AP no. 11 to 
article 2 Collective Agreement Act , Geltungsbereich.
1281  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 507.
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specific state, a district or even an individual city. It is rather common that a 
sectoral collective labour agreement only applies to a specific state.1282
The social partners sometimes specifically stipulate that the collective labour 
agreement only applies to members of the contracting parties. This may appear 
somewhat odd at first glance, since this is already the case on the basis of the 
Collective Agreement Act. Still, sometimes it makes the scope of applicability 
clearer, as the collective labour agreement may stipulate that it only applies to 
“full or ordinary members”, as opposed to, for example, members on trial or 
extraordinary members.1283 Furthermore, the social partners may choose that 
only current members fall within the scope of application of the collective 
labour agreement and that members who cease their membership immediately 
lose any rights and obligations arising from the agreement.
Matters on term and termination of the collective labour agreement will be 
set out in section 7.7 below.
7.2.3 What are the legal consequences?
We now know that a collective labour agreement applies should both the 
employer and the employee be bound by that agreement and fall within its 
scope of application. But what are the consequences of an applicable collective 
labour agreement? here, article 4.1 of the Collective Agreement Act is of 
relevance. Pursuant to that article, the legal norms set forth in an applicable 
collective labour agreement regulating the content, commencement and 
termination of the individual employment agreement shall apply directly and 
with mandatory effect to that individual employment agreement. This means 
that every (individual) normative provision of the collective labour agreement 
automatically applies to the individual employment agreement, modelling the 
individual employment agreement and setting aside from the collective labour 
agreement deviating provisions.1284 In other words, in Germany the individual 
normative provisions in the collective labour agreement also have a self-
executing (direct normative) effect on the individual employment agreement.
After the employment agreement has been remodelled by the collective labour 
agreement and during the term of that agreement, it is not possible to deviate 
from the content of the collective labour agreement or to waive the rights set 
1282  Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Tarifvertragliche Arbeitsbedingungen 
im Jahr 2004, page 6.
1283  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 511.
1284  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 490.
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forth within it. Moreover, it is not permitted to agree that rights can only be 
enforced in a certain period of time, unless the collective labour agreement 
specifically permits this. A waiver of rights arising from the collective labour 
agreement is, pursuant to article 4.4 of the Collective Agreement Act, only 
permissible in the case that the contracting parties to the collective labour 
agreement have agreed to it.
7.2.4 Deviation from the collective labour agreement in 
the individual employment agreement
It should be noted that not every provision in an individual employment 
agreement that is different from the corresponding provision in the collective 
labour agreement deviates from the collective labour agreement. Article 4.3 of 
the Collective Agreement Act stipulates that arrangements in the individual 
employment agreement may differ from the corresponding provisions of the 
collective labour agreement (i) should that be permitted by the collective 
labour agreement itself  or (ii) should such a departure be advantageous to the 
employee (Günstigkeitsprinzip). 
This principle of favour is an important rule, not permitting the deterioration 
of provisions in the employment agreement. It applies to both individual 
arrangements agreed on before and after the collective labour agreement 
entered into force.1285 Moreover, it is of mandatory law: any provision in 
the collective labour agreement prohibiting more favourable individual 
arrangements is void.1286 As a consequence, unlike the Netherlands, Germany 
does not distinguish between “standard”, “minimum” and “maximum” 
provisions of a collective labour agreement, since all normative provisions of 
the collective labour agreements are minimum agreements. An exception to 
this principle of favour can follow from specific acts which can allow collective 
labour agreements to deviate from legal standards (see also the first part of 
article 4.3 of the Collective Agreement Act). This is discussed in section 7.6 
below.
1285  Federal Labour Court, 7 November 1989, AP no. 46 to article 77 of the 1972 
Works Constitution Act. Although this ruling concerned an agreement concluded 
with the Works Council, it is likely to apply to collective labour agreements as well. 
See also h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2638.
1286  See for example Federal Labour Court, 15 december 1960, AP nos. 2 and 3 to 
article 4 Collective Agreement Act, Angleichungsrecht.
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7.2.5 Enforcement
Since the normative provisions of the collective labour agreement have a self-
executing effect, the individual employer and employee who do not abide 
by these normative provisions are in breach of the individual employment 
contract. The aggrieved party can subsequently claim specific performance 
and/or damages following this breach of contract (article 280 ff GCC). This 
party cannot claim the dissolution of the collective labour agreement, as 
the contracting parties did not breach the collective labour agreement, but 
“merely” the employer or employee in their mutual relation.1287
7.3 Scenario 3
The above-mentioned only applies if  both the employee and the employer 
are bound by the collective labour agreement and fall within the scope of 
application of that agreement. But what if  either the employer or the employee 
is not bound by the collective labour agreement (although they both fall within 
the scope of application of that agreement)? 
In that situation the individual normative provisions of collective labour 
agreements do not apply to the employment agreement. The social partners 
lack competency and legitimacy to draft normative rules and regulations for 
the entire labour market; the social partners represent their members and are 
not entitled to draft normative provisions that apply between the employer 
and employee, of which one or both is/are unorganised.1288 
The aforementioned does not mean that the content of the collective labour 
agreement is at all times irrelevant for the employer and employee of which 
one or both is/are unorganised. On the contrary: the content or part of 
the content of the collective labour agreement may very well apply to their 
employment agreement.
It is rather common in Germany to apply the legal norms of a collective 
labour agreement, even if  not both parties are bound by the collective labour 
agreement. Many employment agreements stipulate that (a part of) a specific 
collective labour agreement applies. Such a stipulation is usually referred to as 
a “reference clause” (Bezugnahmeklausel). As a rule, an employer who is bound 
by a collective labour agreement uses such a reference clause to bind all of its 
1287  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 175.
1288  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 9.
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employees (organised and unorganised) to the collective labour agreement.1289 
This enables the employer to apply the same employment conditions to all 
of its employees, regardless of whether they are a contracting trade union’s 
member. This is especially relevant, as the employer generally does not know 
whether the individual employee is a trade union member, as he is not entitled 
to ask the employee whether he is.1290
The reference clause does not bind both parties to the collective labour 
agreement on the basis of the Collective Agreement Act, but it ensures that 
the normative provisions of the collective labour agreement apply as a part 
of the employment agreement.1291 If  the employee who is not bound by the 
collective labour agreement has accepted a reference clause, his position is very 
comparable to the position of the employee in scenario 2.1292 The individual 
normative part of the collective labour agreement applies to the individual 
employment agreement. The collective normative provisions, however, do 
not apply (reference is made to section 7.4).1293 Both the employer and the 
employee may enforce the (individual normative) employment conditions 
towards each other, as they agreed on the applicability thereof.
7.4 Scenario 4
Employers and employees who are bound by and fall within the scope of 
applicability of the collective labour agreement (see scenario 2 above) are, 
if  provided for in the collective labour agreement, also bound vis-à-vis 
collectivities by (the collective normative provisions of) this agreement. There 
are statutory provisions arranging for the rights and obligations between (i) 
the employer and the works and (ii) the employer and employee on the one 
hand and jointly established organisations on the other.
First, article 3.2 of the Collective Agreement Act stipulates that the legal norms 
set forth in a collective labour agreement which regulate matters pertaining to 
(a) the operation of works and (b) the legal aspects of the works constitution 
apply to all works of which the employer is bound by the collective labour 
1289  Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Tarifvertragliche Arbeitsbedingungen 
im Jahr 2004, page 11.
1290  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 427.
1291  Federal Labour Court, 7 december 1977, AP no. 9 to article 4 Collective 
Agreement Act, Nachwirkung.
1292  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, pages 2628, 2630 and 2631. 
See also h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 454.
1293  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 463.
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agreement. Whether or not employees working for this bound employer are 
member of the contracting trade union is, given this provision, not relevant. 
Pursuant to article 4.1 of the Collective Agreement Act, the legal norms 
contained in a collective labour agreement regarding the operation of works 
and legal aspects of the works constitution apply, just like the individual 
normative provisions, directly and with mandatory effect.
The aforementioned provisions govern the relation between (a) the employer 
and its “entire personnel” (the works, in the end, being a labour unit) and (b) 
the employer and its Works Council. As the works/entire personnel is not a 
separate entity, the Works Council has to serve their interests.1294 If  there is no 
Works Council installed, the individual employees may call on these collective 
normative provisions, if  they are ultimately addressed by these provisions.1295 
Second, a collective labour agreement can provide for the joint establishment 
of institutions (collectivities) by the contracting parties. Such institutions 
could include wage equalisation funds, vacation funds and institutions for 
vocational training. Setting up these institutions has become particularly 
common in the construction sector in Germany. Pursuant to article 4.2 of 
the Collective Agreement Act, the provisions on the establishment of these 
institutions shall apply directly and mandatory to the articles of association 
of these institutions and to the relation between these institutions on the 
one hand on the employers and employees bound by the collective labour 
agreement on the other. 
The joint institutions may directly collect the contributions from the (bound) 
employers and the (bound) employees have a direct entitlement towards the 
institutions.1296 By way of exception, the contracting parties to the collective 
labour agreement are also entitled to collect the contributions from the bound 
employers and enforce the performance of the joint institution for the benefit 
of the bound employee.1297 As already mentioned in section 7.3 above, the 
employees who are not bound by a collective labour agreement, but whose 
employment agreement refers to the applicability of the collective labour 
agreement, have no entitlements towards the joint institution. 
Unlike the ACLA in the Netherlands, the German Collective Agreement Act 
does not arrange for provisions in the collective labour agreement setting 
1294  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 488.
1295  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 488.
1296  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, pages 536 ff.
1297  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 495.
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out obligations for the employers and employees towards the contracting 
parties. The rights and obligations between the trade unions and employers’ 
organisations vis-à-vis their own members are arranged by the general 
principles governing associations and their articles of association.
7.5 Other statutory means of enforcement
The above-mentioned scenarios discuss, amongst others, whether or not the 
parties whose rights are concerned are entitled to enforce these rights. however, 
more parties play a role in the enforcement of the collective labour agreements, 
as will be set out hereunder. Furthermore, the Collective Agreement Act has a 
specific provision on the effects of the collective labour agreement, which may 
be of relevance with regard to enforcement as well.
7.5.1 Article 9 of the Collective Agreement Act
As mentioned above, collective labour agreements are invalid in the case that 
the contracting parties lack the capacity or the competence to conclude these 
agreements. The existence or non-existence of the collective labour agreement 
can therefore be an issue. In order to streamline litigation and prevent 
conflicting rulings in this respect, article 9 of the Collective Agreement Act 
introduces a special arrangement. Pursuant to this article, a final decision 
taken by labour courts in proceedings between the contracting parties to a 
collective labour agreement concerning matters arising from this agreement 
or its mere existence or non-existence, is also binding in litigation upon the 
members of these parties in their mutual relation as well as their relation 
towards third parties. This article furthermore makes clear that only the 
contracting parties themselves may start litigation in order to establish for 
law the existence or non-existence of the collective labour agreement.1298
7.5.2 Enforcement of obligatory provisions
The aggrieved party may, following a breach of an obligatory provision, revert 
to the general provisions of the dCC, which are already set out in scenario 
1 above. If  the obligatory provisions in fact establish rights for third parties 
– such as employers and employees – these third parties may directly enforce 
these rights on the basis of article 328 GCC.1299 
1298  Federal Labour Court, 10 May 1989, AP no. 6 to article 2 Collective Agreement 
Act, Tarifzüstandigkeit.
1299  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 30.
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Some obligatory provisions may relate to the bound employer and/or bound 
employee. Examples of this are obligatory provisions setting out that the 
employers should create new jobs or should take environment friendly 
measures. It is disputable whether trade unions may enforce these obligatory 
provisions against members of the contracting employers’ organisation on 
the basis of the so-called Burda-ruling, which will be discussed below.1300 
7.5.3 Enforcement of (individual) normative provisions
The employer and the employee who are both bound by and fall within the 
scope of applicability of the collective labour agreement can enforce their 
rights set out in the individual normative provisions of the collective labour 
agreement through claims based on the individual employment agreement. 
Reference is made to scenario 2 above. The Federal Labour Court also allows 
the request of a declaratory judgement, should such a judgement solve multiple 
individual matters. This can be especially useful when it comes to establishing 
whether specific employment agreements are governed by a collective labour 
agreement and, if  so, by which collective labour agreement.1301
The Works Council can also play a role in the enforcement of normative 
provisions.1302 One of the tasks of the Works Council is to ensure that the 
employer applies the applicable collective labour agreement (article 80.1.1 of 
the Works Constitution Act). An individual employee may revert to the Works 
Council should he feel that the employer breaches an applicable normative 
provision. If  the Works Council subscribes to the employee’s point of view, it 
should revert this issue to the employer, in order to find a solution (article 85.1 
of the Works Constitution Act). The Works Council, however, cannot enforce 
the alleged individual right in court. It can merely withhold its consent to 
specific intended decisions of the employer on the basis of article 99 of the 
Works Constitution Act, should such an intended decision violate the content 
of an applicable collective labour agreement. 
1300  According to Löwisch and Rieble the Burda-ruling only applies to normative 
provisions and not to obligatory provisions. Reference is made to h.C.M. Löwisch 
and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 167. Schaub and Franzen seem to take the 
opinion that the aforementioned ruling can also apply to obligatory provisions. 
Reference is made to h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 
2611.
1301  See for example Federal Labour Court, 25 September 2002, AP no. 26 to article 1 
Collective Agreement Act, Bezugnahme auf Tarifvertrag.
1302  In fact, this applies to different “Works Councils”, not only being the Betriebsrat, 
but also the Sprecherausschuss and the Bundespersonalvertretung. I will only focus 
on the role of the Betriebsrat, referred to as Works Council.
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A contracting party to the collective labour agreement may demand from 
its counterparty to incite this latter party’s members to fulfil the obligations 
arising from the collective labour agreement (the aforementioned obligation 
to influence). It is, however, as a rule not entitled to claim damages or to 
demand specific performance from the individual employer or employee who is 
in breach of the normative provisions of the collective labour agreement.1303 
Two important exceptions apply to this rule. First, a contracting trade union 
may instigate legal actions against an employer who does not fulfil the 
normative provisions of an enterprise level collective labour agreement. After 
all, this employer is in violation of an agreement he himself  directly entered 
into with that trade union.1304 The other exception is based on a negligence 
claim (Unterlassungsanspruch; article 1004 GCC) and was firstly recognised 
by the Federal Labour Court in the Burda-ruling.1305 This Court allowed a 
contracting trade union to commence litigation against and demand to refrain 
the violation of the collective labour agreement from the employer bound by 
a sectoral-level collective labour agreement, which employer had introduced 
a generally applicable company arrangement deviating from the normative 
provisions of the applicable collective labour agreement. The Federal Labour 
Court would not permit this employer to fully set aside the norm setting power 
of the collective labour agreement, consequently depriving this agreement of 
its central function. It should be noted, however, that this enforcement method 
can only be used in specific circumstances, involving amongst others a serious 
breach of the collective labour agreement, at least one employee who is bound 
by the collective labour agreement, and an employer who is aware of this (or 
these) bound employee(s).1306
The German state does not have a general obligation to ensure that the 
normative provisions of the collective labour agreement are fulfilled.1307
7.5.4 Enforcement of collective normative provisions
The collectivities themselves (the Works Council and the joint institutions), 
addressed by the collective normative provisions of the collective labour 
agreement, are entitled to enforce these provisions. By way of exception, 
the contractual parties to the collective labour agreement are also entitled 
1303  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2636.
1304  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 494.
1305  Federal Labour Court, 20 April 1999, AP no. 89 to article 9 German Constitution.
1306  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 497. See also h.C.G. 
Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, pages 2611 and 2612.
1307  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 499.
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to collect the contributions from the bound employers and to enforce the 
performance of the joint institution for the benefit of the bound employees. 
Reference is made to scenario 4 above.
7.6 Special legal consequences of a collective labour 
agreement: Tarifdispositives Gesetzesrecht
Like the Netherlands, Germany also has statutory provisions of directory and 
mandatory law. When applied to an employment agreement, the employer 
may deviate in favour, and to the detriment of the employee from directory 
law. Obviously neither party may deviate from mandatory law at all. There 
are also statutory provisions that are only partially mandatory and allow 
departure only in favour of the employee (Einseitig zwingendem Gesetzesrecht). 
Also, like in the Netherlands (¾ mandatory law), German law contains 
provisions that can only be set aside by a collective labour agreement 
(Tarifdispositives Gesetzesrecht).1308 The rationale of this law is in the 
assumption that social partners of a specific sector are best equipped to draft 
regulations that the sector or enterprise concerned actually needs.1309 Examples 
of fields in which derogation (also to the detriment of the employees) of 
the law, by means of collective labour agreements, is allowed are: working 
time, fixed-term contracts and temporary work.1310 Not only the parties of 
an individual employment agreement that are both bound by the collective 
labour agreement are free to use this entitlement. The same is the case 
with regard to the parties that apply a collective labour agreement through 
a reference clause.1311 
7.7 Term and termination
The collective labour agreement is a private law agreement, involving the 
signatories’ freedom of contract. Consequently, the contracting parties may 
freely establish the collective labour agreement’s date of entrance into force 
and its term; the Collective Agreement Act does not play a role in this. This 
freedom includes the contracting parties’ right to award retro-effect to the 
legal norms of the collective labour agreement.1312 
1308  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, pages 2595 and 2596.
1309  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 12.
1310  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 13.
1311  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2630.
1312  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, pages 2634, 2635 and 2641.
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Collective labour agreements can, as any “normal” agreement, be concluded 
for a fixed or an indefinite period of time. In practice, Pay Agreements tend to 
have durations of one or two years, while Framework Agreements last longer. 
In any case, the social partners have a responsibility to their members not to 
bind them for “overly long” periods of time.1313 This also means that, should a 
collective labour agreement have an indefinite duration, it should be possible 
to terminate such an agreement within a reasonable period of time.
Agreements for a fixed period of time end, by operation of law, at the end 
of their term. They cannot be prematurely terminated by notice, unless 
specifically agreed otherwise.1314 A collective labour agreement can also be 
concluded under the subsequent condition that it terminates on the occurrence 
of a special event. It is not unusual, for example, for the social partners to 
agree that the collective labour agreement will terminate automatically once a 
new collective labour agreement has been concluded. The occurrence of these 
events, however, should easily be established for them to have effect.1315
The collective labour agreement with indefinite duration can be terminated by 
notice. Sometimes the contracting parties have agreed that notice should be 
served within a specific timeframe. This is, however, not necessary: the parties 
can even arrange that the agreement can be terminated at any given time 
with or without a notice period. Should the contracting parties have failed to 
arrange for a notice period, it is argued to link the applicable notice period to 
the statutory notice period in place for another collective agreement, the so-
called company agreement (Betriebsvereinbarungen) concluded between the 
company and its Works Council.1316 This notice period is set on three months 
(article 77.5 of the Works Constitution Act). 
The collective labour agreement can furthermore be terminated upon 
occurrence of an important event, upon which it cannot reasonably be 
expected that the party continues the collective labour agreement (article 314 
GCC). This method of termination should be restrictively applied. Whether 
a collective labour agreement also terminates if  the foundation to conclude 
the collective labour agreement (Geschäftsgrundlage) has disappeared, is 
1313  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 93.
1314  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 182.
1315  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 180.
1316  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 182. See also h.C.G. 
Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2600.
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disputed.1317 This matter is, however, purely academic, as it would constitute 
an important event upon which termination as permitted anyway.
The collective labour agreement can also be terminated at any time by mutual 
consent of the contracting parties involved. If  the contracting parties conclude 
a new collective labour agreement with the same scope of application as the 
prior collective labour agreement, this prior collective labour agreement will 
lose force (Ablösung).1318 Finally, the collective labour agreement will terminate 
after one of the contracting parties lost its capacity to conclude collective 
labour agreements.1319
7.8 After-effects
As is the case in the Netherlands, in Germany possible after-effects 
(Nachwirkung) of a collective labour agreement are also of importance.1320 
The obligatory provisions of the collective labour agreement have no after-
effects: at the expiration of the collective labour agreements, these provisions 
lose their force.1321 This is different with regard to normative and collective 
normative provisions. Pursuant to article 4.5 of the Collective Agreement 
Act, the legal norms put forward in the collective labour agreement continue 
to apply after the agreement’s expiration, until they are replaced by another 
arrangement. These after-effects can be prevented, if  the social partners 
specifically arrange so in the collective labour agreement.1322 The original 
1317  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2601.
1318  See for example Federal Labour Court, 20 March 2002, AP no. 12 to article 1 of 
the Collective Agreement Act, Tarifverträge: Gebaudereinigung. 
1319  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2600. The authors 
mention as one of the examples hereof Federal Labour Court, 28 May 1997 AP 
no. 26 to article 4 Collective Agreement Act, Nachwirkung, in which they view 
the Court decided that the collective labour agreement ended after the employers’ 
organisation was wounded-up. It is, however, questionable whether this indeed can 
be derived from that ruling. See the note below said ruling from T. Kania.
1320  The after-effects concern the period after the collective labour agreement has 
lapsed, and should be distinguished from the position described in article 3.3 of 
the Collective Agreement Act, which stipulates that termination of his membership 
does not free an individual of the consequences of a collective labour agreement 
up to the date that such an agreement has expired or is terminated. In this latter 
scenario, the (former) member is fully bound by the collective labour agreement 
during its term, and not “merely” bound by after-effects.
1321  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2601.
1322  Federal Labour Court, 3 September 1986, AP no. 12 to article 4 Collective 
Agreement Act, Nachwirkung; and Federal Labour Court, 16 August 1990, AP no. 
19 to article 4 Collective Agreement Act, Nachwirkung. 
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goal of this article was to regulate the period after expiration of a collective 
labour agreement, but before the entering into force of a new collective labour 
agreement.1323 Another goal was to ensure that the employee is not confronted 
with employment conditions that change to his detriment upon expiration of 
the collective labour agreement.1324
The after-effects only apply to employment agreements that were already in 
force during the term of the collective labour agreement and were governed by 
that collective labour agreement; they do not apply to employment agreements 
entered into after the collective labour agreement has already lapsed.1325 The 
after-effects have effect until the employer and employee agreed on other 
arrangements, or until a new collective labour agreements entered into force.1326 
The norms that have after-effects therefore resemble directory law. In the case 
whereby a collective labour agreement applies to an individual employment 
contract merely due to a reference clause, the norms of the collective labour 
agreement also remain to apply after this agreement has lapsed, on the basis 
of German general contract law.1327
The after-effects equally apply to the legal norms set out for the benefit for the 
works, the works’ constitution and the joint organisations.
7.9 The role of alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining
In Germany, many collective labour agreements have introduced some sort of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism.1328 Although such mechanisms are 
not mandatory, they are of importance, as during the term of the collective 
labour agreement the trade unions cannot revert to collective actions as a 
means of solving conflicts given the immanent peace obligation. The scope 
1323  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2641.
1324  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 588.
1325  Federal Labour Court, 6 june 1958, AP no. 1 to article 4 Collective Agreement 
Act, Nachwirkung; and Federal Labour Court, 29 january 1975, AP no. 8 to article 
4 Collective Agreement Act, Nachwirkung. 
1326  The termination of after-effects once a new collective labour agreement applies 
is of importance for the German system. Should this be different, the German 
system would be static as subsequent collective labour agreements would be unable 
to change the normative provisions of the previous collective labour agreement to 
the detriment of the employees, as such a change would be incompatible with the 
principle of favour. See also chapter 13, section 8.8 and chapter 16, section 5.
1327  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 442.
1328  See h. dribbusch and O. Stettes, EIRO Thematic Feature on Collective dispute 
Resolutions in an enlarged European Union – case of Germany. This report can be 
found on the EIRO-website.
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of these mechanisms differs considerably, ranging from mere voluntary 
mediation to mandatory conflict resolution systems.1329 
8. Extending collective labour agreements
German law also has an instrument which enables the Ministry to extend a 
collective labour agreement in such a fashion that it applies to all employers 
and employees that fall within the scope of application of that agreement. 
The extension decision constitutes a material act of law (Verwaltungsakt or 
Rechtssetzungsakt).1330 
The extension process is surrounded by several demands and safeguards, 
which will be discussed in section 8.1. The Ministry’s discretionary power 
regarding whether or not to extend will be discussed in this section as well. 
Once declared binding, the collective labour agreement has important 
consequences for all parties that fall within its scope. These consequences 
will be discussed in section 8.2, as well as the means of enforcement of this 
extended collective labour agreement.
8.1 Demands and safeguards surrounding the extension 
/ the Ministry’s discretionary power
Neither all collective labour agreements, nor all provisions of them can 
be declared binding. The collective labour agreement should meet several 
demands and safeguards, which can be divided into (i) demands concerning 
(the provisions of) the collective labour agreements that are to de declared 
binding, (ii) procedural demands and safeguards, and (iii) limitations on 
the duration of the binding collective labour agreement. If  the applicable 
demands are met, it is up to the judgement of the Ministry whether or not to 
extend the collective labour agreement.
8.1.1 Demands concerning (the provisions of) the collective labour agreement
The extension process presumes (i) the existence of a valid collective labour 
agreement. An invalid collective labour agreement cannot become valid 
merely because of the extension.1331
1329  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, pages 159 ff.
1330  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2652.
1331  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2650.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 10
452
Pursuant to article 5.1 of the Collective Agreement Act, a collective labour 
agreement can only be extended if  (ii) the employers bound by the agreement 
employ not less than 50% of the total number of employees working within 
the scope of application of the collective labour agreement and if  (iii) the 
extension serves the public interests. The Ministry is entitled to deviate from 
these demands in response to a social emergency.
From this second demand, it can be derived that only the employers that are 
bound by the collective labour agreement are of relevance when establishing 
the number of employees that fall within the scope of application of the 
collective labour agreement; the number of employees that are bound by 
the collective labour agreement is irrelevant. The requirement of a sufficient 
number of bound employers is in place to ascertain a balance in the market 
between organised and unorganised employers;1332 a minority should not be 
able to model the working conditions of a majority.1333 Obviously, it is rather 
difficult for the Ministry to establish whether the bound employers employ 
at least 50% of the total number of employees falling within the collective 
labour agreement’s scope of applicability. The Ministry should make an 
estimation of the number of employees employed by the bound employers 
and the number of total employees that fall within the scope of application of 
the collective labour agreement. When making this estimation, the Ministry 
should take all relevant sources available into account, including information 
of the different chambers of commerce.1334 
The extension should, given the aforementioned third demand, serve the 
public interest. Whether or not the public interest is served with the extension, 
should be established by the Ministry, balancing the interests of all parties 
involved, most particularly those of the employers and employees. This 
balancing process is obviously closely related with the Ministry’s discretionary 
power as to whether or not to extend a collective labour agreement, and will 
be discussed further in section 8.1.4 below. The importance of the public 
interest is further emphasised by article 5.5 of the Collective Agreement Act, 
which states that the Ministry may revoke its extension decision should the 
public interest warrant this.
1332  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2650.
1333  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 10.
1334  Federal Labour Court 11 june 1975, AP no. 29 to article 2 Collective Agreement 
Act; and Federal Labour Court, 24 january 1979, AP no. 16 to article 5 Collective 
Agreement Act.
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In case of a social emergency, the Ministry is, on the basis of article 5.1 of 
the Collective Agreement Act, entitled to depart from the above-mentioned 
(ii and iii) demands. This, in fact, only plays a role in respect to the “50% 
demand” (on balance, if  an extension is necessary due to a social emergency, 
that extension would surely serve the public interest).
It should be noted that (iv) not all provisions of the collective labour agreement 
can or have to be extended. Article 5.4 of the Collective Agreement Act makes 
it clear that the normative and collective normative provisions of a collective 
labour agreement can be extended, as opposed to the obligatory provisions. 
This entails, amongst others, that the (obligatory) peace obligation cannot 
be extended. Some non-obligatory provisions cannot, by law, be declared 
binding as well, which is, for example, the case if  such a provision contravenes 
the German Constitution. A provision restricting the competence of the state 
courts can, for instance, not be extended as the admittance to a state court is 
protected by the Constitution. Finally, a collective labour agreement should 
not necessarily be extended in full; a partial extension (extending a mere part 
of the collective labour agreement) is permitted as well. 
Moreover, (v) the provisions of the collective labour agreement that are to be 
extended, including the provisions on the scope of application, should be fully 
clear.1335 This is especially important if  only a part of the collective labour 
agreement is extended; partial extension can impair the clarity. With regard to 
the scope of application, it should be noted that the Ministry is not entitled to 
broaden this scope. It is, however, entitled to only extend the collective labour 
agreement in a part of Germany, even if  the agreement’s original territorial 
scope covers Germany entirely. The Ministry may furthermore stipulate that 
the extended collective labour agreement only applies to companies and their 
employees who are not yet bound by another collective labour agreement, or 
it may exclude specific companies from the extension.1336
8.1.2 Procedural demands and safeguards 
The Ministry may not declare a collective labour agreement binding on its 
own initiative, but is dependent on (vi) the request of the signatory parties. 
Pursuant to article 5.1 of the Collective Agreement Act, either labour or 
management may request for the extension. If  there are multiple parties at 
one side (management or labour), these parties should jointly request the 
1335  Federal Labour Court, 14 October 1987, AP no. 88 to article 1 Collective 
Agreement Act, Tarifverträge: Bau.
1336  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, pages 611 and 612.
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extension.1337 Apart from the contracting parties to the collective labour 
agreement, no other party is entitled to request the extension.
This request is subsequently (vii) published in the Federal Gazette 
(Bundesanzeiger) pursuant to article 4.1 of the Implementation Ordinance 
(Durchführungsverordnung). Parties affected by the requested declaration are 
entitled (viii) to raise objections, as a rule within a 3 weeks’ term following the 
publication.1338 These affected parties are the employers and employees falling 
within the scope of application of the collective labour agreement involved, 
the trade unions and employers’ organisations interested in the extension 
procedure and the Supreme Labour Authorities (obersten Arbeitsbehörden) 
of the federal states in whose area the collective labour agreement applies 
(article 5.2 of the Collective Agreement Act). These parties may express 
their view in writing and also state their case in a public hearing. Should the 
aforementioned Supreme Labour Authorities object to the extension of the 
collective labour agreement, the Ministry requires the approval of the federal 
government in order to still be able to extend the agreement (article 5.3 of the 
Collective Agreement Act).
Pursuant to article 5.1 if  the Collective Agreement Act, the Ministry should 
(ix) obtain the approval of a special committee (Ausschuss) prior to its 
decision to extend a collective labour agreement. This committee is comprised 
of three representatives of the central organisations on the labour side and 
three representatives of the central organisations on the management side. 
Voting in this committee is based on simple majority, which in fact means that 
either side of the industry is (jointly) capable of preventing the extension of a 
collective labour agreement.1339 
If  all formalities are complied with, all material demands are met and the 
Ministry decides to extend the collective labour agreement, it should (x) 
publish such a decision (article 5.7 of the Collective Agreement Act). The 
same applies if  the Ministry withdraws such a decision. The extension should 
also be registered on the basis of article 6 of the Collective Agreement Act in 
the Ministry’s register of collective labour agreements.
1337  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 621.
1338  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 621.
1339  M. Fuchs, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Germany, page 10.
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8.1.3 Limitations in duration of the declaration
The binding collective labour agreement may (xi) not have “real” retro-
effect. As a rule, the extension may only enter into force from the moment 
of its publication.1340 In the case whereby the publication of the application 
to extend a collective labour agreement already noted that the extension, if  
granted, would have retro-effect, the binding collective labour agreement may 
have effect from the date of the publication of said application.1341 In that 
case everyone concerned could have anticipated the retro-effect. If  it concerns 
an extended collective labour agreement that changes an already existing 
extended collective labour agreement, or follows-up an expired collective 
labour agreement, this agreement may have retro-effect.1342
Furthermore, (xii) the extension decision is limited in time, as the extension 
may not outlast the duration of the collective labour agreement itself, but it 
may be shorter;1343 the extension of a collective labour agreements ends at the 
moment the underlying collective labour agreement has been terminated or 
changed (without extending this changed collective labour agreement).1344
8.1.4 The discretionary power of the Ministry / public interest
Pursuant to article 5.1 of the Collective Agreement Act, the Ministry can (as 
opposed to shall) declare binding a collective labour agreement that satisfies 
the relevant requirements. The Ministry therefore has a discretionary power 
whether or not to declare such a collective labour agreement binding.1345 
Closely related to this discretionary power is the Ministry’s opinion whether 
or not the public interest is served with the extension.
In order to answer this last question the Ministry should, as already mentioned 
above, balance all interests involved. This balancing should be done on a case-
by-case scenario; the German government cannot, for example, rule that all 
collective labour agreements furthering a particular (political) goal will be 
1340  Federal Labour Court, 3 November 1982, AP no. 18 to article 5 Collective 
Agreement Act.
1341  Federal Labour Court, 3 November 1982, AP no. 18 to article 5 Collective 
Agreement Act.
1342  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 618.
1343  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 613.
1344  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, pages 613 and 614.
1345  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 628.
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extended.1346 The specific advantages of each collective labour agreement 
should be balanced against its specific disadvantages. Normally the most 
obvious disadvantage is the influence that the collective labour agreement 
has on employers that are not already bound by it. As the collective labour 
agreement sets minimum norms, they can be confronted with a raise of costs. 
As a rule the most obvious advantage of the extension of a collective labour 
agreement lies in the protection of the employees.
In general, the public interest is served if  the extension averts an imminent real 
disadvantage for a sufficient number of employees.1347 According to the German 
Courts, this is the case should the extension (a) prevent an erroneous trend 
in the labour market by setting equal minimum employment conditions,1348 
(b) be necessary for the proper functioning of a joint organisation,1349 and 
(c) strengthen a statutory goal.1350 In this respect, it should be noted that 
the court only marginally assesses whether or not the Ministry balanced all 
interests correctly.1351 
8.2 The consequences of a binding collective labour agreement / enforcement
Pursuant to article 5.4 of the Collective Agreement Act, the legal norms of 
the collective labour agreement that is extended also apply to the employers 
and employees that fall within the scope of application of the agreement and 
who were not already bound by the agreement. The extension is therefore 
an additional way to bind employers and employees by the collective labour 
agreement.1352 The scope of application of the collective labour agreement is 
set out in the provisions of the collective labour agreement itself  (although, as 
previously stated, the Ministry’s declaration may be limited to only a part of 
Germany, in which case only in that part the provisions will be binding).1353
1346  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 629.
1347  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2650.
1348  Federal Constitutional Court, 24 May 1977, NjW 1977, page 2255.
1349  Federal Labour Court, 24 january 1979, AP no. 16 to article 5 Collective 
Agreement Act, which ruling dealt with the (collective) payment of holidays. 
1350  Federal Labour Court, 28 March 1990, AP no. 25 to article 5 Collective Agreement 
Act.
1351  See for example Federal Constitutional Court, 10 September 1991, AP no. 27 to 
article 5 Collective Agreement Act. See also Federal Labour Court, 24 january 
1979, AP no. 16 to article 5 Collective Agreement Act.
1352  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 608.
1353  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 611.
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The above-mentioned brings forth that the legal position of the employers 
and employees falling within the scope of application of the extended 
collective labour agreement is the same as the legal position of the employers 
and employees who already were bound by that agreement regardless of 
the extension. For the legal position of (i) these employers and employees 
towards each other and (ii) towards “collectivities” reference is made to the 
above-mentioned scenarios 2 and 4 respectively. With regard to the possibility 
to enforce rights, reference is made to said scenarios and section 7.5.
The after-effects of the provisions of the binding collective labour agreements 
are also the same as those of “normal” (non-binding) collective labour 
agreements. These after-effects obviously apply to all employers and employees 
falling within the scope of applicability of the collective labour agreement 
(thus regardless of whether these employers and employees are solely bound by 
these provisions due to the extension decree).1354 The Ministry, however, may 
stipulate in its extension decree that the extension has no after-effects.1355
9. The collective labour agreement and the 
reach of the social partners
9.1 What can the social partners regulate in a collective labour agreement?
The German social partners enjoy contractual freedom. Consequently, the 
social partners are free to arrange those matters in the collective labour 
agreement they choose, provided that the goal of the collective labour 
agreement is the protection and advancement of employment and economic 
conditions (article 9.3 of the German Constitution) and the normative 
provisions are in line with article 1.1 of the Collective Agreement Act (see 
section 4.1 above). Some collective employment issues are by law (primarily) 
the task of other parties than the social partners, such as social plans, which, 
as a rule, should be concluded between the employer and its Works Council 
(article 112 Works Constitution Act). 
The social partners are entitled to deviate from Tarifdispositives Gesetzesrecht, 
but not from national and international mandatory law. National law 
includes the laws of the individual states, such as state constitutions, state 
acts and other legislative measures from the states.1356 The social partners may 
1354  Federal Labour Court, 25 October 2000, AP no. 38 to article 4 Collective 
Agreement Act, Nachwirkung.
1355  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, pages 612 and 613.
1356  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 102.
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furthermore not contravene German federal constitutional law,1357 although 
it is not beyond dispute whether this regards the entire Constitution or 
only those parts that private individuals should oblige.1358 The Social State 
Principle brings forth that the social partners should abide by elementary 
social entitlements. A collective labour agreement may, for instance, not 
contain a disaccord between performance on the one hand and payment on 
the other; a collective labour agreement must abide by elementary claims of 
fairness (Gerechtigkeitsanforderungen).1359
9.2 Collective labour agreements and representativity demands
Representativity of social partners is of relevance in Germany when it comes 
to extending a collective labour agreement (in that situation the employers 
bound by the collective labour agreement should employ sufficient employees). 
however, representativity within the meaning of having a minimum number 
of members active in the sector or company in which the collective labour 
agreement is to be concluded, is not an issue for the validity of collective 
labour agreements. No real representativity demands in that sense apply in 
Germany; as said, a trade union just requires one member in a company, 
in order to be entitled to conclude a collective labour agreement with that 
company.1360
This lack of said representativity demands does not cause as many problems 
in Germany as it does in the Netherlands. In Germany, the collective labour 
agreement only applies to the employment agreements of bound employers 
and bound employees, whilst the employer is not obliged to apply the 
collective labour agreement to the employment agreements of employees 
who are not bound. Moreover, the competency demands (Tarifzuständigkeit) 
make sure that the employees’ and employers’ organisations only conclude 
collective labour agreements for companies or sectors that lie within their 
own field of interest. This has two relevant consequences. First, it makes the 
competition for a trade unions to conclude a collective labour agreement 
considerably smaller when compared with the Netherlands (a trade union 
serving, for instance, the interests of miners cannot conclude a collective 
labour agreement for civil servants). This is definitely the case since dGB 
– which is by far the most important central organisation on the side of 
the employees – arranges which of its members (trade unions) is entitled to 
1357  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 19.
1358  h.C.G. Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2595.
1359  Federal Labour Court, 24 March 2004, AP no. 59 of article 138 GCC.
1360  W.L. Keller, International Labor and Employment Laws, page 4-22.
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conclude collective labour agreements with which employers (or employers’ 
organisations). The situation that a small trade union from another branch 
suddenly enters into a collective labour agreement is therefore less likely to 
occur in Germany than in the Netherlands.1361 Second, it makes certain that the 
social partners only conclude collective labour agreements within the sector 
they actually comprehend. The social partners can truly focus on the sector 
they call their own and gain as much expertise as possible. These competency 
demands may be viewed as a mild form of representativity: the social partners 
can at least be viewed as “representative” – within the meaning of being well-
introduced and consequently better able to do their job – within the sector 
they are competent. The same value may be attached to the requirement that 
the social partners must satisfy with regard to “surpassing company level”. 
Should a trade union or employers’ organisation enter into a sectoral collective 
labour agreement, it can only begin to be representative in that sector, if  it 
has members in more than just one company. A final mild condition that 
is related to representativity and that applies to employees’ organisations is 
the demand that these associations should possess real powers; a trade union 
should be a counterparty that is to be taken seriously. Without any doubt, a 
trade union will better be able to “persuade” its counterparty to conclude a 
“good” collective labour agreement when it can count many employees of 
that counterparty (or of that counterparty’s members) as its own members.
 
In any case, demands on representativity, within the meaning of having a 
minimum number of members active in the sector or company in which 
the collective labour agreement is to be concluded, are not deemed overly 
important. To quote, freely translated, Löwisch and Rieble with regard to the 
possible organisational function of collective labour agreements:1362
The contracting parties to a collective labour agreement are not legitimised to 
set norms for the entire labour market, they are restricted to serve the interests 
of their members and especially lack competence to regulate the entire labour 
market including the unorganised employees and employers. (Für eine normierung 
des ganzen Arbeidstmarktes fehlt es den Tarifsvertragsparteien an der Legimation, 
sie sind auf die Interessenwahrnemung inhrer Mitglieder beschränkt und haben 
1361  This is not to say that the employer cannot be bound by more than just one 
collective labour agreement. An employer can, for example, be bound by 
multiple collective labour agreements should it be member of several employers’ 
organisations or should besides the “normal” collective labour agreement also a 
binding (extended) collective labour agreement apply (Tarifpluralität). See h.C.G. 
Schaub and M. Franzen, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 2647.
1362  h.C.M. Löwisch and V. Rieble, Tarifvertragsgesetz, page 9.
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inbesondere keine Kompetenz, den Arbeitsmarkt als Ganzes und damit auch die 
nichtorganisierten Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitgeber zu regulieren).
Notwithstanding the above, it should be noted that, although the social 
partners may not directly regulate the employment conditions of the 
unorganised, indirectly they still do. After all, as mentioned in section 1.2 
above, in 2002 collective labour agreements fully or substantially governed 
the employment agreements of approximately 84% of all German employees. 
The traditional estimations from the 1960s indicate that around 80% of all 
companies and 90% of all employees are covered by collective bargaining. In 
contrast, only about ¼ of the German workforce in unionised. Therefore the 
social partners do more or less regulate the entire labour market, mainly due 
to reference clauses.
9.3 Collective labour agreements and independence of trade unions
The independence of trade unions is arranged by article 9.3 of the German 
Constitution, combined with case law. As stated in section 5 above, trade 
unions have to be independent from their social counter parties and from 
state, church and political parties in order to be able to conclude collective 
labour agreements. 
10. Summary
10.1 Industrial relations: past and present
Industrial relations and collective bargaining play an important role in 
Germany. Between 80% and 90% of the total working population is bound 
by a collective labour agreement. In contrast, only about a quarter of this 
population is a trade union member. The organisation rate on the employers’ 
side, however, is very substantial. Collective bargaining takes place at three 
levels: national, sectoral and company-level (although it can be disputed 
whether on national level “real” collective bargaining takes place).
In 1894 the first collective labour agreement was concluded; more collective 
labour agreements followed thereafter. The collective labour agreements had 
merely obligatory effects; they bound the contracting parties involved, but did 
not directly apply to the individual employment agreements. The employees 
and their trade unions could only enforce their rights vis-à-vis the contracting 
employers’ organisation and not vis-à-vis the actual employer. This was 
considered a weakness in the system.
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The central agreement of 1918 between both sides of the industry and the 
subsequent Collective Agreement Ordinance acknowledged the trade unions, 
invalidated limitations to trade unions and recognised collective labour 
agreements. The Ordinance awarded direct and mandatory effect to collective 
labour agreements on individual employment agreements governed by that 
collective labour agreement. It also enabled the Minister of Labour to extend 
a collective labour agreement. The freedom of association was embedded in 
the Constitution of the Weimar Republic in 1919.
National Socialism halted the collective bargaining process in 1933, after 
which it re-emerged in 1948. In 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany 
embedded the freedom of association in the Federal Constitution and the 
Collective Agreement Act was introduced. This Act applies to the united 
Germany since 1990. 
10.2 The collective labour agreement
A collective labour agreement governs the rights and obligations of the 
contracting parties and contains legal norms on the content, the commencement 
and the termination of employment agreements and on matters pertaining 
to the operation of works and legal aspects of the works’ constitution. Pay 
Agreements arrange the primary employment conditions, while Framework 
Agreements only deal with general employment conditions, and collective 
labour agreement “on special issues” merely cover a single topic. As in the 
Netherlands, German collective labour agreements can contain obligatory, 
normative and collective normative provisions. 
The contracting parties to a collective labour agreement should, on the one 
hand, be one or more employers or associations of employers and, on the 
other, one or more trade unions. Also central organisations are capable of 
entering into collective labour agreements, either on behalf  of their members, 
or on their own account. In order to be capable of concluding collective 
labour agreements, trade unions should: (i) protect and advance employment 
and economic conditions; (ii) be voluntarily established; (iii) be independent 
from their social counterparties and from state, church and political parties; 
(iv) surpass company level; (v) have a democratic organisation; (vi) posses 
real powers; (vii) be sufficiently prepared to enter into collective bargaining; 
(viii) be committed to enter into collective labour agreements and the articles 
of association should stipulate their power to conclude these agreements; and 
(ix) acknowledge the German laws on collective labour law and collective 
action. These demands only fully apply to trade unions and not to employers’ 
associations, most notably the requirement of possessing real powers. 
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 10
462
Besides these general demands on capacity, the contracting parties should 
also be competent to conclude a specific collective labour agreement. The 
parties concerned may only conclude collective labour agreements within 
their own field of interest; a trade union serving the interests of employees 
working in the metal industry may therefore only conclude a collective labour 
agreement with an employers’ association or an individual employer in that 
field of industry.
The bargaining process is primarily governed by general rules on concluding 
agreements. In Germany, there is a constitutional right to collective bargaining, 
not being an obligation to bargain. Consequently, a party may refuse to enter 
into negotiations. Only in very exceptional circumstances will German courts 
oblige a party’s participation in negotiations.
10.3 The consequences of a collective labour agreement
Once a collective labour agreement is concluded, it should be established to 
whom it applies, what its consequences are and how the rights arising from it 
can be enforced.
10.3.1 The contracting parties
The contracting parties are bound to each other by the (obligatory provisions 
of the) agreement. As a consequence of this, they need, by law, to perform 
under the contract. Should a contracting party breach an obligatory 
provision of the collective labour agreement, the counterparty may instigate 
proceedings against that party claiming damages and/or specific performance. 
The aggrieved party may not suspend its obligations or step back from the 
collective labour agreement. The contracting parties have, by law, to abide by 
a peace-obligation and an “obligation to influence”. On the basis of this latter 
obligation, the contracting association is obliged to promote that its members 
fulfil the obligations arising from the collective labour agreement. 
10.3.2 The members of the contracting associations
The legal norms of the collective labour agreement should be applied to those 
employers and employees who both (i) are bound by and (ii) fall within the 
scope of application of said agreement. Members of the parties to a collective 
labour agreement and the employer who is himself  a party thereto are bound 
by that agreement. The social partners themselves determine the scope of 
application of the collective labour agreement in that agreement.
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The legal norms in an applicable collective labour agreement regulating the 
content, commencement and termination of the individual employment 
agreement apply directly and in a mandatory fashion to that individual 
employment agreement. This means that every normative provision of 
the collective labour agreement automatically applies to the individual 
employment agreement, modelling the individual employment agreement 
and setting aside from the collective labour agreement deviating provisions. 
After the employment agreement has been remodelled by the collective labour 
agreement, and during the term of that agreement, it is not possible to deviate 
from the content of the collective labour agreement or to waive the rights set 
forth within it. Not every provision in an individual employment agreement 
that differs from the corresponding provision in the collective labour 
agreement deviates from the collective labour agreement: arrangements in the 
employment agreement may differ from the corresponding provisions in the 
collective labour agreement, should that be permitted by the collective labour 
agreement, or should such a departure be advantageous to the employee. 
As a consequence of the latter rule, the distinction between “standard” and 
“minimum” provisions in collective labour agreements is non-existent in 
Germany as all collective labour agreements are, by law, minimum agreements. 
The individual employer and employee who do not oblige these normative 
provisions are in breach of the individual employment contract. The aggrieved 
party can claim specific performance and/or damages.
10.3.3 Members vs. non-members
The above-mentioned only applies if  both the employee and the employer 
are bound by the collective labour agreement (and fall within the scope of 
application of that agreement). If  either the employer or the employee is not 
bound by the collective labour agreement, the normative provisions of the 
collective labour agreement do not apply to the employment agreement. This 
does not mean that the content of the collective labour agreement is at all 
times irrelevant in such a situation, as (a part of) a collective labour agreement 
may apply anyway due to a “reference clause” in the employment agreement. 
The reference clause ensures that the normative provisions of the collective 
labour agreement apply as a part of the employment agreement. If  the 
employee who is not bound by the collective labour agreement has accepted 
a reference clause, his position is very comparable to the position of the 
employee in scenario 2: the normative part of the collective labour agreement 
applies to the individual employment agreement. Both the employer and the 
employee may enforce these employment conditions towards each other. The 
reference clause does not bring about the applicability of collective normative 
provisions. 
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10.3.4 The collectivities
Employers and employees who are bound by the collective labour agreement 
are, if  provided for in the collective labour agreement, also bound to 
collectivities by the (collective normative provisions of) this agreement. The 
legal norms in a collective labour agreement which regulate (a) the operation 
of works and (b) the legal aspects of the works constitution apply to all works 
of which the employer is bound by the collective labour agreement. These 
legal norms apply directly and with mandatory effect. The Works Council may 
enforce these rights. A collective labour agreement can also provide for the 
joint establishment of institutions by the contracting parties. The provisions 
on the establishment of these institutions apply directly and are mandatory 
to the articles of association of these institutions and to the relation between 
these institutions on the one hand and to the employers and employees bound 
by the collective labour agreement on the other. The joint institutions may 
directly collect the contributions from the (bound) employers, and the (bound) 
employees have a direct entitlement to the institutions. By way of exception, 
the contractual parties to the collective labour agreement are entitled to collect 
the contributions from the bound employers and enforce the performance of 
the joint institution for the benefit of the bound employees.
10.3.5 Special means of enforcement
The Works Council can play a role in the enforcement of normative provisions. 
One of its tasks is to ensure that the employer applies the applicable collective 
labour agreement. An individual employee may revert to the Works Council 
should he feel that the employer breaches an applicable normative provision, 
after which the Works Council should raise this issue with the employer in 
order to find a solution.
A contracting party to the collective labour agreement may demand that its 
counterparty incites its members to fulfil the obligations arising from the 
collective labour agreement. It is, however, as a rule, not entitled to claim 
damages or to demand specific performance from the individual employer or 
employee who is in breach of the normative provisions of the collective labour 
agreement. Two important exceptions apply to this rule. First, a contracting 
trade union may instigate legal actions against an employer who does not fulfil 
the normative provisions of an enterprise level collective labour agreement. 
The other exception derives from the Burda-ruling, in which the Federal 
Labour Court allowed a contracting trade union to commence litigation 
against, and demand to refrain the violation of the collective labour agreement 
from, the employer bound by a branch level collective labour agreement, who 
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had introduced a generally applicable company arrangement deviating from 
the normative provisions of the applicable collective labour agreement.
10.3.6 Tarifdispositives Gesetzesrecht
German law contains provisions that can only be set aside by a collective 
labour agreement. It is not only the parties to an individual employment 
agreement that are bound by the collective labour agreement who are entitled 
to use this entitlement, the same applies to the parties that apply a collective 
labour agreement through a reference clause.
10.3.7 Term and termination
The contracting parties may establish the date that the collective labour 
agreement comes into force and its term. They may also award retro-effect to the 
legal norms of the collective labour agreement. Collective labour agreements 
can be concluded for a fixed or an indefinite period of time. Agreements for 
a fixed period of time end, by operation of law, at the end of their term. 
A collective labour agreement for indefinite duration can be terminated by 
notice. The collective labour agreement can also be terminated at any time by 
mutual consent of the contracting parties. It can furthermore be terminated 
on occurrence of an important event, upon which it cannot reasonably be 
expected from a party to continue the collective labour agreement. Finally, 
the collective labour agreement will terminate after one of the contracting 
parties has lost its capacity to conclude collective labour agreements.
10.3.8 After-effects
After expiration of the collective labour agreement, the obligatory provisions 
have lost their force. This is different when it comes to normative and collective 
normative provisions; they continue to apply after the agreement’s expiration, 
until they are replaced by another arrangement. In the case whereby a 
collective labour agreement applies due to a reference clause, the norms of 
that agreement also remain to apply after it has lapsed.
10.3.9 The role of alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining
Many collective labour agreements have introduced some sort of alternative 
dispute resolution mechanism upon breach of the agreement. This is 
particularly important as during the term of the collective labour agreement 
the trade unions cannot revert to collective actions as a means of solving 
conflicts given the immanent peace obligation.
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10.4 Extending collective labour agreements
The Ministry is entitled to declare an existing collective labour agreement 
binding for all employers and employees that fall within the scope of 
application of that agreement. The extension process is surrounded by a 
number of important demands and safeguards, being: (i) demands concerning 
(the provisions of) the collective labour agreements that are to be declared 
binding, (ii) procedural demands and safeguards, and (iii) statutory limitations 
on the duration of the binding collective labour agreement. 
The extension process presumes (a) the existence of a valid collective labour 
agreement. An invalid collective labour agreement cannot become valid merely 
due to the extension. This collective labour agreement can only be extended 
if  (b) the employers bound by the agreement employ not less than 50% of the 
total number of employees working within the scope of application of the 
collective labour agreement and if  (c) the extension serves the public interest. 
The Ministry is entitled to deviate from these demands in response to a social 
emergency. Furthermore, (d) only specific provisions of the collective labour 
agreement can be declared binding, most notably normative and collective 
normative provisions. Moreover, (e) the provisions of the collective labour 
agreement that it is to be extended, including the provisions on the scope of 
application, should be fully clear.
Besides these demands, many formalities must be observed. There should be 
(f) a formal request of the parties concerned to extend the collective labour 
agreement, (g) a request which is to be published, (h) upon which third parties 
can raise objections against this request. The Ministry should (i) obtain the 
approval of a special committee prior to its decision to extend a collective 
labour agreement. If  all formalities are complied with, all material demands 
are met and the Ministry sees no reason to refuse the request, the Ministry’s 
decree extending the collective labour agreement must (j) be published.
Finally, the extension (k) may not have “real” retro-effect and (l) may not 
outlast the duration of the collective labour agreement itself, but it may be 
shorter.
Even if  all of the above demands and safeguards are met and complied with, 
the Ministry can refuse the extension application; it has a discretionary power 
as to whether or not to extend. Closely related to this discretionary power is 
the Ministry’s opinion whether or not the public interest is served with the 
extension. In order to answer this last question the Ministry should, on a 
case-by-case scenario, balance all interests involved; the specific advantages 
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of each collective labour agreement should be balanced against its specific 
disadvantages. 
The legal norms of the collective labour agreement that is extended apply 
to all employers and employees who fall within the scope of application 
of the agreement and who were not already bound by the agreement. The 
legal position of these employers and employees is the same as that of the 
employers and employees who were already bound by the collective labour 
agreement regardless of the extension. In addition, the after-effects of the 
provisions of the binding collective labour agreements are the same as those 
of “normal” collective labour agreements. 
10.5 The reach of the social partners
As collective labour agreements are private agreements, the social partners 
enjoy contractual freedom, provided that the normative provisions are in line 
with the Collective Agreement Act. Some collective employment issues are by 
law (primarily) the task of other parties than the social partners. The social 
partners are entitled to deviate from Tarifdispositives Gesetzesrecht, but not 
from national and international mandatory law. The social partners should 
furthermore abide by elementary social entitlements.
In Germany there are no representativity demands, within the meaning of 
having a minimum number of members active in the sector or company in 
which the collective labour agreement is to be concluded, when it comes to 
the validity of collective labour agreements. A trade union only requires one 
member in a company in order to conclude a collective labour agreement with 
that company. “Mild representativity demands” can be found in the competency 
demands, the demand that the association should surpass company-level and 
the demand that a trade union should possess real powers. The lack of the 
first mentioned representativity demands is not perceived as worrisome, as 
the collective labour agreement only applies to the employment agreements 
of bound employers and bound employees, whilst the employer is not obliged 
to apply that agreement to the employment agreements of employees who are 
not bound. Still, although the social partners may not directly regulate the 
employment conditions of the unorganised, indirectly they do, as collective 
labour agreements fully or substantially govern the employment agreements 
of a large majority of all German employees, whilst only about ¼ of the 
German workforce in unionised. 
The independence of trade unions is arranged by article 9.3 of the German 
Constitution, combined with case law. Trade unions have to be independent 
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from their social counterparties and from state, church and political parties in 
order to be able to conclude collective labour agreements. 
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ChAPTER 11
COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS IN BELGIUM
1. Industrial relations in Belgium in a nutshell
This chapter focuses on collective labour agreements (collectieve 
arbeidsovereenkomsten) in Belgium, applying the framework set out in section 
7 of chapter 8. It concerns the Belgian federal system of industrial relations, 
as opposed to regional systems.1363
1.1 The Belgian consultation model
Belgian industrial relations are, according to the scholars humblet and 
Rigaux, typified by three characteristics: (i) the parties concerned are free 
to conclude collective labour agreements, (ii) the structures are embedded in 
a neo-corporatist public-law industrial regulatory body, and (iii) the relative 
importance of law and legal intervention in defining the content and form of 
industrial relations.1364
First, the Belgian social partners are free to voluntarily enter into collective 
labour agreements. As a rule, the Belgian government adheres to the 
subsidiarity principle. Consequently, it only intervenes in industrial relations 
if  the social partners fail to act adequately themselves.
Second, collective bargaining takes place in different institutions, depending on 
the level of the collective labour agreement to be concluded. Inter-professional 
collective bargaining occurs within the so-called National Labour Council 
1363  Belgium has three regions that are relevant in social and economic matters: 
the Flemish, the Walloon and the Brussels region. Moreover, there are three 
communities in Belgium: the Flemish, French and German speaking community. 
See F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 2. The report 
can be found on: http://www.unifi.it/polo-universitario-europeo/ricerche/collective_
bargaining.html.
1364  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, Intersentia, 
Antwerpen – Oxford, 2005, pages 1 and 2.
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(Nationale Arbeidsraad). Sectoral collective bargaining mainly takes place 
within joint committees (Paritaire Comités) or sub-committees. Enterprise 
level collective bargaining occurs outside these institutions (institutions which 
are jointly referred to as “joint bodies”). The most substantive part of the 
collective bargaining process is situated at sectoral level.1365 
In connection with the above, it should be noted that representative employers’ 
and employees’ organisations have an oligopoly in collective bargaining; 
the legislator regards them as institutes acting in a system of institutional 
representativity. due to this rule only (the members of) three major employees’ 
organisations are entitled to conclude collective labour agreements, which has 
led to social stability, as there is little or no competition between them.1366
Third, the role of the law and courts is limited. The social partners are, to 
quite an extent, free to arrange their relations, free from intervention. Still, 
law and courts are crucial in the Belgian Industrial Relations system, because 
they define the limits of the voluntarism of the social partners. 
1.2 Statistics
Collective labour agreements, as well as their adaptation and termination, 
must be registered (see section 4.1 below). The number of registrations rose 
from 3,134 in 1993, to 3,364 in 1997 and to 4,417 in 2001.1367 In the year 2000, 
approximately 90% of all Belgian employees were covered by a collective 
labour agreement setting their wages.1368
The trade union density in Belgium is relatively high.1369 In 1985 it was 51% 
of the total working population, a number which dropped to 48% in 1990, to 
1365  j. van Ruysseveldt, CAO-onderhandelingen in België en Nederland [Collective 
bargaining in Belgium and the Netherlands], Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken 
2002-18, no. 4, page 322.
1366  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 91.
1367  Reference is made to www.fgov.be.
1368  A. Martens, G. van Gyes and P. van der hallen, De vakbond naar de 21ste eeuw 
[The trade union to the 21st century], September 2001, page 1. I was not able to 
retrieve how many of these employees were covered due to the extension of the 
collective labour agreement.
1369  For an in depth analysis of the representativeness of employees’ organisations, 
see F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, pages 31 ff.
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rise again to 53% 1995.1370 In 2001 the number was estimated on “exceeding 
50%.”1371 The organisation rate of employers in Belgium was, according to a 
year 2000 study, 82%.1372
1.3 Trends
There are not many relevant references to trends in Belgian collective 
bargaining. It was mentioned only sporadically that employers are increasingly 
calling for the conclusion of collective labour agreements at enterprise 
level.1373 This seems to be confirmed by the figures set out by Petit, who states 
that ¾ of all collective labour agreements registered in 2001 are enterprise 
level agreements.1374 That is consistent with the trends in Germany and in the 
Netherlands. Nonetheless, the system of collective bargaining, as well as the 
levels, have changed only marginally over time.1375
1.4 Bargaining levels
Belgium has enterprise, sectoral and (national) inter-professional collective 
labour agreements. This distinction is very strict, as the scope of applicability 
does not only differ, but also the level at which these agreements are concluded 
and, as is set out in section 9.1 hereafter, their hierarchy. There is an informal 
“division of labour” in Belgium between these three levels, a coordination of 
which topic is arranged on which level.1376
1370  A. Martens, G. van Gyes and P. van der hallen, De vakbond naar de 21ste eeuw, 
page 4. The numbers as set out in the report of the European Commission, 
directorate-General for employment and social affairs, Industrial Relations in 
Europe 2004, completed in 2004, are a bit higher. The density is supposed to be 
53.9% in 1990 and 55.7% in 1995. See page 19 of said report.
1371  A. Martens, G. van Gyes and P. van der hallen, De vakbond naar de 21ste eeuw, 
page 2. In the report of the directorate-General for employment and social affairs, 
Industrial Relations in Europe 2004, page 19, the density number was set on 55.8% 
in 2001.
1372  j. van Ruysseveldt, CAO-onderhandelingen in Belgie en Nederland, page 325. The 
same study set the union density in Belgium at that time on 65%.
1373  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 108.
1374  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002) 
[The Collective Labour Agreement Act: an overview of jurisprudence and literature 
(1968 – 2002)], Tijdschrift voor Sociaal Recht [Magazine on Social Law; “T.S.R”.], 
2002, page 238.
1375  F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 66.
1376  F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 6.
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The inter-professional collective labour agreement is concluded in the 
National Labour Council between the representative employees’ organisations 
and the representative employers’ organisations that have seat there. These 
inter-professional collective labour agreements should not to be confused 
with agreements concluded between employers’ and employees’ organisations 
outside the National Labour Council. The latter agreements are not collective 
labour agreements, but “merely” inter-professional agreements. This is not 
to say that these agreements are irrelevant: if  possible these agreements are 
converted in the National Labour Council into “proper” collective labour 
agreements.1377
A sectoral collective labour agreement is concluded between, on one side, 
the representative employees’ organisations, and on the other, representative 
employers’ organisations having seat in a joint committee or sub-committee.1378 
As will be set out in further detail in sections 5 and 6 below, the National 
Labour Council is empowered to draft sectoral collective labour agreements 
for a sector not falling within the jurisdiction of any joint committee or sub-
committee or for a sector where such a committee does not function. 
An enterprise level collective labour agreement is concluded between, on the 
one side one or more representative employees’ organisations, and on the 
other, one or more employers or representative employers’ organisations. 
2. A brief history of collective bargaining in Belgium
Employees and employers in the sheet industry concluded, in September 1789, 
an agreement which was probably the first collective labour agreement in 
Belgium. This agreement set out wages and other employment conditions.1379 
The follow-up to this early start of collective bargaining was meagre: only 
19 collective labour agreements were concluded up to World War I.1380 This, 
however, is not that surprising because in Belgium, like many other European 
1377  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 34.
1378  This wording also makes clear that it is not the joint committee or sub-committee 
entering into the collective labour agreement, but it is the organisations having seat 
therein that do. See also: j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en 
rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), page 147.
1379  W. van Eeckhoutte, Sociaal Compendium ‘03-’04, Arbeidsrecht met fiscale notities 
[Social Compendium ‘03-’04, Employment law with fiscal notes], volume I, Kluwer, 
2003, page 3.
1380  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het 
Belgisch Arbeidsrecht [Synopsis of Belgian Employment Law], Intersentia 
Rechtswetenschappen, Antwerpen – Groningen, 1999, page 382.
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countries, the so-called coalition prohibition (coalitieverbod) applied, set out 
in the Penal Code of Napoleon of 1810, which fully limited the freedom 
of association. These penal provisions were a consequence of the Loi Le 
Chapelier dating back to 1791, prohibiting associations of citizens with an 
equal profession. The Penal Code did not allow employers to conspire with 
an aim of lowering wages either. In turn, the employees were not entitled to 
cease their work; collective actions were prohibited.1381
After the French annexation of Belgium ended, many obstructions to the 
freedom of association were lifted. In 1831, article 20 (the current article 27) of 
the Belgian Constitution (Grondwet) recognised the freedom to unite, without 
prior state intervention. In contrast to this development, the legislator did not 
revoke the aforementioned (and by then unconstitutional) penal provisions. 
Trade union freedom was therefore still not in place. Apparently, this freedom 
was not highly ranked on the political agenda, as opposed to, for example, 
political freedom.1382
In the second half  of the 19th century, the Belgian legislator paved the way, 
step by step, for the recognition of trade unions. In 1866 it revoked the 
aforementioned penal provisions.1383 This opened the way for employees 
to unite. The legislator, however, simultaneously introduced a new penal 
provision, article 310 of the Penal Code, which continued to prohibit collective 
actions. Trade unions could therefore be formed, but were lacking power. The 
next step in the recognition of trade unions was the 1898 launch of the Act 
on the Professional Associations (Wet op de Beroepsverenigingen).1384 Trade 
unions could be formally recognised, but had to pay a high price in return, as 
they had to accept a specific statute. This statute included the obligation for 
the unions to publish a list of their members and enabled the court, in specific 
circumstances, to dissolve the trade unions. At the end of the day, not a single 
trade union accepted this statute.1385
In 1906, following a notorious lock-out in the city of Verviers, the parties 
of the Belgian industrial relations acknowledged the concept of a collective 
1381  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 289.
1382  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 289.
1383  Belgian Bulletin of Acts and decrees (Belgisch Staatsblad; “B.S.”) 11 june 1866.
1384  B.S. 8 April 1898.
1385  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 290.
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labour agreement and agreed that wages and other employment conditions 
could be arranged collectively.1386 This did not mean, however, that both sides 
of the industry co-operated in harmony. Employers refused, on a large scale, 
to enter into negotiations with organisations of employees and they preferred 
individual wage setting.1387 Moreover, multiple collective actions infested 
Belgium in 1919, spreading over different sectors of the trade and industry. 
The government tried to solve these collective conflicts through mandatory 
arbitration. As this did not (sufficiently) work, the government established 
joint committees (committees comprising both sides of the industry), first in 
the two industries that were suffering the most from the collective actions, the 
mining and metal industry. The joint committees were to assess the possibility 
of a working hours reduction. The joint committees proved to be successful, 
and grew in number from 3 at the end of 1919 to 56 in 1936.1388
In the period between World War I and World War II, the Belgian legislator 
tried hard to enact legislation on collective labour agreements. Unfortunately, 
it failed time and time again. In contrast, it did succeed on 24 May 1921 
in revoking the aforementioned article 310 of the Penal Code (prohibiting 
collective actions).1389 On the same day the Act on Freedom of Association 
(Wet tot Waarborging der vrijheid van Vereniging) was introduced, recognising, 
in full, the freedom of association.1390 This finally enabled the trade unions to 
do their work freely. 
World War II drew employers and employees together. during this war, a draft 
agreement was concluded, the draft Agreement regarding Social Solidarity 
(Ontwerp van Overeenkomst tot Sociale Solidariteit). This draft formed the 
blueprint for the social relations after liberation. One of the principles of this 
draft was to establish joint committees on national, sectoral and enterprise 
level.1391 It also stated that the employers would recognise trade unions as 
equal parties.1392
1386  W. van Eeckhoutte, Sociaal Compendium ‘03-’04, page 4.
1387  W. van Eeckhoutte, Arbeidsrecht [Employment Law], Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen, 
Belgium, 1998, page 43.
1388  W. van Eeckhoutte, Sociaal Compendium ‘03-’04, page 4.
1389  B.S. 28 mei 1921.
1390  B.S. 28 mei 1921.
1391  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 311.
1392  Reference is made to the brochure of the Secretary of the Central Economic 
Council, De Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven [The Central Economic Council], 
page 4, as published on: www.ccerb.fgov.be.
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The plans, as formulated in the draft agreement, were indeed executed after 
World War II. In 1945 the Act on joint Committees (Besluitwet Paritaire 
Comités) was enacted,1393 establishing a legal statute for the joint committees. 
This Act also made it possible to extend, by Royal decree (Koninklijk Besluit), 
collective labour agreements reached by the joint committees, at their request 
or at that of representative organisations. In 1947 the Statute on Trade 
Union Representation (Statuut van de Vakbondsafvaardiging) was drafted. In 
1948, the Act on the Organisation of the Trade and Industry (Wet houdende 
Organisatie van het Bedrijfsleven) arranged for the Central Economic Council 
(Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven), the Councils for Trade and Industry 
(Bedrijfsraden) and the Works Councils (Ondernemingsraden). The National 
Labour Council was set up in 1952. All these organisations and acts promote 
the consultation of both sides of the industry.
Within the joint committees, and later on, as from 1960, also on the highest 
level between the Federation of Enterprises in Belgium (Verbond van Belgische 
Ondernemingen; “VBO”) and the representative trade unions, multiple 
collective labour agreements were concluded.1394 A major difficulty in these 
days with regard to the collective agreements was that their normative effects 
were uncertain. If  a collective labour agreement was extended on the basis 
of the Act on joint Committees, the (normative) content of the agreement 
applied erga omnes. Whether this was also the case if  the collective agreement 
was not extended was far from clear. Case law since 1945 has varied greatly 
in this respect.1395 The Court of Cassation (Hof van Cassatie) even ruled in 
1950 that a collective labour agreement could only bind those parties that had 
explicitly agreed to the agreement.1396 This meant an important invalidation 
of the collective labour agreements.1397 As a response, acts on 4 and 11 March 
1954 strengthened the collective labour agreements. These acts stipulated that 
the collective labour agreements would have supplementary powers in case 
parties to an employment agreement had not arranged for subjects that were 
1393  B.S. 5 july 1945.
1394  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 311. It should be noted that the agreements concluded between 
VBO and the representative trade unions can formally not be considered proper 
collective labour agreements in Belgium. Reference is made to section 1.4 above.
1395  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 383.
1396  Court of Cassation (Hof van Cassatie), 21 december 1950, Arresten van het hof 
van Cassatie [Rulings of the Court of Cassation; “.A.C.”] 1951, page 221.
1397  See h. Lennaerts, Inleiding tot het Sociaal Recht [Introduction to Social Law], 
Kluwer, Belgium, 1995, page 336.
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provided for in the collective labour agreement.1398 But this supplementary 
power did not satisfy the needs of the contracting parties, as they aimed for 
full binding power of the collective labour agreements.1399
It was apparent that the above period should end. In 1963 the Belgian 
government proposed an act on collective labour agreements and submitted 
this draft to the National Labour Council. The employers’ organisations 
had no real objection to this proposed act. The trade unions, however, felt 
that the draft would limit their freedom to collective action. The draft was 
subsequently altered to quite an extent, and on 5 december 1968 the Act 
on collective labour agreements and joint Committees (Wet betreffende de 
collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten en de paritaire comités; “BACLA”) was 
finalised.1400 Since then, the BACLA forms the heart of Belgian industrial 
relations’ law.
3. The classical rights concerning collective bargaining
Belgium protects (i) the freedom of association, (ii) the right to collective 
bargaining, and (iii) the right to strike.
Article 27 of the current Belgian Constitution guarantees the freedom of 
association. This freedom applies to all societal activities, provided that these 
activities do not violate public policy or good morals. This right includes the 
freedom to establish trade unions.1401 The aforementioned Act on Freedom 
of Association also protects the freedom of association and arranges the 
consequences of joining an association. Although this Act is not restricted 
to trade unions, it was primarily aimed at trade unions when drafted.1402 The 
Act guarantees the positive and the negative freedom of association. Forcing 
an individual to join an association or to withdraw from one is penalised in 
this Act.
The Belgian Constitution also refers to the freedom to collective bargaining. 
Article 23 of said Constitution stipulates that everyone has the right to, 
amongst others, employment and the freedom of profession in the context of 
an employment policy aimed at i.a. the constitutional right to information, 
1398  W. van Eeckhoutte, Sociaal Compendium ‘03-’04, page 5.
1399  See h. Lennaerts, Inleiding tot het Sociaal Recht, page 337.
1400  B.S. 15 january 1969.
1401  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 7.
1402  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 292.
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consultation and collective bargaining.1403 Some authors take the view that 
the constitutional freedom of association also contains the (in that case: 
constitutional) right to collective bargaining.1404 Besides these arrangements 
in the constitution, the entitlement to bargain derives from the BACLA. The 
mere fact that the legislator drafted this Act enabling the social partners in 
a statutory fashion to conclude collective labour agreements, sufficiently 
establishes this right in Belgium.
The right to collective action (or the right to strike for that matter) is not 
embedded in any statute or in the Constitution. This right, nevertheless, is 
recognised in Belgium. The Court of Cassation stated in a 1981 ruling that (i) 
employees have a right not to perform their work due to a strike, (ii) taking part 
in a strike does not constitute an illegal act as such, and (iii) there is no legal 
provision forbidding employees from participating in a strike not organised 
by an official trade union.1405 Moreover, the European Social Charter has been 
ratified by Belgium in 1990.1406 Article 6 acknowledges the right to collective 
action. It is generally accepted in Belgium that the Charter has direct effect, 
therefore guaranteeing the right to collective actions further.1407
4. Collective labour agreements
It should now be explained what constitutes a collective labour agreement 
in Belgium (section 4.1). Afterwards, the different types of provisions in a 
collective labour agreement (section 4.2) will be discussed.
4.1 What constitutes a collective labour agreement?
Pursuant to article 5 BACLA, a collective labour agreement is (i) an agreement 
concluded between (ii) one or more employees’ organisations and one or more 
employers’ organisations or one or more employers, (iii) in which individual 
and collective relations between employers and employees in enterprises or 
in a sector are set out, and rights and obligations between the contracting 
1403  See also F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of 
Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 9.
1404  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 9.
1405  Court of Cassation, 21 december 1981, in: W. van Eeckhoutte, De grote arresten 
van het Hof van Cassatie in sociale zaken [The major cases of the Court of Cassation 
in social matters], Antwerpen - Apeldoorn, Maklu, 1996, no. 19. 
1406  B.S. 28 december 1990. 
1407  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 118.
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parties are arranged. This definition shows that at least three elements are of 
relevance.
First, there should be an agreement that, as with all agreements in Belgium, has 
to comply with the general rules on agreements.1408 This agreement has to be 
set out in writing1409 and should be drafted in the dutch and French language 
(article 13 BACLA). however, the agreement can exclusively be drafted in the 
dutch, French or German language, should the agreement solely apply to such 
a language area. The agreement should be executed by the persons who agree 
to it on behalf  of their organisation or on their own account. It is worthwhile 
to note that the representatives of organisations are by virtue of article 12 
BACLA being considered to duly represent their organisation, a presumption 
which is not disprovable. Under specific circumstances outlined in article 14 
BACLA, the signatures of the aforementioned persons may be replaced by, 
briefly put, the signature of the person who brought the negotiating parties 
together and affirms that the agreement between these parties was reached. 
Article 16 BACLA summarises the minimum content of the collective labour 
agreement. The agreement should include:
a. the names of the signatory organisations;
b. the name of the joint body should the agreement be concluded 
therein;1410
c. the identity of the persons concluding the agreement and, if  it is conclu-
ded outside the joint body, the capacity in which these persons act and 
possibly the position they hold in their organisation;
d. the persons, the sector or the enterprise for, and the geographic territory 
in which the agreement applies, unless it applies to all employers and 
1408  The parties involved should agree on something, the persons should be 
empowered to represent their organisation (see, however, article 12 BACLA), 
the agreement must concern a permitted subject, and there must be a valid 
reason to conclude the agreement. Reference is made to the brochure of the 
Federal Governmental Agency Employment, Labour and Social Consultation 
[Federale Overheidsdienst Werkgelegenheid, Arbeid en Sociaal Overleg], Wegwijs 
in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst [Knowing your way in the collective labour 
agreement], december 2004, pages 11 and 12. See also B. Mergits, De geldigheids- 
en vormvereisten van de CAO [The validity and formality demands of the collective 
labour agreement], in M. Rigaux, Actuele problemen van het Arbeidsrecht 3, Kluwer 
Rechtswetenschappen, Antwerpen, 1990, pages 1 ff.
1409  This means that the actual agreement of all parties involved must be set out in 
writing; a mere letter of a trade union secretary directed at the employer does 
not suffice. See Court of Cassation, 4 May 1981, in: W. van Eeckhoutte, De grote 
arresten van het Hof van cassatie in Sociale Zaken, no. 3.
1410  The term “joint body” includes (i) the joint committee, (ii) the joint sub-committee, 
and (iii) the National Labour Council. Reference is made to article 1.3 BACLA. 
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employees that fall under the jurisdiction of the joint body in which the 
agreement is concluded;
e. the term of the agreement, if  it is concluded for a fixed period of time, 
or the manner in which the agreement can be terminated, including the 
notice period, if  it concerns an agreements concluded for an indefinite 
period of time or for a definite period of time containing a (tacitly) rene-
wal clause;
f. the date of entrance into force, in case the agreement does not enter into 
force on the date it is concluded;
g. the date of conclusion of the agreement;
h. the signature of the persons that are entitled to execute the agreement.
Second, the agreement must be concluded between specific parties. Pursuant 
to article 6 BACLA, the collective labour agreement can be concluded (i) 
within the joint body (as opposed to by the joint body)1411 between one or 
more employees’ organisations and one or more employers’ organisations1412 
and (ii) outside this joint body, between one or more employees’ organisations 
and one or more employers’ organisations or one or more employers. In any 
event, the aforementioned employees’ and employers’ organisations must be 
representative (article 2.4 BACLA). An introduction of these representative 
organisations will be given in section 5 below.
Third, collective labour agreements should deal with the relation between 
employers and employees on the one hand, and on rights and obligations of 
the contracting parties on the other (although a collective labour agreement 
is still valid should this latter relation not be arranged).1413 This enables the 
contracting parties, with regard to the provisions concerning the relation 
between the employer and the employees, to arrange subjects in all domains 
of social law,1414 or, to phrase it in the wording of a governmental agency, 
“they can agree on anything that falls within ‘the universe’ of the individual 
and collective relations of employers and employees”.1415 
1411  F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 15.
1412  To be more precise, within the joint body, a collective labour agreement may only 
be concluded between all representative employees’ and employers’ organisations 
having seat within that body (article 24 BACLA).
1413  F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 20.
1414  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
page 149.
1415  Federal Governmental Agency Employment, Labour and Social Consultation, 
Wegwijs in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, page 12.
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A further requirement is that a collective labour agreement should, on the basis 
of article 18 BACLA, be registered at the Ministry for Work and Employment 
(Ministerie van Tewerkstelling en Arbeid). Without this notification, the 
agreement will not be considered a collective labour agreement, and therefore 
lacks the power attributed to a collective labour agreement; it will only bind the 
signatory parties.1416 The registration is thus an essential formal requirement. 
This registration will be refused if  the collective labour agreement does not 
meet the demands of articles 13, 14 and 16 BACLA (articles which concern 
demands on language, on correct execution and on content; as already 
mentioned above). Everyone is entitled to receive a copy of the collective 
labour agreement upon payment of a reasonable price. Collective labour 
agreements concluded within a joint body are published on the internet.1417 
A collective labour agreement concluded within a joint body should, given 
article 25 BACLA, also be published in the Belgium Bulletin of Acts and 
decrees (Belgisch Staatsblad). This publication includes the collective labour 
agreement’s subject, date, duration, scope of applicability, and its place of 
registration. 
4.2 Different types of provisions
In Belgium, individual normative, collective normative and obligatory 
provisions can be distinguished.1418 This follows directly from the definition 
of collective labour agreement set out in article 5 BACLA. In the end, it 
stipulates that “a collective labour agreement is an agreement (…) in which 
(i) individual and (ii) collective relations between employers and employees in 
enterprises or in a sector are set out, and (iii) rights and obligations between 
the contracting parties are arranged”. 
The individual normative obligations relate to the individual employment 
relation between the employer and the employee. As a rule, the individual 
normative provisions concern working hours, working place and organisation 
of labour, and also the classification of positions, wage scales, education and 
wage indexation.1419 
1416  Court of Cassation, 30 May 1988, in: W. van Eeckhoutte, De grote arresten van het 
Hof van cassatie in Sociale Zaken, no. 5. 
1417  www.meta.fgov.be.
1418  Federal Governmental Agency Employment, Labour and Social Consultation, 
Wegwijs in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, page 7.
1419  Federal Governmental Agency Employment, Labour and Social Consultation, 
Wegwijs in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, page 7.
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Collective normative provisions relate to collective employment relations 
within the company.1420 It concerns provisions concerning the employer(s) and 
the collectivity of employees, such as safety norms, reconciliation procedures 
on company level, the statute of union delegation (vakbondsafvaardiging), 
provisions with regard to the functioning and competence of the Works 
Council and the Committees for prevention and protection on the job 
(Comités voor preventie en bescherming op het werk), and arrangements for 
funds.1421
It should be noted that in practice it can be rather difficult to distinguish 
between individual and collective normative provisions. A specific provision 
may, for example, very well be both individual and collective normative in 
nature.1422 There are, however, important legal differences between individual 
and collective normative provisions. Individual normative provisions (and, as 
will be set out, collective normative provisions having individual effects) have 
a stronger binding power than collective normative provisions.1423 As opposed 
to collective normative provisions, individual normative provisions remain to 
apply once the contracting organisation to a collective labour agreement is 
dissolved (article 22 BACLA) and once the collective labour agreement has 
ended (article 23 BACLA). These subjects will be discussed in sections 7.3 
and 7.9 respectively. Furthermore, individual normative provisions have a 
supplementary power (article 26 BACLA) that collective normative provisions 
do not have. Reference is made to section 7.1 below.
Obligatory provisions outline the mutual rights and obligations of the 
signatory parties. These provisions specifically relate to the “contractual” 
part of the collective labour agreement, while the normative provisions relate 
to the “regulatory” part thereof.1424 As a rule, obligatory provisions aim at 
1420  See W. Rauws, De binding van de normatieve bepalingen [The binding power of 
normative provisions], in: M. Rigaux, Actuele problemen van het Arbeidsrecht 3, 
Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen, Antwerpen, 1990, page 35.
1421  Federal Governmental Agency Employment, Labour and Social Consultation, 
Wegwijs in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, page 7.
1422  G. Cox, De juridische binding en afdwingbaarheid van obligatoire C.A.O.-bepalingen 
[The legal binding power and enforceability of obligatory provisions in the collective 
labour agreement], in M. Rigaux, Actuele problemen van het Arbeidsrecht 3, Kluwer 
Rechtswetenschappen, Antwerpen, 1990, page 121.
1423  W. Rauws, De binding van de normatieve bepalingen, page 34.
1424  Collective labour agreements are dualistic legal constructions: the collective 
labour agreement is essentially an agreement, but its normative provisions contain 
standards that are regulatory. P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial 
Relations Law, page 96.
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enhancing the normative provisions of a collective labour agreement.1425 
Obligatory provisions can be divided in express and implied provisions.1426 
Express obligatory provisions are explicitly agreed on. Examples of this are 
clauses on the modalities of the collective labour agreement, the renewal 
and the termination thereof, dispute resolution mechanisms etc. Implied 
obligatory provisions apply “automatically”, without having to be explicitly 
arranged. These provisions are regarded to be inherent to all collective labour 
agreements. This concerns the “peace obligation” (vredesplicht) and the 
principle of “good faith” (beïnvloedingsplicht), which will be discussed further 
in section 7.2 below.
5. The players in the collective bargaining process
There are multiple parties who take part in the complex Belgian collective 
bargaining system. At the very least the following parties need to be 
distinguished: (i) the government, (ii) trade union confederations and trade 
unions, (iii) employers’ confederations and separate employers’ associations, 
(iv) representative employers’ and employees’ organisations, (v) the “Belgian 
house of the Social Partners” (The National Labour Council and the Central 
Economic Council), (vi) joint committees, and (vii) individual employers. 
5.1 The government
The government has marginal involvement in the bargaining process. Its main 
involvement is enacting legislation on collective labour agreements, providing 
for an institutional structure and, where appropriate, extending collective 
labour agreements. There is no real, formal tripartite social dialogue in 
Belgium.1427 however, there is a vivid informal tripartite dialogue.1428 On 
occasion the government attempts to persuade the social partners to take 
appropriate action on a specific topic.1429
1425  G. Cox, De juridische binding en afdwingbaarheid van obligatoire C.A.O.-bepalingen, 
page 121.
1426  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 94.
1427  F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 10.
1428  F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, pages 3 and 4.
1429  W. van Eeckhoutte, Arbeidsrecht, page 56.
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5.2 Trade union confederations and trade unions
In Belgium, there are three main trade unions/trade union confederations, 
jointly referred to as employees’ organisations. First, there is the Algemeen 
Belgisch Vakverbond (ABVV). The ABVV is a confederation, representing 
nearly 1,400,000 members, and acting to defend the rights of all workers. It is 
comprised of 7 trade unions, all active in different fields of trade and industry. 
It considers itself  a socialistic confederation.1430 Second, there is the Algemene 
Centrale der Liberale Vakbonden van België (ACLVB), representing the 
interests of 220,000 members. The ACLVB is a trade union, bringing together 
employees of different professions and industries in one union. As can be 
inferred from its name, the ACLVB is a liberal union.1431 Finally, there is the 
Algemeen Christelijk Vakbond (ACV). The ACV is a confederation comprised 
of 16 trade unions, representing the interests of 1,700,000 members. The ACV 
is a Christian confederation.1432
The employees’ organisations all refused to organise themselves in such a 
manner that they have legal personality.1433 The reason for this is rather simple: 
not having legal personality implies both not being liable as an organisation 
towards any party and not having to comply with supervisory measures 
automatically applicable to legal entities.1434 The employees’ organisations 
are “factual” organisations.1435 The handicap of not having legal personality 
is, of course, not being able to participate in usual legal activities, such as 
concluding agreements and obtaining capital. This handicap is lifted to 
quite an extent due to the so-called functional legal personality (functionele 
rechtspersoonlijkheid) employees’ organisations have. This means that they are 
subject to rights that are explicitly granted to them in specific acts; it does not 
1430  Reference is made to www.fgtb.be. 
1431  Reference is made to www.aclvb.be. 
1432  Reference is made to www.acv-online.be.
1433  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, pages 300 and 303.
1434  W. van Eeckhoutte, Arbeidsrecht, page 47.
1435  For an extensive research on the legal position of Belgian factual (representative) 
employees’ organisations, reference is made to F. dorssemont, Rechtspositie en 
Syndicale Actievrijheid van representatieve werknemersorganisaties [Legal position 
and Syndical action freedom of representative employees’ organisations], die Keure, 
Brugge, 2002.
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mean that the organisation can be held liable.1436 The most important rights 
granted to representative1437 (factual) employees’ organisations are the right 
(i) to conclude agreements, (ii) to have legal standing in court, and (iii) to 
represent their members or even employees in general.1438 These rights are 
obviously very useful, if  not indispensable, in order to conclude collective 
labour agreements.
It should be noted that the lack of legal personality is rather controversial 
in Belgium. The scholar Blanpain, for example, noted that trade unions 
have a lot of power, but that they escape from the responsibility normally 
accompanying such power.1439 he argued that trade unions should have legal 
personality. Several amendments to Belgian law have been filed by politicians 
to make legal personality mandatory for trade unions.1440 These amendments 
have not (yet) led to a change in law.
5.3  Employers’ confederations and separate employers’ associations
There are a number of inter-professional employers’ organisations. Only 
one of these organisations represents employers throughout the whole of 
Belgium, that being the already mentioned VBO (Federation of Enterprises 
in Belgium). It represents small, medium-sized and large companies. It has 33 
full members, all of which are professional sectoral organisations, as well as 
a number of applicants and corresponding members. All in all, it represents 
over 30,000 businesses.1441 In addition to the VBO, there are a number of local 
inter-professional employers’ organisations, such as UCM and UNIZO.
1436  W. van Eeckhoutte, Arbeidsrecht, page 47. Only rarely can a factual organisation 
be brought before court. See for example Court of Cassation, 20 june 1988, 
Rechtskundig Weekblad [Weekly Legal Magazine; “R.W.”] 1989-1990, page 1425, 
note A. van Oevelen.
1437  Exactly which employees’ organisations are representative will be set out hereunder. 
1438  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 303.
1439  Reference is made to the quote of R. Blanpain in the article Vakbonden en 
Rechtspersoonlijkheid [Trade Unions and Legal Personality], by L. van Braekel, 
in the Brussels journal dated 7 August 2005, as published on the website www.
brussels.journal.com.
1440  See for a recent proposed amendment A. van de Casteele and others, Proposition on 
the Act on legal personality of trade unions [Wetsvoorstel op de rechtspersoonlijkheid 
van vakorganisaties], as filed on 14 june 2005 (no. 3-1244/1). The same proposal 
is introduced again by P. Vankrunkelsven and others on 12 November 2007 (no. 
4-387/1).
1441  Reference is made to www.vbo-feb.be.
COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS IN BELGIUM
485
There are also a number of sectoral employers’ organisations. Active in the 
agriculture sector are, for example, the Fédération Wallonne de l’Agriculture 
(FWA), Boerenfront and the Boerenbond. Agoria brings together the employers 
in the technological industry, Febeltex in the textile industry and Fechimie in 
the chemical industry.
Similar to the trade unions, a number of – but not all – employers’ organisations 
(being both organisations and confederations) are functional legal persons, 
instead of organisations having full legal personality.1442 The comments made 
before with regard to the trade unions equally apply to these employers’ 
organisations having functional legal personality.1443
5.4 Representative organisations in Belgium
Not all employers’ and employees’ organisations play a (full) role in the 
Belgian social dialogue. The Belgian legislator chose to only award important 
entitlements to such organisations that have an important influence on the 
social and economic situation in Belgium, the representative organisations. In 
order for an organisation to be representative, it has to meet specific conditions. 
These conditions can, amongst others, be found in article 3 BACLA, which 
attributes the qualification “representative” to: 
1. inter-professional organisations, established for the entire country, which 
are party to both (i) the Central Economic Council and (ii) the National 
Labour Council; employees’ organisations should furthermore have at 
least 50,000 members;
2. trade unions which are associated to or a part of the above-mentioned 
inter-professional organisations;
3. employers’ organisations that are recognised by the Crown (i.e. the fede-
ral government) on the advice of the National Labour Council, which 
are representative within a specific sector;
4. national organisations representing small and medium-sized businesses 
recognised as representative on the basis of the special Act of 6 March 
1964 on the Organisation of the Small-firm Sector (Wet Organisatie van 
de Middenstand).1444
1442  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 308.
1443  W. van Eeckhoutte, Arbeidsrecht, page 53.
1444  B.S. 17 March 1964.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 11
486
In other acts similar “representativity provisions” can be found.1445 These 
provisions introduce a form of institutional representativity, as opposed to 
factual representativity.1446 Factual representativity demands are not in place in 
Belgium.1447 An enterprise level collective labour agreement can, for example, 
be concluded with just one (institutional) representative organisation, even 
if  that organisation only represents a minority of the employees in said 
enterprise.1448
The aforementioned representativity demands in Belgian acts put forward 
that, from an employees’ perspective, only ACLVB, ABVV, ACV and the 
trade unions affiliated with these last two confederations are capable of 
concluding collective labour agreements.1449 From an employers’ perspective, 
only the VBO is a representative inter-professional organisation. however, a 
number of (approximately 60 in 2002) sectoral employers’ organisations have 
also been qualified as representative on the basis of the last subparagraphs 
mentioned above.1450 Some further remarks regarding these representativity 
demands and their strictness will be made in section 9.2.
5.5  The Belgian House of the Social Partners
The National Labour Council and the Central Economic Council are, as said, 
also known as the “Belgian house of the Social Partners”.
 
The National Labour Council was introduced by the National Labour Council 
Act of 1952 and has the status of a public institution. Pursuant to article 1 of 
that Act, the National Labour Council’s role is (i) to advise a Minister or the 
houses of Parliament on its own initiative or at the request of these authorities, 
on general social issues concerning employers and employees and (ii) to 
issue opinions on jurisdictional disputes between joint committees. Article 7 
BACLA extended the Council’s role quite a bit by empowering it to conclude 
1445  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 304.
1446  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 3.
1447  To some extent this statement needs to be nuanced. Factual representativity does 
play a role when deciding which organisations should have a seat in the joint 
committees. Reference is made to section 5.6 below.
1448  Raad van State [Council of State], 8 january 1986, journal des Tribunaux de 
Travail [Magazine of Labour Courts; “j.T.T.”] 1986, page 171; Arbeidshof Brussel 
[Higher Employment Court], 20 March 1987, j.T.T. 1987, page 238.
1449  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 304.
1450  W. van Eeckhoutte, Sociaal Compendium, page 59.
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collective labour agreements, which are binding on various branches of 
activity or all sectors of the economy. Moreover, a collective labour agreement 
may be concluded in the National Labour Council for a sector which does 
not fall within the competence of an established joint committee or where 
an established joint committee does not function. Besides these duties, the 
National Labour Council carries out advisory tasks under different social laws. 
The National Labour Council is composed of 24 titular and 24 substitute 
members. The titular members are appointed by the Crown and their seats are 
equally divided between the most representative inter-professional employers’ 
and employees’ organisations. On the employees’ side these are: ABVV, ACV 
and ACLVB. On the employers’ side these are: VBO, the “middle classes” 
organisations UCM and UNIZO, and the agricultural organisations FWA and 
Boerenbond. By virtue of the Royal decree of 7 April 1995, two associated 
members take part in the activities of the Council. Associated members 
are not given an equal status as titular or substitute members; their vote is 
non-decisive. The National Labour Council is chaired by one chairperson 
appointed by the Crown.1451 
The Central Economic Council was established by the 1948 Act on the 
Organisation of the Trade and Industry.1452 Pursuant to article 1 of that Act, 
the Central Economic Council’s role is to advise a Minister or the houses 
of Parliament on its own initiative or at the request of these authorities on 
general social issues concerning the national trade and industry. This includes 
the relation between employers and employees, aspects on production and 
trade, and social and economic policy on international, national and enterprise 
level.1453 The powers of the Central Economic Council are purely advisory; 
the decision making power remains with the legislator. Besides this advisory 
function, the Central Economic Council acts as a forum in which the dialogue 
between the social partners is furthered and social and economic issues can 
be analysed. 
The Central Economic Council is composed of a maximum of 50 titular 
members and an equal number of substitute members. The members 
are appointed by the Crown on a proposal of representative employers’ 
and employees’ organisations; both sides of the industry have an equal 
1451  The content of the text on the National Labour Council mainly derives from www.
cnt-nar.be.
1452  B.S. 27 – 28 September 1948.
1453  Reference is made to the brochure of the Secretary of the Central Economic 
Council, De Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven.
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representation. The members appointed in this fashion may subsequently 
appoint 6 members that are known for their scientific or technical capacity. 
The Council is chaired by an independent chairperson, appointed by the 
Crown.1454 On the employees’ side parties to the Central Economic Council 
are: ABVV, ACV, and ACLVB. On the employers’ side these are: VBO, UCM, 
UNIZO, FWA, Boerenbond, Boerenfront, the Royal Belgium Forestry 
(Koninklijke Belgische Bosbouwmaatschappij), the Federation of Belgian Co-
operations (Féderatie der Belgische Coöperaties) and Arcofin.
Although the Central Economic Council is not directly involved in the 
collective bargaining process, it still holds an important position. After all, 
as was outlined above, inter-professional organisations can be considered 
representative if  they are party to both the National Labour Council and the 
Central Economic Council.
5.6  The joint committees
There is no legal definition for the term “joint committees”. They can be 
described as sectoral consultation bodies, in which representatives of both 
sides of the industry meet on equal terms, to discuss common problems.1455 
Their establishment, rights and obligations are set out in the BACLA.
joint committees are established by Royal decree on the basis of article 35 
BACLA. The Crown can do so on its own initiative,1456 or on the request of 
representative employers’ and employees’ organisations. The Crown should 
decide (i) which persons, sector or companies, and (ii) which geographical 
territory fall within the jurisdiction of each joint committee. Consequently, 
1454  For the exact procedure regarding appointment reference is made to (i) the Act on 
the Organisation of the Trade and Industry, (ii) the decree of 28 december 1948 
on the determination of the number of members of the Central Economic Council 
and the fixation of the modelties of their nomination [Besluit houdende vaststelling 
van het aantal leden van de Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven en bepaling der 
modaliteiten van hun voordracht], B.S. 16 january 1949, and (iii) the brochure De 
Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven.
1455  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 322. It should be noted that joint committees are not strictly 
a federal matter; regional governments can also set such committees up under 
specific statutes. See P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, 
pages 37 and 38. These regional joint committees will not be discussed in this 
thesis.
1456  Should a Minister – being the Minister to whose competence the labour belongs; 
article 1.2 BACLA – consider requesting the Crown to establish a new joint 
committee or to adapt its scope of application, he has to publish this intention 
pursuant to article 36 BACLA in the Belgian Bulletin of Acts and decrees.
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joint committees can be established for any sector, any profession, any group 
of employees (it should be noted that Belgium distinguishes between “white 
collar” and “blue collar” employees), and for any region of Belgium, including 
the whole of Belgium.1457 
An already existing joint committee may request that the Crown establishes a 
joint sub-committee. If  this request is granted, the Crown should determine, 
on the advice of the joint committee, which persons and which geographical 
territory fall within the resort of that joint sub-committee (article 37 BACLA). 
The Crown should also decide, again on the advice of the joint committee, 
whether the joint sub-committee is empowered to autonomously conclude 
collective labour agreements, or if  it should obtain the joint committee’s 
approval (article 8 BACLA). 
Pursuant to article 38 BACLA, the joint (sub-)committee’s tasks are:
1. to cause the represented organisations in the committee to conclude col-
lective labour agreements;
2. to resolve conflicts between employers and employees;
3. to advise the government, the National Labour Council, the Central 
Economic Council or the Councils for Trade and Industry on its own 
initiative or at their request, on issues belonging to its (the joint (sub-)
committee’s) competence; and
4. to fulfil any other task assigned to it by law.
The joint committee is composed of one chairperson (and vice chairperson), an 
equal number of representatives of employers’ and employees’ organisations, 
and at least two secretaries (article 39 BACLA). It should be noted that the 
representatives of the employees’ organisations have to be associated with 
the three representative employees’ organisations,1458 while the employers’ 
organisations need to be representative as well. The Crown determines the 
number of members of the joint committees; the number of members and 
substitute members must be the same (article 41 BACLA). The chairperson 
and vice chairperson must, pursuant to article 40 BACLA, be competent in 
social matters and independent from the interests of the joint committees. 
The Crown also appoints the members and substitute members of the joint 
committees, as well as the secretaries (articles 41 and 44 BACLA respectively). 
The above equally applies to the joint sub-committees.
1457  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 324.
1458  Federal Governmental Agency Employment, Labour and Social Consultation, 
Wegwijs in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, page 10.
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Organisations are asked whether they wish to be eligible for representation 
in the joint committee in a publication in the Belgian Bulletin of Acts and 
decrees. The Minister concerned determines, given article 42 BACLA, which 
organisations are eligible for representation in the joint committees, and how 
many mandates these organisations will obtain. When determining this, the 
Minister should take into consideration the strength of the different trade 
unions in the sector concerned, or even a possible agreement concluded 
between these unions. The minister also establishes the representativity of the 
employers’ organisations.1459 The decision on the distribution of mandates 
will be announced to all organisations that asked for representation in the 
committee (article 42 BACLA). The selected organisations are requested to 
submit two candidates for each mandate they obtained. The mandate has a 
duration of 4 years and can be prolonged (article 43 BACLA).
5.7 The employers
 
The employers also play a role in the collective bargaining process, as they are 
entitled to conclude enterprise-level collective labour agreements.
6. The negotiation process / conclusion of 
a collective labour agreement
The negotiation process and manner in which collective labour agreements 
are concluded differ depending on the type of collective labour agreement 
that is to be concluded.
An inter-professional collective labour agreement is concluded within the 
National Labour Council. Pursuant to article 24 BACLA, a collective labour 
agreement can only be concluded by all organisations having seat in the National 
Labour Council; no organisation can be left out. The word “organisations” 
refers to representative employers’ and employees’ organisations (article 2.4 
BACLA). Solely these organisations have decisive votes (article 47 BACLA). 
These organisations can only take valid decisions relating to the conclusion of 
collective labour agreements if  at least half  of the members representing the 
employers’ organisations and half  of the members representing the employees’ 
organisations are present (article 47 BACLA). The decisions must be taken 
unanimously (article 47 BACLA). 
1459  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 323.
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Sectoral collective labour agreements are normally concluded within the 
joint committees, or, as the case may be, in the joint sub-committees. here, 
the same as was set out above applies. The collective labour agreement can 
only be concluded by all organisations having seat in the committees. These 
organisations are representative employers’ and employees’ organisations. 
They can only take valid decisions unanimously, if  at least half  of the 
members representing the employers’ organisations and half  of the members 
representing the employees’ organisations are present. Should a specific 
sector not (yet) be covered by a joint committee, or should an established 
joint committee not function properly, the National Labour Council is, on the 
basis of article 7 BACLA, entitled to enter into a sectoral collective labour 
agreement for that sector. 
An employer – regardless of whether it belongs to a representative employers’ 
organisation – or a representative employers’ organisation can conclude an 
enterprise-level collective labour agreement with one or more representative 
employers’ organisations. There is no obligation under Belgian law to involve 
multiple representative employees’ organisations in the collective bargaining 
process; one of such an organisation suffices for a collective labour agreement 
to have full effect.1460 having said this, it should be noted that in practice 
collective labour agreements concluded with only one employees’ organisation 
are seldom found.1461 At enterprise-level, the actual collective bargaining 
is done by the so-called union delegation.1462 The union delegation was 
institutionalised for the first time in 1947, in a framework agreement between 
representative employers’ and employees’ organisations, and later in 1971 in a 
framework collective labour agreement concluded within the National Labour 
Council.1463 Union delegates are individuals chosen from the personnel of 
the employer who represent to that employer both the trade union members 
amongst the employees, as well as the trade union itself.1464 Although the union 
delegates bargain, the actual execution of the collective labour agreement has 
1460  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 108. See also 
section 5 above.
1461  W. van Eeckhoutte, Arbeidsrecht, page 90.
1462  F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 12.
1463  Collective labour agreement on the statute of union delegation of the personnel 
of the enterprise (collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst betreffende het statuut van de 
syndicale afvaardigingen van het personeel der ondernemingen ), 24 May 1971, no. 5.
1464  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 86. A sectoral 
collective labour agreement may stipulate that the union representative represents 
the entire personnel (article 6 of the framework agreement).
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to be done by the trade union secretary (and can only be done by the union 
delegate himself  if  he is properly mandated for that purpose).1465
It is common in Belgium for the trade unions to hold ballots on important 
decisions. The draft sectoral agreement reached between the central social 
partner organisations in january 2005 was, for example, rejected in a ballot 
by the ABVV.1466
As has already been mentioned, the collective labour agreement should, after 
its conclusion, be registered at the Ministry for Work and Employment on 
the basis of article 18 BACLA. This obligation does not only apply to new 
collective labour agreements concluded, but also to an accession of another 
party to the collective labour agreement and to the termination of the 
agreement concluded for an indefinite period of time or for a definite period 
of time containing a renewal clause. A collective labour agreement concluded 
within a joint body should be published in the Belgium Bulletin of Acts and 
decrees (article 25 BACLA).
7. The effects of the collective labour agreement
Once the proper parties have concluded a (valid) collective labour agreement, 
its consequences should be assessed. As has been done in the previous chapters, 
it should be established for all 4 standard scenarios (i) to whom the collective 
labour agreement applies, (ii) what effects such an application has, and (iii) 
how the parties involved can enforce their rights. As in Belgium the answer to 
this first question is arranged to quite an extent in one article, this article will 
be discussed in advance in section 7.1, before sections 7.2 through 7.5 discuss 
the scenarios. In section 7.1 the “supplementary” binding power of collective 
labour agreements concluded within a joint body will be discussed as well. 
Section 7.6 sets out which other means of enforcement are in place in case of 
a breach of the collective labour agreement. Section 7.7 describes a “special” 
consequence that the collective labour agreement has: it may set aside specific 
statutory provisions. Section 7.8 focuses on the term and termination of 
collective labour agreements. The collective labour agreement’s possible after-
effects will be discussed in section 7.9. Finally, section 7.10 sets out the role of 
alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining.
1465  F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 12.
1466  A. Chaidron, Sectoral bargaining continues, 28 july 2005, EIRO.
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7.1 Who is bound by the collective labour agreement?
Article 19 BACLA sets out which persons and organisations are bound by the 
collective labour agreement:
1. the organisations that have concluded the agreement and employers who 
are members of such organisations or have concluded such an agree-
ment themselves, starting on the date on which the agreement becomes 
effective;
2. the organisations and employers accessing to the agreement and employ-
ers who are member of such organisations, starting on the date of acces-
sion;
3. the employers who become a member of an organisation bound by the 
agreement, starting on the date of joining;
4. all employees in the service of employers bound by the agreement.
These are the parties that are directly and fully bound by the collective labour 
agreement. This type of binding power will be discussed in the 4 scenarios 
below. however, besides these parties, the individual normative parts of 
collective labour agreements concluded within joint bodies are also, in a 
supplementary manner, binding on the employment agreement of the employer 
and its employees, not already bound by article 19. Should (i) the enterprise 
of that employer fall within the jurisdiction of the joint body that concluded 
the agreement, (ii) the individual employment agreement fall within the scope 
of applicability of the collective labour agreement, and (iii) the individual 
employment agreement not explicitly deviate in writing from the content of 
the individual normative provisions in that collective labour agreement, these 
individual normative provisions apply (article 26 BACLA). The same applies 
to collective normative provisions that not only have a collective normative 
nature, but also apply individually.1467 This binding power starts after 15 days 
following the publication of the collective labour agreement in the Belgium 
Bulletin of Acts and decrees. It cannot, therefore, have retro-effect.
The collective labour agreement concluded within the joint bodies has, given 
the above, a supplementary force for the employers (and their employees) that 
were not already bound by the agreement on the basis of article 19 BACLA. 
It can also have a direct mandatory force, should it be extended. Extending 
collective labour agreements will obviously fully bind more parties to the 
collective labour agreement than only the parties set out above. The extended 
collective labour agreement will be discussed in depth in section 8 below. 
1467  W. Rauws, De binding van de normatieve bepalingen, page 47.
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7.2 Scenario 1
The contracting parties – that is, one or more employers or representative 
organisations of employers and one or more representative organisations of 
employees – are bound to each other by the (obligatory provisions of the) 
collective labour agreement, upon concluding that agreement. This follows 
from the definition of collective labour agreement of article 5 BACLA, 
as it states that it “lays down the rights and obligations of the contracting 
parties”. Moreover, article 19.1 BACLA as referred to above stipulates that 
the contracting organisations or the contracting employer(s) are bound by 
the agreement. The same applies to the organisation(s) and employer(s) who 
accede to the collective labour agreement. They are bound by the agreement 
as from the moment of accession on the basis of article 19.2 BACLA. 
As already mentioned in section 4.2 above, obligatory provisions can be 
express or implied. Express obligations could, for instance, include clauses 
on the renewal and the termination of the agreement, dispute resolution 
mechanisms and specific sanctions upon breach of the collective labour 
agreement. Implied provisions are the “peace obligation” and the principle 
of “good faith”. 
The peace obligation means that the contracting parties will not engage in 
action to end or alter the provisions of the collective labour agreement. The 
implied peace obligation is not, however, absolute, in the sense that all collective 
actions are forbidden during the term of the collective labour agreement. 
Trade unions are allowed, for example, to resort to industrial action after the 
formulation of new demands and in order to force the other party to respect 
the collective labour agreement.1468 It should be noted that the implied peace 
obligation may further be enhanced in the collective labour agreement, even 
making it an absolute obligation.
The implied principle of good faith means that (i) the employers’ and 
employees’ organisations should inform their members of the existence of 
the collective labour agreement, and that they (ii) should do their utmost to 
ensure that their members fulfil the obligations arising from that agreement. 
The organisation thus has to act to the best of its abilities to make sure that 
its members follow the collective labour agreement. It does, however, not 
have to guarantee this.1469 Members that are in breach of the collective labour 
agreement are personally liable.
1468  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 94.
1469  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 95.
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In connection with the above it should be noted that, although the contracting 
parties to a collective labour agreement are bound by the obligatory provisions 
of that agreement, it is not beyond dispute whether that binding power is of a 
legal or merely a moral nature.1470 This difference is, without doubt, important, 
as only legally binding agreements can be enforced in court.1471 As a rule, 
obligatory provisions tend to be regarded as legally binding.1472
In Belgium, a party is required, by law, to perform under a contract; the 
signatory parties should therefore abide by the (express and implied) 
obligatory provisions of the collective labour agreement. Each party should 
act reasonably and fairly towards its counterparty (article 1134 Belgian Civil 
Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek; “BCC”)). Should a contracting party breach such 
an obligatory provision, the counterparty may instigate proceedings against 
that party. This may lead to an action for dissolution of the contract (article 
1184 BCC), claims on damages (articles 1146 ff BCC) or specific performance 
(article 1144 BCC).1473 Although organisations that have concluded the 
collective labour agreement may not always have legal personality, article 4 
BACLA entitles them to start proceedings against their counterparty upon 
breach of provisions of the collective labour agreement anyway.
however, when enforcing these obligatory provisions, several problems arise. 
There is article 4.2 BACLA, stipulating that a failure to respect the obligations 
set out in the collective labour agreement may not lead to the obligation of 
organisations1474 to pay damages, unless this is specifically agreed on in the 
collective labour agreement. In practice, however, stipulations permitting an 
obligation to pay damages are never agreed on.1475 This leaves parties with 
“other” remedies only, such as seeking enforcement or dissolution of the 
1470  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
page 177.
1471  G. Cox, De juridische binding en afdwingbaarheid van obligatoire C.A.O.-bepalingen, 
page 126.
1472  G. Cox, De juridische binding en afdwingbaarheid van obligatoire C.A.O.-bepalingen, 
pages 119 ff; P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 
104; and W. van Eeckhoutte, Arbeidsrecht, page 92.
1473  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, pages 305 and 306.
1474  It should be noted that the article only refers to organisations. Employers who 
enter into collective labour agreements do not enjoy the protection of article 4.2 
BACLA.
1475  See W. van Eeckhoutte, Sociaal Compendium, page 63. 
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collective labour agreement.1476 But even these remedies can be problematic 
given the fact that most organisations (including all employees’ organisations) 
do not have legal personality. It is extremely difficult to obtain, let alone enforce 
(a factual organisation has no funds of its own), a possible ruling against 
these factual organisations.1477 In other words, enforceability of obligatory 
provisions is not, to say the least, without difficulties.1478
7.3 Scenario 2
A collective labour agreement should be applied to the individual employment 
agreement of (i) the employer and employee who are bound by that agreement 
on the basis of article 19 BACLA and who also (ii) fall within the scope of 
application of that agreement.1479
7.3.1 Which employers and employees are bound by 
the collective labour agreement?
The employer who is either a member of an employers’ organisation that 
is a party to the collective labour agreement, or entered into the collective 
labour agreement itself, is, pursuant to article 19.1 BACLA, bound by 
that agreement. All employees in the service of an employer bound by the 
collective labour agreement – regardless of whether these employees are trade 
union members or not – are, given article 19.4 BACLA, automatically bound 
by that agreement as well. This last stipulation confirms on the one hand 
that representative employees’ organisations are regarded to represent the 
interests of all employees (and not just of their members) and prevents on the 
other that employers would escape the applicability of the collective labour 
agreement by simply not hiring trade union members.1480 
This binding power is strong. It not only applies if  the employer is a 
contracting party or a member of a contracting organisation at the moment 
of concluding the agreement, but also if  the employer or the organisation 
1476  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 20. See in more 
detail: G. Cox, De juridische binding en afdwingbaarheid van obligatoire C.A.O.-
bepalingen, pages 133 and 134.
1477  W. van Eeckhoutte, Arbeidsrecht, page 51. See also G. Cox, De juridische binding en 
afdwingbaarheid van obligatoire C.A.O.-bepalingen, page 133.
1478  See also j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 
2002), page 179.
1479  See W. Rauws, De binding van de normatieve bepalingen, page 42.
1480  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
page 180.
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of which it is a member accedes to the agreement (article 19.2 BACLA). In 
this situation the collective labour agreement applies as from the moment of 
accession. Furthermore, termination of the employer’s membership of the 
contracting organisation has no effect on the binding power of the collective 
labour agreement on that employer up to the date on which the terms of this 
collective labour agreement are altered, an alteration which has to significantly 
change the obligations arising from the agreement (article 21 BACLA). 
Such a significant alteration is, for instance, present should the term of the 
collective labour agreement have lapsed, should an agreement be terminated 
by notice, or should the collective labour agreement be replaced by a new, 
different collective labour agreement. A mere extension of a collective labour 
agreement does not qualify as a significant alteration.1481 
The dissolution of a contracting association has, given article 22 BACLA, 
no impact on the rights and obligations arising from the collective labour 
agreement towards the members of that (dissolved) organisation. These rights 
and obligations cease on the date on which the terms of this collective labour 
agreement are altered, an alteration which significantly changed the obligations 
arising from the agreement. This article merely applies to individual normative 
provisions, and not to obligatory and collective normative provisions.1482
7.3.2 Which employers and employees fall within the collective 
labour agreement’s scope of application?
It is at the contracting parties’ discretion to determine the scope of applicability 
of the collective labour agreement. The collective labour agreement should 
contain a specific clause to that effect. After all, article 16.1 BACLA explicitly 
stipulates that the collective labour agreement should establish the persons, 
the sector or the enterprise for, and the geographic territory in which the 
agreement applies, unless it applies to all employers and employees that fall 
within the jurisdiction of the joint body in which the agreement is concluded. 
It should be noted that a collective labour agreement without a (clear) 
provision on its scope of application is refused registration at the Ministry for 
Work and Employment and consequently lacks the legal effects of a collective 
labour agreement.1483
1481  W. Rauws, De binding van de normatieve bepalingen, page 45.
1482  W. Rauws, De binding van de normatieve bepalingen, page 45.
1483  Federal Governmental Agency Employment, Labour and Social Consultation, 
Wegwijs in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, page 17.
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discussions on whether an employer falls within the scope of jurisdiction of a 
specific joint committee are possible. In that respect it should be recalled that, 
given article 35 BACLA, the Crown has to determine when establishing a 
joint committee which (i) persons, sector or companies, and (ii) geographical 
territories fall within the jurisdiction of each joint committee. As a rule, the 
joint committee has jurisdiction over employees employed by an employer 
whose enterprise is active in the sector for which the joint committee is set 
up, regardless of the employee’s work. In order to determine the activity of 
the enterprise, its main activity is normally taken into consideration.1484 When 
establishing this main activity, only the activities of the enterprise itself are 
of relevance. In other words, activities performed not on the company’s own 
account, but for example by a sub-contractor, are excluded when determining 
the company’s activities. The activities performed by the sub-contractor may 
very well fall within the scope of jurisdiction of another joint committee 
than the one that has jurisdiction over the company.1485 On occasion, joint 
committees are established that do not focus on the activities of the employer, 
but rather on a specific group of employees. An example hereof is joint 
Committee No. 223, which governs employment conditions of professional 
sportsmen.1486 
If  two joint committees claim to have jurisdiction over a specific company, the 
National Labour Council has, pursuant to article 1 of the National Labour 
Council Act, the authority to issue an opinion on that jurisdictional dispute 
between the joint committees.1487 The Ministry for Work and Employment may 
also advise an employer under which joint committee it resorts.1488 It should 
be noted that an employer falls, as a general rule, within the jurisdiction of 
just one joint committee.1489
7.3.3 What are the legal consequences?
Pursuant to article 11 BACLA, provisions in an individual employment 
agreement that deviate from an applicable collective labour agreement are 
1484  See Court of Cassation, 17 june 1996, J.T.T. 1996, page 365. 
1485  Court of Cassation, 14 February 1984, J.T.T. 1984, page 132. 
1486  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 41.
1487  There are several ways to solve such a jurisdictional dispute. Reference is made 
to P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, pages 327 and 328.
1488  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
page 206.
1489  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
pages 200 ff.
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null and void. These provisions are, in fact, automatically converted1490 into 
the corresponding provision of the collective labour agreement. Provisions 
arranged for in the collective labour agreement but not in the individual 
employment agreement apply to the latter agreement as well.1491 As is rightly 
stated in article 23 BACLA, the individual employment agreement is tacitly 
amended by the individual normative provisions of the collective labour 
agreement. The individual normative provisions in the collective labour 
agreement have, in short, a self-executing (direct normative) effect on the 
individual employment agreement.
7.3.4 Deviation from the collective labour agreement in 
the individual employment agreement
Although not arranged in statute, the normative provisions of a collective 
labour agreement can be of minimum, maximum or fixed nature.1492 This 
nature sets out whether the provision allows any departure from its rule in 
any agreement lower in hierarchy (see section 9.1 hereafter). departure from 
minimum provisions is only allowed if  such a departure is in favour of the 
employee. Maximum provisions do not allow more favourable arrangements 
in a lower level agreement. Fixed provisions do not allow any departure in a 
lower level agreement at all. Most collective labour agreements in Belgium set 
out minimum norms.1493
Since there can be maximum and fixed provisions in a Belgian collective labour 
agreement, unlike the situation in Germany, it is possible that collective labour 
agreements alter the individual employment agreement to the detriment of 
the employee.1494 The individual employment agreements are converted by the 
individual normative provisions of an applicable collective labour agreement, 
regardless of any opposition from the employees concerned against that 
collective labour agreement.1495 
1490  Which differs to some extent from the pure nullity of the provision. See W. Rauws, 
De binding van de normatieve bepalingen, pages 56 and 57.
1491  See W. Rauws, De binding van de normatieve bepalingen, page 39.
1492  Reference is made to the Federal Governmental Agency Employment, Labour and 
Social Consultation, Wegwijs in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, page 8.
1493  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
pages 215.
1494  See for example Arbeidshof Antwerpen, 22 October 1975, R.W. 1975-1976, page 
1775.
1495  Court of Cassation, 1 February 1993, j.T.T. 1993, page 327.
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7.3.5 Enforcement
As the individual normative provisions of the collective labour agreement 
have a self-executing effect and therefore automatically adapt the individual 
employment agreement, the parties to that employment agreement should 
oblige these individual normative provisions. If  they do not, they are in 
breach of the individual employment contract. The aggrieved party can 
subsequently claim specific performance and/or damages following this 
breach of contract. 
7.4 Scenario 3
Article 19 BACLA makes clear that only the position of the employer is of 
relevance when it comes to determining whether the collective labour agreement 
applies directly to the relation between the employer and the employee. This 
means that a collective labour agreement does not apply to the employment 
agreement of an employer and employee, should the employer not have 
concluded that collective labour agreement or should he not be member of a 
contracting employers’ organisation. It makes, in that situation, no difference 
whether or not the employee is a member of the contracting trade union.1496 
The other way around is different. Should the employer be bound (through 
membership of a contracting association or through executing the contract 
itself) by the collective labour agreement, while the employee is not a member 
of one of the contracting trade unions, the collective labour agreement does 
apply to the individual employment agreement between the two. This scenario 
does not differ from scenario 2 as set out above.
Reference clauses, i.e. clauses in the employment contract stipulating which 
collective labour agreement is applicable, to the effect of binding the employee 
to that collective labour agreement, play no real role in Belgium, as opposed 
to the situation in the Netherlands and Germany. After all, all employees 
of “bound” employers are by law bound by the collective labour agreement 
(on the basis of article 19.4 BACLA). This is not to say that an employer 
would never follow, for example, the wages determined in a collective labour 
agreement concluded within a joint committee by which the employer is not 
bound. The employer is free to do so, and the mere fact it is following those 
1496  F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 16.
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wages does not bind him to that entire agreement or other collective labour 
agreements concluded within said joint committee.1497 
7.5 Scenario 4
Collective normative provisions in Belgium bind the “collectivities”.1498 They 
do not bind the individual employees towards their employer (unless the 
provision concerned also qualifies as an individual normative provision).1499 
As a consequence, “pure” collective normative provisions do not alter the 
individual employment agreement.1500 
A textbook example of a collective normative provision is the establishment 
of a Fund for Income (Fonds voor Bestaandszekerheid). These Funds are a 
creation of the social partners dating back to 1946.1501 The goals of these 
Funds include (i) financing, granting and paying social benefits to a group 
of employees, (ii) financing and organising vocational training, and (iii) 
furthering employment.1502 Employers finance these Funds. The employees 
have an entitlement to payment from these Funds in specific circumstances. 
In short, collective labour agreements establishing these Funds create rights 
and obligations between the employer and the Funds on the one hand and 
between the Funds and the employees on the other, but not between the 
employer and the employees. This is the principle of collective normative 
provisions.1503 This principle is, with regard to Funds, affirmed in article 11 of 
the 1958 Act regarding Funds for Income (Wet betreffende de Fondsen voor 
Bestaanszekerheid).1504 This article stipulates that employees who are entitled 
to payment from the Funds have a direct claim against these Funds, and such 
a payment may not be made dependent on whether or not their employer has 
paid the contributions due. Moreover, article 7 of that Act stipulates that the 
1497  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
page 181.
1498  See note M. Rigaux, under Arbeidshof Brussel, 24 November 1980, R.W. 
1980/1981, page 2273.
1499  See for example Arbeidshof Antwerpen, 27 May 1988, j.T.T. 1988, page 357.
1500  Arbeidshof Brussel, 18 june 2001, j.T.T. 2001, 481.
1501  W. van Eeckhoutte, Arbeidsrecht, page 66.
1502  See for a list of goals article 1 of the collective labour agreement no. 66 of 4 
November 1997, regarding the Funds for Income, as concluded within the National 
Labour Council.
1503  O. de Leye, De C.A.O. en het Hof van Cassatie [The collective labour agreement and 
the Court of Cassation], j.T.T. 1995, page 168.
1504  B.S. 7 February 1958.
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Funds themselves are entitled to collect the contributions from the employers, 
although they may also leave this to the institutions for social security.
The second textbook example concerns the union delegation, as already 
discussed in section 6. As mentioned, union delegates are individuals chosen 
from the personnel of the employer who represent to that employer both the 
trade union members amongst the employees, as well as the trade union itself  
(both “collectivities”). The union delegation should comply with the collective 
normative obligations in a collective labour agreement, such as a reconciliation 
procedure.1505 Should a union delegate not to do so, the employer may take 
appropriate action against him.1506
Given the above, and most explicitly the arrangements on Funds, collective 
normative provisions of a collective labour agreement may be enforced by 
and against the relevant collectivities.
7.6 Other statutory means of enforcement
The above-mentioned scenarios discuss, amongst others, whether or not 
the parties, whose rights are concerned, are entitled to enforce these rights. 
however, more parties can play a role in the enforcement of the collective 
labour agreements, as will be set out below. 
7.6.1 General means of enforcement
The BACLA is, on the basis of articles 52 and 53, enforced by officers of the 
judicial police and civil servant appointed by the Crown. These officials can 
carry out inspections, investigations and surveys deemed necessary for the 
exercise of their duties.1507 Violation of extended collective labour agreements 
is a criminal offence, as will be set out in further detail in section 8. Besides 
these means of enforcement, collective labour agreements may confer specific 
responsibilities to the joint committees or sub-committees, including the 
power to sanction offenders who do not abide by the rules set out in the 
1505  See also j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 
2002), page 173, and the case law mentioned by him.
1506  See for example Arbeidshof Charleroi, 27 june 1983, Sociaal Rechtelijke 
Kronieken [Chronicles of Social Law; “S.R.K.”] 1984, page 411. Rulings of this 
nature – affirming disciplinary actions against union representatives - have been 
criticised though. For cases and scholars “pro” and “con”, reference is made to j. 
Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
pages 173 and 174.
1507  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 108.
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collective labour agreement.1508 Moreover, the union delegation is empowered 
to verify whether the collective labour agreement is applied correctly (article 
11 of the collective labour agreement on the statute of union delegation of the 
personnel of the enterprise).
7.6.2 Enforcement of obligatory provisions
In principle, the aggrieved party may, following a breach of an obligatory 
provision, revert to the general provisions of the BCC, within the limitations 
set out in article 4.2 BACLA, This party also has to surmount the further 
obstacle of lack of legal personality, if  applicable. I refer to scenario 1 above. 
7.6.3 Enforcement of individual normative provisions
The employer and the employee to whom the collective labour agreement 
applies can enforce their rights as set out in the individual normative 
provisions of the collective labour agreement through claims based on 
the individual employment agreement. Reference is made to scenario 2 
above. however, the contracting organisations may also play a role in the 
enforcement of individual normative provisions. Article 4 BACLA allows 
them to initiate proceedings to defend the rights of their members arising 
from the collective labour agreement. The organisations may, on that ground, 
demand that the employer performs under the collective labour agreement.1509 
In order to pursue a claim, the organisations themselves do not necessarily 
have to have an individual right that is at stake; if  suffices that they claim from 
the employer specific advantages awarded in the collective labour agreement 
to their members.1510 however, the organisations are not entitled to claim 
financial losses on behalf  of third parties that are not named as such in the 
proceedings, even if  these third parties are members of those organisations 
and are working for the employer concerned, as this entitlement belongs to 
the employee himself.1511 A ruling declaring it to be the law that the employer 
breached the collective labour agreement, on the other hand, could very well 
be obtained.1512 Finally, it should be noted that the contracting organisations 
do not require a mandate from their members in order to start proceedings 
1508  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 41.
1509  Arbeidshof Gent, 12 april 1989, T.S.R. 1989, page 305 and Arbeidsrechtbank 
Namen [Employment Court], 16 September 1996, j.T.T. 1997, page 69.
1510  Arbeidsrechtbank Namen, 16 September 1996, j.T.T. 1997, page 69.
1511  Arbeidshof Gent, 12 april 1989, T.S.R. 1989, page 305.
1512  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
page 229.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 11
504
against an employer breaching normative provisions of an applicable collective 
labour agreement. The contracting organisations have a fully autonomous 
right to do so. If  necessary, a contracting organisation may even start the 
aforementioned proceedings against the will of their members.1513 
Besides the above, one of the union delegation’s tasks is to assist individual 
employees who have a conflict with their employer (article 13 of the collective 
labour agreement on the statute of union delegation of the personnel of the 
enterprise). If  that conflict relates to the individual normative provisions of 
an applicable collective labour agreement, the union delegation can play a 
role in the enforcement process as well.
7.6.4 Enforcement of collective normative provisions
As set out in section 7.5, collective normative provisions may be enforced by 
and against the relevant collectivities. Moreover, contracting organisations 
may also enforce collective normative provisions on the basis of article 4 
BACLA.1514
7.7 Special legal consequences of a collective labour agreement
As in the Netherlands (¾ mandatory law) and Germany, specific Belgian Acts 
have introduced the possibility for the employers and employees to deviate 
from specific statutory provisions if  an applicable collective labour agreement 
permits them to do so. This is the case in both the Working Act (Arbeidswet) 
and the Act of 1987 concerning the introduction of new working arrangements 
in enterprises.1515 Collective labour agreements can allow employers and 
employees to arrange specific matters in an individual employment contract, 
which could not be arranged without that collective labour agreement.
7.8 Term and termination
Although the nature of a collective labour agreement gave rise to heated 
discussions, the BACLA makes it clear that the collective labour agreement 
is essentially a contract, but that the (individual and collective) normative 
provisions contain standards that apply to the employers bound by the 
1513  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
page 229 and his references to the legal history of the BACLA.
1514  G. Cox, De juridische binding en afdwingbaarheid van obligatoire C.A.O.-bepalingen, 
page 132.
1515  F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 25.
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agreement and the employees in their service.1516 The contractual element puts 
forward that it is primarily at the contracting parties’ discretion to establish 
the term of the agreement, including the date that it comes into force. The 
legislator’s role in this is only limited. hereinafter, the date that the agreement 
becomes effective, the term and the termination of the collective labour 
agreements will be discussed.
7.8.1 The date of entering into force
The parties to the collective labour agreement should arrange when the 
agreement enters into force. By law, they have to set out in writing in the 
collective labour agreement the date on which the agreement comes into force, 
in case the agreement does not enter into force on the date it is concluded 
(article 16.6 BACLA). The date of conclusion should also be inserted in the 
agreement (article 16.7 BACLA). As already noted, the Ministry for Work 
and Employment will refuse the registration of a collective labour agreement 
that does not meet the demands set forth in article 16 BACLA, upon which 
the agreement is, in fact, not a collective labour agreement. 
Collective labour agreements can have retro-effect, if  specifically provided 
for in the agreement itself.1517 In certain circumstances, the collective labour 
agreement may even apply to the past whilst that is not explicitly arranged in 
the agreement itself.1518
7.8.2 Term and termination
The contracting parties may also determine the term of the collective labour 
agreement. Article 15 BACLA stipulates that collective labour agreements 
can be concluded for a fixed period of time, an indefinite period of time, or a 
fixed period of time combined with a renewal clause. The “type” of collective 
labour agreement should clearly follow on from the agreement itself, as article 
16.5 BACLA stipulates that the collective labour agreement must contain a 
clause to this effect.
1516  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 96.
1517  See, extensively, V. Pertry, Retroactieve toepassing van C.A.O.-bepalingen [Retro-
effect of provisions in a collective labour agreement], in M. Rigaux, Actuele 
problemen van het Arbeidsrecht 3, Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen, Antwerpen, 1990, 
pages 83 ff.
1518  Arbeidshof Luik, 9 january 1992, S.R.K. 1993, page 212.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 11
506
The collective labour agreement concluded for a fixed period of time terminates, 
by operation of law, at the end of that term.1519 Collective labour agreements 
entered into for an indefinite period of time, or a fixed period of time combined 
with a renewal clause, may be terminated by notice on the basis of article 15 
BACLA by each of the contracting parties,1520 unless specifically stipulated 
otherwise in the agreement.1521 Pursuant to article 16.5 BACLA, a collective 
labour agreement must, for the aforementioned types of agreements, contain 
a clause outlining the manner in which the agreement can be terminated, 
including the notice period. In all events, the termination has to be given in 
writing in order to have effect (article 15 BACLA). Partial termination is not 
permitted, unless the collective labour agreement specifically allows this. The 
termination should be registered at the Ministry for Work and Employment 
(article 18 BACLA).
Besides termination by notice, the collective labour agreement can be dissolved 
upon breach of the obligatory provisions (see scenario 1). It can also be 
terminated by mutual consent of the contracting parties involved.
7.9 After-effects
The individual normative parts, as well as the collective normative parts that 
also apply individually1522 of the collective labour agreement normally still 
have effect once the agreement is terminated. Article 23 BACLA states that 
an individual employment agreement that has been tacitly modified by the 
collective labour agreement, remains unchanged after the collective labour 
agreement’s end, unless specifically stated otherwise in the collective labour 
agreement. These after-effects do not apply to collective normative provisions, 
1519  Federal Governmental Agency Employment, Labour and Social Consultation, 
Wegwijs in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, page 19.
1520  A collective labour agreement for a fixed period of time that is tacitly renewed 
each time due to a specific clause to that effect, may only be terminated at the 
end of a term. Federal Governmental Agency Employment, Labour and Social 
Consultation, Wegwijs in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, page 19.
1521  Some collective labour agreements stipulate that termination by notice is only 
possible in case all signatory parties agree thereto. This sometimes is considered 
useful when the collective labour agreement was concluded in an atmosphere of 
distrust, as it prevents the unilateral termination of the agreeement agreed on after 
lots of efforts. Reference is made to: Federal Governmental Agency Employment, 
Labour and Social Consultation, Wegwijs in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, 
page 13.
1522  See W. Rauws, De binding van de normatieve bepalingen, page 43. See also j. Petit, 
De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), page 190.
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which do not also apply individually.1523 The employment agreement that is 
modified by the collective labour agreement may, in the “after-effect period”, 
be altered by a new collective labour agreement or an agreement between the 
employer and the employee.1524
7.10 The role of alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining
In Belgium the social partners are encouraged to use alternative dispute 
resolution in the case of a conflict.1525 This normally involves either conciliation 
or mediation, and only rarely arbitration.1526 Many of such alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms are defined in collective labour agreements or in the 
operational procedures for the joint committees and their conciliation office.1527 
Social partners also actively participate in conciliation boards, chaired by 
conciliators/mediators appointed by the Ministry of Labour.1528 
8. Extending collective labour agreements
As in the Netherlands and in Germany, in Belgium a collective labour agreement 
can also be extended in such a manner that it applies in a mandatory fashion 
to all employers and employees that fall within the scope of application of that 
agreement. This is even usual when it concerns collective labour agreements 
concluded within the National Labour Council.1529 Such an extension takes 
place by Royal decree. After extending a collective labour agreement, the 
normative provisions of this agreement are considered material law.1530 
The extension process is surrounded by demands and safeguards as will be 
discussed in section 8.1. Once declared binding, the collective labour agreement 
has important consequences for all parties that fall within its scope. These 
1523  See, for example, Arbeidshof Brussel, 18 june 2001, j.T.T. 2001, page 48.
1524  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
page 189.
1525  F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 8.
1526  See A. Chaidron, EIRO Thematic Feature on Collective dispute Resolutions in an 
enlarged European Union – case of Belgium, page 2. This report can be found on the 
EIRO-website.
1527  A. Chaidron, EIRO Thematic Feature on Collective dispute Resolutions in an 
enlarged European Union – case of Belgium, page 2.
1528  F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 8.
1529  P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 34.
1530  Court of Cassation, 29 April 1996, j.T.T. 1996, page 367.
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consequences will be discussed in section 8.2, as along with the means of 
enforcement.
8.1 Demands and safeguards surrounding the extension 
Neither all collective labour agreements, nor all provisions thereof can be 
declared binding. The collective labour agreement should meet several 
demands and safeguards, which can be divided into (i) demands concerning 
(the provisions of) the collective labour agreements that are to de declared 
binding, (ii) procedural demands and safeguards, and (iii) limitations on the 
duration of the binding collective labour agreement. If  these demands are 
met, the Crown (iv) may extend the collective labour agreement.
8.1.1 Demands concerning (the provisions of) the collective labour agreement
The extension process presumes the existence of a valid collective labour 
agreement. An invalid collective labour agreement cannot be declared 
binding.1531 Moreover, neither all collective labour agreements nor all of their 
provisions can be extended. Pursuant to article 28 BACLA, only agreements 
concluded within the joint bodies can be extended. Enterprise level collective 
labour agreements are therefore excluded from extension. Furthermore, the 
extension only applies to (individual and collective) normative provisions of 
the collective labour agreement.1532 Obligatory obligations are not subject to 
extension, as they merely bind the contracting parties.
8.1.2 Procedural demands and safeguards 
The Crown may not declare a collective labour agreement binding on its 
own initiative, but is dependent on the request of the joint body in which 
the agreement is concluded, or of one of the organisations having seat 
therein (article 28 BACLA). The Minister1533 may oppose to such a request 
and can subsequently refuse to forward the request to the Crown (article 29 
BACLA).1534 The Minister can do so should he consider the collective labour 
1531 Arbeidsrechtbank doornik, 21 September 2001, j.T.T. 2002, page 487.
1532  W. van Eeckhoutte, Arbeidsrecht, page 97.
1533  Being the Minister to whose competence the labour belongs; article 1.2 BACLA. 
This is normally the Minister of Labour. See F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. 
Rombouts, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Belgium, page 18.
1534  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
page 183.
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agreement invalid, or contravening the public interest.1535 he has to inform 
the joint body hereof. Such a refusal, however, rarely occurs.1536 If  the Crown 
decides to extend the collective labour agreement, it should publish the part 
of the collective labour agreement that is extended in the Belgian Bulletin of 
Acts and decrees (article 30 BACLA). 
8.1.3 Limitations in duration of the declaration
The Royal decree extending the collective labour agreement has effect as 
from the moment the collective labour agreement has effect. however, a 
binding collective labour agreement cannot have a retro-effect exceeding one 
year prior to the agreement’s publication (article 32 BACLA). Employers and 
employees bound by the binding collective labour agreement may therefore 
be held to apply specific stipulations over the past. The Court of Cassation 
limited this effect somewhat. If  an employer had not met specific standards 
at the moment an employee was made redundant, standards which were 
introduced by a binding collective labour agreement with retro-effect after 
the termination of the employment agreement, this non-observance will not 
nullify the termination.1537
The Royal decree extending a collective labour agreement concluded for a 
fixed period of time ends automatically once the applicable term has lapsed 
(article 33 BACLA). The extension of a collective labour agreement entered 
into for an indefinite period of time, or for a fixed period of time combined 
with a renewal clause, will be terminated by Royal decree once the agreement 
itself  is terminated by notice as from the moment that said agreement ends 
(article 33 BACLA). 
In addition to the above, the Royal decree extending a collective labour 
agreement may wholly or partially be discontinued should the agreement not 
conform anymore to the situation and conditions warranting its past extension. 
The Crown may, however, only do so with the consent of the joint body that 
concluded the collective labour agreement in the first place. The Royal decree 
extending the collective labour agreement may also be discontinued if  the 
agreement violates an instrument that is higher in hierarchy or arranges for 
1535  W. van Eeckhoutte, Arbeidsrecht, page 97.
1536  j. Petit, De C.A.O.-Wet: een overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer (1968 – 2002), 
page 183.
1537  Court of Cassation, 7 december 1981, De grote arresten van het Hof van Cassatie 
in Sociale Zaken, no. 4.
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mandatory arbitration (which is in violation of article 9 BACLA).1538 In such 
a case the joint body that concluded the collective labour agreement will be 
notified.
8.1.4 The discretionary power of the Crown
Pursuant to article 28 BACLA, the Crown can (as opposed to shall) declare 
binding a collective labour agreement. The Crown therefore has a discretionary 
power whether or not to declare such a collective labour agreement binding. 
Scholars take different views on the reach of this discretionary power. It is 
clear that the Crown can refuse to extend the collective labour agreement if  
it is invalid or contravenes the public interests. Some scholars argue, however, 
that a refusal cannot be based on economic or political reasons.1539 Others 
state that the Crown may take such interests into consideration and even may 
refuse the extension on these grounds.1540 What is clear is that the extension is 
indivisible. In other words, the Crown cannot extend certain provisions of the 
collective labour agreement, whilst not extending other provisions.1541 
8.2 The consequences of a binding collective labour agreement / enforcement
Article 31 BACLA stipulates that a binding collective labour agreement 
applies to all employers and employees resorting under the jurisdiction of 
the joint body and falling within the scope of application of the agreement. 
The legal position of the employers and employees falling within the scope 
of application of the binding collective labour agreement is the same as the 
legal position of the employers and employees who already were bound by 
that agreement, regardless of the extension. For the legal position of (i) these 
employers and employees towards each other and (ii) towards “collectivities” 
reference is made to the above-mentioned scenarios 2 and 4 respectively. With 
regard to the possibility to enforce, reference is made to said scenarios and 
section 7.6. The after-effects of the provisions of the binding collective labour 
agreements are also the same as those of “normal” (not-extended) collective 
labour agreements. 
1538  In such a case, only the Royal decree extending the collective labour agreement is 
discontinued. It does not discontinue the entire collective labour agreement itself. 
See Court of Cassation, 12 October 1992, j.T.T. 1992, page 478.
1539  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 396.
1540  See h. Lennaerts, Inleiding tot het Sociaal Recht, p. 340.
1541  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 396. See also h. Lennaerts, Inleiding tot het Sociaal Recht, p. 
340.
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It should be noted that violation of a binding collective labour agreement can 
be a criminal offence. Pursuant to article 56 BACLA, any employer who fails 
to comply with a binding collective labour agreement or obstructs inspections 
on the proper execution of that agreement risks being punished by a fine or 
even imprisonment. 
9. The collective labour agreement and the 
reach of the social partners
9.1 What can the social partners regulate in a collective labour agreement?
As collective labour agreements are essentially private agreements, the social 
partners enjoy contractual freedom.1542 Of course, given the definition of the 
collective labour agreement, the individual and collective normative parts of 
that agreement should concern the individual and collective relation between 
the employer and the employees. This still gives the social partners ample 
choice what to arrange in collective labour agreements. 
Within these broad limitations, the social partners may conclude agreements. 
They should, however, observe the content of other instruments regulating 
employment relations, particularly those instruments that are higher in 
hierarchy. hierarchy is very important with regard to collective labour 
agreements, as their hierarchy differs depending on which level the agreements 
were concluded and depending on their possible extension, as will be shown 
hereunder. The hierarchy of the sources of obligations in employment relations 
is arranged in article 51 BACLA and reads as follows:
1. mandatory provisions of the law;1543 1544
2. collective labour agreements that are extended in the following sequen-
ce:
a. collective labour agreements concluded within the National Labour 
Council;
b. collective labour agreements concluded within a joint committee;
c. collective labour agreements concluded within a joint sub-committee;
1542  Federal Governmental Agency Employment, Labour and Social Consultation, 
Wegwijs in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, page 12.
1543  here, it should be noted that international law precedes over national law. 
Reference is made to the Court of Cassation, 27 May 1971, A.C. 1971, as set out 
on date.
1544  This includes the demand that collective labour agreements may not contravene 
public policy nor violate good morals.
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3. collective labour agreements that are not extended but that are either 
signed by the employer or by the representative organisation of which it 
is a member, in the following sequence:
a. collective labour agreements concluded within the National Labour 
Council;
b. collective labour agreements concluded within a joint committee;
c. collective labour agreements concluded within a joint sub-committee.
d. collective labour agreements concluded outside these joint bodies;
4. written individual employment agreements;
5. collective labour agreements that are not extended and that are conclu-
ded within a joint body, when the employer, although the agreement was 
neither signed by the employer nor by the representative organisation of 
which it is a member, falls within the jurisdiction of that joint body;
6. standing employment conditions (arbeidsreglement);
7. directory provisions of law;
8. oral agreements;
9. usage.
If  provisions of the different sources of law deviate from each other, the 
provision of the lower ranked source will be set aside.1545 
In addition to the above list, there are also articles 9, 10 and 11 BACLA that 
establish a hierarchy in norms. Article 9 BACLA stipulates that provisions of 
collective labour agreements that violate (i) mandatory (international) law or 
(ii) refer individual (as opposed to collective) conflicts to arbitration are null 
and void. Article 10 BACLA stipulates that the following provisions are also 
null and void:
(i)  provisions in a collective labour agreement concluded within a joint 
committee that deviate from provisions in a collective labour agreement 
concluded within the National Labour Council;
(ii) provisions in a collective labour agreement concluded within a joint sub-
committee that deviate from provisions in a collective labour agreement 
concluded within the National Labour Council or within the joint com-
mittee under which the sub-committee resorts;
(iii) provisions in a collective labour agreement concluded outside a joint 
body (enterprise level agreement) that deviate from provisions in a col-
lective labour agreement concluded within a joint body under which the 
company resorts.
1545  Court of Cassation, 5 june 2000, A.C. 2000, as listed on date.
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Moreover, as already discussed, article 11 BACLA sets out that provisions 
in an individual employment agreement that deviate from an applicable 
collective labour agreement are null and void.1546
Finally, it should be noted that not every variation of  provisions is an actual 
deviation: a lower provision may very well vary from a higher provision, as 
long as the lower provision does not deviate from there. In order to establish 
whether the lower provision in fact deviates from the higher provision, it 
should be established whether that higher provision is a minimum, standard, or 
maximum provision. The lower provision should oblige that higher provision’s 
nature. If, for example, the higher provision is a minimum provision, variations 
in instruments lower in ranking are allowed as long as they are in favour of 
the employee.1547 
9.2 Collective labour agreements and representativity demands
It is obvious that “representativity” plays a crucial role in Belgian collective 
bargaining. This gives sufficient reason to have a closer look at the 
representativity demands set out in, amongst others, article 3 BACLA. These 
demands are rather peculiar. 
Article 3 BACLA qualifies trade unions as representative, if  they are (i) inter-
professional, (ii) established throughout the whole of Belgium, (iii) participate 
in both the Central Economic Council and the National Labour Council 
and (iv) have at least 50,000 members. Trade unions that are associated to, 
or are a part of, these inter-professional organisations are representative as 
well. With the exception of the fourth demand, the same demands apply to 
the employers’ organisations. however, the Crown and the special Act of 6 
March 1964 on the Organisation of the Small-firm Sector may declare other 
(sectoral) employers’ organisations representative as well. I refer to section 5 
above.
These demands are strict. This is especially the case for trade unions, as they do 
not have the “escape” of having unions that do not meet the general demands 
appointed as “representative”, that the (sectoral) employers’ organisations 
have. As already noted, this escape is regularly used in practice (there were 
about 60 sectoral employers’ organisations that qualified as representative 
1546  The content of the three articles mentioned above is very similar to the hierarchy 
contained in article 51, but is not identical. This may lead to conflicting situations. 
See: P. humblet and M. Rigaux, Belgian Industrial Relations Law, page 100.
1547  Federal Governmental Agency Employment, Labour and Social Consultation, 
Wegwijs in de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, pages 8 and 9.
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in 2002, whilst only one inter-professional employers’ organisation is 
representative).1548 As a consequence, sectoral trade unions that are not 
affiliated to the three representative employees’ organisations are completely 
left aside in the collective bargaining process. Moreover, the demands are 
not only strict, but also easy to manipulate. After all, there are no legal 
demands to be entitled to participate in the Central Economic Council and 
the National Labour Council;1549 it is at the government’s discretion who to 
admit and who not.1550 In other words: it is up to the Belgian government 
to decide which organisations – and, given the above, which trade unions in 
particular – are representative. It has been said that the government actually 
used this entitlement to choose which trade unions are representative. In 
other words, the general rules are drafted in such a manner that they have 
enabled the government to pick and chose the three big trade unions as solely 
representative.1551 
These representativity demands may be challenged. ILO institutions have held 
the current situation in violation of its Conventions on several occasions.1552 
One of the “highlights” in that respect was the Belgian government’s refusal 
to grant the National Federation of Independent Trade Unions (Nationale 
Unie van Onafhankelijke Syndycaten; “UNSI”) a seat in the National Labour 
Council. The UNSI filed a complaint in 1984 with the ILO Committee 
on Freedom of Association on the alleged infringement of Belgium of 
Conventions C87 and C98.1553 The Committee observed that the refusal to 
grant a seat to UNSI on the National Labour Council made it impossible 
for that union to sit on the general negotiating committees for the public 
service. Subsequently, the Committee requested that the Belgian government 
indicate the objective factors that formed the basis for the refusal to grant such 
a seat to UNSI, so that it could reach a decision on this aspect of the case 
1548  Reference is made to section 5.4 above.
1549  The National Labour Council does demand that the participating organisation is 
established throughout the whole of Belgium; this is, however, not an additional 
requirement the organisations must meet as the same requirement is set out in 
article 3 BACLA.
1550  W. van Eeckhoutte, Arbeidsrecht, page 48.
1551  See h. Lennaerts, Inleiding tot het Sociaal Recht, p. 389.
1552  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 305.
1553  Report no. 241, case no. 1250 and document no. (ilolex): 0319852411250. 
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in full knowledge of the facts.1554 The Committee furthermore requested the 
Belgian government to amend its legislation. This was to be done in order to 
prevent organisations that are not inter-occupational in nature, or which are 
not affiliated to an inter-occupational organisation established at the national 
level, from being able to sit on the National Labour Council. In the end, as a 
result of this, these organisations are denied a considerable number of trade 
union rights, including the right to bargain collectively in the economic sectors 
in which they exercise their activities. Belgium has never responded to any of 
the ILO’s opinions or requests.1555 1556
9.3 Collective labour agreements and independence of trade unions
As only representative trade unions may enter into collective labour 
agreements, and there are only three large, strong and independent trade 
unions, “yellow” trade unions concluding collective labour agreements are a 
non-issue in Belgium.
10. Summary
10.1 Industrial relations: past and present
Industrial relations and collective bargaining are important in Belgium. In 
the year 2000, approximately 90% of the Belgian employees were covered by a 
collective labour agreement setting their wages. Trade union density in Belgium 
is also high: in 2001 the number of trade union membership was estimated 
on “exceeding 50%” of the total working population. The organisation rate 
of employers in Belgium was, according to a year 2000 study, 82%. Collective 
1554  This demand is challenged by some. It is stated that the Committee never 
demonstrated in what way “the rule of objective and pre-established criteria (…) 
can be derived from the freedom of collective bargaining and the freedom of union 
association”. See F. dorssemont, G. Cox and j. Rombouts, The evolving structure 
of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Belgium, page 14.
1555  P. humblet, R. janvier, W. Rauws and M. Rigaux, Synopsis van het Belgisch 
Arbeidsrecht, page 305.
1556  In the case brought before the European Court of human Rights between the 
National Union of Belgian Police and Belgium, the Court ruled that Belgium’s 
general policy of restricting the number of trade unions to be consulted is not 
incompatible with trade union freedom. See European Court of human Rights, 
27 October 1975, National Union of Belgian Police/Belgium. This is, however, a 
different issue than the one that is raised by the ILO institutions. They do not argue 
that Belgium violates ILO standards by selecting trade unions that may have a seat 
in the National Labour Council, but by not making clear which criteria are applied 
in this selection process.
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bargaining takes place at three levels: (national) inter-professional, sectoral 
and company-level. An enterprise level collective labour agreement is 
concluded between one or more representative employees’ organisations and 
one or more employers or representative employers’ organisations. A sectoral 
collective labour agreement is concluded between representative employees’ 
organisations and representative employers’ organisations having seat in 
a joint committee or sub-committee (or sometimes the National Labour 
Council). The inter-professional collective labour agreement is concluded 
within the National Labour Council between the representative employees’ 
organisations and the representative employers’ organisations having seat 
therein. 
In 1789 the first collective labour agreement was concluded. Only a few new 
collective labour agreements followed for a rather long period. The effects of 
the collective labour agreements were also limited. The Court of Cassation 
ruled in 1950 that a collective labour agreement could only bind those parties 
that had explicitly agreed to the agreement, in fact depriving a collective labour 
agreement from direct normative effect. This changed upon the introduction 
of the 1968 BACLA. This act forms the heart of Belgian industrial relations’ 
law.
10.2 The collective labour agreement
A collective labour agreement is an agreement concluded between one or 
more employees’ organisations and one or more employers’ organisations or 
one or more employers, in which individual and collective relations between 
employers and employees in enterprises or in a sector are set out, and rights 
and obligations between the contracting parties are arranged. 
A collective labour agreement should deal with the relations between 
employers and employees on the one hand and on rights and obligations of 
the contracting parties on the other. It has to contain a number of mandatory 
elements, summarised in the BACLA. 
The collective labour agreement must furthermore be concluded between 
representative employers’ organisations or employers on the one hand 
and representative employees’ organisations on the other. Representative 
organisations are: 
1. inter-professional organisations, established for the entire country, which 
are party to both (i) the Central Economic Council and (ii) the National 
Labour Council; employees’ organisations should furthermore have at 
least 50,000 members;
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2. trade unions which are associated to or a part of the above-mentioned 
inter-professional organisations;
3. employers’ organisations that are recognised by the Crown on advice of 
the National Labour Council, which are representative within a specific 
sector;
4. national organisations representing small and medium-sized businesses 
recognised as representative on the basis of the special Act of 6 March 
1964 on the Organisation of the Small-firm Sector.
These demands bring forth that, from an employees’ perspective, only ACLVB, 
ABVV, ACV and the trade unions affiliated with these last two confederations 
are capable of concluding collective labour agreements. From an employers’ 
perspective, only the VBO is a representative inter-professional organisation. 
however, a number of (approximately 60 in 2002) sectoral employers’ 
organisations have also been qualified as representative on the basis of the 
last subparagraphs mentioned above.
In Belgium, it is common to distinguish between obligatory, individual 
normative and collective normative provisions of a collective labour 
agreement. The individual normative obligations relate to the individual 
employment relation between the employer and the employee. Collective 
normative provisions relate to collective employment relations within the 
company. Obligatory provisions outline the mutual rights and obligations of 
the signatory parties. 
Inter-professional collective labour agreements are concluded within the 
National Labour Council by all organisations (that is: representative employers’ 
and employees’ organisations) having seat therein. Sectoral collective labour 
agreements are normally concluded by all representative employers’ and 
employees’ organisations within the joint committees, or, as the case may 
be, within the joint sub-committees. Rarely are sectoral collective labour 
agreements concluded by the National Labour Council. An employer or a 
representative employers’ organisation can conclude enterprise-level collective 
labour agreements with one or more representative employers’ organisations. 
The actual collective bargaining at this level is done by the so-called union 
delegation.
10.3 The consequences of a collective labour agreement
Once a collective labour agreement is concluded, it should be established to 
whom it applies, what its consequences are and how the rights arising from it 
can be enforced.
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10.3.1 The contracting parties
The contracting parties are bound to each other by the (obligatory provisions 
of the) agreement. Most scholars take the view that these provisions are not 
only morally, but also legally binding. As a consequence hereof, the contracting 
parties must, by law, perform under the contract. Each party should act 
reasonable and fair towards its counterparty. Should a contracting party 
breach an obligatory provision the counterparty can dissolve the contract, 
and can sometimes claim damages or specific performance. Enforcing 
obligatory provisions is not without difficulties. A breach cannot lead to the 
obligation on organisations to pay damages, unless this is specifically agreed 
on in the collective labour agreement, which never happens. Other remedies, 
such as seeking specific performance of the party in breach of the collective 
labour agreement can also be problematic as most organisations (including 
all employees’ organisations) do not have legal personality. The contracting 
parties have an implied “peace obligation” and must abide by the principle of 
“good faith”. 
10.3.2 The members of the contracting associations
A collective labour agreement should be applied to the individual employment 
agreement of (i) the employer and employee who are bound by that agreement 
and who also (ii) fall within the scope of application of that agreement. The 
employer who is either a member of an employers’ organisation that is a 
party to the collective labour agreement, or entered into the collective labour 
agreement itself, is bound by that agreement. All employees in the service of 
an employer bound by the collective labour agreement – regardless of their 
possible trade union membership – are automatically bound by that agreement 
as well. The social partners themselves determine the scope of application of 
the collective labour agreement in that agreement. The individual normative 
provision of the collective labour agreement automatically apply to the 
individual employment agreement, modelling the individual employment 
agreement and setting aside possible from the collective labour agreement 
deviating provisions. This modelling can be done in favour but also to the 
detriment of the individual employee. Provisions in the collective labour 
agreement can be of a “standard”, “minimum” or “maximum” nature. As 
a result of the direct normative effect of the collective labour agreement, the 
parties to that employment agreement can claim specific performance and/or 
damages following a possible breach of contract based on their employment 
contract. 
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10.3.3 Members vs. non-members
Merely the position of the employer is relevant when determining whether 
the collective labour agreement applies directly to the relation between the 
employer and the employee. A collective labour agreement does not apply 
to the employment agreement of an employer and employee, should the 
employer not have concluded that collective labour agreement or should he 
not be member of a contracting employers’ organisation. The collective labour 
agreement does apply to such an employment agreement in the situation that 
the employer is bound by the collective labour agreement while the employee 
is not a member of one of the contracting trade unions.
10.3.4 The collectivities
Collective normative provisions create rights and obligations between the 
employer and the collectivity on the one hand and between the collectivity and 
the employees on the other, but not between the employer and the employees. 
Collective normative provisions of a collective labour agreement may be 
enforced by and against the relevant collectivities.
10.3.5 Special means of enforcement
The BACLA is enforced by officers of the judicial police and civil servants 
appointed by the Crown. Furthermore, collective labour agreements may confer 
specific responsibilities to the joint committees or sub-committees, including 
the power to sanction offenders who do not abide by the rules set out in the 
collective labour agreement. Moreover, the union delegation is empowered 
to verify whether the collective labour agreement is applied correctly. The 
contracting organisations may also play a role in the enforcement of collective 
labour agreements. The BACLA allows them to initiate proceedings to defend 
the rights of their members arising from the collective labour agreement. 
10.3.6 Deviation by collective labour agreement
Specific Belgian Acts have introduced the possibility for the employers and 
employees to deviate from specific statutory provisions if  an applicable 
collective labour agreement permits them to do so.
10.3.7 Term and termination
The contracting parties have to establish the collective labour agreement’s 
date of entrance into force and its term. By law, they have to set this out 
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in writing in the collective labour agreement. They may also award retro-
effect to the legal norms of the collective labour agreement. Collective labour 
agreements can be concluded for a fixed period of time, an indefinite period 
of time, or a fixed period of time combined with a renewal clause. The “type” 
of collective labour agreement should clearly follow on from the agreement 
itself. The collective labour agreement concluded for a fixed period of time 
terminates, by operation of law, at the end of that term. Collective labour 
agreements entered into for an indefinite period of time, or a fixed period 
of time combined with a renewal clause, may be terminated by notice from 
each of the contracting parties, unless specifically stipulated otherwise in 
the agreement. The termination has to be given in writing in order to have 
effect and partial termination is not permitted, unless the collective labour 
agreement specifically allows this.
10.3.8 After-effects
The individual normative parts, as well as the collective normative parts that 
also apply individually, of the collective labour agreement remain to have 
effect once the agreement is terminated, unless specifically stated otherwise 
in the collective labour agreement. These after-effects do not apply to purely 
collective normative provisions and to obligatory provisions. 
10.3.9 The role of alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining
Social partners in Belgium are encouraged to use alternative dispute resolution 
in the case of a conflict. Many alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are 
defined in collective labour agreements or in the operational procedures for 
the joint committees and their conciliation office. 
10.4 Extending collective labour agreements
The Crown is entitled to declare an existing collective labour agreement binding 
upon all employers and employees that fall within the scope of application 
of that agreement. The extension process is surrounded by a number of 
important demands and safeguards, which are: (i) demands concerning (the 
provisions of) the collective labour agreements that are to be declared binding, 
(ii) procedural demands and safeguards and (iii) statutory limitations on the 
duration of the binding collective labour agreement. 
The extension process presumes (a) the existence of a valid collective labour 
agreement. An invalid collective labour agreement cannot be declared binding. 
Only (b) agreements concluded within the joint bodies can be extended. 
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Furthermore, (c) the extension only applies to (individual and collective) 
normative provisions of these collective labour agreements.
In addition to these demands, a number of formalities must be observed. 
The Crown may not declare a collective labour agreement binding on its own 
initiative, but is dependent on (d) the request of the joint body in which the 
agreement is concluded, or of one of the organisations having seat there. 
The Minister may (e) oppose such a request and can subsequently refuse to 
pass on the request to the Crown, should he consider the collective labour 
agreement invalid, or contravening the public interests. If  the Crown decides 
to extend the collective labour agreement, it should (f) publish the part of the 
collective labour agreement that is extended in the Belgian Bulletin of Acts 
and decrees. 
Finally, a binding collective labour agreement cannot (g) have retro-effect 
exceeding one year prior to the agreement’s publication and (h) may not 
outlast the duration of the collective labour agreement itself. The Royal 
decree extending a collective labour agreement may (i) wholly or partially be 
discontinued should the agreement not conform anymore to the situation and 
conditions warranting its past extension, or should it violate an instrument 
that is higher in hierarchy, or arrange for mandatory arbitration.
Even if  all of the above demands and safeguards are met and complied 
with, the Crown can refuse the extension application; it has a discretionary 
power whether or not to extend. Scholars take different views on the reach of 
this discretionary power. It is clear that the Crown can refuse to extend the 
collective labour agreement if  it is invalid or contravenes the public interests. 
Some scholars argue, however, that a refusal cannot be based on economic or 
political reasons. What is clear is that the extension is indivisible; the Crown 
cannot extend certain provisions of the collective labour agreement, whilst 
not extending other provisions.
The legal norms of the collective labour agreement that is extended apply to all 
employers and employees falling under the jurisdiction of the joint body and 
within the scope of application of the agreement. The legal position of these 
employers and employees is the same as that of the employers and employees 
who were already bound by the collective labour agreement regardless of the 
extension, with the exception that violation of a binding collective labour 
agreement can be a criminal offence. Also the after-effects of the provisions 
of the binding collective labour agreements are the same as those of “normal” 
collective labour agreements. 
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10.5 The reach of the social partners
As collective labour agreements are essentially private agreements, the 
social partners enjoy contractual freedom, provided that the individual 
and collective normative parts of that agreement concern the individual 
and collective relation between the employer and the employees. The social 
partners may even deviate from specific statutory provisions by a collective 
labour agreement. They should, however, observe the content of other 
instruments regulating employment relations, in particular those instruments 
that are higher in hierarchy, including mandatory provisions of the law and 
collective labour agreements higher in ranking. It should be noted that not 
every variation of  provisions of an instrument higher in ranking is an actual 
deviation: a lower provision may very well vary from a higher provision, as 
long as the lower provision does not deviate from there. In order to establish 
whether the lower provision does in fact deviate from the higher provision, it 
should be established whether that higher provision is a minimum, standard, 
or maximum provision. The lower provision should oblige that higher 
provision’s nature. 
It is obvious that “representativity” plays a crucial role in Belgian collective 
bargaining. The representativity demands are strict. This is especially the 
case for trade unions, as they do not have the “escape” of having unions 
that do not meet the general demands appointed as “representative”, as the 
(sectoral) employers’ organisations do have. Moreover, the demands are also 
easy to manipulate. In any case, there are no legal demands to be entitled 
to participate in the Central Economic Council and the National Labour 
Council; it is at the government’s discretion who to admit and who not. It 
has been said that the government actually used this entitlement to choose 
which trade unions are representative. These representativity demands may be 
challenged. ILO has held the current situation in violation of its Conventions 
on several occasions.
As only representative trade unions may enter into collective labour 
agreements, and there are only three large, strong and independent trade 
unions, “yellow” trade unions concluding collective labour agreements are a 
non-issue in Belgium.
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ChAPTER 12
COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS IN ThE UK
1. Industrial relations in Britain in a nutshell
This chapter focuses on collective labour agreements (often simply referred 
to as collective agreements) in the United Kingdom. To be more precise, the 
laws of England and Wales, and to a certain extent also Scotland (there are 
some minor differences in Scottish law) are scrutinised;1557 Northern Ireland is 
excluded from this research. The countries researched will jointly be referred 
to as Great Britain, or simply Britain. The sequence in this chapter is in 
accordance with the framework set out in section 7 of chapter 8.
In this chapter I will use the term “employee” on many occasions. It should 
be noted that the relevant British statute differentiates between the broader 
group of “workers” and the more select group of “employees”. A worker 
is an individual who normally works or seeks to work (i) under a contract 
of employment (the actual “employee”), or (ii) under any other contract 
whereby he undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for 
another party to the contract who is not a professional client of his, or (iii) 
in employment under or for the purposes of a government department (save 
some exceptions) in so far as such employment does not fall within (i) and (ii) 
above.1558 hereinafter, I will usually simply use the word “employee”, even if  
the relevant acts or other documents refer to “worker”, unless the difference 
between the two terms is of relevance or if  a text is quoted.
1557  See also: E.P. de jong, Een inleiding tot het denken over arbeidsconflictenrecht. 
Een vergelijkende studie van arbeidsconflicten in het recht en het systeem van 
arbeidsverhoudingen in Groot-Brittannië en Nederland [An introduction to thinking 
about the law on labour disputes. A comparative research of labour disputes in the 
law and the system of labour relations in Great Britain and the Netherlands], Kluwer, 
deventer 1975, page 2.
1558  Article 296 of the Trade Union and Labour (Consolidation) Act 1992.
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1.1 The British industrial relation model
A warning is in place for the legal practitioners who wish to understand 
industrial relations in Britain. This warning is accurately described in Harvey 
on Industrial Relations and employment Law: “uncomfortable as it may be 
to lawyers brought up to believe in the impartiality of the law, much of our 
industrial relations law is, at the end of the day, explicable only in party 
political terms”.1559 This warning gives reason to focus in more detail on 
the history of collective bargaining in Britain when compared to the other 
countries described so far. Apart from this warning, other general remarks 
can be made on British industrial relations.
First it should be noted that, on the one hand, the British labour market 
is rather liberal and has relatively little legislative intervention; employment 
rights are to a certain extent centred around the common law of contract. 
On the other hand, there are certain parts of collective labour law that are 
described in detail in specific acts. There does not always seem to be that much 
logic in the topics that are set out in detail in the statute and the topics that are 
not. The aforementioned book Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment 
Law summarises the British industrial relation model quite strikingly when it 
states: “the law of industrial relations is a patchwork quilt, the result of the 
higgledy-piggledy development of the system of industrial relations in this 
country and also of the differing political and economic outlook of successive 
governments”. 1560
Second, it should be noted that although there is legislation in place in the 
field of collective labour law, the collective agreements themselves are rarely 
considered legally binding. This leaves much room for the individual employer 
and employee to arrange wage formation themselves. In fact, as opposed to the 
Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, the British wage formation is primarily 
individual and not collective.1561
Last, while sectoral collective bargaining is important in many continental 
countries, this is not the case in Britain. In Britain, collective bargaining is 
1559  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, Butterworths, UK, August 2006, Issue 181, page NI/14.
1560  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/1.
1561  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of 
collective wage formation, in R. Blanpain (ed.), Collective bargaining and Wages in 
Comparative Perspective, Kluwer, den haag, 2005, page 68.
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mainly focused on enterprise-level bargaining. It is therefore not as centralised 
as it is in many other countries.
1.2 Statistics
Collective bargaining used to play a very important role in British industrial 
relations through the 1950s, 1960s and the first half  of the 1970s. It is 
estimated that during the 1950s and 1960s about 60% of the employees were 
covered by national collective labour agreements. The peak was to be found in 
the mid 1970s, with an estimated coverage of about 76-78%.1562 The coverage 
rate declined to about 54% in 1990,1563 only to drop further to about 34% in 
2005.1564 Trade union density has undergone a similar curb. The trade union 
density in Britain rose from 40.5% in 1965, to 46% in 1970, to reach its top in 
1978 with 53%. It subsequently dropped to 40% in 1990 and to even as low as 
29% in 2000.1565 
These declining rates are probably the result of three major changes over time. 
First, there was the economic pressure on British industrial relations through 
the 1960s and 1970s. Second, there was a relatively “hostile” governmental 
approach towards collective bargaining under the conservative governments 
led by Thatcher (1979 – 1990) and subsequently by Major (1990 – 1997). 
Last, there is a change in social attitude: the British society seems to have less 
of a community sense and has become more individualistic and consumer-
driven.1566
1.3 Trends
In addition to the clear drop in the percentage of employees covered by 
collective bargaining and the decreasing union density, there are a few other 
1562  S. Milner, Charting the coverage of collective pay setting institutions: 1895-1990, 
Centre for Economic Performance, discussion Paper no. 215, table 3.
1563  S. Milner, Charting the coverage of collective pay setting institutions: 1895-1990, 
table 3.
1564  A. Charlwood, The De-Collectivisation of Pay setting in Britain 1990-1998: 
Incidence, Determinants and Impact, Centre for Economic Performance, discussion 
Paper no. 705.
1565  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, page 85.
1566  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, pages 50 and 51.
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trends in British collective bargaining. There is a decline in multi-unionism.1567 
In other words, increasingly there is only one union instead of several unions 
present at the negotiation table. In case multiple trade unions are involved, 
there is an increasing preference for single-table bargaining, which means 
that the trade unions jointly (as opposed to separately) negotiate with the 
employer.1568 But not only are there more single trade unions bargaining, 
the same applies to employers, as multi-employer bargaining has dropped 
considerably as well. It has been said that “multi-employer bargaining has all 
but disappeared from the private sector”.1569 A preference for single-employer 
bargaining, regarding an enterprise or even just a site, is clearly detected.1570 
In other words, there is an important tendency towards decentralisation of 
collective bargaining, from multi-employer to single-employer bargaining. 
however, within the single-employer agreements group, bargaining is getting 
more and more centralised, moving from shop-floor-level agreements to 
plant- or company-level agreements.1571 
1.4 Bargaining levels
In Britain there are three common bargaining levels: workplace (also called 
sub-company), organisation (also called company), and industry (also called 
sectoral) level. The workplace-level agreement is evidently the most specific 
agreement. This agreement can either be a shop-floor agreement (that is below 
the level of an individual plant) or a plant-level agreement (which covers the 
employees in an individual plant).1572 Broader in scope is the organisational 
level collective agreement, which can be concluded where the workplace is part 
of a multi-site organisation. Such an agreement is a collective agreement at 
company, corporate or divisional level, covering all, or groups of, employees 
1567  A. Bryson and d. Wilkinson, Collective bargaining and workplace performance: An 
investigation using the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998, department of 
Trade and Industry, Employment Relations Research Series no. 12, page 3.
1568  A. Bryson and d. Wilkinson, Collective bargaining and workplace performance: An 
investigation using the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998, page 3.
1569  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, page 52.
1570  W. Brown, S. deakin, M. hudson, C. Pratten and P. Ryan, The individualisation of 
employment contracts in Britain, Research Paper for the department of Trade and 
Industry, june 1998, page 73.
1571  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, pages 46 and 49. The report 
can be found on: http://www.unifi.it/polo-universitario-europeo/ricerche/collective_
bargaining.html.
1572  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, page 50.
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in that organisation.1573 Finally, there is the multi-employer level agreement, or 
sectoral or industry level agreement.1574 These agreements can have a national 
reach or only a regional reach, although the latter is becoming increasingly 
rare.1575 Bargaining at a fourth level, the level of the entire economy, is not 
a feature of the British industrial relations system.1576 It should be noted 
that in Britain the focus lies very much on the first two levels. Sectoral level 
agreements have nearly disappeared from the private sector and are under 
pressure in the public sector.1577
2. A brief history of collective bargaining in Britain
At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, Britain 
transformed from an agrarian, rural society into a more industrialised society. 
This industrial revolution, combined with a war against France (1793 – 1815), 
gave impetus to trade organisation. The legislator, however, did not want to 
cope with such a trade organisation and passed the so-called Combination 
Acts in 1799 and 1800.1578 These acts prohibited workers to join together to 
press their employers for shorter hours or more pay. Basically, these acts made 
trade unions illegal. In 1824 the Combination Acts were repealed. This led 
to an outbreak of strikes and consequently the 1825 Combination Act was 
passed. This act narrowly defined the rights of trade unions as meeting to 
bargain over wages and conditions. Although this new act seriously restricted 
trade union action, trade unions rapidly emerged.1579
At the end of the 1840s and the beginning of the 1850s Britain’s industry 
flowered. Trade unions became less radical. Negotiation and arbitration 
increasingly gained acceptance and strikes were cautiously used. In 1868 the 
1573  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, page 49.
1574  A. Bryson and d. Wilkinson, Collective bargaining and workplace performance: An 
investigation using the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998, page 5.
1575  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, page 48.
1576  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, page 46.
1577  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, page 77.
1578  Reference is made to the research “The Union Makes Us Strong: TUC History 
Online”, published on www.unionhistory.info. This information derives from the 
timeline 1815 – 1834, as drafted by M. davis.
1579  The Union Makes Us Strong: TUC History Online, timeline 1815 – 1834, drafted by 
M. davis.
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important Trade Union Congress (“TUC”) was founded, bringing together 
the different trade unions. Trade unions were recognised as legal entities by 
the 1871 Trade Union Act. The 1875 Conspiracy and Protection of Property 
Act decriminalised the work of trade unions. Under these acts, stopping at 
work and peaceful picketing during industrial disputes were allowed. Labour 
disputes became purely civil (as opposed to criminal) matters.1580 The Trade 
dispute Act of 1906 gave trade unions some immunity against new forms of 
tortious civil liability in relation to the organisation of industrial actions.1581 
Between 1888 and 1918 trade unions grew fast. World War I (1914 – 1918) 
divided the labour movements into groups that supported and groups that 
opposed the war. This led to multiple, illegal, collective actions.1582 The period 
between World War I and World War II showed a declined staple industry and 
high unemployment. Strikes were common and Britain faced the big “general 
strike” in May 1926.1583 Although strikes and lockouts were banned during 
World War II (1939 – 1945), collective actions still occurred.1584
The traditional approach of British law on industrial relations was described 
in the 1950s by the scholar Kahn-Freund as “collective laissez-faire”; the 
forces of society had free play, without too much state intervention. Kahn-
Freund argued that this collective laissez-faire contained three elements. 
First, there were neither regulations on wage setting and other employment 
conditions nor on the enforcement of individual contractual rights. Second, 
the legislation that was available on industrial relations solely lifted obstacles 
in common law hindering collective bargaining, rather than stating positive 
rights for collective bargaining. In other words, the role of statute merely 
enabled a voluntary system of industrial relations to operate without undue 
impediment. Last, there was, according to Kahn-Freund, no auxiliary law 
promoting collective bargaining. The result of this abstentionist approach 
was that “the existence, extent and outcome of bargaining relationships 
was entirely a matter for the collective parties to determine”.1585 In practice, 
1580  The Union Makes Us Strong: TUC History Online, timeline 1850 – 1880, drafted by 
M. davis.
1581  G.S. Morris and T.j. Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, Butterworths, 
London, dublin, Edinburgh, second edition, 1993, page 2.
1582  The Union Makes Us Strong: TUC History Online, timeline 1914 – 1918, drafted by 
M. davis.
1583  The Union Makes Us Strong: TUC History Online, timeline 1918 – 1939, drafted by 
M. davis.
1584  The Union Makes Us Strong: TUC History Online, timeline 1939 – 1945, drafted by 
M. davis.
1585  G.S. Morris and T.j. Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, page 2.
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that meant that collective labour agreements generally bound the parties in 
honour, as most social partners rarely intended their agreements to be legally 
enforceable contracts.1586
Others have questioned the aforementioned third point raised by Kahn-
Freund (there was no auxiliary law promoting collective bargaining). They 
refer to the Fair Wages Resolutions, which sought for a “fair wage mechanism” 
extending terms of collective labour agreements to employers and employees 
not covered by them. These mechanisms were particularly well used in the 
1960s and are further described in section 8 below.1587 Notwithstanding this, 
it became apparent in the late 1950s and the 1960s that the “gap in civil 
law” concerning collective bargaining should be filled. In this period the 
trade unions had a lot of power, but remained unaccountable. Closed shop 
agreements, for example, were common, as a consequence whereof individual 
freedom was limited.1588 A Royal Commission on trade unions and employers’ 
associations, chaired by Lord donovan, was assigned the task of researching 
the conduct of industrial relations. In its 1968 report, the Commission did 
see a need to reform the system of industrial relations and even suggested 
a few adaptations, but did not envisage an effective role for the law in this 
respect and mostly favoured a voluntary system of change.1589 The report still 
gave reason for the government in the second half  of the 1960s to propose 
legislation in the field of collective labour law. These proposals, however, 
never made it to acts.1590 The trade unions’ opposition against changes was 
simply too strong.1591 
1586  G.S. Morris and T.j. Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, page 2. It 
should be noted that before the Second World War collective labour agreements 
were regarded as contracts on the assumption that the parties involved were able 
to meet the requirements of contract formation including intention. See j. Gaymer, 
The Employment Relationship, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001, page 254.
1587  For a summary on the position of Kahn-Freund, including references, and a 
summary of counter arguments, including references, reference is made to B. 
Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, page 53.
1588  The 1964 house of Lords’ decision against the closed shop in the case of Rookes v. 
Bernard temporarily outlawed the closed shop agreements. The decision was turned 
void by the 1965 Trade dispute Act.
1589  Royal Commission on trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 1965 – 1968, 
Report presented to Parliament by Command of her Majesty june 1968, London. 
1590  The Union Makes Us Strong: TUC History Online, timeline 1960 – 2000, part 2, 
drafted by N. Fishman.
1591  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/5B.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 12
530
The enactment of the Industrial Relations Act in 1971 radically changed 
this status quo and started an era of a much more interventional approach 
of British governments in industrial relations. This act introduced a legal 
framework for industrial relations. It gave the trade unions specific rights 
towards the employer, including the possibility to force the employer to 
start bargaining in good faith. It also included the presumption of legal 
enforceability of the collective labour agreements, unless stipulated otherwise 
in the agreement. however, most rights were only available for registered trade 
unions. These registered unions were limited in their right to industrial action. 
More “radical” action, including unofficial action and most secondary action, 
was fully denied.1592 The Industrial Relations Act failed. Trade unions, led by 
TUC, refused to register in order to benefit from the act’s protection and 
employers did not invoke the act either. Moreover, social partners stipulated, 
in nearly every collective labour agreement, that the agreement was not legally 
enforceable.1593 
The new Labour government almost fully revoked the Industrial Relations 
Act in 1974. It agreed a policy of temporary wage restraint with TUC, in 
return for a programme of social and legal reforms.1594 In 1974 the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations Act was enacted, amplified by an amendment 
act in 1976. This legislation introduced the presumption that collective 
labour agreements were not legally enforceable, unless stipulated otherwise. 
Trade unions were furthermore granted broad immunities from liability in 
tort and closed-shop arrangements could easily be enforced.1595 In 1975 the 
Employment Protection Act was introduced. This act supported trade unions 
in collective bargaining. It protected individual employees that were member 
of independent trade unions from discrimination by employers and they could 
take time off  for union work. It also arranged for a new legal framework 
for industrial relations, including a recognition procedure and a method to 
extend terms and conditions set out in a collective labour agreement to non-
participant employers. From a statutory point of view, this act signified the 
peak of collective bargaining.1596
1592  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, page 54.
1593  G.S. Morris and T.j. Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, page 3.
1594  G.S. Morris and T.j. Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, page 3.
1595  G.S. Morris and T.j. Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, page 4.
1596  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/2.
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The law on industrial relations changed drastically in the “conservative period” 
of Thatcher and Major (1979 – 1997). Basically, the conservative government 
changed this law in three steps (the so-called “step-by-step” approach).1597 In 
the first stage, the worst excesses of militant trade unionism were repressed. 
The 1980 Employment Act outlawed secondary picketing and limited the 
legality of secondary action. This act furthermore repealed the statutory 
procedures for recognition of trade unions in the bargaining procedure, 
and the possibility to extend collective labour agreements. Closed-shop 
arrangements were limited. The second stage was to weaken the trade unions. 
The Employment Act 1982 further limited the scope of lawful industrial 
action and lifted a part of the immunity of trade unions from liability in tort. 
The rights of employees who were fired due to their participation in collective 
actions were also limited. Stipulations in contracts that required a party to 
use union-only labour were void and industrial action enforcing such practice 
was made illegal.1598 The Trade Union Act 1984 imposed new obligations on 
trade unions. Trade unions were to hold secret ballots on a variety of topics, 
on pain of losing their immunity in liability in tort. 1599 In the last stage the 
conservative government tried to promote individualism over collectivism.1600 
This was done in the three Employment Acts that entered into force in the 
period 1988 – 1990. These acts arranged for further requirements on ballots. 
Trade unions were further limited in their power to discipline members and 
had to give their members the opportunity to inspect union accounting 
records. Trade union members could claim less paid time off  from work for 
union activities. Nearly all secondary action was made unlawful. The range of 
persons for whose actions the trade union could be held liable was extended. 
Employees participating in an unofficial collective action lost protection 
against unfair dismissal. It became unlawful for an employer to refuse to 
employ a person because he refused to join a certain trade union.1601 
1597  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/9.
1598  G.S. Morris and T.j. Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, page 5.
1599  G.S. Morris and T.j. Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, pages 5 and 6.
1600  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/9.
1601  G.S. Morris and T.j. Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, page 6.
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The above conservative government’s changes were consolidated in the 1992 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act (Consolidated) (TULRA). Shortly 
thereafter, the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 
introduced further changes. Based on this act, trade unions must follow 
complex procedures before they can engage in lawful industrial actions. 
Orders against such actions can, under this act, be requested by individuals 
not suffering losses from said actions. Trade union members may only be 
expelled from the trade unions in specific, statutory circumstances, limiting 
the trade union’s autonomy. 
In 1997 a labour government replaced the conservative government. This, 
however, did not mean that the clock was set back to 1970. Most of the 
“conservative legislation” remained in place, including the TULRA, but 
generally the tone was softened a bit.1602 In 1999, the Employment Relations 
Act was introduced. This act, which is still in force today, introduced, amongst 
others, (i) the statutory right to recognition, (ii) the extension of rights of 
employees who are dismissed when on strike to claim unfair dismissal, and 
(iii) the possible extension of rights to “atypical” or “marginal” employees.1603 
The 2004 Employment Relations Act was partly a “tidying-up exercise”, but 
also amended the law regarding trade union recognition.1604  
The above makes clear that in the last decades the law on industrial relation 
changed significantly. Let us now focus on Britain’s positive law on industrial 
relations.
3. The classical rights concerning collective bargaining
In strictly juridical terms, the three classical rights as such do not exist in 
Great Britain.1605 Still, to quite an extent Britain acknowledges – albeit mainly 
1602  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, pages 55 and 57.
1603  N. Randall and I. Smith, A guide to the Employment Relations Act 1999, 
Butterworths, London, Edinburgh, dublin, 1999, pages 2 and 3.
1604  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/11.
1605  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, page 10.
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through statute, most explicitly through international instruments1606 and 
not always in full – (i) the freedom of association, (ii) the right to collective 
bargaining, and, to a certain extent, (iii) the right to strike.
Common law itself  does not recognise the freedom of association.1607 A fairly 
recent reminder hereof was the 1994 high Court case Boddington & another 
v Lawton & another.1608 In this case the Court reviewed the status of an 
association (the Prisoner Officers’ Association), without the provisions of the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974. This association assisted in an 
industrial action. The Court ruled that it was an organisation that restricted 
trade as it interfered in the operation of the free market. The association’s 
restraint of trade was held unreasonable, as the methods used by it to achieve its 
purposes involved inducing members to breach their contract of employment. 
As a result of this the rules of the association were held unenforceable. 
The above is the situation without relevant legislation. Legislation, however, 
protects the freedom of association in two ways. First, there is the freedom, as 
against the state, to form a trade union to protect one’s interests. This freedom 
is guaranteed by the 1998 human Rights Act. Article 1 of this act incorporates 
article 11 of the European Convention on human Rights (the Convention), 
which protects the freedom of association.1609 Everyone in Britain is therefore 
free to form and join trade unions, without state interference.1610 Second, there 
is the freedom of an individual employee, as against his employer, to join a 
trade union.1611 This freedom is guaranteed by a set of provisions contained 
in TULRA. The following articles are of relevance:
1606  And here lies an important weakness. There is a dualistic regime in Great Britain 
when it comes to national and international law. International law does not have 
effect in Great Britain, unless it is actively implemented in the national system by 
statute. See E.P. de jong, Een inleiding tot het denken over arbeidsconflictenrecht. 
Een vergelijkende studie van arbeidsconflicten in het recht en het systeem van 
arbeidsverhoudingen in Groot-Brittannië en Nederland, page 39. 
1607  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, London, december 2000, page 6.
1608  high Court, january and February 1994, Industrial Cases Reports (“ICR”) 1994, 
pages 478 ff, Boddington & another v Lawton & another.
1609  Reference is made to chapter 8, section 2.1 of this thesis.
1610  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division M Trade 
Unions, page M/3.
1611  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/39.
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(i)  article 137 TULRA guarantees that a prospective employee has a free-
dom to access to employment without discrimination on union mem-
bership or non-membership;
(ii) article 145A TULRA stipulates that an employee must not be offered in-
ducements relating to union grounds as defined in this article (such as in-
ducing him to become a trade union member or to cease membership);
(iii) article 145B TULRA states that an employee must not be offered indu-
cements relating to collective bargaining (such as making him an offer 
with the result that his terms of employment will not be determined by a 
collective labour agreement);
(iv) article 146 TULRA stipulates that an employee may not be subject to 
any detriment on union grounds as defined in this article (such as deter-
ring him to become a member of an independent trade union);
(v) article 152 TULRA stipulates that an employee may claim unfair dismis-
sal if  he is dismissed on union grounds as defined in this article (such as 
becoming a trade union member or participating in union activities at an 
appropriate time).
The entitlement to bargain derives from TULRA. This act gives a statutory 
framework for the conclusion of collective labour agreements. A right to 
collective bargaining, in the sense that one party can oblige the other party 
to enter into such bargaining, is not accepted in Britain. however, in specific 
circumstances, or upon specific topics, there may be a duty on the employer 
to inform and consult trade unions. Employers are also required to provide 
information to trade unions that are both independent and recognised by 
the employer for the purposes of collective bargaining.1612 Furthermore, the 
mandatory recognition process, as set out in detail in section 5 below, can 
force the employer to agree on procedural aspects of collective bargaining.
In Britain, there is a freedom to collective action vis-à-vis the state. That is, 
industrial actions do not normally expose the participants to criminal sanctions. 
This is mainly the consequence of the aforementioned 1875 Conspiracy and 
Protection of Property Act.1613 A more complex situation is whether and to 
which extent an employee is free towards his employer to engage in industrial 
action. From a common law point of view, participants in an industrial 
action will typically be held in breach of their contracts of employment and 
1612  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/375.
1613  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NII 
Industrial Actions, page NII/11.
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organisers will typically commit several torts.1614 To summarise, there seems 
no positive right to strike under common law.1615 however, statute – more 
specifically TULRA – gives immunity from legal liabilities in many cases. 
In brief, TULRA protects the organisers of industrial action from liability, 
provided that the organisers act “in contemplation or furtherance of a trade 
dispute”. The participants are also given some statutory protection. They 
have a limited right to claim unfair dismissal should they be dismissed for or 
during industrial action.1616 Or, to phrase Barnard in this respect:1617
(…) in the UK the right to strike does not exist as such, but, subject to certain 
stringent conditions, trade unions are protected by immunities established by law 
when their members take certain forms of industrial action. These same immunities 
now do provide some protection for individual employees but they are likely to 
breach their individual employment contracts by taking any form of industrial 
action and can, in certain circumstances, be dismissed as a result.
Finally, it should be noted that Britain obliged itself  to protect the above-
mentioned rights in international perspective. After all, article 11 of the 
Convention is, as mentioned above, incorporated into the 1998 human 
Rights Act. Article 11 of the Convention clearly protects the freedom of 
association, and to a certain extent the right to collective bargaining and the 
right to strike.1618 Moreover, Britain ratified the ILO Convention C98 (on the 
right to Organise and Collective Bargaining), as well as the European Social 
Charter and the United Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. These instruments protect one or more of the classical 
rights as discussed here. These instruments – in particular the recognition of 
the Convention – may have changed the common law doctrine. It has been 
argued, for example, that the earlier common law doctrine on the (lack of) 
freedom of association has lost force and that nowadays trade unions are 
considered legal organisations, regardless of the TULRA.1619
1614  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NII 
Industrial Actions, page NII/8.
1615  Incomes data Services Ltd., Industrial Action, London, August 1999, page 2.
1616  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NII 
Industrial Actions, page NII/8.
1617  C. Barnard, EC Employment law, page 773.
1618  Reference is made to chapter 8 of this thesis. 
1619  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 8. B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial 
Relations and employment Law, division M Trade Unions, pages M/21B ff. 
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4. Collective labour agreements
Let us now turn to the definition of a collective labour agreement in Britain, 
and to the different types of collective labour agreements and different types 
of provisions therein.
4.1 What constitutes a collective labour agreement?
Article 178 TULRA defines a collective agreement, within that act’s meaning, 
as follows:
(…) “collective agreement” means any agreement or arrangement made by or on 
behalf  of one or more trade unions and one or more employers or employers’ 
associations and relating to (…) 
(a) terms and conditions of employment, or the physical conditions in which any 
workers are required to work;
(b) engagement or non-engagement, or termination or suspension of employment 
or the duties of employment, of one or more workers;
(c) allocation of work or the duties of employment between workers or groups of 
workers;
(d) matters of discipline;
(e) a worker’s membership or non-membership of a trade union;
(f) facilities for officials of trade unions; and
(g) machinery for negotiation or consultation, and other procedures, relating to 
any of the above matters, including the recognition by employers or employers’ 
associations of the right of a trade union to represent workers in such 
negotiation or consultation or in the carrying out of such procedures.
As in the countries previously discussed, the following three elements are of 
importance:
First, there should be an agreement or arrangement. It is important to note 
that the term “agreement” as referred to in article 178.1 TULRA is not 
necessarily synonymous with the term “contract”.1620 After all, a contract is 
an agreement between parties that is intended to be legally binding, while, 
as will be discussed in section 7.1 below, this is normally not the case with 
a collective labour agreement. The agreement, as referred to in article 178.1 
TULRA, can either be in writing or agreed on orally. An exchange of 
letters may, for example, be considered a collective labour agreement. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal ruled in that connection that, at least, there 
1620  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 239.
COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS IN THE UK
537
must be “a mutual intention on the part of the employers and employees’ 
bargaining agents to enter into a collective bargain, the effect of which will be 
to modify the contracts of employment between employer and employee”.1621 
It should be noted though that, in order for a collective agreement to be legally 
enforceable (which is rarely the case), it must, amongst other things, be agreed 
on in writing (article 179 TULRA).
Second, the agreement must be concluded between specific parties. The 
contracting parties should, on the one hand, be one or more employers or 
employers’ associations and on the other, one or more trade unions. These 
associations must meet specific demands. For a further discussion of the 
parties involved reference is made to section 5 hereof.
Third, collective labour agreements should deal with the topics set out above, 
hereinafter referred to as “bargaining topics”. The bargaining topics relate 
both to the relation between employers and employees as well as to the rights 
and obligations of the contracting parties. 
There are no “registration” demands in Britain that should be satisfied in order 
for an agreement to be considered a collective labour agreement. however, 
possible terms of a collective agreement restricting employees’ potential to 
strike are not part of the contract between the employee and his employer 
unless, among other things, that collective agreement is reasonably accessible 
at the employee’s place of work and is available for him to consult during 
working hours. In such a case there is an obligation to “make available” a 
collective agreement (article 180.2 TULRA) in order for the aforementioned 
terms to have force. Reference is made to section 7.2 below.
4.2 Different types of collective labour agreements and of provisions
In Great Britain, it is common to distinguish procedural from substantive 
terms in collective labour agreements, or even entire substantive or procedural 
agreements.1622 Procedural agreements concern both the relationship between 
the trade union and the employer, (such as the definition of the bargaining 
unit and the status of the unions and their representatives) and the treatment 
of individual employees (disciplinary procedures). Substantive agreements 
1621  Employment Appeal Tribunal, February 1997, ICR 1997 pages 730 ff, Burke v 
Royal Liverpool University Hospital NHS Trust.
1622  E.P. de jong, Een inleiding tot het denken over arbeidsconflictenrecht. Een 
vergelijkende studie van arbeidsconflicten in het recht en het systeem van 
arbeidsverhoudingen in Groot-Brittannië en Nederland, page 11.
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relate to pay and other employment conditions, such as working hours and 
holidays.1623
When it comes to provisions in a collective labour agreement, British law 
distinguishes between terms that are of an individual nature and those that 
are of a collective nature.1624 The reason for this distinction is that only 
the terms of an individual nature can be incorporated into an individual 
employment contract. These terms concern the relationship between the 
employer and the individual employees.1625 Although the relevant authorities 
are not absolutely consistent in their division between individual and collective 
terms,1626 the terms of an individual nature are quite comparable to terms 
that are described in other countries as normative provisions. These terms 
include pay, maternity or sick leave, holiday entitlement and weekly hours.1627 
Collective terms are intended to govern the relationship between the union 
and the employer.1628 These are comparable to terms that are described in 
other countries as obligatory provisions. Some terms in a British collective 
labour agreement could be compared with collective normative provisions. 
This is, for example, the case if  an employers’ association agrees with the 
union that union officials are granted facilities at the individual employer’s 
premises. however, provisions that are considered important collective 
normative provisions in, for example, the Netherlands and Belgium, being 
provisions on funds, are in principle not part of a collective labour agreement 
in Britain. In the case Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v International 
Transport Workers’ Federation, for example, the house of Lords maintained 
that an agreement between the employer and the union on which basis the 
employer was obliged to pay an amount of money to a union’s welfare fund 
was not to be considered a collective labour agreement.1629 This agreement did 
not, after all, relate to one of the statutory bargaining topics. To summarise, 
the only relevant distinction in English law is between terms in a collective 
labour agreement that are of an individual nature and those that are of a 
collective nature.
1623  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, page 12.
1624  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/455.
1625  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 244.
1626  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/456.
1627  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 244.
1628  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 244.
1629  house of Lords, February – April 1982, ICR 1982 pages 262 ff, Universe Tankships 
Inc. of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation.
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5. The players in the collective bargaining process
There are several parties involved in the British collective bargaining system. 
At least the following are of relevance: (i) the government, (ii) trade union 
confederations and trade unions, (iii) employers’ confederations and separate 
employers’ associations, and (iv) individual employers. In Great Britain, it is 
especially important to distinguish the different types of trade unions.
5.1 The government
The government’s role in the bargaining process is only limited. Its main 
involvement is to enact legislation on collective labour agreements and to 
provide an institutional structure that enables bargaining. That is not to say 
that politics over years were not important for collective bargaining, as they 
were. As said in section 1, much of the British law of industrial relations is 
really only explicable in party political terms.
5.2 Trade union confederations and trade unions
British law is detailed when it comes to categorising trade unions. The 
rights trade unions enjoy depend on the category they are in. Only specific 
organisations can qualify as trade unions. These organisations can apply for 
listing. Trade unions and their right to be listed are discussed in section 5.2.1 
below. Listed trade unions that are also independent may ask for a so-called 
certificate of independence. Which union can obtain such a certificate and 
what rights independent trade unions enjoy are discussed in section 5.2.2. 
Independent trade unions can, by law, if  specific requirements are satisfied, 
be recognised vis-à-vis an employer for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
The recognition procedure and the accompanying rights are set out in section 
5.2.3 below.
5.2.1 Trade unions and listing
“Trade union” as referred to in the TULRA means pursuant to article 1: 
an organisation (whether temporary or permanent) – 
(a) which consists wholly or mainly of workers of one or more descriptions 
and whose principal purposes include the regulation of relations between 
workers of that description or those descriptions and employers or employers’ 
associations; or
(b) which consists wholly or mainly of – 
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 (i)  constituent or affiliated organisations which fulfil the conditions in 
paragraph (a) (or themselves consist wholly or mainly of constituent or 
affiliated organisations which fulfil those conditions), or
  (ii) representatives of such constituent or affiliated organisations,
and whose principal purposes include the regulation of relations between workers 
and employers or between workers and employers’ associations, or the regulation 
of relations between its constituent or affiliated organisations.
This definition makes clear that both trade unions (under a) and trade 
union confederations (under b) are considered “trade unions” as referred to 
in TULRA. For that reason, from now on merely the term “trade union” 
will be used, which is deemed to include both trade unions and trade union 
confederations. This definition further makes it clear that, in order to be 
regarded a trade union, 3 requirements should be satisfied: (i) there should 
be an organisation, (ii) consisting wholly or mainly of workers which (iii) has 
as its principal purpose the regulation of relations between employers and 
employees.
In order to be qualified as an organisation, there should be at least some sort 
of form or structure. Elements that can give form or structure are a name, a 
constitution,1630 rules, meetings, keeping minutes, offices, property or funds 
etc.1631 The organisation can be temporary or permanent. This means that ad 
hoc committees could also qualify as trade unions.
The organisations should wholly or mainly consist of workers. The term 
“workers” includes employees (reference is made to section 1 above). The 
word “mainly” means that the organisation may also have a number of non-
workers – such as retired people or honorary members – as a member without 
undermining the union’s status.1632
Finally, the organisation should have, as one of its principal purposes, the 
regulation of relations between employees and employers. This requires on 
the one hand more than the simple orchestration of industrial action.1633 
On the other hand, it has a wider meaning than “collective bargaining”. 
1630  Although a written or formal constitution is not required. See Incomes data 
Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 2.
1631  See for example: National Industrial Relations Board, Industrial Relations Law 
Reports (IRLR) 1973 pages 216 ff, Frost v Clarke & Smith Manufacturing Co Ltd & 
Others.
1632  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 4.
1633  National Industrial Relations Board, july 1972, ICR 1972 pages 230 ff, Midland 
Cold Storage Ltd v Turner and others.
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Consequently, an organisation can be a trade union even when it does not 
negotiate.1634 The size of an organisation and its effectiveness do not matter 
– even a small union without much power can be considered a trade union 
if  it meets the aforementioned three demands.1635 It should be noted that the 
regulation of industrial relations must be one of the principal purposes. This 
implies that the union also may have other purposes.
A trade union is typically an unincorporated association.1636 Under TULRA, 
the trade union has a quasi-corporate status: the union is not a judicial person 
– and may not be treated as if  it were a body corporate1637 - but is still invested 
with some of the most relevant attributes of legal personality. Article 10.1 
TULRA arranges that a trade union (i) is capable of making contracts, (ii) 
is capable of suing and being sued in its own name, and (iii) can be subject 
to proceedings for an offence alleged to have been committed by it or on its 
behalf. The property of a trade union is vested in trustees in trust for the union 
(article 12.1 TULRA). A judgement, order or award made in proceedings 
brought against a trade union is enforceable against this property held in trust 
for it to the same extent and in the same manner as if  it were a body corporate 
(article 12.2 TULRA).
A trade union can be listed. The so-called Certification Officer (CO) maintains 
a list of unions, a list which is open for public inspection free of charge 
(article 2 TULRA). Every union can be put on the list upon payment of a fee, 
provided of course that it qualifies as being a trade union, which is verified by 
the CO (article 3 TULRA). The fact that the name of a union is on this list 
constitutes evidence that an organisation is in fact a trade union (article 2.4 
TULRA). There are several advantages of being a listed trade union,1638 the 
most important being that only a listed trade union may apply to the CO for 
a certificate that it is independent (article 6.1 TULRA). Independent trade 
unions are discussed hereafter.  
1634  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division M Trade 
Unions, page M/5B.
1635  Courts of Appeal, IRLR 1986 pages 497 ff, British Association of Advisers and 
Lecturers in Physical Education v National Union of Teachers and others. Note that 
there are about 40 trade unions with a membership of fewer than 100. B. Perrins, 
Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division M Trade Unions, 
page M/1. 
1636  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division M Trade 
Unions, page M/7B.
1637  Article 10.2 TULRA.
1638  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 12.
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There are about 200 trade unions in existence in the United Kingdom today. 
About 60% of these trade unions have a membership fewer than 2,500. There 
are 15 large unions, each with a membership exceeding 100,000.1639 Pluralism 
is an inherent feature of trade union structure in Great Britain. Some trade 
unions have a specific ideological background. Other trade unions are merely 
active within one sector and some are focused on blue- or white-collar 
employees. Cross-sectoral trade unions are also in place. A change that can 
clearly be seen is that many trade unions have restructured and merged in 
recent years, abandoning whatever organisation coherence they may once 
have had.1640 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all, or even most, trade unions. 
For that reason I solely mention the most important trade union confederation, 
the already mentioned TUC, as this confederation represents by far the most 
employees. It stands at 66 unions representing over six and a half  million 
people in total.1641 Still, its actual powers with regard to bargaining are weak. 
TUC has never been mandated by its members to bargain collectively; its 
role is mostly supportive.1642 Moreover, TUC cannot call strikes, has no strike 
funds and cannot influence its affiliates in their formulation of collective 
bargaining strategies.1643 
5.2.2 Independent trade unions
Many rights awarded to trade unions are made subject to unions being 
independent. The British legislator apparently has taken the view that 
yellow unions (i.e. unions that are not independent, that is unions to which 
management may belong or to whom they may provide funds) cannot 
sufficiently defend the interests of their members because of management’s 
1639  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division M Trade 
Unions, page M/1.
1640  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, page 28.
1641  Reference is made to the website of TUC: www.tuc.org.uk.
1642  For an overview of the roles which TUC performs for its affiliates reference is made 
to: P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, page 23.
1643  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, page 58.
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control.1644 Advantages independent trade unions (as opposed to trade unions 
that are not independent) enjoy include the following:1645
•	 the	employee	 is	protected	 in	his	right	 to	 join	and	participate	 in	 its	af-
fairs;
•	 it	may	negotiate	 an	unfair	dismissal	 procedure	 to	 take	 the	place	of	 a	
statutory scheme;
•	 it	may	bargain	away	the	right	to	strike;
•	 it	may	derogate	from	the	rights	in	Working	Time	Regulations	and	Ma-
ternity and Parental Leave Regulations;
•	 it	may	apply	for	statutory	recognition	(reference	is	made	to	section	5.2.3	
below).
Moreover, most rights that recognised trade unions enjoy for the purposes 
of collective bargaining – which will be set out in section 5.2.3 – can only be 
enjoyed by independent trade unions.1646  
That leaves us to the question of which trade unions are considered independent. 
Pursuant to article 5 TULRA, an “independent trade union” means a trade 
union which (i) is not under the domination or control of an employer, and (ii) 
is not liable to interference by an employer tending towards such control. The 
trade union must satisfy both requirements. When assessing whether or not 
the trade union involved is under domination or control of the employer, one 
should look beyond the form of the union’s constitution and must consider 
whether, in reality, this trade union is independent. An organisation that was 
formerly controlled by the employer and had no negotiation rights since its 
formation in 1971 until just before its application for independence in 1976, 
and who adopted an own constitution and obtained negotiation rights in the 
beginning of 1976, had not substantially moved away from the employer’s 
domination. It therefore did not satisfy even the first part of the statutory 
definition of independence.1647 When assessing whether the trade union is 
liable to interference by an employer tending towards control, one should 
verify whether the trade union is vulnerable to such interference, rather than 
whether there is a likelihood of  such interference. The Court of Appeal stated 
that when a union is overly dependent of the employer for facilities – such 
1644  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 12.
1645  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division M Trade 
Unions, pages M/35A and M/35B.
1646  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 13.
1647  Employment Appeal Tribunal, November and december 1976, ICR 1977 pages 
224 ff, Blue Circle Staff Association v Certification Officer.
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as free office accommodation, stationary, telephone, photocopying, internal 
mail etc. – it is liable to interference by that employer, even if  it is satisfied 
that the union is, at the moment of the ruling and in the past, not under the 
dominance or control of the management.1648
The most common manner for a trade union to show that it is independent 
is to present a so-called certificate of independence.1649 having this certificate 
is conclusive evidence that the trade union concerned is independent, while a 
refusal, withdrawal or cancellation of that certificate is conclusive evidence 
that a trade union is not independent (article 8.1 TULRA). 
A listed trade union may apply for a certificate of independence to the CO. 
The CO will subsequently establish whether this trade union is independent 
or not. he shall, in that respect, make all enquiries as he sees fit and shall take 
into account any relevant information submitted to him by any person. The 
CO shall either issue a certificate of independence to an independent trade 
union, or he shall give a reasoned decision why the trade union involved is 
not independent (article 6.6 TULRA). All decisions are entered in a public 
record.
As said, the CO will verify whether the applicant falls within the aforementioned 
statutory definition of independence. The CO has set criteria that it uses in 
applying the statutory definition to individual cases. These criteria are set out 
in the booklet “Guidance for trade unions wishing to apply for a certificate 
of independence”.1650 The CO has always applied this booklet and the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal has approved the criteria set therein.1651 The 
booklet’s criteria are:1652
•	 History	-	The	circumstance	that	in	the	recent	past	the	union	began	with	
the support or on the initiative of the employer is an argument for the 
CO against the grant of a certificate. 
1648  Court of Appeal, October 1978, ICR 1979 pages 235 ff, Squibb United Kingdom 
Staff Association v Certification Officer.
1649  Although a certificate of independence is not an absolute prerequisite for a trade 
union to qualify as “independent”. Reference is made to B. Perrins, Harvey on 
Industrial Relations and employment Law, division Q Statutes, page Q/486. 
1650  This booklet can be found on the website of the CO: www.certoffice.org. I used the 
revised April 2005 version of the booklet.
1651  Employment Appeal Tribunal, November and december 1976, ICR 1977 pages 
224 ff, Blue Circle Staff Association v Certification Officer.
1652  Paragraphs 18 – 25 of the CO’s guidance booklet.
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•	 Membership	Base	-	A	union	whose	membership	is	confined	to	the	em-
ployees of one employer is according to the CO more vulnerable to em-
ployer interference than a broadly based union. 
•	 Organisation	 and	 Structure	 -	 The	CO	 examines	 the	 organisation	 and	
structure of the organisation, which should allow its members to fully 
participate in the decision-making process while it excludes employer 
involvement in its internal affairs. 
•	 Finance	-	The	CO	regards	a	union	with	weak	finances	and	inadequate	
reserves as more vulnerable to employer interference than one with a 
strong financial position.  
•	 Employer-provided	Facilities	-	The	union	should	not	be	too	dependent	
on facilities – such as premises, time off  and office space – provided by 
the employer. The CO sets the costs of these facilities off  against the 
financial state of the union. But not only the costs are relevant, but also 
the union’s ease to cope on its own if  the facilities were withdrawn. The 
greater the union’s reliance on employer’s facilities the more vulnerable 
it is to employer interference. 
•	 Negotiating Record - Although a weak negotiating record does not itself  
indicate dependence, a strong record may outweigh other factors unfa-
vourable to the union’s independence assessment. A robust attitude in 
negotiation, for example, suggests independence.
The CO holds no single factor set out above as decisive by itself. Instead, it 
looks at “the whole nature and circumstances of the union” before it makes 
a decision about whether or not this union satisfies the statutory definition 
of independence.1653 The CO may periodically review the trade union’s 
independence and may withdraw the certificate of independence if  he is in the 
opinion that the union is no longer independent (article 7.1 TULRA). The 
union may appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal from points of law 
against a decision of the CO refusing to give a certificate of independence or 
withdrawing such certificate (article 8 TULRA). 
5.2.3  Recognised trade unions
Regulation of the terms and conditions of employment within the British 
system of industrial relations depends primarily upon the recognition of 
1653  Paragraph 26 of the CO’s guidance booklet.
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trade unions by the employer for bargaining purposes.1654 Or, to put it in the 
words of Lord denning M.R.: “anyone concerned with industry knows the 
great importance which both sides of industry attach to the recognition of a 
trade union”.1655  
Recognition offers a number of important advantages for the trade union. The 
recognised trade union (i) can force the employer into a so-called “method of 
collective bargaining” (in case of statutory recognition) and (ii) is entitled 
to disclosure of information that can be helpful to concluding a collective 
labour agreement. These rights will be discussed in section 6 below. Other 
advantages a recognised trade union enjoys include the rights for its officials, 
learning representatives and other members to time off  work,1656 the right to 
consultation on redundancies,1657 and rights to information and consultation 
on specific topics.1658
Pursuant to article 178.3 TULRA, “recognition” means “the recognition of 
the union by an employer, or two or more associated employers, to any extent, 
for the purpose of collective bargaining”. This definition refers to “collective 
bargaining”. Pursuant to article 178.1 TULRA, “collective bargaining” means 
negotiations relating to or connected with one or more of the bargaining 
topics dealt with in a collective labour agreement (and set out in section 4.1 
above). A more informal way to describe recognition is the process by which 
an employer accepts a trade union as entitled to act on behalf  of a particular 
group (or groups) of workers to undertake collective bargaining.1659 It should 
be noted that recognition does not necessarily regard just one trade union, 
but can just as well apply to more trade unions.
A trade union needs only to be recognised in one of the bargaining topics 
for it to be recognised within the meaning of the TULRA.1660 Moreover, an 
employer could recognise the trade union only with respect to a specific group 
1654  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, page 49.
1655  Court of Appeal, july 1978, ICR 1978 pages 84 ff, National Union of Gold, Silver & 
Allied Trades v. Albury Brothers Ltd.
1656  Articles 168, 168a and 170 TULRA.
1657  Article 188 TULRA.
1658  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, pages NI/166 and NI/167.
1659  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 89.
1660  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 184.
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(or groups) of employees, the so-called “bargaining-unit”.1661 Recognition can 
either be voluntary or statutory.
5.2.3.1 Voluntary recognition
Should the employer be willing to negotiate with a trade union on one or 
more of the bargaining topics, with a view to actually reach an agreement, the 
employer voluntarily recognises such a union. A mere willingness to consult 
or discuss with the union does not suffice.1662 The employer’s willingness 
to negotiate may be express – for example a written agreement conferring 
negotiating rights – or implied. The Court of Appeal has set out general 
principles that should be taken into account when deciding whether or not a 
trade union has been recognised.1663 It ruled that recognition of a trade union 
for the purposes of collective bargaining is a serious step. Therefore, it should 
not be held as established unless there is “clear and unequivocal evidence of 
either an express agreement, or conduct from which recognition should be 
inferred”. The Court of Appeal noted that recognition for the purposes of 
collective bargaining includes a positive decision to bargain on one or more 
bargaining topics. This means that “partial recognition” is possible. Finally, 
it derives from the ruling that recognition requires mutuality: the employer 
should acknowledge the role of the union to which the latter assents.1664
It goes without saying that express recognition is easier to establish than 
implied recognition. The Employment Tribunal ruled that recognition implies 
agreement, which involves consent. It continued that where there is neither 
a written recognition agreement nor an express oral agreement, it suffices 
that the established facts are clear and unequivocal and give rise to the clear 
inference that the employers have recognised the union. It then held that this 
normally involves “conduct over a period of time and the longer that state of 
facts has existed the easier it is to reach a conclusion that the employers have 
recognised the union”.1665 Mere union rights to represent employees under 
1661  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 94.
1662  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 184.
1663  Court of Appeal, july 1978, ICR 1978 pages 84 ff, National Union of Gold, Silver & 
Allied Trades v Albury Brothers Ltd.
1664  See also: Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 185.
1665  Employment Appeal Tribunal, IRLR 1977 pages 147 ff, National Union of Tailors 
and Garment Workers v Charles Ingram & Co Ltd.
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grievance or disciplinary procedures do not amount to voluntary implied 
recognition.1666
5.2.3.2 Statutory recognition
Statutory recognition is a formal and complex manner for trade unions to 
force the employer into recognition, should the employer not voluntarily do 
so. The procedure is described in depth in schedule A1 to the TULRA. In 
(very) broad terms, this procedure works as follows:
An independent trade union may request the employer to be recognised for 
a specific bargaining unit.1667 This employer should have a minimum size of 
21 employees.1668 Should the employer and trade union be unable to reach 
an agreement on this request, the trade union may apply to the Central 
Arbitration Committee (CAC). In such a case, it requests the CAC to decide 
on (i) whether the proposed bargaining unit is appropriate and (ii) whether 
the union has the support of a majority of the employees constituting the 
appropriate bargaining unit.1669 Upon acceptation of this application, the 
CAC decides – after it has given both parties a limited time to still reach 
an agreement themselves1670 – whether the proposed bargaining unit is 
appropriate. If  not, it decides which bargaining unit is appropriate.1671 
If  a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit is a member of the union 
applying for recognition, the CAC must declare the trade union involved as 
recognised as to conduct collective bargaining on behalf  of the employees 
constituting the bargaining unit.1672 This is different if  any of three specific 
conditions apply. In that case there should be a secret ballot held in which 
1666  See for example: Employment Appeal Tribunal, April and May 1981, ICR 1981 
pages 644 ff, Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers v Sketchley Ltd.
1667  Articles 4 and 6 of Schedule A1.
1668  Article 7 of Schedule A1.
1669  Articles 11 and 12 of Schedule A1.
1670  Schedule A1 also deals with semi-voluntary recognition, which briefly put 
means that the parties can reach an agreement on recognition themselves, during 
the statutory recognition process. There are specific rules on semi-voluntary 
recognition, mainly set out in articles 52 – 63 of Schedule A1. I will not discuss 
semi-voluntary recognition.
1671 In this respect, the CAC takes into account different circumstances, including (a) 
the need for the unit to be compatible with effective management, (b) the views 
of the employer and the union, and (c) existing national and local bargaining 
arrangements. For this procedure reference is made to articles 18 – 19B of Schedule 
A1. 
1672  Article 22.2 of Schedule A1.
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the employees constituting the bargaining unit are asked whether they want 
the trade union to conduct collective bargaining on their behalf.1673 These 
conditions are: (i) the CAC rules that a ballot should be held in the interests 
of good industrial relations, (ii) a significant number of trade union members 
within the bargaining unit informs the CAC that they do not want the union 
to conduct collective bargaining on their behalf, and (iii) “membership 
evidence”1674 is produced which brings doubts whether a significant number 
of trade union members within the bargaining unit want the union to conduct 
collective bargaining on their behalf  – even if  they do not openly admit it. 
A secret ballot should also be held if  the CAC concludes that the number 
of workers in the bargaining unit who are union members fall short of a 
majority.1675
Should the union be supported by (i) a majority of the employees that voted 
in the ballot and (ii) at least 40% of the employees constituting the bargaining 
unit, the CAC must issue a declaration that the trade union involved is 
recognised as to conduct collective bargaining on behalf  of the employees 
constituting the bargaining unit.1676 If  the result is otherwise, the CAC must 
state that the union is not entitled to be recognised.
It should be noted that collective bargaining for the purposes of Schedule 
A1 is defined narrower than the definition of collective bargaining in the 
TULRA. For the purposes of Schedule A1, collective bargaining relates only 
to negotiations concerning pay, hours and holidays, unless the parties involved 
choose to define collective bargaining differently.1677 
5.2.3.3 Derecognition
Employers can withdraw from a voluntary (non-statutory) recognition 
agreement at any time, provided that the agreement is not legally binding.1678 
By withdrawing voluntary recognition, the employer escapes from future 
1673  Article 22.3 of Schedule A1.
1674  Membership evidence is (a) evidence about the circumstances in which union 
members became member and (b) evidence about the length of time for which 
union members have been members, in case where the CAC is satisfied that such 
evidence should be taken into account. See article 22.5 of Schedule A1.
1675  Article 23 of Schedule A1.
1676  Article 29.2 of Schedule A1.
1677  Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of Schedule A1.
1678  See for example: house of Lords October, November 1994 and March 1995, ICR 
1995 pages 406 ff, Associated Newspapers Ltd. v Wilson; Associated British Ports v 
Palmer and others. See also Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 188.
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statutory obligations towards a recognised trade union. The employer, 
however, does not escape from such current or past obligations.1679
derecognition of statutory recognition is more complex. Basically, there are 
three statutory derecognition procedures, all set out in detail in Schedule A1. 
First, there is the procedure in which the employer wishes the trade union 
recognition to end, as the number of employees it employs has fallen under 
21.1680 Second, there is the procedure in which either the employer or the 
employees wish the recognition to end on the grounds that there now is only 
a minority support for the trade union within the bargaining unit.1681 This 
procedure is a mirror-image of the recognition procedure, and normally leads 
to a secret ballot. Should the employer or employees asking for derecognition 
of the trade union be supported by (i) a majority of the employees that 
voted in the ballot and (ii) at least 40% of the employees constituting the 
bargaining unit, the trade union will be derecognised. Finally, the employer 
can start a procedure requesting derecognition of the trade union that was 
“automatically” recognised – that is, recognised without a ballot, since a 
majority of the employees of the relevant bargaining unit was a member of 
the trade union – on the ground that fewer than half  of the employees in 
the bargaining unit now belong to the union and there is now only minority 
support for that union.1682 Basically, if  it is established that indeed fewer than 
half  of the employees in the bargaining unit is a trade union member, the trade 
union will be derecognised should there also be a minority support for the 
trade union. In order to establish the latter, a similar derecognition procedure 
as mentioned above (second derecognition procedure) will be followed.
5.3 Employers’ confederations and separate employers’ associations
The definition of “employers’ association” is closely linked to that of trade 
union. In brief, an “employers’ association” means pursuant to article 122 
TULRA a temporary or permanent organisation which consists wholly or 
mainly of employers and whose principal purposes include the regulation of 
relations between employers and employees or trade unions. A confederation of 
employers’ associations is also considered an employers’ association, provided 
that its main purposes include either the conduct of industrial relations or the 
1679  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/179.
1680  Articles 99 – 103 of Schedule A1.
1681  Articles 104 – 121 of Schedule A1.
1682  Articles 122 – 133 of Schedule A1.
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regulation of relations between its members. Finally, employers’ associations 
include combinations of employers and employers’ associations.
Given this definition, the elements (i) organisation, (ii) existing of employers 
for (iii) the purposes of the regulation of relations between employees and 
employers are of relevance. These elements are, given the explanation given 
in the context of trade unions, rather self-explanatory. It should be noted that 
on the question which degree of stability and structure is necessary in order 
to qualify as an organisation, the demands seem a bit lighter for an employers’ 
association than for a trade union.1683
Like a trade union, also an employers’ association may, if  it so wishes, be listed 
(article 124 TULRA). This will attribute the employers’ association some 
additional rights.1684 But unlike a trade union, an employers’ association may 
also register under the Companies Act. It may therefore choose to either be 
incorporated or not (article 127 TULRA). Should it remain unincorporated, 
it is nevertheless invested with the same degree of legal personality as a trade 
union (see above).1685
There are about 160 employers’ associations in the United Kingdom. Typically, 
employers see the association as a source of support and encouragement, but 
the existence of it is less vital to an employer than a trade union is to an 
employee. Consequently, the employers’ association has normally a looser 
formation than a trade union.1686 
An important employers’ association worth mentioning is the Confederation 
of British Industry, which more or less parallels TUC. This confederation 
represents large companies in the private sector and is regarded by 
the government as its main interlocutor with business. Like TUC, the 
Confederation of British Industry has no mandate to collectively bargain 
and bind its affiliates. More in general, most associations only offer advice to 
members, and only a few actually bargain.1687
1683  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division M Trade 
Unions, pages M/7A and M/7B.
1684  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division M Trade 
Unions, page M/32.
1685  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division M Trade 
Unions, page M/18.
1686  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division M Trade 
Unions, pages M/1 and M/2.
1687  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, pages 35 ff.
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5.4 The employers
 
The employers also play a role in the collective bargaining process, as they are 
entitled to conclude collective labour agreements.
6. The negotiation process / conclusion of 
a collective labour agreement
Typically, there are a number of steps taken to conclude a collective labour 
agreement. These steps are normally set out in an agreement on bargaining 
procedures. In Britain, it is very common for an employer to agree on such 
bargaining procedures with a trade union (after having recognised this union 
for collective bargaining purposes).1688 These voluntary procedural agreements 
normally contain the following elements:1689
i. a definition of the area in which the union’s role is acknowledged (which 
group of employees, at which level (national, group or plant level), at 
which locations etc.);
ii. the issues that are subject to negotiation;
iii. an identification of the steps by which the agreement is to be sought; 
and
iv. an identification of the steps to be taken were there a failure to agree (it 
is good practice to agree that industrial action will not take place until 
all stages of the negotiation procedure have been exhausted).1690
In the case of statutory recognition the employer and (recognised) trade 
union will also have to agree upon a method of collective bargaining, unless 
they jointly choose not to do so. The legislator intended this method of 
collective bargaining to resemble the above-mentioned “standard” voluntary 
agreement.1691 The employer and trade union first get the opportunity to 
voluntarily agree on the method of bargaining. If  they succeed, the status 
of the agreement reached is the same of the statutory status of any other 
collective labour agreement. This means – as will be set out in section 7.1 
below – that such voluntary procedural agreement is solely binding in 
1688  See information on collective bargaining on the website from the Advisory, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) on collective bargaining: www.acas.
org.uk. 
1689  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 124.
1690  See information on collective bargaining on the website from ACAS on collective 
bargaining.
1691  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 124.
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honour.1692 Consequently, there are no legal remedies if  either party breaches 
the voluntary procedural agreement, save the one stated below. 
If, after statutory recognition, (i) a voluntary, agreed-on procedural agreement 
is not carried out or if  (ii) the parties involved do not succeed in reaching 
a procedural agreement, they may apply to the CAC for assistance.1693 The 
CAC will help the parties to reach a suitable (new or adjusted) agreement 
on bargaining procedures. If  the parties fail to reach such an agreement, the 
CAC will impose a method of collective bargaining upon the parties.1694 This 
method of bargaining takes effect as a binding contract, unless the parties 
involved agree that they do not consider it legally binding.1695 Should either 
the employer or the trade union depart from the (legally binding) bargaining 
procedure that is imposed by the CAC, the other party may ask the court for 
an order for specific performance. By law this is the only remedy possible upon 
breach of an enforceable bargaining procedure imposed by the CAC.1696
These “methods of collective bargaining” identify the steps to be taken in 
order to conclude a collective labour agreement. The actual bargaining is 
often done by so-called shop stewards, provided that the agreement concerns 
a workplace-level agreement. Shop stewards are employees of the employer 
who (voluntarily) act as representative of the union in the plant. The roles 
of the shop steward include bargaining and representing union members in 
the workplace.1697 Shop stewards are nowadays, as opposed to in the past, 
highly dependent on the trade unions. They not only depend on full time 
trade union officials, but a trade union can also replace them. Furthermore, 
the trade union officials need to approve wage agreements negotiated by shop 
stewards.1698 
Shop stewards are normally well aware of the situation at the employer with 
whom they bargain. Still, recognised trade unions have more possibilities to 
retrieve information for bargaining purposes; they have the right in relation 
1692  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/289.
1693  Articles 30.3, 32 and 58.3 of Schedule A1.
1694  Articles 31.3 and 63.2 of Schedule A1.
1695  Articles 31.4 and 31.5 of Schedule A1.
1696  Article 31.6 of Schedule A1.
1697  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, page 29.
1698  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, paged 31 and 62.
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to the employer to disclosure of information. This concerns all information 
relating to the employer’s undertaking (i) without which the trade union 
would be materially impeded in carrying on collective bargaining with the 
employer, and (ii) which would be in accordance with “good industrial 
relations practice” for the employer to disclose in respect of the collective 
bargaining (article 181.2 TULRA). 
Assisted by these procedures, most negotiations are settled between the 
parties involved.1699 Should, however, the negotiations break down without 
a settlement having been reached, the parties involved may turn to the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS). Often the provision 
to request assistance from ACAS is even set out in the negotiating agreement. 
ACAS is a service governed by a council comprised of leading figures from 
business, unions, independent sectors to academics and has the statutory duty 
to promote the improvement of industrial relations (article 209 TULRA). It 
may provide assistance to the parties involved in bargaining in order for them 
to come to an agreement.1700 
This possible assistance to reach a collective labour agreement notwithstanding, 
it is of course not a necessity that such an agreement is actually reached. 
After all, an employer is neither obliged to enter into negotiations nor to 
conclude a collective labour agreement.1701 Not entering into a collective 
labour agreement while a legally binding bargaining procedure is imposed 
by the CAC may, however, limit the employer’s entitlement to adjust the 
employment conditions for the workers in a bargaining unit to which the 
bargaining procedure applies. The standard CAC bargaining procedure states 
that the purpose of the procedure agreement is to “specify a method by which 
the employer and the union conduct collective bargaining concerning the 
pay, hours and holidays of the workers comprising the bargaining unit or 
any section thereof”.1702 It may be argued – and it has – that it constitutes a 
breach of contract and/or statutory duty for the employer to engage in any 
individual bargaining with its employees included in the bargaining unit on 
any of the items pay, hours and holidays (or anything else covered by the 
1699  See information on collective bargaining on the website from ACAS on collective 
bargaining.
1700  See information on collective bargaining on the website from ACAS on collective 
bargaining.
1701  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/375.
1702  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/289.
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imposed procedure).1703 This may be an important incentive for the employer 
to indeed agree on a collective labour agreement.
Trade unions may have a consultative ballot amongst their members prior 
to entering into a collective agreement with the employer. This, however, is 
not a legal necessity and depends on the trade union’s constitution. There 
are only few topics on which ballots are mandatory by law, not including the 
conclusion of a collective labour agreement.1704
Assuming that parties are capable of entering into a collective agreement, 
it should be noted that there are no registration obligations. The collective 
labour agreement immediately has effects, effects which will be discussed in 
section 7 below.
7. The effects of the collective labour agreement
After the social partners entered into a (valid) collective labour agreement, its 
consequences should be assessed. Again, it should be established (i) to whom 
the collective labour agreement applies, (ii) which effects such an application 
has, and (iii) how the parties involved can enforce their rights. These questions 
are answered for the standard 4 scenarios, that will be discussed in sections 
7.1 through 7.4. Section 7.5 sets out which other means of enforcement are 
in place in case of a breach of the collective labour agreement. Section 7.6 
describes a “special” consequence the collective labour agreement has: it may 
set aside specific statutory provisions. Section 7.7 focuses on the term and 
termination of collective labour agreements and section 7.8 discusses the 
collective labour agreement’s possible after-effects. Finally, section 7.9 focuses 
on the role of alternative dispute resolution in British collective bargaining.
7.1 Scenario 1
As noted in section 4.1 above, an “agreement” as referred to in the definition 
of collective (labour) agreement, is not necessarily synonymous with the 
term “contract”. The rationale behind this is, as said, that a contract is an 
agreement between parties that is intended to be legally binding, while this 
is not normally the case with a collective labour agreement. The main rule 
in British law is that collective employment agreements are not enforceable 
1703  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/289.
1704  The issues which need by law to be balloted on are: merger, political objects, 
leadership and industrial action. B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and 
employment Law, division M Trade Unions, page M/288.
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and must be considered a mere gentleman’s agreement. This is made clear 
in article 179.1 TULRA, which states that a collective labour agreement 
is “conclusively presumed not to have been intended by the parties to be a 
legally enforceable contract”. 
This was already the case under common law (without statutory intervention). 
In the leading Ford case it was ruled that a collective labour agreement is as 
a rule not legally enforceable, as a result of the contracting parties’ lack of 
intention to create legal obligations.1705 This was equally found in the report 
of the aforementioned (section 2 above) Royal Commission on trade unions 
and employers’ associations, chaired by Lord donovan. This Commission 
stated:1706
In this country collective agreements are not legally binding contracts. This is not 
because the law says they are not contracts or that the parties to them may not give 
them the force of contracts. (…) It is due to the intention of the parties themselves. 
They do not intend to make a legally binding contract, and without both parties 
intending to be legally bound there can be no contract in the legal sense.
This common law rule is, as just mentioned, currently set out in article 179.1 
TULRA. This article continues and states that a collective labour agreement is 
only binding should the contracting parties have concluded this agreement (i) 
in writing while it (ii) contains “a provision which (however expressed) states 
that the parties intend that the agreement shall be a legally binding contract”. 
If  a collective agreement satisfies these requirements it shall, pursuant to 
article 179.2 TULRA, conclusively presumed to have been intended a legally 
enforceable contract. The contracting parties may also stipulate that only a 
part of the collective labour agreement is legally enforceable (179.3 TULRA). 
It should be noted that it is very rare in practice for a collective labour 
agreement to contain a statement indicating that it is legally enforceable.1707 
Or, as put by Bercusson: “in the UK, collective agreements are rarely, if  ever, 
legally binding”.1708
1705  Queens Bench division, All England Law Reports 1969 pages 481 ff, Ford Motor 
Co Ltd. v Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers and others.
1706  Royal Commission on trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 1965 – 1968, 
Report presented to Parliament by Command of her Majesty june 1968, 
paragraph 470. 
1707  G.S. Morris and T.j. Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, page 189.
1708  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, page 56.
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British Courts seem to be reluctant to hold a collective agreement legally 
enforceable. The word “binding” in a collective employment agreement, for 
example, was held insufficient to rule that the parties meant the collective 
agreement to be legally enforceable. The court considered that binding could 
very well refer to binding in honour instead of binding by law.1709 
As collective labour agreements are, apart from rare exceptions, not binding 
upon the signatory parties, there is no remedy by law if  one of the parties 
fails to comply with the collective labour agreement. The ultimate sanction 
for a breach of the collective labour agreement is industrial action.1710 If, 
in exceptional circumstances, a collective labour agreement is held legally 
enforceable, the aggrieved party may seek whatever remedy it finds appropriate 
– specific performance, injunction or damages.1711 In that respect it should also 
be noted that breach of contract claims against trade unions are not limited 
as to the amount that can be recovered,1712 as opposed to most proceedings in 
tort (article 22 TULRA).
7.2 Scenario 2
The bound employees cannot enforce the collective labour agreement as 
against the bound employer, because these employees are not a party to the 
collective labour agreement.1713 This argument equally applies the other way 
around: the employer may not enforce the collective agreement as against his 
employees, as these employees are not a party to this agreement. Furthermore, 
neither common law nor TULRA awards direct normative effect to collective 
labour agreements. As a consequence, the collective labour agreement does 
not have a direct effect in the individual employment agreement of the bound 
employer and the bound employee.
Nevertheless, terms of the collective labour agreement can be incorporated 
into the individual employment contract. This is the case should the 
individual employer and employee agree that the terms of the collective 
1709  high Court, May and june 1986, ICR 1986 pages 736 ff, National Coal Board v 
National Union of Mineworkers and others.
1710  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NII 
Industrial Actions, page NII/437.
1711  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/289.
1712  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 10.
1713  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 241.
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labour agreement are to form part of the employment contract.1714 Therefore, 
it is in the hands of the employer and the employee to decide whether in their 
relation the collective labour agreement applies. Obviously, whether or not 
to apply a specific collective labour agreement in practice also depends on 
whether the employee is part of the bargaining unit for which the collective 
labour agreement was drafted in the first place. After all, the social partners 
tend to agree on the proper bargaining unit first, either voluntary or imposed 
by the CAC, before concluding a collective labour agreement for that unit. 
however, decisive is the mere incorporation of the terms of the collective 
labour agreement into the individual employment contract.
7.2.1 Incorporation of the collective labour agreement 
into the individual employment contract
There are three methods on which the employer and individual employee can 
incorporate the relevant terms of the collective labour agreement: (i) express 
incorporation, (ii) implied incorporation, and (iii) incorporation by way of 
agency.1715 
Express incorporation of a collective labour agreement occurs when the 
individual employment contract stipulates that (parts of) the contract is 
(are) regulated by a collective labour agreement. The individual employment 
contract may refer to the collective labour agreement “as amended from time 
to time” or “for the time being in force”.1716 Whether or not a particular term 
of a collective labour agreement is incorporated by such express incorporation 
is a matter of law. A mere mentioning of a collective labour agreement does 
not constitute “express incorporation”.1717
Implied incorporation is obviously more difficult to establish, as there must 
be some form of implied agreement between the employer and the individual 
employee to be bound by the terms of the collective labour agreement; there 
must be a recognisable contractual intent between the individual employee 
and his employer.1718 The courts tend to look at the conduct of the parties and 
establish whether that suggests that they intended the terms of the collective 
1714  j. Gaymer, The Employment Relationship, page 201.
1715  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 241.
1716  j. Gaymer, The Employment Relationship, page 201.
1717  Employment Appeal Tribunal, April 1979, ICR 1979 pages 713 ff, Stewart v Graig 
Shipping Co Ltd.
1718  high Court, Queen’s Bench division, IRLR 1991 pages 286 ff, Alexander and 
others v Standard Telephones & Cables Ltd (No.2).
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labour agreement to be incorporated. Courts also look for a collective custom 
or practice that terms are incorporated.1719 It should be noted that the mere fact 
that an employee agreed to the incorporation of terms of a previous collective 
labour agreement, does not suggest that he also agrees on any changes thereof. 
If  the employee in such a situation challenges the incorporation of terms 
deriving from an adjusted collective labour agreement, these new terms are 
not to be considered implicitly incorporated.1720
Finally, at least from a theoretical point of view, terms of the collective labour 
agreement can be incorporated through agency. In that case it should be argued 
that the union negotiated terms on behalf  or their members, binding these 
members to the agreement itself. Agency and collective labour law, however, 
are not easily combined in Great Britain. Agency means an authorisation 
from the principal to the agent for the latter to negotiate and agree on an 
agreement on behalf  of the first. Members should therefore authorise the 
trade union to agree on employment terms on their behalf. The Employment 
Appeal Tribunal made clear that trade union membership itself  is insufficient 
to infer an agency relationship.1721 More in general, it is argued that agency 
is not likely inferred where the union negotiates a collective agreement which 
will affect a large number of its members.1722
The above states how terms of a collective labour agreement can be 
incorporated into the individual employment contract, but let us now turn 
to exactly which terms of the collective labour agreement can be incorporated 
into the individual employment contract.
7.2.2 Which terms can be incorporated into the individual employment contract?
As explained in section 4.2 above, in Britain there is a differentiation between 
terms of a collective nature (comparable with obligatory provisions) and terms 
of an individual nature (comparable with normative provisions). Only these 
latter terms can be incorporated into the individual employment contract. 
There is no absolute consistency as to which clauses are of a collective and 
1719  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 250.
1720  Industrial Tribunal, IRLR 1974 pages 131 ff, Singh v British Steel Corporation.
1721  Employment Appeal Tribunal, IRLR pages 351 ff, The Burton Group Ltd v Smith.
1722  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/455.
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which are of an individual nature. Examples showing this are the following 
Court cases:1723
•	 recognition	agreements	cannot	be	incorporated;1724
•	 facilities	agreements	(granting	union	officials	the	use	of	offices	etc.)	are	
arguably incorporated in a specific shop steward’s contract;1725
•	 collective	 disputes	 resolution	 mechanisms	 are	 not	 to	 be	
incorporated;1726
•	 redundancy	 agreements	 meant	 for	 long-term	 policy	 are	 not	 to	 be	
incorporated;1727
•	 redundancy	procedures	agreed	on	in	one	specific	redundancy	situation,	
however, can be incorporated.1728
Many terms, however, are easier to qualify as “terms of an individual nature”. 
Briefly put, these concern terms relating to the relationship between the 
employer and the employee such as pay, hours, holiday etc. These terms are 
appropriate for incorporation. Terms relating to the relationship between 
the employer and the trade union, such as recognition, collective disputes 
resolution mechanisms, and (arguably) no-strike agreements are terms of a 
collective nature, and consequently not suitable for incorporation.1729
And with that last topic – the no-strike agreement – a relatively sensitive 
subject is touched upon. The view on whether or not such an agreement 
may be incorporated differs to quite an extent.1730 That gave reason for the 
legislator to intervene, which it did by drafting article 180.1 TULRA. This 
article states that a term in a collective labour agreement restricting the right 
1723  These examples derive from B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and 
employment Law, division NI Labour Relations, page NI/456.
1724  high Court, All England Law Reports 1970 pages 712 ff, Gallagher and another v 
Post Office.
1725  Court of Appeal, IRLR 1985 pages 252 ff, City and Hackney Health Authority v 
National Union of Public Employees and others.
1726  high Court, May and june 1986, ICR 1986 pages 736 ff, National Coal Board v 
National Union of Mineworkers and others.
1727  See for example: Court of Appeal, IRLR 2005 pages 40 ff, Kaur v MG Rover Group 
Ltd.
1728  See for example: Court of Session, IRLR 1998 pages 64 ff, Anderson v Pringle of 
Scotland Ltd.
1729  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/455.
1730  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, pages NI/457 and NI/458.
COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS IN THE UK
561
for the employees to strike or engage in other industrial action will not form 
part of the individual employment contract. That is only different in the case 
that the requirements of article 180.2 TULRA are satisfied, in which case the 
term may be incorporated expressly or impliedly in the individual employment 
contract. That provision stipulates that the collective labour agreement (i) must 
be in writing, (ii) containing a provision expressly stating that those terms 
shall or may be incorporated in such a contract, (iii) is reasonably accessible 
at his place of work to the employee to whom it applies and is available for 
him to consult during working hours, and (iv) is one where each trade union 
which is party to the agreement is an independent trade union. 
This section and the one above deal with (i) how to incorporate the terms of 
a collective labour agreement into an individual employment contract and (ii) 
which terms are to be incorporated. These both matters were also dealt with 
in clear wording in the 1991 case Alexander v Standard Telephones and Cables 
Ltd (No 2). The court noted:1731
The principles to be applied in determining whether a part of a collective agreement 
is incorporated into individual contracts of employment can be summarised 
as follows: the relevant contract is that between the individual employee and 
his employer; it is the contractual intention of those two parties which must be 
ascertained. In so far as that intention is to be found in a written document, 
that document must be construed on ordinary contractual principles. In so far 
as there is no such document or that document is not complete or conclusive, 
their contractual intention has to be ascertained by inference from other available 
material including collective agreements. The fact that another document is not 
itself  contractual does not prevent it from being incorporated into the contract 
if  that intention is shown as between the employer and the individual employee. 
Where a document is expressly incorporated by general words it is still necessary to 
consider, in conjunction with the words of incorporation, whether any particular 
part of that document is apt to be a term of the contract; if  it is inapt, the correct 
construction of the contract may be that it is not a term of the contract. Where 
it is not a case of express incorporation, but a matter of inferring the contractual 
intent, the character of the document and the relevant part of it and whether it is 
apt to form part of the individual contract is central to the decision whether or not 
the inference should be drawn. 
1731  high Court, Queen’s Bench division, IRLR 1991 pages 286 ff, Alexander and 
others v Standard Telephones & Cables Ltd (No.2).
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7.2.3 What are the legal consequences of incorporation?
As can be inferred from the quote above, the mere fact that a collective labour 
agreement in itself  is not binding by law, does not mean that its incorporation 
is not binding by law either, as, in fact, it is.1732 If  an individual employment 
contract incorporates a collective labour agreement as is currently in force 
between the employer and the relevant trade union, an alteration of that 
collective labour agreement will directly vary the terms of the individual 
employment contract accordingly.1733 This is the case, regardless of whether 
the individual employee terminates his trade union membership due to the 
new collective labour agreement and regardless of whether it constitutes an 
improvement or deterioration of the applying employment conditions. A good 
example in this respect is the ruling of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in 
the case Higgins v Cables Montague Contracts Ltd.1734 The employers reached 
a collective agreement with the unions that arranged for a 20% wage cut for 
all employees. The employee higgins terminated his trade union membership 
and did not accept this wage reduction. The Employment Appeal Tribunal 
upheld the decision made in first instance, which ruled that since the collective 
labour agreement was expressly incorporated in the employment contract, 
the terms of this new agreement formed part of this employment contract. 
Consequently, the rate of higgins’ salary had been reduced by 20% as of the 
date that the collective agreement took effect, regardless of the fact that he 
terminated his union membership.
If  a collective labour agreement that has been incorporated in an individual 
employment contract awards the employer the power to unilaterally change 
certain employment conditions, this indeed has the effect that the employer 
has the right to change said conditions without obtaining the employee’s 
consent.1735 Incorporation of the terms of collective labour agreement 
therefore has strong effects.
1732  See also: Court of Appeal, december 1982, ICR 1983 pages 351 ff, Robertson and 
Jackson v British Gas Corporation.  
1733  j. Gaymer, The Employment Relationship, page 200.
1734  Employment Appeal Tribunal, january 1995, Higgins v Cables Montague Contracts 
Ltd, case number: [1995] UKEAT 564_93_1201, to be found on http://alpha.bailii.
org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1995/564_93_ 1201.html.
1735  Employment Appeal Tribunal, IRLR 1996 pages 516 ff, Airlie and others v City of 
Edinburgh District Council. This case concerned the unilateral review and variation 
of a bonus scheme, as permitted in the collective labour agreement that was 
incorporated into the individual contracts of employment.
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7.2.4 Deviation from the collective labour agreement in 
the individual employment agreement
The fact that a collective labour agreements applies, does not exclude the 
possibility for an employer and employee to agree on deviating employment 
conditions1736 (with the possible exception that if  a bargaining method is 
imposed by the CAC, that may preclude the employer and employee from 
validly agreeing on individual employment terms; reference is made to section 
6 above). This should, however, be done freely. Article 145B TULRA prohibits 
the employer to make an offer to the employee who is also a member of the 
trade union in order to induce this employee that his employment terms 
will not (or will no longer) be determined by a collective labour agreement 
negotiated by the union. 
Given the fact that, in principle, a collective labour agreement is, in itself, 
not binding by law and the employer and individual employee can normally 
deviate from its content by individual employment contract, there it is not 
much use to differentiate between provisions of a minimum, maximum or 
fixed nature, as is the rule in the other countries that were researched. British 
statute also does not give reason for such a distinction.
7.2.5 Enforcement
The bound employees cannot enforce the collective labour agreement as 
against the bound employer. Likewise, the bound employer cannot enforce 
the collective labour agreement as against the bound employees. Moreover, 
the content of that collective agreement does not have direct normative effect. 
Consequently, there are no legal actions available should the collective labour 
agreement not be applied to the individual employment agreement of the 
bound employer and the bound employee. however, if  the (individual) terms 
of the collective labour agreement have been incorporated in the employment 
contract, the employees and the employer must oblige these terms on pain of 
being in breach of contract.1737 The aggrieved party can subsequently under 
common law claim damages and/or specific performance following this breach 
of contract.1738 
1736  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 253.
1737  G.S. Morris and T.j. Archer, Trade Unions, Employers and the Law, page 63.
1738  See for breach of contract: Incomes data Services Ltd., Contracts of Employment, 
London, August 2001, pages 277 ff.
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If  a bound employee is induced by his employer that his employment terms 
will not (or will no longer) be determined by a collective labour agreement 
negotiated by the union, as mentioned above, the employee may present 
a complaint to the Employment Tribunal (article 145B.5 TULRA). If  the 
complaint is well-founded, the Tribunal shall award £2,600 to this employee 
(article 145E TULRA).
7.3 Scenario 3
As a collective labour agreement has no direct normative effect even in case 
both the employer and employee involved are bound by that agreement, it 
is hardly surprising that such an effect is equally lacking in case just one 
of these parties is bound to the collective labour agreement. That does not 
preclude, however, that an employer may just as well incorporate the terms of 
the collective labour agreement into the individual employment contract of 
an employee who is not a union member.1739 In fact, it is irrelevant whether 
the employee involved is a union member or not, for the terms of the 
collective labour agreement to apply to the employment contract by means of 
incorporation.1740 Moreover, the employer who is not bound by the collective 
labour agreement may still apply its content by means of incorporation. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal ruled that an employer may withdraw from 
an industry level collective labour agreement, as a consequence whereof it 
was not bound by that agreement anymore. however, such a withdrawal 
did not automatically end the incorporation of the terms of the collective 
labour agreement in the individual employment contracts. The individual 
employment conditions remained varied by the changing collective labour 
agreement. In other words, the circumstance that the employer was not 
bound by the collective labour agreement anymore, did not alter the fact that 
the contents of the collective labour agreement remained applicable to the 
individual employment contracts (until the employer would negotiate with his 
employees variations of the individual employment contracts).1741 
1739  It should also be noted that membership of the employer of an employer’s 
association is in itself  not sufficient to incorporate a collective agreement into 
an individual contract in case there is no obligation on employers’ association’s 
members to introduce particular terms of conditions into the contracts of 
employees. See j. Gaymer, The Employment Relationship, page 205.
1740  Court of Appeal, december 1982, ICR 1983 pages 351 ff, Robertson and Jackson v 
British Gas Corporation.
1741  Employment Appeal Tribunal, IRLR 1997 pages 153 ff, Whent and others v T 
Cartledge Ltd.
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Given the above, the position of the employer and employee in scenario 3 
does not really differ from their position in scenario 2. In both instances, 
the collective labour agreement as such has no influence on their individual 
relationship. In both instances that is different should the terms of the 
collective labour agreement be incorporated into the individual employment 
contract. True, the incorporation of these terms may occur by means of 
agency, which is more likely to occur if  the employee is bound by the collective 
labour agreement. But then again, this type of incorporation is rarely applied. 
There is, therefore, no material difference in position between the bound 
employee and the employee who is not bound when it comes to collective 
labour agreements. 
having said this, there might still be some sort of difference between these 
two. It may be that union members are supposed to know the content of 
a collective labour agreement sooner than non members ought to know 
this. In the case Gray Dunn & Co Ltd v Edwards the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal held that trade union members are supposed to know the contents 
of a disciplinary code agreed on between the union and the employer.1742 This 
disciplinary code stipulated that an employee who was under the influence 
of alcohol at work could be summarily dismissed. The employee and trade 
union member Edwards was indeed dismissed after being found intoxicated 
at work. he argued he that he did not know that this could lead to a summary 
dismissal, as he was unaware of the content of the disciplinary code. The 
Tribunal held in that respect:
Where employers negotiate a detailed agreement with a recognised union, they are 
entitled to assume that all employees who are members of the union know of and 
are bound by its provisions. There could be no stability in industrial relations if  
this were not so.
These sentences were solely directed at union members. It is not clear whether 
the same could also apply to an employee who is not a member of the trade 
union. In any event, in a more recent case the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
ruled that the dismissal of an employee was unfair, even though it was in 
accordance with a management-union agreement stipulating that employees 
too inebriated to report for work after a staff  Christmas party would be 
dismissed.1743 The case did not make clear whether the individual was a trade 
union member or not. It was argued by the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
1742  Employment Appeal Tribunal, IRLR 1980 pages 23 ff, Gray Dunn & CO Ltd v 
Edwards.
1743  Employment Appeal Tribunal, IRLR 1984 pages 379 ff, W Brooks & Son v Skinner.
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that this case was different than the Gray dunn case, because the collective 
agreement at stake only covered a single occasion (the Christmas party) and it 
did not relate to conduct that any reasonable employee would see as likely to 
lead to summary dismissal (the employer had not taken disciplinary measures 
in previous years in the same situation). It is therefore not entirely clear 
whether employees who are a member of the contracting trade union ought 
to know the contents of a collective labour agreement sooner than employees 
who are not.
7.4 Scenario 4
Collective labour agreements do in principle only bind in honour. That means 
that, should a term in the collective labour agreement relate to collectivities, 
that term is not legally binding. Such terms will normally not be considered 
terms with an individual nature, which can be incorporated in an individual 
employment agreement upon which they are awarded a binding force. In other 
words, terms in a collective agreement relating to collectivities do in principle 
not bind the subjects involved.
In section 4.2 it is already noted that provisions on funds are in principle not 
considered (a part of) a collective labour agreement as referred to in article 
178 TULRA, since the subject matter does not concern a statutory bargaining 
topic. Such agreements are therefore “extra-statutory” agreements, which are 
subject to common law. This means that the agreements are subject to the rules 
as set forth in the already mentioned Ford case (section 7.1).1744 In this case 
it was decided that such agreements are in principle not legally enforceable, 
unless the specific circumstances demonstrate a contrary intention of the 
contracting parties involved. To summarise: the employers and employees 
falling within the scope of application of the collective labour agreement are 
in principle not legally bound as against collectivities.
7.5 Other statutory means of enforcement
The above-mentioned scenarios discuss, amongst others, whether or not the 
parties whose rights are concerned are entitled to enforce these rights. The 
TULRA does not offer many alternatives for enforcement of collective labour 
agreements than already described above. The only important alternative that 
the TULRA does provide is the right to bring a matter to the CO instead of 
the court, should a union (allegedly) have violated rights of its members.
1744  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/438.
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A member, or a former member who was a member at the time of the alleged 
breach, may turn to the CO should he take the view that the trade union 
breached or threatens to breach its rules relating to specific matters. These 
matters concern (i) the appointment, election or removal of a person from 
office, (ii) disciplinary proceedings by the union, (iii) balloting of members on 
an issue other than industrial actions, (iv) the constitution or proceedings of 
an executive committee or decision-making meeting, and (v) specific matters 
specified by the secretary of State (article 109A TULRA). The CO would 
normally require the individual to use any internal complaints procedure in 
the union first to resolve the dispute (article 108B.1 TULRA). Furthermore, 
applying to the CO with a complaint on a breach of the union rules on the 
subjects mentioned above, bars the applicant’s possibility to apply to the court 
on the same matter (article 108A.14 TULRA). 
If  the CO accepts the application, he shall make such enquiries as he sees fit 
and will hear both parties. he must reach a reasoned decision in 6 months, 
either making or refusing the declaration asked for (article 108B.2 TULRA). 
This declaration may be relied upon as if  it were a declaration made by the 
court (article 108B.6 TULRA). The parties involved may appeal against this 
decision on questions of law (article 108C TULRA).
7.6 Special legal consequences of a collective labour agreement
Also Britain allows variation from specific acts by a collective labour 
agreement.1745 This is for example the case with regard to the Working 
Time Regulation, The Road Transport Regulations, the Merchant Shipping 
Regulations, the Inland Waterways Regulations, the Sea Fishing Regulations, 
the Civil Aviation Regulations and the Fixed-term Regulations.1746 just like 
in other countries, collective labour agreements can therefore allow parties 
to arrange specific matters in the individual employment relationship which 
could not be arranged without that collective labour agreement.
1745  Or by a so-called “workforce agreement”. Basically, such agreement must satisfy 
5 conditions: (i) it must be in writing, (ii) it must have a limited duration not 
exceeding 5 years, (iii) it must cover all relevant employees, (iv) it must be signed 
by duly elected representatives of the employees concerned (save an exception for 
small companies), and (v) before signing, the agreement must have been made 
available to the employees concerned, if  necessary with a proper explanation. 
Reference is made to: B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment 
Law, division NI Labour Relations, page NI/461. As the workforce agreement 
does not qualify as a collective labour agreement, I will not discuss this type of 
agreement any further. 
1746  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, pages NI/462 – NI/464. 
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7.7 Term and termination
There are no requirements set out in statute with regard to the entrance into 
force, duration and termination of a collective labour agreement. Consequently, 
the parties to the collective labour agreement can freely arrange when this 
agreement enters into force and what its term is. In practice, collective labour 
agreements with retro-effect are agreed on.1747
 
Termination of a collective labour agreement is rather easy, as such an 
agreement is in principle not binding. Both parties therefore can withdraw 
from the agreement with immediate effect. In the case Robertson and Jackson 
this was put as follows:1748 “It is true that collective agreements such as those 
in the present case create no legally enforceable obligations between the trade 
union and the employers. Either side can withdraw.” The same was held true 
in the case Whent and others v T Cartledge Ltd.1749 Even more explicit was the 
ruling of the high Court in the National Coal Board case. It ruled:1750
If, as I have held, the 1946 Agreement is not legally enforceable, either party has 
always been free at any time to decline any longer to abide by its terms. To argue 
that the law will import into such an agreement a term allowing termination on 
reasonable notice seems to me plain nonsense.
As a consequence, any party may terminate the collective agreement at any 
time, without observing a notice period. This also holds true with regard to 
a voluntary non-statutory recognition agreement: the employer is entitled to 
withdraw from such an agreement at any time.1751 
The above is different should the collective labour agreement be legally 
binding. In that case, the rules for termination as set out in the agreement 
itself  should be observed. With regard to recognition it should be noted that 
the employer may only unilaterally terminate a legally binding recognition 
agreement imposed by the CAC, after the relevant period of three years has 
ended (article 56 of Schedule A1).
1747  See for example: house of Lords, February – April 1982, ICR 1982 pages 262 ff, 
Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation.
1748  Court of Appeal, december 1982, ICR 1983 pages 351 ff, Robertson and Jackson v 
British Gas Corporation.
1749  Employment Appeal Tribunal, IRLR 1997 pages 153 ff, Whent and others v T 
Cartledge Ltd.
1750  high Court, May and june 1986, ICR 1986 pages 736 ff, National Coal Board v 
National Union of Mineworkers and others.
1751  Incomes data Services Ltd., Trade Unions, page 188.
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7.8 After-effects
The collective labour agreement can, as set out above, normally easily be 
terminated. The terms of the collective labour agreement that have been 
incorporated in the individual employment contract retain, however, their 
force even if  the collective labour agreement itself  is terminated (these terms 
have after-effects).1752 This has been decided on several occasions in court. In 
Gibbons v Associated British Ports,1753 for example, the employment contract 
incorporated the terms of collective agreements “for the time being in force”. 
The collective agreement was terminated and the employer subsequently 
sought to reduce the wages of the employee Gibbons. According to the high 
Court this constituted a breach of contract. The terms governing pay had 
been incorporated into the employment contract and the termination of the 
collective agreement had no effect hereon. A similar ruling is in place with 
regard to an incentive bonus scheme.1754 An important exception to this rule is 
if  the collective agreement itself  entitles the employer to unilaterally withdraw 
from any provision. In such a case the withdrawal also has direct effects on 
the individual employment agreement.1755 
7.9 The role of alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining
It is very common to arrange for (alternative) dispute resolution in a 
collective labour agreement in Great Britain. Nearly all collective labour 
agreements contain a clause to that effect.1756 Often these clauses provide a 
basis for voluntary use of ACAS dispute-resolution processes. ACAS will first 
encourage the parties to settle the dispute by means of negotiation, prior to 
referring the parties to other means of dispute resolution, such as conciliation 
or arbitration. 1757
1752  j. Gaymer, The Employment Relationship, page 202.
1753  high Court, Queen’s Bench division, IRLR 1985 pages 376 ff, Gibbons v 
Associated British Ports.
1754  Court of Appeal, december 1982, ICR 1983 pages 351 ff, Robertson and Jackson v 
British Gas Corporation. 
1755  j. Gaymer, The Employment Relationship, page 206.
1756  P. davies and M. Freedland, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in 
Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report United Kingdom, page 48.
1757  See L. dickens, EIRO Thematic Feature on Collective dispute Resolutions in an 
enlarged European Union – case of UK. This report can be found on the EIRO-
website.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 12
570
8. Extending collective labour agreements
Unlike the situation in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, there are no 
mechanisms in place in Britain to extend a collective labour agreement. This 
used to be different. Briefly put, there were two important mechanisms to 
extend collective wage setting.
First, the so-called statutory wage councils played a role in British collective 
wage formation. Representatives of employees, employers and independent 
members made up these councils. The wage councils were empowered to 
adopt legally binding orders concerning terms and conditions of employment 
in less-organised sectors.1758 Although this mechanism is not truly the same 
as extending collective labour agreements, it was an important means to set 
wages collectively. 
Second, there used to be “fair wages” mechanisms in place. These mechanisms 
sought to extend terms of collective labour agreements to workers and 
employers who were not covered by them.1759 The 1946 Fair Wages Resolution, 
for example, required government contractors to observe wages, hours 
and other conditions that were not less favourable than those applicable to 
the trade and industry in that district, based on terms agreed in collective 
bargaining or arbitration. This principle was also applied to other sectors, such 
as road haulage, public house-building, film-making, broadcasting and public 
transport.1760 In addition to this, employers were obliged to respect “recognised 
terms and conditions” for their trade or industry in their district based on 
the 1959 Conditions of Employment Act. The 1975 Labour Government’s 
Employment Protection Act also arranged that non-participants needed to 
oblige general levels of terms and conditions principally set by collective 
agreements.
The above-mentioned systems were all rescinded in time. As from 1983 the 
Fair Wages Resolutions lost their force. As a consequence, there was no 
statutory system in Britain anymore for extending the effects of collective 
labour agreements to those who did not wish to be bound by them.1761 In 
1758  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, page 95.
1759  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, page 53.
1760  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, page 53.
1761  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, page 55.
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1993, the system of wage councils was also abolished altogether by the Trade 
Union Reform and Employment Rights Act.1762
9. The collective labour agreement and the 
reach of the social partners
9.1 What can the social partners regulate in a collective labour agreement?
Article 178 TULRA gives a quite clear scope of what the contracting parties 
can arrange in a collective agreement. After all, the bargaining topics are set 
out in this article and relate to:
 
(a)  terms and conditions of employment, or the physical conditions in which 
any workers are required to work;
(b)  engagement or non-engagement, or termination or suspension of em-
ployment or the duties of employment, of one or more workers;
(c)  allocation of work or the duties of employment between workers or 
groups of workers;
(d)  matters of discipline;
(e)  a worker’s membership or non-membership of a trade union;
(f)  facilities for officials of trade unions; and
(g)  machinery for negotiation or consultation, and other procedures, rela-
ting to any of the above matters, including the recognition by employers 
or employers’ associations of the right of a trade union to represent wor-
kers in such negotiation or consultation or in the carrying out of such 
procedures.
In brief, the agreement must relate to: terms and conditions of employment 
and conditions of work; hiring, firing and suspension; demarcation; discipline; 
union membership; union recognition; facilities agreements; procedures and 
other machinery of collective bargaining.1763 Within these broad limitations, 
the social partners may conclude collective labour agreements. 
The approach in Britain on possible unwanted content of collective labour 
agreements was – and to a certain extent still is – rather simple: it is no use 
to render legally void a specific term in a collective labour agreement, as that 
1762  B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline of collective 
wage formation, page 56.
1763  B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, division NI 
Labour Relations, page NI/437.
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term has no legal force to begin with.1764 This, however, was not the approach 
of the European Court of justice when it came to discrimination. It ruled 
that, although collective labour agreements in Britain are not enforceable, 
they do establish industrial standards. Council directive 76/207/EEC of 9 
February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training 
and promotion, and working conditions1765 requires that any discriminatory 
clause, even in a non-enforceable agreement, should be rendered inoperative, 
or be eliminated or amended by appropriate means.1766 As a result of this 
ruling, the British legislator stated in several acts that a term in a collective 
labour agreement is rendered void if  it provides for unlawful discrimination. 
Unlawful discrimination relates to: sex discrimination, race discrimination, 
disability discrimination, religious discrimination, and sexual orientation 
discrimination.1767
9.2 Collective labour agreements and representativity demands
Representativity plays a limited role in British collective bargaining. After 
all, there are no representativity demands in place to entitle a trade union to 
conclude a collective labour agreement. This is not overly surprising, as the 
collective labour agreement is not binding in itself. Only the terms that are 
incorporated into the individual employment agreement are binding by law.
Representativity does play a role in (statutory) recognition. As said in section 
5 above, the employer must recognise the trade union which either has a 
majority of the employees in the relevant bargaining unit as its member, or 
which is supported by a majority of the employees that voted in a ballot and 
at least 40% of the employees constituting the bargaining unit. Moreover, 
only independent trade unions may apply for statutory recognitions, and such 
independent trade unions surpass, as a rule, company level, which may be 
considered a mild form of representativity. Consequently, a representative 
trade union can force an employer to recognise it.
1764  See for example high Court, May and june 1986, ICR 1986 pages 736 ff, National 
Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers and others. The Court described as 
“plain nonsense” that the doctrine of frustration could apply to a non-enforceable 
agreement. See also B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and employment Law, 
division NI Labour Relations, page NI/453.
1765  Oj L 39 of 14 February 1976.
1766  European Court of justice, 8 November 1983, C 165/82, Commission of the 
European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain.
1767  See, with reference to the several acts, B. Perrins, Harvey on Industrial Relations and 
employment Law, division NI Labour Relations, pages NI/452 and NI/453.
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9.3 Collective labour agreements and independence of trade unions
Many rights awarded to trade unions are made subject to them being 
independent. The independence verification of the CO is rather thorough. 
“Yellow” trade unions would normally not pass such a test. I refer to section 
5 above.
10. Summary
10.1 Industrial relations: past and present
Industrial relations were rather turbulent in the British past. Moreover, 
they have been influenced by politics to quite an extent. The importance of 
collective agreements had its peak in the mid 1970s, to decline in more recent 
years. The estimated coverage of collective labour agreements was in those 
peak years about 76-78%, to drop to about 34% in 2005. Trade union density 
reached its top in 1978 with 53%, to fall to 29% in 2000. 
Collective barging in Britain takes place at three levels: workplace, organisation, 
and industry. The focus lies very much on the first two levels. Sectoral level 
agreements have nearly disappeared from the private sector and are under 
pressure in the public sector.
10.2 The collective labour agreement
A collective labour agreement is an agreement or arrangement concluded 
between one or more trade unions and one or more employers’ organisations 
or employers, relating to a fixed number of specific bargaining topics. These 
topics concern the relation between employers and employees as well as the 
rights and obligations of the contracting parties.
British law is detailed when it comes to categorising trade unions. The 
rights trade unions enjoy depend on the category they are in. Only specific 
organisations can qualify as trade unions. A trade union must (i) be an 
organisation, (ii) consisting wholly or mainly of workers and (iii) having as its 
principal purpose the regulation of relations between employers and employees. 
Genuine trade unions can apply for listing. Listed trade unions that are also 
independent may ask for a so-called certificate of independence. Only truly 
independent trade unions obtain such a certificate. These independent trade 
unions can, by law, if  specific requirements are satisfied, be recognised vis-à-
vis an employer for the purposes of collective bargaining. Being recognised is 
crucial for collective bargaining.
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In Great Britain it is common to distinguish procedural from substantive 
collective labour agreements. British law also distinguishes between terms that 
are of an individual nature and those that are of a collective nature, as only 
the first type of terms can be incorporated into an individual employment 
contract. Terms of an individual nature concern the relationship between the 
employer and the individual employees and are comparable to terms that are 
described in other countries as normative provisions. Collective terms are 
intended to govern the relationship between the union and the employer and 
are comparable to terms that are described in other countries as obligatory 
provisions. Some terms in a British collective labour agreement could be 
compared with collective normative provisions. however, provisions on funds, 
which are normally considered important collective normative provisions in 
many countries, are in principle not part of a collective labour agreement in 
Britain.
 
10.3 The consequences of a collective labour agreement
Once a collective labour agreement is concluded, it should be established to 
whom it applies, what its consequences are and how the rights arising from it 
can be enforced.
10.3.1 The contracting parties
Collective labour agreements in Britain are in principle not enforceable and 
must be considered a mere gentleman’s agreement. This is different if  the 
contracting parties have concluded this agreement in writing while it contains 
a provision that states that the parties intend that the agreement shall be 
a legally binding contract. It is very rare in practice for a collective labour 
agreement to contain such a statement. As collective labour agreements are 
nearly always not binding upon the signatory parties, there is no remedy by 
law if  one of the parties fails to comply with the collective labour agreement. 
The ultimate sanction for a breach of the collective labour agreement is 
industrial action. Should in very exceptional circumstances a collective labour 
agreement be held legally enforceable, the aggrieved party may seek whatever 
remedy it finds appropriate – specific performance, injunction or damages.
10.3.2 The members of the contracting associations
Neither common law nor TULRA awards direct normative effect to collective 
labour agreements. The terms of the collective labour agreement only apply in 
the relationship between the bound employer and the bound employee if  they 
are incorporated into the individual employment contract. The individual 
COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS IN THE UK
575
employer and employee should therefore agree that the terms of the collective 
labour agreement are to form part of the employment contract. There are 
three incorporation methods: express incorporation, implied incorporation, 
and incorporation by way of agency. This last method is rather theoretical. Not 
all terms can be incorporated into the individual employment contract; only 
terms with an individual nature can be incorporated. After being incorporated, 
the term forms part of the agreement and is legally binding. Variations to 
the collective labour agreement automatically vary the terms of employment, 
provided that the individual employment contract incorporates a collective 
labour agreement as is currently in force. The employer and employee may, 
however, freely decide to deviate from a term that is incorporated. There 
is, consequently, no relevant difference in Britain between provisions of a 
minimum, maximum or fixed nature. The bound employee can neither enforce 
the collective labour agreement as against the bound employer nor does the 
content of that collective agreement have direct normative effect. he can, 
however, enforce terms of collective labour agreements that are incorporated 
into his individual employment contract. The same applies to the employer. 
Upon breach of a contractual term, the aggrieved party can, under common 
law, claim damages and/or specific performance.
10.3.3 Members vs. non-members
An employer may incorporate the terms of the collective labour agreement into 
the individual employment contract of an employee, regardless of whether he 
is a union member or not. The employer who is not bound by the collective 
labour agreement may even apply its content by means of incorporation. 
There is in that respect no real difference between this scenario and the one 
mentioned above.
10.3.4 The collectivities
Should a term in the collective labour agreement relate to collectivities, 
that term is not legally binding. Many of these terms will normally not be 
considered terms with an individual nature, individual terms which can be 
incorporated into an individual employment agreement. Other terms, such 
as provisions on funds, are not even considered appropriate terms for a 
collective labour agreement, as the subject matter does not concern a statutory 
bargaining topic.
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10.3.5 Special means of enforcement
Should a union (allegedly) have violated rights of its members, these members 
may bring this matter to the CO instead of to the court should they wish so. 
These matters should concern (i) the appointment, election or removal of a 
person from office, (ii) disciplinary proceedings by the union, (iii) balloting 
of members on an issue other than industrial actions, (iv) the constitution or 
proceedings of an executive committee or decision-making meeting, and (v) 
specific matters specified by the secretary of State. The declaration of the CO 
may be relied upon as if  it were a declaration made by the court.
10.3.6 Deviation by collective labour agreement
Collective labour agreements in Great Britain can allow employers and 
employees to arrange specific matters in the individual employment 
relationship, which could, given specific legislation, not be arranged without 
a collective labour agreement giving that opportunity.
10.3.7 Term and termination
The contracting parties can freely establish the collective labour agreement’s 
date of entrance into force and its term. They can terminate the non-
enforceable collective labour agreement at any time, without observing a 
notice period. If  the collective labour agreement would be legally binding, the 
rules for termination as set out in the agreement itself  should be observed. 
10.3.8 After-effects
After termination of the collective labour agreement, the terms of the collective 
labour agreement that have been incorporated in the individual employment 
contract retain their force. This is different if  the collective agreement itself  
entitles the employer to unilaterally withdraw from any provision and the 
employer uses this power.
10.3.9 The role of alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining
Nearly all collective labour agreements have introduced some sort of 
(alternative) dispute resolution mechanism. The organisation ACAS plays an 
especially important role in that respect. ACAS will first encourage the parties 
to settle the dispute by means of negotiation, prior to referring the parties to 
other means of dispute resolution, such as conciliation or arbitration.
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10.4 Extending collective labour agreements
There are no mechanisms in Britain anymore to extend a collective labour 
agreement to those who do not wish to be bound by it.
10.5 The reach of the social partners
The content of the collective agreement must relate to: terms and conditions 
of employment and conditions of work; hiring, firing and suspension; 
demarcation; discipline; union membership; union recognition; facilities 
agreements; procedures and other machinery of collective bargaining. The 
approach on possible unwanted content of collective labour agreements was 
rather simple: it is no use to render legally void a specific term in a collective 
labour agreement, as that term has no legal force to begin with. Nevertheless, 
due to a decision of the European Court of justice, the British legislator had 
to explicitly state that a term in a collective labour agreement is rendered void 
if  it provides for unlawful discrimination, which it did in a number of acts.
Representativity plays only a limited role in British collective bargaining, 
as there are no representativity demands in place to entitle a trade union to 
conclude a collective labour agreement. Representativity does play a role in 
(statutory) recognition: the employer must recognise the trade union which 
either has a majority of the employees in the relevant bargaining unit as its 
member, or which is supported by a majority of the employees that voted in a 
ballot and at least 40% of the employees constituting the bargaining unit.
Many rights awarded to trade unions are made subject to them being 
independent. The independence verification of the CO is rather thorough. 
“Yellow” trade unions would normally not pass such a test. 
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ChAPTER 13
COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENTS IN EUROPE
1. Introduction 
This chapter gives a high level view on collective labour agreements in Europe. 
Its goal is to present a general outline on collective labour agreements in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Great Britain (jointly referred to as the 
“Researched Countries”) specifically, where appropriate also referring to the 
situation in other Member States. This chapter is structured along similar 
lines as the previous chapters.
Section 2 summarises a number of main topics concerning industrial relations 
in Europe. Section 3 follows with a few brief  remarks on the history of industrial 
relation in the Researched Countries and, on occasion, other Member States. 
Section 4 scrutinises the three classical rights concerning collective bargaining 
further. Section 5 compares the definitions of a “collective labour agreement” 
in the Researched Countries and in other Member States. It also explains 
which different types of provisions the collective labour agreements in the 
Researched Countries may contain. Section 6 discusses the parties involved 
in the collective bargaining process with a specific focus on trade unions and 
employers’ organisations in the Researched Countries and in other Member 
States. 
Subsequently, the bargaining process in the Researched Countries, possibly 
leading to the conclusion of a collective labour agreement, will be set out and 
compared in section 7. Section 8 examines the effects of the collective labour 
agreement in the Researched Countries on all parties involved. This section 
discusses which parties are bound by the collective labour agreement, which 
legal effects this agreement has on these parties and how the agreement can 
be enforced. This will be done with regard to the 4 standard scenarios. It will 
also deal with the term and termination of the collective labour agreement, its 
possible after-effects and the role of alternative dispute resolution in collective 
bargaining. 
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Section 9 sets out the possibility of extending a collective labour agreement 
in the Researched Countries and other Member States. It discusses the 
similarities and differences of the national extension processes. The reach 
of the social partners in the different countries when concluding collective 
labour agreements will be set out in section 10. This section focuses on three 
specific aspects of the reach of the social partners in relation to the conclusion 
of collective labour agreements: (i) what can the social partners regulate in a 
collective labour agreement, (ii) are they in any way limited by representativity 
demands, and (iii) are there any limitations with regard to independence? 
Finally, section 11 summarises this chapter. 
2. Industrial relations in Europe in a nutshell
just as has been done in the Researched Countries, this section gives a 
general overview on industrial relations in Europe. Section 2.1 discusses the 
different European industrial relations models. Obviously, given the many 
countries in the EU, such an overview is high level in nature. Subsequently, 
statistics concerning European industrial relations will be discussed in section 
2.2, more in specific figures on the density of trade unions and employers’ 
organisation membership and on coverage rates. Section 2.3 states recent 
trends in industrial relations in Europe and section 2.4 sets out the different 
levels at which collective bargaining occurs. 
2.1 The European industrial relation models
As already follows from the previous chapters, there is no single or even 
dominant model of European Industrial relations, which largely applies to 
the individual Member States. In fact, each Member State has a more or 
less unique system on collective bargaining, varying widely in terms of level, 
coverage, content and nature.1768 Still, the social dialogue is, although to a 
varying degree, of importance to every Member State. Or, as phrased by the 
European Commission: “there is a strong tradition of social dialogue and 
partnership between governments, industry and trade unions – even if  the 
detailed mechanisms vary considerably between Member States”.1769 
These national differences notwithstanding, some general statements can 
be made on the legal framework of collective bargaining. First, almost all 
1768  Reference is made to the EIRO publication from T. Schulten, Changes in national 
collective bargaining systems since 1990, 17 May 2005, page 1.
1769  See the Commission Communication on European values in the globalised world 
COM (2005) 525 final, page 5.  
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Member States have a rather detailed legal framework on collective bargaining 
that contains basic provisions on:
•	 the	parties	that	are	entitled	to	conclude	collective	labour	agreements;
•	 the	possible	levels of collective bargaining;
•	 the	hierarchy	of	different	bargaining levels;
•	 the	legal	coverage	of	collective	labour	agreements;	and
•	 the	procedural	rules for collective bargaining.1770
This legal framework can be part of a labour code or a specific act. In the 
Scandinavian countries the legal framework is mainly determined by bipartite 
agreements concluded by the social partners at national level.1771
Second, it is not unusual to distinguish between two groups of countries that 
have a broad range of similarities in their respective collective bargaining 
systems. This concerns on the one hand the EU-15 Member States, 
representing an important part of Western Europe, and on the other the newly 
acceded countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The industrial relations 
between these two groups differ considerably. Whereas the EU-15 Member 
States generally spoken concentrate on bipartite collective bargaining, the 
new Member States’ social dialogue is more tripartite in nature. Where 
bipartite collective bargaining does occur in these countries, it primarily 
focuses on company level, as opposed to sectoral level, which latter level is 
the more dominant level in the “old” Member States. Furthermore, the social 
partners in the new Member States have, certainly in comparison with the old 
Member States, to cope with organisational weaknesses and limited financial 
resources.1772 As will be set out below, the new Member States have usually a 
lower bargaining coverage when set off  against the old Member States. 
An exception, however, to this distinction between old and new Member 
States is Great Britain. This country fits more in the group of new than old 
Member States, as it also has comparatively weak bargaining institutions with 
company level bargaining as the predominant bargaining level.1773 But this is 
1770  This list derives from T. Schulten, Changes in national collective bargaining systems 
since 1990, page 2.
1771  T. Schulten, Changes in national collective bargaining systems since 1990, page 2.
1772  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 79.
1773  T. Schulten, Changes in national collective bargaining systems since 1990, page 1.
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not Great Britain’s only peculiarity.1774 Its common law approach, the lack 
of a clear statutory recognition of the classical rights concerning collective 
bargaining and the British laissez-faire approach to collective bargaining also 
make the British system stand out. Moreover, collective labour agreements 
in Great Britain are almost always binding in honour only, which is a rather 
uncommon feature when compared to other Member States.
2.2 Statistics
Three figures are of particular relevance when analysing collective bargaining: 
(i) trade union membership density, (ii) employers’ organisation membership 
density and (iii) collective bargaining coverage. 
2.2.1 Trade union membership density
An important measure for trade union power is its organisational 
representativeness, normally measured by union density.1775 Union density is 
defined as the ratio of actual to potential union membership.1776 hereafter, 
the net union density figures are presented, being “the total figure of gainfully 
employed members (excluding unemployed, students or retired) divided by the 
total wage earners population of the country”.1777 It should be noted that the 
comparison of trade union membership between the different Member States 
is a rather difficult process, as the method of calculation and the quality of 
the data source can differ considerably.1778 That also explains why the figures 
set out below for the Researched Countries may be somewhat different than 
the figures mentioned in the chapters above. The trade union membership 
density in the year 2004 in the (at that moment) Member States is, according 
to the Industrial relations 2006 report, the following:1779
1774  To speak with the words of Ryan and Bercusson: “Wage formation in Britain – 
as currently constituted – is quite different from that of many other European 
countries.” B. Bercusson and B. Ryan, The British case: before and after the decline 
of collective wage formation, page 49.
1775  j. Visser, Union membership statistics in 24 countries, page 38.
1776  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 22.
1777  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 23.
1778  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 23. See also j. 
Visser, Union membership statistics in 24 countries, pages 39 – 43.
1779  This information is copied from: European Commission, Industrial Relations in 
Europe 2006, page 25, figure 1.1. The figures show the total figure of gainfully 
employed members (excluding unemployed, students or retired) divided by total 
wage earners population of the country. The figure of CZ dates from 2003 and of 
CY from 2002.
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Trade union membership density 
Country Total
BE 49
CZ 22
dK 80
dE 20
EE 12
EL 20
ES 16
FR 8
IE 36
IT 34
CY 53
LV 16
LT 13
LU 46
hU 17
NL 25
AT 32
PL 17
PT 17
SK 31
SI 44
FI 74
SE 77
UK 29
MT 55
As can be derived from the table above, union density clearly differs per 
Member State. The overall weighted average union density rate in the 
European Union lies between 20 and 25% of the wage earners.1780 It should 
be noted that this was considerably higher in the past. There is a downward 
trend across Europe in the trade union density rate.1781 About ten years ago, 
one in three European workers was a member of a trade union. Nowadays, 
this is about one in four.1782
1780  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 23.
1781  See also j. Visser, Union membership statistics in 24 countries, pages 45 and 46. 
1782  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 23. See also figure 
1.1 on page 25.
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For completeness’ sake, it should be noted that the above-mentioned figures 
include union membership density in the public sector. This “contaminates” 
the figures to a certain extent, as the position of civil servants is excluded from 
the scope of this thesis.1783 Trade union membership in Europe is particularly 
high in the public sector when compared to the private sector.1784 This holds 
especially true in the administration, health and social services.1785 This should 
be taken into account when interpreting the above figures.
2.2.2 Employers’ organisation membership density
Employers’ organisation density is an indicator comparable with trade 
union density.1786 however, this figure is not defined as the ratio of actual 
to potential membership, as is the case with trade union density, since such 
a figure would not necessarily say a lot about the employers’ organisations’ 
power. Instead, the employers’ organisation density figure defines the ratio of 
the number of employees the members have to the number of employees of 
potential membership.1787 data on employers’ organisation density is difficult 
to collect for various reasons,1788 and must therefore be interpreted with 
caution. Taking this into consideration, the (weighted) average employer rate 
of organisation within the European Union lies approximately between 55 to 
60%.1789 Moreover, this density does not seem to be dropping, as opposed to 
the trade union membership density.1790 
1783  See chapter 1, section 2.3.
1784  j. Waddington, Trade Union Membership in Europe, a background paper for the 
ETUC/ETUI-REhS top-level summer school, Florence, 1-2 july 2005, page 1.
1785  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, pages 24 and 25.
1786  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 37.
1787  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 37.
1788  The employers’ associations are reluctant to make available information on their 
members, they themselves not always have all information necessary available 
(especially the number of employees their members employ), and density figures 
are often based on survey data, which is not always available. See European 
Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 37.
1789  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 37. For a more 
detailed overview on employers’ organisation density reference is made to figure 1.2 
on the same page of this report.
1790  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 38.
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2.2.3 Collective bargaining coverage
Across Europe, there are huge differences in collective bargaining coverage. 
This coverage rate is usually understood as the number of employees covered 
by a collective agreement as a proportion of the number of employees (that is: 
wage and salary earners).1791 There are two main elements that influence the 
bargaining coverage. First, the level of bargaining is of relevance. Countries 
with strong sectoral and inter-sectoral bargaining normally have a higher 
bargaining coverage than countries with mainly company-level bargaining. 
Second, there is the existence and use of extension procedures. Countries 
that have and use such procedures tend to have a higher bargaining coverage 
than countries that do not.1792 The following table sets out an overview of the 
collective bargaining coverage in the Member States, with the exception of 
Luxembourg and Portugal.1793
1791  Reference is made to the EIRO publication from F. Traxler and M. Behrens, 
Collective bargaining coverage and extension procedures, 18 december 2002, page 3.
1792  T. Schulten, Changes in national collective bargaining systems since 1990, page 12.
1793  This information is copied from: T. Schulten, Changes in national collective 
bargaining systems since 1990, pages 13 and 14, table 4. The sources needed for 
compiling the table date back to 2004.
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Collective bargaining coverage
Inter-sectoral bargaining dominant
Belgium > 90%
Finland +/- 90%
Ireland > 44%
Slovenia < 100%
Sectoral bargaining dominant
Austria 98%-99%
Bulgaria 25-30%
denmark +/- 77%
Germany +/- 70%
Greece 60%-70%
Italy +/- 90%
Netherlands +/- 80%
Spain +/- 80%
Slovakia +/- 40%
Sweden > 90%
No bargaining level clearly dominant
France +/- 90%
Company bargaining dominant
Cyprus 27%
Czech Republic 25%-30%
Estonia 20%-30%
hungary +/- 40%
Latvia 10%-20%
Lithuania +/- 10%
Malta +/- 50%
Poland +/- 40%
Romania no data
UK < 40%
An EIRO research established that in the year 2002 on average more than 70% 
of the employees within the Member States at that time, excluding Greece, 
were covered by a collective labour agreement.1794
2.3 Trends
In all Researched Countries there seems to be a trend towards decentralisation 
of shaping of employment conditions. The conclusion of company-level 
collective labour agreements gains ground to the detriment of sectoral 
collective labour agreements. Moreover, collective labour agreements often 
1794  M. Carley, Industrial relations in the EU, Japan and USA, 2002, page 18.
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leave more room than in the past to fill in general clauses and concepts at 
enterprise level (“opening clauses”). This tendency towards decentralisation 
appears not to be unique for the Researched Country but is rather a tendency 
that can be seen in almost every Member State.1795 Another trend in Europe 
is that the scope of the content of collective labour agreements seems to be 
broadening and now includes restructuring, working conditions of non-
standard employees and social rights.1796 
2.4 Different levels of bargaining
In all Researched Countries there are different levels at which collective 
bargaining takes place. Three levels should be distinguished: (i) national 
(or inter-sectoral), (ii) sectoral and (iii) company-level. In each Researched 
Country collective bargaining is not exclusively defined to just one level. All 
of these countries have collective bargaining at least at sectoral and company-
level. however, in Belgium collective bargaining at inter-sectoral (national) 
level is also of relevance. 
This picture can be applied to other Member States as well. In each Member 
State collective bargaining takes place at more than one level.1797 The following 
table sets out the levels of collective bargaining involved in wage-setting in 
most of the Member States.1798 It should be noted that the inter-sectoral level 
is broadly defined in the table below, as it does not only concern national 
bilateral agreements between peak federations, but also tripartite wage 
coordination.
1795  T. Schulten, Changes in national collective bargaining systems since 1990, page 19.
1796  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, pages 48 and 49.
1797  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 41.
1798  This table literally derives from: European Commission, Industrial Relations in 
Europe 2006, page 47, table 2.2.
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Levels of collective bargaining involved in wage-setting, EU-25
Inter-sectoral Sector Enterprise
BE ** *** *
CZ * ***
dK * *** **
EE * * ***
EL ** *** *
ES * *** **
FR ** **
IE *** * *
IT * *** **
CY ** ***
LV * ***
LT * ***
LU ** **
hU * ** ***
MT * ***
NL * *** *
AT *** *
PL * * ***
PT * *** **
SI ** *** **
SK *** **
FI *** ** *
SE *** *
UK * ***
*       existing level of collective bargaining
**      important but not dominant level of collective bargaining
***     dominant level of collective bargaining
Based on its own research, EIRO distinguishes three groups of countries 
within the EU (excluding Luxembourg and Portugal) when it comes to the 
level of collective bargaining concerning wages only:1799
•	 the	first	group	covers	4	countries	 (Belgium,	Finland,	Ireland	and	Slo-
venia). In these countries the inter-sectoral level is the most important 
bargaining level for the determination of wages. Additionally, there are 
5 countries (Greece, Estonia, hungary, Lithuania and Romania) where 
1799  T. Schulten, Changes in national collective bargaining systems since 1990, page 12.
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the national minimum wage is determined by bipartite or tripartite 
agreements at national level; 
•	 the	second	group	covers	10	countries,	mostly	in	North	and	West	Europe	
(Austria, Bulgaria, denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Slovakia, Sweden). These countries have bargaining systems in 
which the sectoral-level is the most important bargaining level for wage 
determination; and 
•	 the	third	group	of	10	countries,	including most of the Central and Ea-
stern Europe states (the Czech Republic, Estonia, hungary, Latvia, Li-
thuania, Poland and Romania) plus Cyprus, Malta and Great Britain, 
have rather decentralised bargaining systems with company-level bargai-
ning dominant. 
France does not fit into any of these groups since it has no pay bargaining 
level that is clearly dominant. While in particular for small and medium-sized 
companies sectoral-level is the most important, it is company-level that is key 
for most large companies.
3. The history of collective bargaining in 
the Researched Countries
The overviews of the history of industrial relations in the Researched 
Countries make clear that each country faced its own particular difficulties in 
the past with regard to industrial relations. Many of the legal consequences 
a collective labour agreement has today in each country can only really be 
understood against the backdrop of these past national difficulties. The 
same applies to national politics: these politics have influenced the laws on 
industrial relations rather extensively and shaped them into what they are at 
present. This is most notably the case in Great Britain. 
despite these national differences in collective bargaining in the Researched 
Countries, there are similarities as well. It is apparent that the introduction of 
collective bargaining was a struggle in each of these countries. The trade unions 
all faced a prohibition of employees to join in pursue of better employment 
conditions. The freedom of association was, in short, much oppressed. In 
many other (Western) European countries this was not different.1800 But even 
after the trade unions were free to form, they had to surmount many other 
obstacles. Management was not keen on giving up its managerial powers 
1800  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Het recht op collectief onderhandelen in rechtsvergelijkend 
en Europees perspectief, pages 21 ff. jacobs states that the prohibition on the 
formation of associations was revoked in Western Europe as from about 1870.
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easily, most notably its powers to unilaterally set employment conditions. 
Employers simply refused to enter into collective labour agreements, entered 
into collective labour agreements with yellow unions, or even terminated the 
employment contracts of active trade union members.1801 The most powerful 
means that trade unions had at their disposition to counter the powers of 
management, being collective actions, were not always readily available. The 
right to strike was simply not, or only marginally, recognised in the past. 
It was, in summary, very difficult for the trade unions in Europe to actually 
conclude collective labour agreements. In the years following World War I, 
things got better for trade unions. Management and labour more or less had to 
cooperate given the weak economical situation. In these years, and especially 
after World War II, modern industrial relations formed.1802 But although it 
got easier to actually conclude collective labour agreements in these years, the 
conclusion of the agreement in itself  did not solve all problems. The status of 
a collective labour agreement appeared rather troublesome in many countries. 
The collective labour agreement simply did not sit well with the standard 
type of contract. The collective aspects of the collective labour agreements 
caused difficulties. In the end, a collectivity of employees, and sometimes 
a collectivity of employers, intended to (primarily) arrange by contract the 
legal relation not between themselves, as is the case in “normal” contracts, but 
rather between the individual employer and employee. It was difficult to tie 
in a direct normative effect of the collective labour agreements in the existing 
legal systems.1803 
In the Researched Countries, the above difficulties were overcome by enacting 
legislation (the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium), sometimes following an 
agreement reached between both sides of the industry. Great Britain stands 
out in that respect, as intervention of the state in industrial relations was only 
applied with reticence. British legislation was mostly limited to simply making 
collective bargaining possible. In general, it can be noted that most Member 
States have enacted (detailed) legislation on collective bargaining. denmark 
is an exception, as it has no such statutory regulations at all. Besides Great 
1801  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Het recht op collectief onderhandelen in rechtsvergelijkend en 
Europees perspectief, page 44.
1802  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Het recht op collectief onderhandelen in rechtsvergelijkend en 
Europees perspectief, pages 52 ff.
1803  The same applied to collective action, which was also considered out of the 
ordinary.
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Britain, legislation on collective labour agreements is also limited in content 
in Italy and Ireland.1804
4. The classical rights concerning collective bargaining
The three classical rights –the freedom of association, the right to collective 
bargaining, and the right to strike – are recognised in all of the Researched 
Countries. The only country in which this recognition is not full and clear is 
Great Britain. 
In the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium the freedom of association is 
laid out in the Constitution. This is not the case in Great Britain. however, 
Great Britain incorporated the European Convention on human Rights 
(the Convention) into its own legislation through the 1998 human Rights 
Act, a Convention which guarantees the freedom of association. Moreover, 
the freedom of an employee as against his employer to join a trade union is 
recognised in the TULRA. 
The Researched Countries all have acts on collective bargaining. The 
entitlement to bargain collectively derives from these acts. In Germany, the 
right to collective bargaining is also (implicitly) embedded in its Constitution. 
This is the case for at least 15 Member States.1805 In Belgium, reference is 
made in its Constitution to the right to collective bargaining. In none of the 
Researched Countries, however, does the right to collective bargaining entail 
an obligation to bargain. A party is free to refuse to bargain in each of these 
countries. 
In Germany, the right to strike is embedded in the constitution. In Belgium 
and the Netherlands this right is established by judge-made law. In both of 
these countries the European Social Charter played in important role in the 
development of this right. In Britain, there is a freedom to collective action 
vis-à-vis the state. This freedom is only partial in the relationship between 
an employee and his employer; although statute gives immunity to the 
participants of a strike from legal liabilities in many cases, the right as such is 
lacking. To sum up, Britain does not have a real right to strike. 
1804  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
The International journal of Comparative Law and Industrial Relations, Autumn 
2003, page 274.
1805  T. Schulten, Changes in national collective bargaining systems since 1990, pages 3 ff. 
As this research does not include Luxembourg and Portugal, I stated that at least 
15 Member States protect the right to collective bargaining by Constitution. 
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It should be noted that the classical rights have, to an important extent, 
been recognised by all Western European countries after World War II.1806 
Moreover, as set out in chapter 8 of this thesis, all Member States are, in 
fact, obliged by international legislation (due to accession to relevant treaties 
and conventions) to recognise these classical rights. From a European Union 
perspective, the freedom of association is considered a fundamental right.1807 
The right to collective bargaining – meaning the right to enter into negotiations 
and to conclude collective labour agreements – is also protected at Community 
level,1808 as is the case with the right to strike.1809 The Treaty of Lisbon and the 
execution of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights further highlight the 
recognition of the classical rights.1810 The protocol on the application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the 
United Kingdom, however, also makes clear that two countries in particular 
experience difficulties with the full recognition of these rights, being Great 
Britain and Poland.
5. Collective labour agreements
There is a great resemblance in the definition of a collective labour agreement 
and their different provisions in the Researched Countries. This also seems to 
be the case in other Member States.
5.1 What constitutes a collective labour agreement?
In all Researched Countries there are at least three requirements an agreement 
must satisfy in order to be regarded a collective labour agreement. A fourth 
requirement can be found in some of these countries.
First, there must be an agreement. The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium 
require a written contract. In Great Britain an oral agreement suffices, unless 
the agreement is intended to be legally enforceable, in which case it must also 
be agreed on in writing.
Second, only specific parties are entitled to conclude a collective labour 
agreement. On the one hand there should be employers or employers’ 
1806  A.T.j.M. jacobs, Het recht op collectief onderhandelen in rechtsvergelijkend en 
Europees perspectief, page 66.
1807  See chapter 8, section 2.
1808  See chapter 8, section 3.
1809  See chapter 8, section 4.
1810  See chapter 8, section 5.
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organisations. This is common in (nearly) all Member States.1811 On the other 
hand, there should be trade unions (or sometimes also confederations of trade 
unions). here, the situation differs to some extent in other Member States. 
In most Member States the right to collective bargaining on labour’s side is 
restricted to trade unions. however, in Member States that have a low trade 
union density or a dual system of employee representation (normally with 
Works Councils as representatives of labour at company level), the exclusive 
role of the trade unions in collective bargaining is challenged.1812 In the Baltic 
States, for example, (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) authorised employee 
representatives (comparable to Works Councils) are entitled to conclude 
collective labour agreements at company level, should the employees not be 
represented by trade unions. In other Member States – including Germany, 
Austria, the Netherlands, and Spain – Works Councils can sometimes work 
out, on a company level, certain elements that were left open in opening clauses 
in sectoral collective labour agreements. In France trade unions can appoint a 
mandated employee in companies with no union representation, who can enter 
into company-level collective bargaining. The final agreement, however, has 
to be confirmed by the trade union.1813 At EU level (again, without including 
Luxembourg and Portugal) this leads to the following situation:1814
1811  T. Schulten, Changes in national collective bargaining systems since 1990, page 6. 
however, Austria does not allow an individual employer to enter into a collective 
labour agreement. See R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a 
Comparative Perspective Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ 
Participation (Part I), page 274.
1812  T. Schulten, Changes in national collective bargaining systems since 1990, page 6.
1813  T. Schulten, Changes in national collective bargaining systems since 1990, page 6.
1814  This table derives from: T. Schulten, Changes in national collective bargaining 
systems since 1990, pages 6 and 7, table 2.
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Employees’ representatives entitled to conclude collective  
agreements 
Only trade unions 
Trade unions, Works Councils and other 
employees’ representatives 
Austria x* .
Belgium x .
Bulgaria x
Cyprus x .
Czech Republic x .
denmark x .
Estonia . x
Finland x .
France x** .
Germany x* .
Greece x .
hungary x .
Ireland x .
Italy x .
Latvia . x
Lithuania . x
Malta x .
Netherlands x*
Poland x .
Romania x***
Slovakia x .
Slovenia x .
Spain x* .
Sweden x .
UK x .
* Works Councils can renegotiate certain collectively agreed standards at company 
level, if entitled by sectoral agreements.** In companies with no union representa-
tion, unions can appoint ‘mandated employees’ to negotiate with the employer, but any 
agreement has to be confirmed by the union. *** Employee representatives are entitled 
to conclude collective agreements in companies where employees are not organised in 
trade unions, but Works Councils do not yet exist.
The above shows that trade unions are the primary representatives of labour 
in collective bargaining. These trade unions should meet specific demands. 
These demands will be discussed in section 6 below. 
Third, the collective labour agreement should concern employment 
conditions. This is normally broadly defined. In the Netherlands, the 
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collective labour agreement is required to principally or exclusively set out the 
terms of employment applicable to employment agreements, but the dutch 
Supreme Court also allowed an agreement that merely contains provisions 
which relate to employment agreements. In Germany, the collective labour 
agreement may arrange the content, the commencement and the termination 
of employment agreements. As far as the content is concerned, the collective 
labour agreement may arrange the same topics that can be arranged in the 
individual employment agreement. Belgian law stipulates that collective 
labour agreements should deal with the relation between employers and 
employees. This enables the contracting parties to arrange subjects in all 
domains of social law. In Great Britain the bargaining topics are fixed. This 
is done, however, in a broad manner. Collective labour agreements should 
deal with: terms and conditions of employment and conditions of work; 
hiring, firing and suspension; demarcation; discipline; union membership; 
union recognition; facilities agreements; procedures and other machinery of 
collective bargaining. 
 
Besides these employment conditions, collective labour agreements in 
all Researched Countries may set out rights and obligations between the 
contracting parties. This is explicitly stipulated in the laws of Belgium and 
Germany, which consequently set out that collective labour agreements have 
normative and obligatory effects. Although not stated in the statutory definition 
of collective labour agreement, the same holds true in the Netherlands and 
Great Britain.
Last, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany require collective labour 
agreements to be registered. In the first two countries this is a constitutive 
requirement. In Belgium, the collective labour agreements are even assessed 
upon registration in order to verify that they satisfy all relevant requirements. 
In Great Britain there are no “registration demands”. Many other Member 
States also have registration requirements. In Ireland, for example, registration 
of collective labour agreements by the Labour Court is required when they 
introduce flexible standards; the Court must be satisfied that such agreements 
are not in breach of EU law and have been negotiated by representative 
parties.1815 The following table shows which Member States have a legal 
obligation to register the collective labour agreements (with the exception of 
Luxembourg and Portugal):1816
1815  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 53.
1816  This table literally derives from: T. Schulten, Changes in national collective 
bargaining systems since 1990, pages 9 – 11, table 3.
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Registration and national documentation of collective agreements
Obligatory registration 
Austria Yes
Belgium Yes
Cyprus Yes
Czech Republic Yes*
denmark No
Estonia Yes
Finland Yes
France Yes
Germany Yes
Greece No
hungary Yes
Ireland No**
Italy No
Latvia No
Lithuania Yes*
Malta Yes
Netherlands Yes
Poland Yes
Slovakia Yes*
Slovenia Yes*
Spain Yes
Sweden No
UK No
* Legal obligation to register exists only for national and sectoral agreements, but not for 
company agreements. ** Some agreements are registered voluntarily by the Labour Court.
In its 2006 research on collective agreements, ILO concluded that collective 
labour agreements are commonly defined as “agreements regulating conditions 
to be observed in employment contracts or otherwise in employment relations, 
concluded by one or more employers or employers’ associations on one side, 
and one or more trade unions on the other”.1817 This research was based on 
reports from 16 countries, including 11 Member States.1818 The aforementioned 
1817  Reference is made to the ILO research: M. Blatman (general reporter), Collective 
Agreements, Synopsis of responses to questionnaire, 4 September 2006, page 2. This 
report can be found on the ILO website, under events. 
1818  These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Israel, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, 
United States and Venezuela. See: M. Blatman, Collective Agreements, Synopsis of 
responses to questionnaire, page 2.
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definition fits the above-mentioned criteria. however, it lacks the distinction in 
effects of collective agreements, which concerns the normative and obligatory 
effects.
5.2 Different types of provisions
All Researched Countries distinguish (sometimes for practical purposes only) 
between obligatory and (individual) normative provisions in a collective labour 
agreement. The obligatory provisions lay down the rights and obligations 
between the parties concluding the collective employment agreement. These 
may include provisions on the manner of termination of the collective labour 
agreement, the possible obligations to consult the counterparty in specific 
circumstances and a possible obligation to inform members on the collective 
labour agreement. In Germany, Belgium and in the Netherlands there is also 
an obligation on the contracting parties to take adequate measures to ensure 
that their members abide by the collective labour agreement, commonly 
referred to as the principle of good faith. Such a principle of good faith is 
recognised in all countries that participated in the above-mentioned ILO 
Research.1819 Most especially in Germany and in Belgium – and to a lesser 
extent in the Netherlands – a so-called peace obligation automatically forms 
part of the obligatory provisions of a collective labour agreement. however, 
in multiple other Member States this is not the case.1820
Individual normative provisions create rights and obligations between the 
contracting parties to an individual employment agreement (the employers 
and employees). These provisions are the quintessence of collective labour 
agreements. The individual normative provisions typically concern on the 
one hand working hours, working place and organisation of labour, and 
on the other the classification of positions, wage scales, education and wage 
indexation.1821
Collective normative provisions are recognised in the Netherlands, Germany 
and Belgium. These provisions basically arrange the collective employment 
relations. Their exact content varies from country to country, but all countries 
seem to have difficulties in clearly distinguishing this group of provisions 
1819  M. Blatman, Collective Agreements, Synopsis of responses to questionnaire, page 15.
1820  I.h.B. Waas, Omtrent het bestaan en de rechtsgrondslag van een vredesplicht in 
Europese collectieve (arbeids)overeenkomsten [Regarding the existence and the legal 
basis of a peace obligation in European collective (labour) agreements], Sociaal 
Recht 2004, page 153.
1821  See M. Blatman, Collective Agreements, Synopsis of responses to questionnaire, 
pages 40 ff.
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from individual normative provisions. In Great Britain, collective normative 
provisions are not recognised as such. Some terms in a British collective labour 
agreement, however, could be compared with collective normative provisions 
in the other Researched Countries. In all Researched Countries, except Great 
Britain, two “collective normative constructions” seem important. First, the 
collective labour agreement may provide for rights and obligation that arrange 
the relation between the employer and its entire personnel or an employee 
representative body. This construction even bears some relevance in Great 
Britain. Second, the collective labour agreement may provide for rights and 
obligations that arrange the relation between the employer and the employees 
vis-à-vis third collective parties, most notably funds. These constructions will 
be discussed in more detail in section 8.4 below. 
6. The players in the collective bargaining process
In the Researched Countries, there are several parties who play a role in the 
collective bargaining system, in all cases at least being: (i) the government, (ii) 
individual employers, (iii) trade union confederations and trade unions, and 
(iv) employers’ confederations and separate employers’ organisations.
The governments in the Researched Countries have only a limited involvement 
in the bargaining process. They typically enact legislation on collective labour 
agreements and provide for a structure in which collective bargaining takes 
place. The governments of Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium – as 
opposed to Great Britain’s government – furthermore play a role in extending 
collective labour agreements. 
In each of the Researched Countries individual employers (or a group of 
individual employers) are entitled to enter into collective labour agreements. 
There are no specific requirements that these employers must satisfy in that 
respect. 
That leaves us to the players that are - in the Researched Countries, but given 
section 5.1 above also in other Member States - most actively involved in 
the collective bargaining process: trade unions and confederations of trade 
unions on the one hand and employers’ organisations and confederations 
of employers’ organisations on the other. After all, besides the individual 
employer, they are the ones that conclude the collective labour agreements. 
however, trade unions and confederations of trade unions do not play the same 
role in all Researched Countries, as confederations do not actually conclude 
collective labour agreements in all of these countries. In those countries in 
which both the associations and the confederations are actively involved in 
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concluding collective labour agreements, the demands they must satisfy are 
the same. For that reason, hereinafter I will simply refer to “trade unions” 
when labour’s side of industry is meant, comprising employees’ associations 
and – for the countries in which they are of relevance for the conclusion of 
collective labour agreements – confederations of employees’ associations as 
well. When I refer to “employers’ organisations” this includes employers’ 
organisations and – again, for those countries in which confederations play 
a role in the collective bargaining process – confederations of employers’ 
organisations as well. 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations share a number of basic 
characteristics. Both organisations are intermediate organisations: they act 
as an interface between the state, the economy and their membership.1822 
They typically act on behalf  of their members and are normally involved in 
four types of activity: participation of members, representation of members, 
services to members and control over members.1823 Obviously, there are also 
differences between the both sides of the industry.
6.1 Trade unions
Trade unions are basically independent associations of employees, who have 
united to represent and defend their interests in the workplace, but also at the 
general level of the economy and politics.1824 
6.1.1 General features of trade unions
Although the status of a trade union differs extensively from Member State to 
Member State,1825 certain features typify trade unions in general terms. They 
usually:1826
1822  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 19.
1823  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 19. Ewing 
attributes five principal functions to trade unions: a service function, a 
representation function, a regulatory function, a government function and a public 
administration function (a function that involves the implementation of public 
policy that the union may have played part in creating). Reference is made to K.d. 
Ewing, The Function of Trade Unions, Industrial Law journal, March 2005. In my 
view the same functions can be attributed to employers’ organisations. 
1824  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 19.
1825  T. Schulten, Changes in national collective bargaining systems since 1990, page 6.
1826  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 19.
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•	 have	a	centralised	structure	and	a	division	of	work	between	a	network	of	
volunteers and a professional apparatus;1827
•	 are	recognised	in	the	Member	States	and	have	a	quasi	public	status;
•	 have	a	distributive	function	in	the	economy	(they	settle	wages)	and	also	
have a normative function (they are actively involved in setting labour 
regulations);
•	 represent	and	mobilise	their	members.
Obviously, the extent to which these characteristics apply to the trade unions 
differs per Member State. In Belgium, for example, (representative) trade 
unions are far more institutionalised and play a much more public role 
than in, for instance, Great Britain. Moreover, the influence of members in 
trade unions is of great importance in Germany, a country which requires a 
“democratic organisation”, and in Great Britain, which requires mandatory 
ballots for certain trade unions’ decisions. In Belgium, however, trade unions 
have to represent the interests of all employees and not just their members, 
which entitles them to take decisions that could violate the interests of 
individual members, but furthers the collective interests. 
6.1.2 Organisational structure
Most trade unions are organised on a sectoral or occupational base in 
Europe.1828 Moreover, confederations often are based on political and/or 
religious division.1829 Some countries, for example, Great Britain, only have 
one confederation.1830 Other countries, such as Germany, have one very strong 
confederation dominating the others.1831 In southern countries, such as Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, there are two strong confederations.1832 Other countries 
have complex and fragmented confederate structures, including France, 
hungary, Italy and Slovenia.1833 For an overview of the confederations in 
the Member States, reference is made to the European Commission’s report 
Industrial Relations 2006 pages 20 and 21.  
1827  See for a description of modern trade unions: A.T.j.M. jacobs, Het recht op 
collectief onderhandelen in rechtsvergelijkend en Europees perspectief, pages 35 ff.
1828  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 19.
1829  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 20.
1830  Which is the Trade Union Congress. Other Member States with only one 
confederation are Austria, Ireland, Latvia and Slovakia. See European 
Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 19.
1831  Which is the deutscher Gewerkschaftbund. The same applies to the Czech 
Republic. See European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 19.
1832  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 19.
1833  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 19.
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6.1.3 Other features
In all Member States trade unions are entitled to enter into collective labour 
agreements. however, these trade unions are usually subject to a number of 
requirements in order to do so. Some of these requirements are basically the 
same in all Researched Countries, while others vary considerably.
A trade union must, in all Researched Countries, be an organisation. In the 
Netherlands, this organisation must, by law, be an association having legal 
personality. In Germany, Belgium and Great Britain this is not the case. In 
these countries trade unions that are lacking legal personality have some 
form of functional legal personality, enabling these organisations to perform 
those acts that are necessary in the collective bargaining process. Trade unions 
must furthermore pursue the advancement of employment relations and 
conditions. In the Netherlands and in Germany, the trade union’s articles of 
associations must even specifically stipulate the union’s power to enter into 
collective labour agreements.
There are important differences in the Researched Countries when it comes 
to independence and representativness of trade unions. Many of the specific 
German requirements of the trade unions – they must surpass company 
level, possess real powers and be sufficiently prepared to enter into collective 
bargaining – can be brought back to these topics. Independence and 
representativness of trade unions will be discussed in section 11 below. Other 
specific national demands are sometimes unique for the different Member 
States. Great Britain’s demand that trade unions must wholly or mainly consist 
of workers, for example, is not to be found in the other countries, although it 
can be safely assumed that an important part of the trade unions members in 
these other countries are workers as well.1834 The same goes for the German 
demand that trade unions should acknowledge the German laws on collective 
bargaining and collective action.
6.2 Employers’ organisations
Employers’ organisations are in many ways the counterparts of trade unions. 
Broadly spoken, employers’ organisations are bodies designed to organise and 
advance the collective interests that employers have in the labour market and 
1834  Although it must be noted that a significant proportion of trade union members 
has in fact retired from the labour market. Research of Visser indicates that 
on average this is 17.2% in the 14 Member States he studied. j. Visser, Union 
membership statistics in 24 countries, page 42.
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industrial relations.1835 Employers’ organisations tend to be of importance 
for the existence of multi-employer collective bargaining and statutory 
provisions for extending collective labour agreements,1836 as often collective 
labour agreements can only be extended when concluded with employers’ 
organisations as opposed to individual employers.1837
6.2.1 General features of employers’ organisations
Employers’ organisations differ widely in terms of structure, membership 
basis and tasks across Europe.1838 however, EIRO research identified three 
core areas of activity national employer peak associations deploy,1839 research 
which covered most of the Member States (all Member States from the 
beginning of 2004, as well as the then candidate countries hungary and 
Slovenia). These peak associations are involved in:1840
•	 bipartite	or	 tripartite	 “corporatist”	 institutions,	with	 the	 exception	of	
Great Britain;1841 
•	 political	 lobbying	 on	 various	 issues,	mostly	 in	 the	 field	 of	 the	 labour	
market, industrial relations, welfare and economic policy; and 
•	 collective	 bargaining,	 either	 by	 way	 of	 directly	 negotiating collective 
agreements with trade unions or by coordinating the bargaining activi-
ties of their affiliates (in Luxembourg and Great Britain, however, nati-
onal employer peak associations do not fulfil this activity).   
Besides these activities, employers’ organisations tend to provide their 
members with expert services in industrial relations matters.1842
1835  Reference is made to the EIRO publication from M. Behrens and F. Traxler, 
Employers’ organisations in Europe, 5 April 2004, pages 1 and 3.
1836  M. Behrens and F. Traxler, Employers’ organisations in Europe, page 1.
1837  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 32.
1838  M. Behrens and F. Traxler, Employers’ organisations in Europe, page 1.
1839  These are organisations that (i) are independent, that is not subordinate to their 
members, (ii) are organised at national or inter-sectoral level, and (iii) must also 
fulfil tasks of a pure employers’ organisation, that is it must be specialised in 
representing interests related to the labour market and industrial relations. See M. 
Behrens and F. Traxler, Employers’ organisations in Europe, pages 3 – 5.
1840  M. Behrens and F. Traxler, Employers’ organisations in Europe, page 16.
1841  In Great Britain national employer peak associations are often appointed as 
competent individuals rather than as official representatives of an employers’ 
association. M. Behrens and F. Traxler, Employers’ organisations in Europe, page 
18. 
1842  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 32.
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6.2.2 Organisational structure
The organisational structures of the different employers’ organisations are 
very fragmented. The probable reason for this is that employers’ organisations 
normally have to organise companies with often diverging interests, such as 
competitors or “critically intertwined companies” (for instance, buyers and 
sellers of the same product or service providers and service receivers).1843 
In general, sectoral or branch organisations are the strongest employers’ 
organisations in the Member States.1844 however, it is not unusual for small 
and medium sized companies to unite as well.1845 Every Member State has 
employers’ umbrella organisations and employers’ peak federations.1846 
Their role differs from country to country. In, for example, Finland, France, 
Germany, hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden 
and Great Britain employers’ organisations affiliated to employers’ umbrella 
organisations and employers’ peak federations enjoy a rather substantial 
autonomy and operate fairly independently. The emphasis of employers’ 
interest representation is, in this field, at the level of the affiliates rather than 
at the umbrella organisations’ level. The lower-level employers’ organisations 
are, in such a case, leading in collective bargaining,1847 although the umbrella 
organisations’ coordination role can still be of importance. By contrast, in 
a number of other Member States (such as Belgium, denmark, Greece and 
Slovenia), the employers’ peak federations’ power vis-à-vis their affiliates is 
more substantial. This even includes the right either to negotiate collective 
agreements directly, or to impose certain bargaining goals on their affiliates.1848 
For a general overview of some of the employers’ organisations in the Member 
States, reference is made to the European Commission’s report Industrial 
Relations 2006 pages 34 and 35.
1843  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 33.
1844  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 33.
1845  This is, for example, the case in Belgium, France, Greece, hungary, Italy, 
Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia. See European 
Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 36. See also M. Behrens and 
F. Traxler, Employers’ organisations in Europe, page 7.
1846  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 36.
1847  M. Behrens and F. Traxler, Employers’ organisations in Europe, page 17.
1848  M. Behrens and F. Traxler, Employers’ organisations in Europe, page 17.
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6.2.3 Other features
Basically, employers’ organisations in the Researched Countries should satisfy 
the same requirements as trade unions do in order to be eligible to participate 
in collective bargaining and to conclude collective labour agreements. For 
these requirements I refer to the comments concerning the trade unions made 
above. Matters such as independence and representativeness play no, or at 
least a different, role for employers’ organisations, as will be set out in section 
10 below. Moreover, generally the test of whether the employers’ organisations 
satisfy the relevant requirements seems to be applied a bit more leniently when 
compared to trade unions. The Federal Labour Court explicitly ruled in this 
way for the German situation and the same seems to apply for the situation 
in Great Britain.
7. The negotiation process / conclusion of 
a collective labour agreement
The negotiation process in the Researched Countries is basically a free and 
voluntary process, based on mutual recognition. The parties involved are 
free to choose whether they wish to enter into a collective labour agreement. 
Should they wish to enter into collective bargaining they are, to a varying 
degree, free to choose with whom. 
In all Researched Countries parties are free to choose to enter into collective 
bargaining (save some exceptions)1849 and subsequently whether they actually 
reach an agreement. This is a voluntary process; a party cannot be forced by 
law to conclude a collective labour agreement (it can, obviously, be forced 
to do so by collective actions).1850 This is in line with the right to collective 
bargaining which is laid out in international instruments.1851 The Convention 
for the Protection of human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms the European 
1849  In some circumstances an employer is obliged to consult the relevant trade 
unions. Reference is made to section 6 in chapters 9 through 12. See also R. 
Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective Collective 
Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), page 276.
1850  In France, for example, companies can sometimes be obliged to bargain with 
representative trade unions in good faith, but they can not be obliged to actually 
reach an agreement. See M.A. Moreau, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report France, page 46. The report can 
be found on: http://www.unifi.it/polo-universitario-europeo/ricerche/collective_
bargaining.html. See also R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a 
Comparative Perspective Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ 
Participation (Part I), page 276.
1851  Reference is made to chapter 8, section 3.1. 
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Court of human Rights’ case law emphasise the voluntary nature of collective 
bargaining and the conclusion of collective agreements. The European Social 
Charter and ILO Convention C98 also explicitly refer to voluntary bargaining. 
The freedom to bargaining voluntarily is therefore an important principle.
The bargaining parties in the Researched Countries are, to a varying degree, 
also free to choose with whom the collective labour agreement is concluded. 
This freedom is, however, considerably less absolute than the freedom to choose 
whether or not to enter into collective bargaining and to conclude a collective 
labour agreement. When it concerns sectoral or cross-industry collective 
labour agreements in Belgium, for example, the parties involved need to 
conclude these agreements in joint bodies that are comprised of representative 
social partners appointed by the government. In all cases the social partners 
need to be representative. Employers in Great Britain are obliged, after the 
statutory recognition of a trade union by a company, to continue with that 
trade union should it choose to enter into a collective labour agreement. In 
Germany, the contracting parties involved should be competent to enter into 
a specific collective labour agreement (Tarifzuständigkeit). More in general, 
limitations on whom to choose as a bargaining partner are not unique in 
Europe. Countries most notably demand that bargaining occurs with (the 
most) representative counterparty and many countries have introduced legal 
requirements to that effect.1852 The demands on representativity are diverse 
and will be discussed in section 10 below.
8. The effects of the collective labour agreement
As has been done in the Researched Countries, the consequences of a validly 
concluded collective labour agreement should be assessed from a “European 
perspective”. It should be established (i) to whom the collective labour 
agreement applies, (ii) what effects such an application has, and (iii) how the 
parties involved can enforce their rights. These questions are answered for the 
standard 4 scenarios and will be discussed in sections 8.1 through 8.4 below. 
Section 8.5 concerns possible other means of enforcement that are in place 
in the Researched Countries in the case of a breach of the collective labour 
agreement. Section 8.6 sets out the “special” consequence collective labour 
agreements may have: they may set aside specific statutory provisions. Section 
1852  As Kirton-darling put it: “In many states in which trade union pluralism is a 
strong feature of the organisational landscape, most notably several continental 
and southern countries, representativeness is a legal requirement for participation 
in the negotiation and consultation committees.” See j. Kirton-darling (ed.), 
Representativeness of Public Sector Trade Unions in Europe, State Administration 
and Local Government Sectors, page 14.
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8.7 focuses on the term and termination of collective labour agreements in 
the Researched Countries and section 8.8 discusses the collective labour 
agreement’s possible after-effects. Finally, section 8.9 relates to the role of 
alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining in Europe.
8.1 Scenario 1
In the Netherlands and in Germany, the manner in which the contracting 
parties are bound towards each other by the (obligatory provisions of the) 
collective labour agreement is rather straight forward. These parties need, by 
law, to oblige these provisions and are liable in the case of non-compliance. 
In both countries, the contracting associations are under the obligation to 
urge their members to fulfil the obligations arising from the collective labour 
agreement, but they do not have to guarantee this. The same holds true for 
Belgium (as the common opinion is that obligatory provisions are binding 
by law), although the contracting associations are, by law, protected from 
payment of damages upon breach of the collective labour agreement (unless 
it is specifically stipulated otherwise in the agreement, which in practice never 
happens). Moreover, enforcing obligatory provisions in Belgium is not without 
difficulties, as most contracting organisations (including all employees’ 
organisations) do not have legal personality. The situation is entirely different 
in Great Britain, as collective labour agreements are considered a mere 
gentleman’s agreement, unless specifically stated otherwise in the agreement 
(which in practice rarely, if  ever, happens). As collective labour agreements are 
in principle not binding upon the signatory parties, there is no remedy by law 
if  one of the parties fails to comply with the collective labour agreement. The 
ultimate sanction for a breach of the collective labour agreement is industrial 
action. 
The lack of binding legal effects of the (obligatory provisions of the) collective 
labour agreement in Great Britain is in sharp contrast with the situation in 
the continental European countries.1853 In fact, an overwhelming majority of 
the reports from the continental countries participating in the research “The 
evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004” led by 
Sciarra explicitly noted that in their jurisdiction collective labour agreements 
1853  But is in line with the other non-continental Member State: Ireland. Reference is 
made to A. Kerr, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 
2004; National Report Ireland, page 6.
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bind the signatory parties by contract.1854 The situation in Great Britain when 
compared to continental Europe even led the danish reporter Nielsen to state: 
“there are profound differences between the UK, on the one hand, and the 
continental European countries, on the other, with regard to the legal effects 
of collective agreements”. 1855 
8.2 Scenario 2
In the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium the (individual normative) legal 
norms of the collective labour agreement should be applied to those employers 
and employees who both (i) are bound by and (ii) fall within the scope of 
applicability of said agreement. The effects of the (individual normative) 
legal provisions in these countries are broadly the same. The system in Great 
Britain is radically different.
8.2.1 Which employers and employees are bound by 
the collective labour agreement?
Employers in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Great Britain are 
bound by a collective labour agreement if  they are (a) members of one of the 
contracting employers’ association or (b) entered into the collective labour 
agreement themselves. This is a widely accepted situation in Europe, respecting 
the autonomy of the individual employer.1856 Employees in Germany and the 
Netherlands are bound by the collective labour agreement if  they are member 
of the contracting trade union; in Belgium all employees of bound employers 
are automatically bound by the collective labour agreement, regardless of 
their possible trade union membership. In Great Britain only those employees 
are bound by the collective labour agreement whose individual employment 
1854  Most participants clearly stated so in their report. Some reports, however, did 
not mention the possible binding force of obligatory provisions at all. P. xuereb 
from Malta mentioned that the possible binding power of obligatory provisions in 
collective labour agreements in Malta actually was subject to litigation that at the 
moment of drafting that report was not yet finished. Reference is made to  
P. xuereb, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Malta, pages 26 and 27.
1855  R. Nielsen, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Denmark, page 15. This finding is also acknowledged by  
R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
page 277.
1856  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
pages 281 and 282. 
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agreement incorporates the collective labour agreement, regardless of any 
trade union membership issues.
8.2.2 Which employers and employees fall within the collective 
labour agreement’s scope of application?
In all Researched Countries, the social partners themselves determine the 
scope of application of the collective labour agreement in that agreement. 
Logically, a number of elements need to be taken into account in that respect, 
such as: (i) the group of employees falling within the scope of the collective 
labour agreement; (ii) the employer or group of employers falling within the 
scope of the collective labour agreement; (iii) the geographical territory; and 
(iv) the duration of the agreement.
8.2.3 What are the legal consequences?
The (individual normative) provisions of the collective labour agreement apply 
directly, and with mandatory effect, to the individual employment agreement 
of the bound employer and the bound employee in the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Germany. This means that every normative provision of the collective 
labour agreement automatically applies to the individual employment 
agreement, modelling the individual employment agreement and setting 
aside possible from the collective labour agreement deviating provisions. 
This is a typical situation in Europe: the collective labour agreement sets, 
in a mandatory fashion, the employment conditions for the employer and 
employee that are both bound by the collective labour agreement.1857 
The situation in Great Britain, however, is entirely different. Neither common 
law nor TULRA awards direct normative effect to collective labour agreements. 
The terms that are of an individual nature of the collective labour agreement 
(comparable to individual normative provisions) only apply to the relation 
between the employer and the employee if  they have been incorporated 
into the individual employment contract, regardless of whether both the 
employer and the employee are bound by the collective labour agreement 
or not. The individual employer and employee should thus agree that the 
individual terms of the collective labour agreement are to form part of the 
employment contract. After being incorporated, the terms are applicable 
to the agreement and are legally binding. Variations to the collective labour 
1857  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
page 277.
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agreement automatically vary the terms of employment, provided that the 
individual employment contract incorporates a collective labour agreement 
as is currently in force. This sets Great Britain, together with Ireland, off  from 
the continental Member States.1858
8.2.4 Deviation from the collective labour agreement in 
the individual employment agreement
In the Netherlands and in Belgium it is important to distinguish between 
different sorts of normative provisions of the collective labour agreement, 
which can be standard, minimum or maximum. If  a provision is standard, it 
does not allow for any variation of that provision in individual employment 
contracts. A minimum provision allows departure in the individual employment 
contract in favour of the employee. Maximum provisions in collective labour 
agreements may not be exceeded in individual employment agreements. In 
both Belgium and in the Netherlands minimum provisions are the rule: a 
provision is deemed to be a minimum provision, unless stated otherwise. In 
some countries, such as Sweden, this is the other way around: a provision is 
deemed to be a standard provision, unless stated otherwise.1859 This is a system 
in which provisions of a collective labour agreement are mutually compulsory: 
the parties of the individual employment agreement are not allowed any 
deviation, if  the provision of the collective labour agreement does not allow 
such deviation, whether in the employee’s favour or to his detriment.1860
In Germany all provisions are, by law, minimum provisions. This “principle 
of favour” is not unusual when compared to other Member States,1861 and is 
1858  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
page 278.
1859  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
page 278.
1860  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
page 278.
1861  On the basis of the principle of favour “collective labour agreements can only 
improve economic and working conditions”. Reference is made to European 
Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 51 and to S. Sciarra, The 
evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; Draft General 
Report, page 27. how this principle of favour relates to possible after-effects that 
terms of a collective labour agreement can have will be discussed in section 8.8 of 
this chapter and section 4.4 of chapter 16.
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even recommended by the ILO.1862 Provisions in collective labour agreements 
in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia are, by law, minimum provisions as well. The Baltic countries also 
enforce the principle of favour, and Cyprus and Greece to a certain extent.1863 
however, it should be noted that exceptions to this principle of favour are 
common in all systems.1864 In Germany, for example, an exception to this 
principle can follow from specific acts which can allow collective labour 
agreements to deviate from legal standards, a method that will be discussed 
further in section 8.6 below. The principle of favour with its exceptions has, 
more in general, a wide support as can be concluded from the ILO-report, 
which states:1865
The principle of “favour” to the employee is still “firmly” rooted in many countries. 
When there are exceptions, they are framed either by law or regulation or by 
superior collective agreements.
In this system the provisions of a collective labour agreement are unilaterally 
compulsory: the parties of the individual employment agreement may deviate 
from the collective labour agreement only in favour of the employee and his 
position, and may not deviate to his detriment.1866
In Great Britain, there is no relevant difference between provisions of a 
minimum, maximum or fixed nature. The employer and employee may freely 
decide to deviate from a term deriving from a collective labour agreement 
that is incorporated in the employment agreement. The same holds true 
for Ireland. In this system the provisions of a collective labour agreement 
are supplemental: the parties of the individual employment agreement may 
deviate in both directions; their private autonomy remains unrestricted.1867
1862  Article 3.3 of ILO Recommendation R91 states: “stipulations in contracts of 
employment which are more favourable to the workers than those prescribed 
by a collective agreement should not be regarded as contrary to the collective 
agreement”.
1863  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 51.
1864  S. Sciarra, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
Draft General Report, page 27.
1865  M. Blatman (general reporter), Collective Agreements, Synopsis of responses to 
questionnaire, page 61.
1866  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
page 278.
1867  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
page 278.
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8.2.5 Enforcement
In the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany the (individual normative) terms 
of the applicable collective labour agreement have a direct normative effect, 
and therefore become part of the individual employment agreement. As a 
consequence, both the employer and the employee must abide by the content 
of that collective labour agreement, on pain of being in breach of contract. 
Should a party breach the contract, the aggrieved party can claim specific 
performance and/or damages. This is a rather common model in Europe.1868
In Great Britain, the bound employee can neither enforce the collective 
labour agreement as against the bound employer nor does the content of 
that collective agreement have direct normative effect. he can, however, 
enforce terms of collective labour agreements that are incorporated into his 
individual employment contract. The same applies to the employer. Upon 
breach of a contractual term, the aggrieved party can also under common 
law claim damages and/or specific performance. Besides Great Britain, also 
Ireland abides to this system.1869 
A third system can be witnessed in Europe as well, especially in the 
Scandinavian countries. here the employer is only obliged to act in accordance 
with the collective labour agreement vis-à-vis the contracting trade union(s). 
Only these trade union(s) have a cause of action, excluding the individual 
employees.1870 
8.3 Scenario 3
If  the employer is not bound by the collective labour agreement while the 
employee is, the collective labour agreement does not apply on the basis of 
statute in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. This is also the case in 
1868  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
page 277.
1869  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
page 278.
1870  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
page 277. This system is, for instance, in place in Sweden, denmark and Finland.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 13
612
Great Britain, as the collective labour agreement is not legally binding anyhow. 
This is also the general rule in Europe.1871
If  the employer is bound by the collective labour agreement while the 
employee is not, the collective labour agreement does not apply automatically 
in Germany and the Netherlands. however, in the Netherlands – as opposed 
to Germany - the employer still is obliged to apply the agreement. In Great 
Britain, the collective labour agreement would not apply in this situation either, 
nor would the employer be under duty to apply that agreement. however, in 
all three countries it is possible and common to arrange in the individual 
employment agreement that a specific collective labour agreement applies 
to an employee who is not bound. This is done by using a reference clause, 
stipulating that a specific collective labour agreement applies. In such a case, 
the collective labour agreement will govern that employment agreement.
The above situation is quite different in Belgium. In Belgium, merely the 
position of the employer is relevant when determining whether the collective 
labour agreement applies directly in the relation between the employer and 
the employee. A collective labour agreement applies to an employment 
agreement in the situation that the employer is bound, regardless of whether 
the employee is bound or not. This system is far from unique in the EU. It 
is applied, although to a differing extent, in 18 of 25 Member States as the 
following table shows:1872
1871  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
pages 281 and 282. Rebhahn also deals with a number of exceptions to this rule on 
said pages. 
1872  This table literally derives from: T. Schulten, Changes in national collective 
bargaining systems since 1990, pages 6 and 7, table 2, with the exception of the 
footnote.
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Employees covered by collective agreements 
Only employees who belong 
to the parties signatory to the 
agreement (eg trade union 
members) 
All employees working for an 
employer that is covered by an 
agreement 
Austria . x
Belgium . x
Bulgaria x .
Cyprus . x
Czech Republic . x
denmark . x
Estonia x .
Finland x* x*
France . x
Germany x .
Greece . x
hungary . x
Ireland x .
Italy . x
Latvia x .
Lithuania x** x**
Malta . x
Netherlands . x1873
Poland . x
Romania x
Slovakia . x
Slovenia . x
Spain . x
Sweden x .
UK . x
* There are agreements with ‘normal’ applicability covering trade union members only and 
agreements with erga omnes applicability covering all employees. ** National and sectoral 
agreements cover only trade union members, while company agreements cover all employees 
of the company.
c1873
As shows from this table, many national collective labour agreements have an 
erga omnes effect, binding all employees employed by the bound employer, 
regardless of these employees’ possible membership of a contracting trade 
union. It is argued by Rebhahn that an important aim for having this erga 
omnes effect is to achieve uniform working conditions for which the collective 
1873 It should be noted that the bound employer should apply the collective labour 
agreement to all employees employed by him (article 14 ACLA), but that the 
agreement does not automatically apply to all of these employees.
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labour agreement, besides the individual employment agreement, is regarded 
a proper tool.1874
8.4 Scenario 4
In the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, collective normative provisions 
can play an important role. In these countries there are basically two important 
constructions with regard to collective normative provisions, which will be 
discussed below. British law merely distinguishes between terms that are of 
an individual nature and those that are of a collective nature; “real” collective 
normative provisions are not in place. however, some terms in a British 
collective labour agreement could be compared with collective normative 
provisions. 
First, collective labour agreement in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium 
may provide for rights and obligation that arrange the relation between the 
employer and its entire personnel (most explicit in Germany) or an employee 
representative body (the Works Council or even, in Belgium, a union 
delegation). The employer who is bound by the collective labour agreement 
should apply these collective normative provisions in these three countries. 
Some terms in a British collective labour agreement could be compared 
with this type of collective normative provisions. This is, for example, the 
case should a collective labour agreement arrange specific rights that union 
officials (shop stewards) enjoy, such as granting them the free use of facilities 
at the individual employer’s premises. Such provisions bear resemblance to 
provisions on the Belgian union delegation. however, counter to the situation 
in Belgium, these terms only bind in honour in Great Britain.
Second, a collective labour agreement may provide for rights and obligations 
that arrange the relation between the employer and the employees vis-à-vis 
third collective parties, most notably funds. In Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium it is possible to arrange (binding) legal relations concerning such 
funds, including the right of these funds to collect contributions directly from 
bound employers, and the rights of (bound) employees to a direct entitlement 
1874  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
page 284. Another argument mentioned by Rebhahn is that the erga omnes effect 
may prevent competition of employees in an enterprise with unfavourable working 
conditions: employers should not be able to take advantage of the fact that some 
employees do not join a trade union. I do not regard this a particular strong 
argument. It just as well can be argued that employees who refuse to join a trade 
union should not be allowed to benefit from the sacrifices made by employees who 
are a trade union member: free riders behaviour should not be rewarded.
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towards these funds. In Belgium all employees employed by a bound employer 
can enjoy such a right, while in Germany this is only the case with regard to 
members of the contracting trade unions. In the Netherlands, it is questionable 
whether collective normative provisions should be applied to employees who 
are not bound by the collective labour agreement through membership of 
the contracting trade unions. however, if  these employees have accepted the 
collective labour agreement, most notably through a reference clause, the 
collective normative provisions should certainly be applied. In Great Britain, 
provisions on funds are, in principle, not considered (a part of) a collective 
labour agreement, since the subject matter does not concern a statutory 
bargaining topic. Such agreements are therefore “extra-statutory” agreements, 
which are subject to common law. Such agreements are, in principle, not 
legally enforceable, unless the specific circumstances demonstrate a contrary 
intention of the contracting parties. 
8.5 Other statutory means of enforcement
In the Researched Countries, a number of general means of enforcement of 
the collective labour agreement are to be found. There are also specific means 
of enforcing provisions of a collective labour agreement, depending on the 
nature of the provisions at stake.
8.5.1 General means of enforcement
Employee representative institutions may play an important role in the 
enforcement of collective labour agreements. This is the case in Germany, the 
Netherlands and Belgium, countries in which employee representative bodies 
(the Works Council or the union delegation) may verify whether the employer 
actually obliges the provisions of an applicable collective labour agreement. 
Although this power is not institutionalised in Great Britain, it is logical that 
a shop steward verifies whether his employer obliges the provisions of an 
applicable collective labour agreement as well. These employee representative 
institutions do not act on a possible breach of the collective labour agreement 
by the employer themselves, but they are likely to inform the contracting trade 
unions of such a breach. 
In the Netherlands, Germany and Great Britain the government plays no real 
role in verifying whether the collective labour agreement is applied correctly. 
In Belgium, however, the BACLA is enforced by officers of the judicial police 
and civil servant appointed by the Crown. Furthermore, collective labour 
agreements in Belgium may confer the power to sanction offenders who do 
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not abide by the rules set out in the collective labour agreement to the joint 
committees or sub-committees. 
8.5.2 Enforcement of obligatory provisions
As already mentioned in scenario 1, the usual remedy of a breach of an 
obligatory provision is for the counterparty to institute proceedings on the 
basis of breach of contract. This is common in many continental Member 
States. however, in Great Britain and Ireland this is different, as in these 
countries collective labour agreements only bind in honour. The ultimate 
means of enforcement in said jurisdictions is to call for collective actions. 
8.5.3 Enforcement of individual normative provisions
Once a collective labour agreement applies to the employment agreement, 
(in Great Britain by incorporating the collective labour agreement in the 
employment contract) the individual normative provisions should be obliged. 
Upon breach of a contractual term, the aggrieved party can claim damages and/
or specific performance. In the Netherlands and in Belgium, the contracting 
trade unions may play an important role in enforcing individual normative 
provisions as well. They may initiate proceedings against the employer in 
breach, and may claim specific performance and in the Netherlands even 
damages. This is different in Germany; only in specific situations can trade 
unions start litigation against the employer in breach of individual normative 
provisions. In some other continental European Member States, such as in 
Finland, denmark and Sweden, only contracting trade unions are entitled 
to start litigation against the employer upon breach of individual normative 
provisions, excluding the individual employees.1875 In Great Britain, as said, 
the union’s ultimate response to an employer in breach of a collective labour 
agreement is engaging in collective actions. 
8.5.4 Enforcement of collective normative provisions
The collectivities themselves may enforce collective normative provisions of 
a collective labour agreement in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. In 
these three countries, the contracting parties may also enforce the collective 
normative provisions of a collective labour agreement. Signatory trade 
unions may, for example, instigate proceedings against the employer who 
1875  R. Rebhahn, Collective Labour Law in Europe in a Comparative Perspective 
Collective Agreements, Settlement of Disputes and Workers’ Participation (Part I), 
pages 277 and 280.
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refuses to pay contributions due to a fund. This is obviously different in Great 
Britain, as collective labour agreements do not, in principle, contain collective 
normative provisions. If  they do contain similar provisions, these provisions 
are not binding by law. 
8.6 Special legal consequences of a collective 
labour agreement: ¾ mandatory law
The laws of all Researched Counties contain provisions that can be set aside 
by a collective labour agreement, as opposed to by “just” an individual 
employment agreement. These provisions will be referred to as provisions of 
¾ mandatory law. Setting aside such provisions is usually to the disadvantage 
of employees and creates more flexibility for the employers. dorssemont 
refers to this as a system of flexicurity: in collective bargaining flexibility is 
exchanged for setting security on the limits of that flexibility.1876 In Germany, 
this system of ¾ mandatory law constitutes an important exception to the 
already discussed principle of favour.
This system of ¾ mandatory law sits well in a European context. It is not 
unusual for directives to stipulate that collective labour agreements may 
deviate from standard norms. In particular, with regard to working time, 
fixed-time and part-time work – all areas that are covered by EU legislation – 
it is becoming increasingly usual that derogations from the law are arranged 
in collective labour agreements.1877 More and more Member States have 
introduced a system of ¾ mandatory law and the Industrial Relations in 
Europe 2006 Report even views this as an “increasing trend”.1878 The system 
is particularly well established in the Netherlands, denmark and Sweden.1879 
It can be viewed as a part of the subsidiary role collective labour agreements 
can have in relation to statutory law: statutory law can be tailored on the 
appropriate level by collective labour agreements.1880 
1876  F. dorssemont, Green Paper Modernising Labour Law to meet the Challenges of the 
21st Century, ‘Collectief Arbeidsrecht, waer bestu bleven?’, page 153. 
1877  S. Sciarra, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
Draft General Report, page 42. Typically, directives that are transposed agreements 
of the European social partners concluded in the context of the European social 
dialogue contain such stipulations of ¾ mandatory law. See also: F. dorssemont, 
Green Paper Modernising Labour Law to meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, 
‘Collectief Arbeidsrecht, waer bestu bleven?’, page 153. 
1878  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 10.
1879  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, pages 52 and 53.
1880  See also: S. Sciarra, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 
2004; Draft General Report, page 30.
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8.7 Term and termination
In all Researched Countries the freedom of contract plays an important role 
when it comes to term and termination of the collective labour agreement. 
Consequently, the contracting parties are free to establish the date on which 
their collective labour agreement enters into force and whether the legal norms 
of the collective labour agreement have retro-effect. Moreover, the signatory 
parties are free to establish the duration of the collective labour agreement. 
here, the position of the social partners in the Netherlands is limited 
somewhat, as it is not possible to conclude a collective labour agreement with 
a duration exceeding 5 years.
When it comes to termination there are certain differences between the 
Researched Countries. Termination is easy in Great Britain, as a (non 
binding) collective labour agreement can be terminated at any time, with or 
without notice given. In the Netherlands, collective labour agreements can 
be terminated by notice at the end of their term. Should a collective labour 
agreement not be terminated by notice, the agreement is considered to be 
(tacitly) renewed after termination of its original term for the same term, 
but not exceeding one year, unless stipulated otherwise in the agreement. In 
fact, this system bears quite a resemblance with a system permitting collective 
labour agreements for indefinite duration, as the contracting parties have to 
actively terminate the collective labour agreement in order for that agreement 
to end. In Belgium and Germany a collective labour agreement entered into 
for a fixed period of time ends by operation of law at the end of its term, unless 
stipulated otherwise in the agreement. A collective labour agreement entered 
into for an indefinite period of time can be terminated by notice. In Belgium, 
however, it is possible to stipulate that the agreement cannot be terminated 
by notice at all. In all Researched Countries it is possible to terminate the 
collective labour agreement by mutual consent.
8.8 After-effects
The general rule of contract law is that the effects of an agreement end upon 
termination of that agreement. In all Researched Countries, that is the case 
with regard to the obligatory provisions of a collective labour agreement; 
they lose force after the collective labour agreement has expired. Matters are, 
however, more complicated with regard to individual and collective normative 
provisions. 
Once a collective labour agreement applies to the employment agreement 
(in Great Britain by incorporating the collective labour agreement in the 
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employment contract) the individual normative provisions have after-effects 
in all Researched Countries. That means that these provisions retain their 
force after expiry of that collective labour agreement. This is only different if  
the collective labour agreement specifically stipulates otherwise. The employer 
and employee are, however, after expiry of the collective labour agreement1881 
entitled to change the content of the individual employment contract should 
they wish so, observing the rules applicable for such a change in the different 
countries, in fact terminating the collective labour agreement’s after-effects. 
That makes sense, as the expiry of the term of the collective labour agreement 
restores the full contractual freedom of the employer and the employee. In 
all Researched Countries, the after-effects are also terminated once a new 
collective labour agreement applies.
There are practical and social arguments that make attributing after-effects 
to individual normative provisions logical. After-effects arrange the period 
between two subsequent collective labour agreements and therefore contribute 
to rest and tranquillity in the relevant company or sector. Moreover, if  after-
effects of individual normative provisions were to be denied, the employee 
would upon expiry of the collective labour agreement fall back on his “old” 
employment conditions. Especially if  the collective labour agreement had 
lasted a considerable period of time, the termination of the collective labour 
agreement would likely mean a “free-fall” in employment conditions for the 
employee involved, which is hardly acceptable from a social point of view. 
But from an administrative perspective this would also potentially constitute 
problems, as it would be difficult to exactly establish the old employment 
conditions. 
From a legal perspective there are also arguments in favour of attributing 
after-effects to individual normative provisions. If  an applicable collective 
labour agreement tacitly amends the employment contract, in fact altering 
the employment conditions, it makes sense that the “mere” termination of 
the collective labour agreement does not undo all changes. This argument, 
however, potentially involves difficulties for the social partners. If  the collective 
labour agreement fully and unconditionally (for indefinite duration) changes 
the individual employment conditions, there is no real need for any theory 
on “after-effects”. In such a case, the employment agreement is just changed, 
which can only be made undone by changing the employment agreement 
itself  again. This does not necessarily constitute a problem in countries like 
1881  In Great Britain, however, the employer and employee may also change the 
individual employment agreement that has been altered by an applicable collective 
labour agreement during the term of that agreement. 
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Belgium, the Netherlands and Great Britain, in which countries new collective 
labour agreements may alter employment conditions to the detriment of the 
employee. In consequence, the social partners in these countries still have 
ample room to negotiate new terms, without being hindered by the after-
effects of the previous collective labour agreement. In other words, in these 
countries the after-effects can be terminated by a subsequent collective labour 
agreement, regardless of whether any arrangement on after-effects would be 
in place. That is different in countries such as Germany, where the principle of 
favour is in force. Should the after-effects of individual normative provisions 
have indefinite duration, in fact unconditionally changing the employment 
conditions of the individual employee, the social partners cannot make these 
after-effects undone in a subsequent collective labour agreement (to the 
detriment of the employees). This would lead to a static bargaining situation. 
In Germany, however, the after-effects have no indefinite duration, but lapse 
at the moment new arrangements have been put in place, which includes a new 
collective labour agreement.1882 This restores the dynamics that are needed for 
proper industrial relations. Given the above, a proper arrangement on after-
effects is particularly important in a system that is based on the principle of 
favour.1883 
As stated above, all Researched Countries attribute after-effects to the 
individual normative provisions. The situation is more diverse when it comes 
to collective normative provisions. In Germany these provisions have after-
effects. This is not the case in the Netherlands, Belgium or Great Britain. 
Collective normative provisions that also apply individually do have after-
effects in Belgium.
8.9 The role of alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining
In all Researched Countries alternative dispute resolution mechanisms play 
a part in collective labour law, including collective labour agreements. In 
variable degrees this holds true for all Member States. Alternative dispute 
resolution may be applied both in the process of negotiating a new collective 
labour agreement in order to tackle controversies on the content of specific 
stipulations, as well as after the collective labour agreement is concluded, 
in case a dispute arises on the proper execution of said agreement. It may 
invigorate the collective bargaining process, increase the chances of reaching 
1882  Reference is made to chapter 10, section 7.8.
1883  Which observation will be discussed in detail in chapter 16, section 5 for the 
proposed European system on transnational collective labour agreements. 
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an agreement and improve the quality and effectiveness of the negotiation 
process and its outcome.1884 
Basically, three mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution are often applied 
within the EU: conciliation, mediation and arbitration.1885 Conciliation uses 
the expertise of a neutral third party to assist negotiations and foster agreement 
among the social partners. Mediation takes one additional step, as the neutral 
third party may even make recommendations. Arbitration goes beyond that, as 
is allows the third party to unilaterally end the dispute between the parties.1886 
In some Member States dispute resolution is free and autonomous; while in 
others compulsory dispute resolution exists.1887 As a rule, alternative dispute 
resolution is mostly applied to disputes of interest (as opposed to disputes of 
law). In these cases mediation is most popular, followed by conciliation and 
finally arbitration, a method which is not widely used.1888 When disputes of 
law are at stake, the parties involved are more inclined to seek resolution in 
the court system. 
9. Extending collective labour agreements
In the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium it is possible to extend a collective 
labour agreement in such a fashion that it applies to all employers and 
employees falling within the scope of applicability of that agreement. In 
Great Britain this possibility does not exist. The extension techniques in the 
first three countries are rather similar, leading to an extension by means of a 
governmental decree of (parts of) a collective labour agreement. 
First, the collective labour agreement that is to be extended should meet 
specific demands. This means that the collective labour agreement must be 
a proper collective labour agreement with a clear scope of application. In 
Belgium the agreement should be concluded within the joint bodies; it should 
1884  See F. Valdés dal-Ré, Synthesis Report on conciliation, mediation and arbitration in 
the European Union Countries, March 2002, page 5. This report can be found on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/employmentsocial/labour_ law/publications_en.htm.
1885  See F. Valdés dal-Ré, Synthesis Report on conciliation, mediation and arbitration in 
the European Union Countries, page 21. 
1886  See C. Welz and M. Eisner, EIRO Thematic Feature on Collective dispute 
Resolutions in an enlarged European Union, page 1. This report can be found on the 
EIRO-website.
1887  See C. Welz and M. Eisner, EIRO Thematic Feature on Collective dispute 
Resolutions in an enlarged European Union, page 7.
1888  See C. Welz and M. Eisner, EIRO Thematic Feature on Collective dispute 
Resolutions in an enlarged European Union, page 18.
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therefore not concern a company level agreement. Although such a demand 
is not in place in the Netherlands1889 and in Germany, extension obviously 
is only really interesting when it regards agreements surpassing company 
level. Furthermore, briefly put, only (individual and collective) normative 
provisions of a collective labour agreement can be extended. In Germany and 
the Netherlands, the collective labour agreement should already apply to a 
majority of employees falling with the scope of applicability of the collective 
labour agreement. In Germany, the extension should also serve the public 
interest, while in the Netherlands and Belgium the extension can be refused if  
it would violate the public interest. 
Second, procedural demands and safeguards need to be satisfied. This means 
that there should be a request for extension, which needs to be published. 
Third parties may subsequently oppose to the request. In the Netherlands, the 
relevant minister may ask the Labour Foundation’s advice on the extension 
request, while in Germany the minister needs to obtain the approval of a 
special committee prior to its decision to extend a collective labour agreement. 
In Belgium no such check is in place. In all countries, the actual decision to 
extend (parts of) the collective labour agreement, needs to be published.
Third, there are statutory limitations in place on the duration of the binding 
collective labour agreement. In all three countries there is either no or only a 
limited possibility for retro-effect of the extended collective labour agreement. 
Moreover, the extension may not outlast the duration of the actual collective 
labour agreement. 
Once declared binding, the collective labour agreement applies to all 
employment agreements concluded, or to be concluded, within the term of 
the extension decree that fall within the scope of application of that binding 
agreement. The legal norms of such a collective labour agreement apply to all 
these employment agreements and – generally speaking – the legal position 
of employers and employees that were not yet bound by the collective labour 
agreement becomes the same as that of the employers and employees who 
were already bound by the collective labour agreement regardless of the 
extension. That means that the provisions have direct normative effect. Unlike 
the Netherlands, in Germany and Belgium the extended collective labour 
agreements have after-effects.
1889  Although some scholars in the Netherlands argue that extension of company-level 
agreements is not possible in the Netherlands, such an exclusion does not appear 
from the relevant acts. 
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Extension of collective labour agreements is not uncommon in the EU. 
According to an EIRO research, there are basically three manners to extend 
collective labour agreements:1890
•	 extension	in	the	narrow	sense	(erga omnes), making a collective agree-
ment binding within its field of application by explicitly binding all those 
employees and employers which are not members of the parties to the 
agreement; 
•	 enlargement,	providing	for	a	collective	agreement	to	apply	in	sectors	or	
areas where it did not apply yet and where no union and/or employers’ 
association capable of collective bargaining exists. The scope of the ori-
ginal collective labour agreement is thus “enlarged”; and 
•	 functional	 equivalents,	 including	 compulsory	membership	of	 the	bar-
gaining parties’ organisations or legal provisions requiring government 
contractors to comply with the terms of a relevant collective agree-
ment.1891 These functional equivalents are not based on formal extension 
mechanisms but do in effect extend the provisions of an agreement to a 
larger constituency. 
These three types are regularly used, as can be concluded from the table below 
that sets out the existence or non-extistence of extension provisions in 19 
Member States:1892 
1890  F. Traxler and M. Behrens, Collective bargaining coverage and extension procedures, 
page 13.
1891  This latter form of extending collective labour agreements may, however, be in 
violation of article 49 of the EC Treaty. Reference is made to chapter 8, section 
6.3.3 and the European Court of justice, 3 April 2008, C-346/06, Rüffert/Land 
Niedersachsen. 
1892  This table literally derives from: F. Traxler and M. Behrens, Collective bargaining 
coverage and extension procedures, pages 13 and 14, table 7.
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Varieties of extension provisions
Country 
Extension in the  
narrow sense 
Enlargement 
Functional  
equivalents 
Austria + + + 
Belgium + - - 
denmark + - - 
Finland + - + 
France + - - 
Germany + - + 
Greece + - - 
hungary + - - 
Ireland + - + 
Italy - - + 
Luxembourg + - - 
Netherlands + - - 
Poland + - - 
Portugal + + - 
Slovakia + - - 
Slovenia - - + 
Spain + + - 
Sweden - - - 
UK - - - 
Notes: + indicates existence of extension mechanism
As shows from this table, with the exception of Sweden and the UK, all Member 
States mentioned above have a system to extend collective labour agreements. 
The most frequently used extension method is “extension in the narrow 
sense”, which is – to a different degree – applied in 15 of the above-mentioned 
countries. This is also the method described above with regard to Germany, 
the Netherlands and Belgium. The exact requirements and procedures for this 
type of extension differs in said 15 countries, but common elements can be 
found as well. Most of the time, this type of extension requires:
•	 a	public	act	or	decree,	issued	by	the	government	authority	in	charge	of	
labour matters;
•	 a	 request	 of	 one	 of	 the	 social	 partners	 party	 to	 the	 collective	 labour	
agreement or another social partner; and
•	 a	minimum	requirement	for	extension,	most	notably	minimum	rates	for	
coverage of the relevant agreement prior to extension.1893
1893  F. Traxler and M. Behrens, Collective bargaining coverage and extension procedures, 
page 14.
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Enlargement procedures are only common in Austria, Portugal and Spain. 
Functional equivalents to extension can be found in Austria, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy and Slovenia.
Although extension of collective labour agreements is quite common within 
the EU, this is not to say that there is no opposition against this practice. 
As denmark and Sweden have a strong tradition of voluntarism when it 
comes to collective agreements, extending these agreements is only possible 
in denmark when it comes to transposing the content of EC directives 
while it is not possible at all in Sweden.1894 The Constitutional Court of 
the Czech Republic even held in its 2004 ruling the extension by ministerial 
decree of a collective labour agreement to employers that were not bound 
by it through membership of an employers’ organisation unconstitutional. 
The Court argued that extending a collective labour agreement beyond the 
signatory parties would violate the contractual freedom.1895 In Poland, the 
Minister of Labour is, by law, entitled to extend the application of a supra-
establishment collective agreement to employees to whom no agreement 
applies (enlargement of the collective labour agreement) when the overriding 
social interest so requires and this is requested by an appropriate trade union 
or employers’ organisation. This entitlement is, however, never used in practice 
and scholars argue that such an extension would be at odds with the private 
parties’ freedom to bargain.1896
10. The collective labour agreement and the 
reach of the social partners
10.1 What can the social partners regulate in a collective labour agreement?
In Europe, there is a tradition of “autonomy of collective bargaining”, 
meaning “the development of collective agreements as sources for the free 
1894  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 51.
1895  I. Tomeš, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
National Report Czech Republic, page 3. The report can be found on: http://www.
unifi.it/polo-universitario-europeo/ricerche/collective_bargaining.html. See also: 
European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 51.
1896  See M. Sewerynski, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 
2004; National Report Poland, page 4. This type of extension should be distinguished 
from the possibility to apply a collective labour agreement to all employees of a 
bound employer. In any case, in Poland the “regulatory function of collective 
agreements is strengthened by the rule that its provisions apply to all employees of 
the employer covered by an agreement, including those who are not members of the 
union”. See the same page of the same report. 
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definition of wage policies and working conditions”.1897 This autonomy is, as 
already set out in chapter 8 above, often seen as an expression of freedom of 
association.1898 This has given social partners in Europe considerable room 
to determine the content of their collective labour agreements. Moreover, 
collective labour agreements are, in the Researched Countries, also considered 
private agreements, bringing about the contractual freedom of the signatory 
parties. 
As already stated in section 5.1 above, collective labour agreements in the 
Researched Countries should, besides setting out the rights and obligations 
of the contracting parties, concern employment conditions, which is normally 
defined broadly. Obviously, collective labour agreements may not contravene 
norms “higher in hierarchy”, such as national and international laws and 
regulations, which can include the demands that collective labour agreement 
may not contravene public policy or violate good morals.
10.2 Collective labour agreements and representativity demands
When it comes to representativity, the situation in the Researched Countries 
differs to quite an extent. The only country that requires representative social 
partners in order to conclude a collective labour agreement is Belgium. Social 
partners in Belgium are only representative when they meet strict demands 
(with the exception of course of the employer that concludes a company-
level collective labour agreement, which is obviously representative to 
conclude that agreement). As mentioned,1899 the representativity demands 
in Belgium constitute a form of institutional representativity, as opposed to 
factual representativity. Factual representativity demands are not in place in 
Belgium. An enterprise level collective labour agreement can, for example, 
be concluded with just one (institutional) representative organisation, even 
though that organisation only represents a minority of the employees in 
said enterprise. The mere fact that the law appointed an organisation as 
representative suffices in Belgium. In the Netherlands and Germany there are 
no strict representativity demands that the social partners must meet in order 
to conclude valid collective labour agreements. These demands are not strictly 
necessary as collective labour agreements only directly bind the members of 
the contracting parties. however, on the side of labour this argument only 
partially holds true, as many employees in said jurisdictions are bound by a 
collective labour agreement through a reference clause in their employment 
1897  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 41.
1898  See also: European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 41.
1899  See chapter 11, section 5.
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contract. In Germany mild representativity demands do apply. After all, an 
organisation must (i) be competent to conclude a collective labour agreement, 
(ii) surpass company level, and (iii) possess real powers (a demand which 
only fully applies to trade unions). Representativity plays only a limited role 
in British collective bargaining, as there are no representativity demands 
in place to entitle a trade union to conclude a collective labour agreement. 
Representativity does play a role in (statutory) recognition: the employer 
must recognise the independent trade union (which normally means that the 
trade unions surpasses company level) which either has a majority of the 
employees in the relevant bargaining unit as its member, or which is supported 
by a majority of the employees that voted in a ballot and at least 40% of the 
employees constituting the bargaining unit.
This diverse situation is not only in place in the Researched Countries, but in all 
countries in the EU. This clearly follows from the research that was conducted 
on the assignment of the Commission with regard to representation in the 
European social dialogue.1900 One of the lessons that the Commission drew from 
the aforementioned research was that the diversity of practice in the different 
Member States is such that there is no single model as to representativeness 
that could be replicated at European level.1901 Representativity simply differs 
depending on the national tradition.1902 This, however, does not stand in the 
way of some general remarks on representativity in the EU. 
When it comes to representativity in the “old” EU, it is not uncommon to 
distinguish between 4 groups of countries: the southern countries (such as 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain), continental countries (such as Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, France and hungary), Nordic Countries (such as denmark, Sweden, 
Finland, and Estonia) and Anglo-Saxon countries (Great-Britain).1903 In (very) 
general terms these groups of countries have the following similarities. In the 
southern countries there are detailed legal codes for determining trade union 
representativeness, of which the most common factors are membership rates 
(trade union density) and results of workplace elections.1904 In the continental 
1900  See chapter 5, section 2.2.
1901  Reference is made to annex 3 of COM (1993), 600 final.
1902  Institut des Sciences du Travail, Report on the representativeness of European Social 
Partner Organisations, page 5. See also A.Ph.C.M. jaspers, Representativiteit: 
representeren of vertegenwoordigen?, pages 15 ff.
1903  j. Kirton-darling (ed.), Representativeness of Public Sector Trade Unions in Europe, 
State Administration and Local Government Sectors, page 14, with reference to 
Ebbinghaus and Visser.
1904  j. Kirton-darling (ed.), Representativeness of Public Sector Trade Unions in Europe, 
State Administration and Local Government Sectors, page 16.
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countries legal codes exist on representativity, which use a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative criteria.1905 Trade unions, for example, need 
to be independent (a qualitative criterion), independence which partially 
depends on the number of paying members (a quantitative criterion). The 
Nordic countries as a rule do not have legal requirements on trade union 
representativeness, mainly because the Nordic bargaining system is based on 
principles of voluntarism.1906 Mutual recognition rather than representativity 
forms the central principle. In Great Britain, as said, representativeness of 
trade unions depends mainly on recognition of the employer, either or not 
forced after CAC determination. Some, but not all, acceding countries have 
statutory representativeness criteria in place.1907
10.3 Collective labour agreements and independence of trade unions
In Germany and in Great Britain strict independence demands apply to trade 
unions: a trade union must be independent from the employer (and, in the 
case of Germany, from state, church and political parties). In Belgium, there 
are no statutory requirements on the level of independence of trade unions. 
however, as only representative trade unions may enter into collective labour 
agreements, and there are only three large, strong and independent trade 
unions, the issue of representativity is actually a non-issue. The only deviating 
country is the Netherlands, a country in which there are no statutory demands 
on the level of independence trade unions require (from the employer) in 
order to conclude legally valid collective labour agreements. Trade unions 
that were not independent from the employer have, in fact, concluded valid 
collective labour agreements in this jurisdiction. Viewed from an international 
perspective, this dutch situation is out of tune. ILO Convention C98 and 
Recommendation R169 simply require free and independent employers’ and 
workers’ organisations.1908
1905  j. Kirton-darling (ed.), Representativeness of Public Sector Trade Unions in Europe, 
State Administration and Local Government Sectors, page 17.
1906  j. Kirton-darling (ed.), Representativeness of Public Sector Trade Unions in Europe, 
State Administration and Local Government Sectors, page 19.
1907  j. Kirton-darling (ed.), Representativeness of Public Sector Trade Unions in Europe, 
State Administration and Local Government Sectors, pages 14 and 15.
1908  See chapter 8, section 2.1.
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11. Summary
11.1 Industrial relations in Europe: past and present
The introduction of collective bargaining was a struggle in the Researched 
Countries, and more in general in Europe. The freedom of association was 
much oppressed; trade unions faced a prohibition to join in pursuit of better 
employment conditions. Employers opposed collective bargaining vigorously. 
The right to strike was simply not, or only marginally, recognised. In the 
period after World War I, it was, as a rule, easier to conclude a collective 
labour agreement. This did, however, not solve all problems, as the status of a 
collective labour agreement appeared rather troublesome in many countries. 
The collective labour agreement did not sit well with the standard type of 
contract. The collective aspects of the collective labour agreements caused 
difficulties. In a number of countries these difficulties were overcome by 
enacting legislation.
Today, there is no single or even dominant model of European industrial 
relations, which largely applies to the individual Member States. Each Member 
State has a more or less unique system on collective bargaining, varying 
widely in terms of level, coverage, content and nature. Notwithstanding these 
differences, almost all Member States have a rather detailed legal framework 
on collective bargaining that contains basic provisions on: (i) the parties that 
are entitled to conclude collective labour agreements; (ii) the possible levels 
of collective bargaining; (iii) the hierarchy of different bargaining levels; (iv) 
the legal coverage of collective labour agreements; and (v) the procedural 
rules for collective bargaining. Furthermore, in each Member State collective 
bargaining takes place at more than one of the following levels: (i) national 
(or inter-sectoral), (ii) sectoral and (iii) company. It depends on the Member 
State in question as to which level of collective bargaining is dominant. 
Trade union density, defined as the ratio of actual to potential union 
membership, differs widely between the Member States. The overall weighted 
average union density rate in the EU lies between 20 and 25% of the wage earners 
and was considerably higher in the past. Employers’ organisation density, 
defined as the ratio of the number of employees the members of employers’ 
organisations have to the number of employees of potential membership, 
differs as well but is higher than trade union density. The (weighted) average 
employer rate of organisation within the EU lies approximately between 55 
to 60% and does not seem to be dropping. Collective bargaining coverage, 
understood as the number of employees covered by a collective agreement as 
a proportion of the number of employees (that is: wage and salary earners), 
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varies greatly as well. In the year 2002 on average more than 70% of the 
employees within the Member States at that time, excluding Greece, were 
covered by a collective labour agreement.
There seems to be a European trend towards decentralisation of collective 
bargaining, leaving more room to individual companies to tailor employment 
conditions at enterprise level. Another trend in Europe is that the scope of 
content of collective labour agreements seems to be broadening and now 
includes restructuring, working conditions of non-standard employees and 
social rights. 
11.2 The collective labour agreement and the parties involved
The definition of a collective labour agreement in the Researched Countries 
and its different provisions bear great resemblance. This appears to be the 
same in other Member States. In all Researched Countries there are at least 
three requirements that an agreement must satisfy in order to be regarded 
a collective labour agreement. First, there must be an agreement, typically 
a written contract. Second, only specific parties are entitled to conclude a 
collective labour agreement. On the one hand there should be employers or 
employers’ organisations and on the other trade unions. Third, the collective 
labour agreement should concern employment conditions. This is normally 
broadly defined. A fourth requirement is in place in some of the Member 
States, which means that the collective labour agreement is to be registered. 
All Researched Countries distinguish (sometimes for practical purposes only) 
between obligatory and normative provisions in a collective labour agreement. 
The obligatory provisions lay down the rights and obligations between the 
parties concluding the collective labour agreement. The normative provisions 
can be divided into individual and collective normative provisions. Individual 
normative provisions create rights and obligations between the contracting 
parties to an individual employment agreement (the employers and employees). 
These provisions are the quintessence of collective labour agreements. 
Collective normative provisions are recognised in the Netherlands, Germany 
and Belgium. These provisions basically arrange the collective employment 
relations. Some terms in a British collective labour agreement, however, could 
be compared with some of the collective normative provisions in the other 
Researched Countries.
Trade unions in Europe are basically independent associations of employees, 
who have united to represent and defend their interests in the workplace, 
but also at the general level of the economy and politics. They usually (i) 
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have a centralised structure and a division of work between a network of 
volunteers and a professional apparatus; (ii) are recognised in the Member 
States and have a quasi public status; (iii) have a distributive function in the 
economy (they settle wages) and also have a normative function (they are 
actively involved in setting labour regulations); and (iv) represent and mobilise 
their members. In all Member States trade unions are entitled to enter into 
collective labour agreements. however, these trade unions usually are subject 
to a number of requirements in order to do so. Some of these requirements 
are basically the same in all Researched Countries. A trade union must in all 
Researched Countries be an organisation and must pursue the advancement 
of employment relations and conditions. In the Netherlands and in Germany 
the trade union’s articles of associations must specifically stipulate the 
unions’ power to enter into collective labour agreements. There are important 
differences in the Researched Countries when it comes to independence and 
representativeness of trade unions. In general, this holds true with regard to 
trade unions in other Member States as well.
Employers’ organisations are in many ways the counterparts of trade unions. 
Broadly spoken, employers’ organisations are bodies designed to organise and 
advance the collective interests that employers have in the labour market and 
industrial relations. Employers’ organisations tend to be of importance for 
the existence of multi-employer collective bargaining and statutory provisions 
for extending collective labour agreements. Employers’ organisations differ 
widely in terms of structure, membership basis and tasks across Europe. 
Basically, employers’ organisations in the Researched Countries should 
satisfy the same additional requirements as trade unions do in order to be 
eligible to participate in collective bargaining and to conclude collective 
labour agreements. however, generally the test of whether the employers’ 
organisations satisfy the relevant requirements seems to be applied a bit less 
strict when compared to trade unions. 
11.3 The consequences of a collective labour agreement
Once a collective labour agreement is concluded, it should be established to 
whom it applies, what its consequences are and how the rights arising from it 
can be enforced.
11.3.1 The contracting parties
In the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, the contracting parties are 
bound towards each other by the (obligatory provisions of the) collective 
labour agreement. All parties need, by law, to oblige these provisions. This is 
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typically the situation in the continental European countries as well. Things 
are different in Great Britain and Ireland, as collective labour agreements 
in these jurisdictions are considered a mere gentleman’s agreement, unless 
specifically stated otherwise in the agreement. As collective labour agreements 
are in principle not binding upon the signatory parties in these countries, there 
is no remedy by law if  one of the parties fails to comply with the collective 
labour agreement. The ultimate sanction for a breach of the collective labour 
agreement is industrial action. 
11.3.2 The members of the contracting associations
In the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium the (individual normative) 
legal norms of the collective labour agreement should be applied to those 
employers and employees who both (i) are bound by and (ii) fall within 
the scope of applicability of said agreement. Employers in said countries 
are bound by a collective labour agreement if  they are (a) member of one 
of the contracting employers’ association or (b) entered into the collective 
labour agreement themselves. Employees in Germany and the Netherlands 
are bound by the collective labour agreement if  they are member of the 
contracting trade union; in Belgium all employees of bound employers are 
automatically bound by the collective labour agreement, regardless of their 
possible trade union membership. In all Researched Countries, the social 
partners themselves determine the scope of application of the collective 
labour agreement in that agreement. The (individual normative) provisions 
of the collective labour agreement apply directly and with mandatory effect to 
the individual employment agreement of the bound employer and the bound 
employee in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. The situation in Great 
Britain is entirely different. Neither common law nor statutory law awards 
direct normative effect to collective labour agreements. The terms that are 
of an individual nature of the collective labour agreement (comparable to 
individual normative provisions) only apply to the relationship between the 
employer and the employee if  they have been incorporated into the individual 
employment agreement, regardless of whether both the employer and the 
employee are bound by the collective labour agreement or not. Variations to 
the collective labour agreement incorporated into the individual employment 
agreement in principle automatically vary the terms of employment. 
In the Netherlands and in Belgium it is important to distinguish between 
different sorts of normative provisions of the collective labour agreement, 
which can be standard, minimum or maximum. In Germany all provisions 
are, by law, minimum provisions. This “principle of favour” is not unusual 
when compared to other Member States. In Great Britain, there is no relevant 
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difference between provisions of a minimum, maximum or fixed nature. The 
employer and employee may freely decide to deviate from a term deriving 
from a collective labour agreement that is incorporated into the employment 
agreement.
In the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany the (individual normative) terms 
of the applicable collective labour agreement have a direct normative effect, 
and therefore become part of the individual employment agreement. In Great 
Britain, this is only the case if  the collective labour agreement is incorporated 
into this individual employment contract. In all Researched Countries, once 
the collective labour applies, both the employer and the employee must abide 
by its content on pain of being in breach of contract. Should a party breach 
the contract, the aggrieved party can claim specific performance and/or 
damages. 
11.3.3 Members vs. non-members
If  the employer is not bound by the collective labour agreement while the 
employee is, the collective labour agreement does not apply on the basis of 
statute in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. This is also the case in Great 
Britain, as the collective labour agreement is not legally binding anyhow. If  
the employer is bound by the collective labour agreement while the employee 
is not, the collective labour agreement does not apply automatically in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain. however, in all three countries 
it is possible and common to arrange in the individual employment agreement 
through a reference clause that a specific collective labour agreement applies 
to an employee who is not bound. This situation is quite different in Belgium. 
In Belgium, merely the position of the employer is relevant when determining 
whether the collective labour agreement applies directly in the relation between 
the employer and the employee. A collective labour agreement applies to an 
employment agreement in the situation that the employer is bound, regardless 
of whether the employee is bound or not. This system of collective labour 
agreements with erga omnes effects is dominant in the EU. 
11.3.4 The collectivities
In the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, collective normative provisions 
play an important role. In these countries there are basically two constructions 
with regard to collective normative provisions: (i) collective labour agreement 
may provide for rights and obligations arranging the relation between the 
employer and its entire personnel (most explicit in Germany) or an employee 
representative body (the Works Council or even, in Belgium, a union 
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delegation), and (ii) a collective labour agreement may provide for rights and 
obligations arranging the relation between the employer and the employees 
vis-à-vis third collective parties, most notably funds. Although British law 
merely distinguishes between terms of an individual and terms of a collective 
nature, some terms could be compared with the first group of collective 
normative provisions described above. 
11.3.5 Special means of enforcement
In all Researched Countries, employee representative institutions (the Works 
Council, the union delegation or a shop steward) may play an important role 
in the enforcement of collective labour agreements. Only in Belgium the state 
plays a role in enforcing collective labour agreements.
11.3.6 Deviation by collective labour agreement
The laws of all Researched Counties contain provisions that can be set aside 
by a collective labour agreement, as opposed to by “just” an individual 
employment agreement (provisions of ¾ mandatory law). This system of 
¾ mandatory law sits well in a European context, as it is not unusual for 
directives to stipulate that collective labour agreements may deviate from 
standard norms. Particularly with regard to working time, fixed-time and 
part-time work it is becoming increasingly usual that derogations from the 
law are arranged in collective labour agreements.
11.3.7 Term and termination
In all Researched Countries the freedom of contract plays an important role 
when it comes to term and termination of the collective labour agreement. 
The contracting parties are free to establish the date on which their collective 
labour agreement comes into force and whether the legal norms of the 
collective labour agreement have retro-effect. The signatory parties are also 
free to establish the duration of the collective labour agreement, although 
social partners in the Netherlands may not conclude a collective labour 
agreement with a duration exceeding 5 years. Termination of a collective 
labour agreement is easy in Great Britain, as a (non binding) collective labour 
agreement can be terminated at any time, with or without notice being given. 
In the Netherlands, collective labour agreements can be terminated by notice at 
the end of their term. Should a collective labour agreement not be terminated 
by notice, the agreement is normally considered to be (tacitly) renewed after 
termination of its original term for the same term. In Belgium and Germany 
a collective labour agreement entered into for a fixed period of time ends by 
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operation of law at the end of its term. A collective labour agreement entered 
into for an indefinite period of time can be terminated by notice. 
11.3.8 After-effects
In all Researched Countries the obligatory provisions of a collective labour 
agreement lose force after the collective labour agreement has expired. The 
individual normative provisions, however, have after-effects in all these 
countries once a collective labour agreement applies to the employment 
agreement (in Great Britain by incorporating the collective labour agreement 
into the employment agreement). That means that these provisions retain their 
force after expiry of that collective labour agreement. This is only different if  
the collective labour agreement specifically stipulates otherwise. The employer 
and employee are, however, after expiry of the collective labour agreement 
entitled to change the content of the individual employment contract should 
they wish to do so, observing the rules applicable for such a change in the 
different countries, in fact terminating the collective labour agreement’s after-
effects. The introduction of a new collective labour agreement also terminates 
the after-effects of the individual normative provisions in all Researched 
Countries. The situation is more diverse when it comes to collective normative 
provisions. In Germany these provisions have after-effects. This is not the 
case in the Netherlands, Belgium and in Great Britain. Collective normative 
provisions that also apply individually do have after-effects in Belgium.
11.3.9 The role of alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining
In all Researched Countries alternative dispute resolution mechanisms play a 
part in collective labour law, including collective labour agreements. To variable 
degrees this holds true for all Member States. Basically, three mechanisms are 
often applied within the EU: conciliation, mediation and arbitration. In some 
Member States dispute resolution is free and autonomous; while in others 
compulsory dispute resolution exists. As a rule, alternative dispute resolution 
is mostly applied to disputes of interest (as opposed to disputes of law).
11.4 Extending collective labour agreements
In the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium a collective labour agreement can 
be extended as a result of which it applies to all employers and employees 
falling within the scope of applicability of that agreement. In Great Britain 
this possibility does not exist. The extension techniques in the first three 
countries are rather similar. 
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First, the collective labour agreement that is to be extended should meet 
specific demands: it should be a proper collective labour agreement with 
a clear scope of application. Briefly put, only normative and collective 
normative provisions of a collective labour agreement can be extended. In 
Germany and the Netherlands the collective labour agreement should already 
apply to a majority of employees falling with the scope of applicability of 
the collective labour agreement in order for it to be extended. The extension 
should furthermore serve the public interest, or at least not violate it. 
Second, procedural demands and safeguards need to be satisfied. This means 
that there should be a request for extension, which needs to be published. 
Third parties may subsequently oppose to such a request. In the Netherlands 
and in Germany a specific institution may respectively must be involved in 
the extension-process. The actual decision to extend (parts of) the collective 
labour agreement, needs to be published.
Third, there are statutory limitations in place on the duration of the binding 
collective labour agreement. In all three countries there is either no or a 
limited possibility for retro-effect of the extended collective labour agreement. 
The extension may not outlast the duration of the actual collective labour 
agreement. 
Once declared binding, the collective labour agreement applies to all 
employment agreements concluded or to be concluded within the term of 
the extension decree that fall within the scope of applicability of that binding 
agreement. The provisions of the extended collective labour agreement have 
direct normative effect. Unlike the Netherlands, in Germany and Belgium the 
extended collective labour agreements have after-effects.
Extension of collective labour agreements is not uncommon in the EU. There 
are basically three different manners to extend collective labour agreements: 
(i) extension in the narrow sense (erga omnes), making a collective agreement 
binding within its field of application by explicitly binding all those employees 
and employers which are not members of the parties to the agreement; (ii) 
enlargement, providing for a collective agreement to apply in sectors or areas 
where it did not apply yet and where no union and/or employers’ association 
capable of collective bargaining exists; and (iii) functional equivalents, 
including compulsory membership of the bargaining parties’ organisations or 
legal provisions requiring government contractors to comply with the terms 
of a relevant collective agreement. 
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The most frequently used extension method is “extension in the narrow sense”. 
Most of the time, this type of extension requires: (i) a public act or decree, 
issued by the government authority in charge of labour matters; (ii) a request 
of one of the social partners to the collective labour agreement or another 
social partner; and (iii) a minimum requirement for extension, most notably 
minimum rates for coverage of the relevant agreement prior to extension.
11.5 The reach of the social partners / representativity and 
independency requirements of social partners
In Europe, there is a tradition of “autonomy of collective bargaining”. This 
has given social partners in Europe ample room to determine the content 
of their collective labour agreements. Collective labour agreements in the 
Researched Countries should, besides setting out the rights and obligations 
of the contracting parties, concern employment conditions, which is 
normally defined broadly. Collective labour agreements may not contravene 
norms “higher in hierarchy”, such as national and international laws and 
regulations.
When it comes to representativity, the situation in the Researched Countries 
differs to quite an extent. The only country that requires representative social 
partners in order to conclude a collective labour agreement is Belgium. In 
the Netherlands and Germany there are no strict representativity demands 
that the social partners must meet in order to conclude valid collective 
labour agreements. In Germany mild representativity demands do apply. 
Representativity plays only a limited role in British collective bargaining, 
as there are no representativity demands in place to entitle a trade union to 
conclude a collective labour agreement. Representativity does play a role 
in (statutory) recognition. This diverse situation can be seen in all Member 
States. Research established that the diversity of practice in the different 
Member States is such that there is no single model as to representativeness 
that could be replicated at European level.
In Germany and in Great Britain strict independence demands apply to 
trade unions. In Belgium there are no statutory requirements on the level 
of independence of trade unions. however, as only a limited number of 
representative trade unions may enter into collective labour agreements, 
which are strong and independent unions, the issue of representativity is 
actually a non-issue. The only deviating country is the Netherlands, a country 
in which there are no demands on the independence of trade unions and 
yellow trade unions in fact concluded valid collective labour agreements. 
Viewed from an international perspective, the dutch situation is out of tune, 
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as ILO Convention C98 and Recommendation R169 simply require free and 
independent employers’ and workers’ organisations.
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ChAPTER 14
TOWARdS A EUROPEAN SYSTEM ON 
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
1. Introduction 
A preliminary question that arises when discussing a European system on 
transnational collective bargaining is whether there is a proper European 
basis in place for the execution of such a system. This is a topic that will 
be discussed in section 2. Once it is established that there either seems room 
to draft European legislation on transnational collective labour agreements, 
or that such room is to be made, the obvious next question is: how could a 
European system on transnational collective bargaining be shaped? There are, 
of course, many options. That gives reason to first fence off  this system. In 
that respect, it is important to establish how this new system will relate to the 
European social dialogue. In section 3 below I will explain that this system 
will not replace, but rather will complement the institutionalised bargaining 
process embedded in the European social dialogue. It will be argued that said 
institutionalised bargaining process is very comparable to national extension 
procedures, which gives reason to focus the remainder of this thesis on normal, 
i.e. non-extended, transnational collective labour agreements. Furthermore, 
the new transnational collective bargaining system should also be placed at 
the appropriate level or levels. As noted in part II, collective bargaining can 
typically occur at three levels: company, sectoral and inter-professional. These 
levels should be situated in a specific geographical area within the European 
Union. These topics will be discussed in section 4. 
The system that I envisage for transnational collective labour agreements 
will be based on the traditions in industrial relations in place in various 
Member States, as set out in part II. That also means that it should be 
founded on important and fundamental principles, being the three classical 
rights. Employers’ and employees’ organisations should be free to form and 
employers and employees should be free to join (freedom of association). The 
parties involved should be free to voluntarily arrange employment law topics 
by agreement (right to collective bargaining and autonomy of the social 
partners). Trade unions should be able to persuade employers’ organisations 
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and employers into proper arrangements by (threatening with) collective 
actions (right to collective actions). This will be explained in section 5 below. 
The negotiation process that follows should be free and voluntary, as will be 
discussed in section 6.
The new system should make clear exactly what constitutes a transnational 
collective labour agreement and what can be arranged by it. It should also 
make clear whom it may concern. These are topics that will be discussed in 
section 7 below. Finally, section 8 summarises this chapter.
2. The legal basis for a European system on 
transnational collective bargaining
It is reminded that the Community can only act within the limits of the powers 
conferred to it by the EC Treaty (conferred or attributed powers).1909 Attribution 
of powers occurs on an article-by-article basis. As a result, Community acts 
must be properly based on a suitable article of the EC Treaty, giving specific 
competence to draft such an act.1910 This choice should explicitly be made in 
that act.1911 If  the chosen basis would not constitute sufficient ground for that 
act, such an act can be annulled or declared invalid.1912 On occasion, that has 
happened in the past.1913 
2.1 General considerations for choosing the proper basis
When choosing the proper legal basis for Community acts there are two 
important considerations. First, the choice has to be based upon objective 
factors amenable to judicial review.1914 Those factors include, in particular, 
1909  Reference is made to chapter 2, section 3.1
1910  Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, page 122.
1911  Clear on that was for example European Court of justice, 16 june 1993, C-325/91, 
France v. Commission. It ruled in paragraph 26: “Community legislation must be 
clear and its application foreseeable for all interested parties. As a result of that 
requirement for legal certainty, the binding nature of any act intended to have legal 
effects must be derived from a provision of Community law which prescribes the 
legal form to be taken by that act and which must be expressly indicated therein as 
its legal basis.” 
1912  Reference is made to articles 230 and 231 of the EC Treaty. 
1913  See for example: European Court of justice, 5 October 2000, C-376/98, Germany v. 
European Parliament.
1914  See for example: European Court of justice, 26 March 1987, C-45/86, Commission 
v. Council.
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the aim and content of the measure.1915 Second, when searching for the proper 
legal basis of a specific act, a specific legal basis gains precedence over a general 
legal basis.1916 It may also be the case that such an act has to be based on more 
than one article of the EC Treaty in order to properly cover the content of 
that act, or as a compromise of the Council in the event of a dispute amongst 
its members as to which article provides the correct legal basis.1917
The aim and content of a European act on transnational collective bargaining 
would obviously be to ascertain that all Member States recognise and apply 
transnational collective labour agreements on equal footing. It can be 
argued that differences in appreciation of the status and consequences of 
a transnational collective labour agreement per country directly affect the 
functioning of the common market. Besides this economic approach, a social 
approach can be followed as well. After all, a European act on transnational 
collective bargaining would protect specific social rights and it can lay a 
foundation of minimum employment conditions. Both the economic and 
social part of such an act fall within the general ambit of the EC Treaty, as 
already follows from articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty. But what specific basis, 
if  any, can be chosen for an act on transnational collective bargaining?
2.2 Article 137 of the EC Treaty
Given the topic – collective labour agreements – the attention is automatically 
drawn to the social provisions of the EC Treaty. These articles may serve as a 
specific ground to base an act on transnational collective labour agreements 
on. Article 136 of the EC Treaty states that Community and Member States 
shall promote employment, improved living and working conditions, in 
order to make their harmonisation possible while the improvement is being 
maintained.1918 To that end, Community shall support and complement 
activities in a number of fields summed up in article 137.1 of the EC Treaty. 
Fields mentioned in this article include health and safety, working conditions, 
1915  See for example: European Court of justice, 11 june 1991, C-300/89, Commission v. 
Council.
1916  See for example: European Court of justice, 23 February 1988, C-68/86, UK v. 
Council.
1917  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 234, footnote 307.
1918  Article 136 of the EC Treaty can in itself  not form a basis for enacting Community 
legislation, as it gives no competence to do that (it does not attribute powers). 
See j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC 
Legislative Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 44.
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social protection of employees, representation and collective defence of the 
interests of workers and employers and equality between men and women. 
These are all issues that can be dealt with in a transnational collective labour 
agreement. The Council may, pursuant to article 137.2 if  the EC Treaty, 
give the aforementioned support and may complement these activities 
in these social fields i.a. by adopting directives. At first glance, this article 
seems an appropriate basis giving competence to enact legislation regarding 
transnational collective bargaining. however, Community action in the field 
of social policy (in any event) based on article 137 of the EC Treaty is subject 
to article 137.5 of the EC Treaty. This paragraph states that the provisions of 
article 137 of the EC Treaty shall not apply to pay, the right of association, 
the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs. All these themes are 
(potentially) crucial for an act on transnational collective labour agreements. 
As argued in chapter 6, section 5.1 of this thesis, the scope of article 137.5 of 
the EC Treaty was until recently far from clear. The rulings of the European 
Court of justice in the Del Cerro Alonso and Impact cases gave more insight 
in the scope of this article. The Court of justice explained that, as article 
137.5 of the EC Treaty limits the main paragraphs 1 and 4 of that article, the 
matters reserved by paragraph 5 must be interpreted strictly. The exception set 
out paragraph 5 relating to pay, is explained by the fact that fixing the level of 
pay falls within the contractual freedom of the social partners at a national 
level and within the relevant competence of Member States. Consequently, 
paragraph 5 excludes determination of the level of wages from harmonisation 
under articles 136 ff of  the EC Treaty. The exception of article 137.5 must 
on the one hand be interpreted as covering measures which amount to direct 
interference by Community law in the determination of pay within the 
Community. however, the exception cannot, on the other hand, be extended 
to any question involving any sort of link with pay, as that would deprive 
some areas of article 137.1 of the EC Treaty of much of their substance. 
To summarise, directives implemented on the basis of article 137 of the EC 
Treaty may concern issues linked to the matters set out in paragraph 5 of 
that article, but may not set out specific rules on levels of pay or, so it seems, 
on conditions when and how to exercise the right of association, the right to 
strike and the right to impose lock-outs. 
When interpreting article 137.5 of the EC Treaty like that, it still seems to give 
room to serve as a basis to draft a European act on transnational collective 
bargaining on, provided that the act itself  does not set out specific rules on 
levels of pay or on conditions when or how to exercise the right of association, 
the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs. The act would not set out 
levels on pay, as it would leave that up to the social partners who eventually 
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could include pay in their collective labour agreement (if  they would choose 
to arrange levels of pay in their transnational collective agreement, that is). 
This seems sufficiently in line with the ratio of article 137.5 of the EC Treaty, 
leaving matters like pay up to social partners at the appropriate national 
level, as the proposal for an act on transnational collective bargaining set 
out in this thesis includes social partners at national level. Still, an important 
disadvantage is that the act may not give substantive rules on the recognition 
of the right of association and the right to strike. 
To summarise, it seems that article 137 of the EC Treat gives room for a 
directive on transnational collective bargaining, provided that it does not set 
rules on the level of pay and on the conditions when or how to exercise the 
right of association, the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs. 
2.3 Article 94 of the EC Treaty
But is article 137 of the EC Treaty the sole basis for an act on transnational 
collective bargaining? Some would argue it is. They would state that, because 
article 137 of the EC Treaty provides for an appropriate (although because 
of paragraph 5 limited) basis for such an act on transnational collective 
bargaining, the aforementioned principle that a specific basis should prevail 
over a more general basis, prevents another – less “specialised” – article of 
the EC Treaty from being used as a basis for such an act. This view has, for 
instance, been forwarded by Novitz.1919 
The correctness of the view stated above may be questioned. It must be 
acknowledged that the mere fact that possible legislation on transnational 
collective bargaining has a social element to it does not automatically mean 
that the foundation of that legislation must derive from the articles regarding 
social provisions of the EC Treaty. It is generally accepted that harmonisation 
of national laws and policy in the social field can be necessary for the proper 
functioning of the internal market.1920 In fact, many acts in the social field 
have been based on articles concerning the common, free market. The Posted 
Workers directive, for instance, clearly has a “social element” to it but is 
1919  T. Novitz, Promoting Core Labour Standards and Improving Global Social 
Governance: An Assessment of EU Competence to Implement Commission 
Proposals, EU Working Papers, European University Institute, 2002, RSC No. 
2002/59, page 26. See also T. Novitz, International and European Protection of the 
Right to Strike: A Comparative Study of Standards Set by the International Labour 
Organization, the Council of Europe and the European Union, page 162.
1920  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 1047.
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based on the current articles 55 and 47.2 of the EC Treaty. Many other social 
Community initiatives are based on the current article 94 of the EC Treaty. This 
article stipulates that “the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of 
such laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market”. 
Examples of directives based on this article are the directives on collective 
redundancies, transfer of undertaking, employer insolvency, and the 
application of equal pay between genders.1921 In other words, article 137 of 
the EC Treaty is not an exclusive basis for Community legislation in the field 
of social policy.1922 
Engels and Salas argue that article 94 of the EC Treaty has been used in 
the past applying a three step approach.1923 First, the recitals of a directive 
based on article 94 of the EC Treaty spot differences in the different Member 
States as to the protection granted to employees faced with a specific situation 
at hand (such as a transfer of undertaking or collective dismissal). Second, 
it is set out that efforts should be made to reduce these differences. Last, it 
is substantiated that the existence of these differences has a direct effect on 
the functioning of the common market. Applying this three step approach to 
Community legislation on transnational collective labour agreements reveals 
that article 94 of the EC Treaty may form an appropriate basis.1924 As said in 
paragraph 2.1 above, there are differences in appreciation of the status and 
consequences of a transnational collective labour agreement in each Member 
State. These differences should be reduced. The differences also directly affect 
the functioning of the common market. In the end, differences in regulations 
1921  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, pages 1050 and 1067. See also j. hellsten, Reviewing Social 
Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative Process Involving Social 
Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective Agreements, page 59.
1922  j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative 
Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, pages 27 and 61. See also Engels and Salas, Labour Law and the 
European Union after the Amsterdam Treaty, page 99. See also Kapteyn and 
VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities, page 
1060. They, however, do think that article 137 of the EC Treaty will bring forth that 
recourse to other, more general bases for harmonisation will become less frequent.
1923  C. Engels and L. Salas, Labour Law and the European Union after the Amsterdam 
Treaty, pages 88 and 89.
1924  For completeness’ sake I note that article 95 of the EC Treaty would not form a 
proper basis for legislation on transnational collective bargaining, as article 95.2 
explicitly excludes “rights and interests of employed persons” from its scope.
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on issues like pay in transnational collective labour agreements, peace 
obligations and employment conditions may directly influence the common 
market. Article 94 can therefore, in my view, be an appropriate foundation to 
base legislation on transnational collective labour agreements on. 
This  conclusion is shared by the authors of the Report (Transnational Collective 
Bargaining: Past, Present and Future). They state the following:1925
A possible only legal basis on which the directive could be grounded is represented 
by article 94 TEC. We think that a directive offering an optional scheme for 
transnational collective bargaining could provide additional opportunities for 
bringing closer social standards and harmonising collective procedures. We must 
recall that in the past such a legal basis served the purpose to favour secondary 
legislation aimed at avoiding distortions in competition. Albeit in a very different 
economic context, we feel that harmonisation still is an objective to be pursued in 
taking measures which affect both the economic and the social sphere.
They add that all European social partners should be consulted in order to 
disseminate the legislative initiative and clarify its purposes. 
But why is this analysis important, if  article 137 of the EC Treaty already 
provides for an appropriate basis for an act on transnational collective labour 
agreements? Besides that fact that the act may have to be based on two legal 
bases (both article 139 and 94 of the EC Treaty), another argument may be 
forwarded as to why it is important to assess whether article 94 is a proper 
article to base said act on. 
Article 137.5 of the EC Treaty prevents, as previously mentioned, an act to 
contain conditions on when and how to exercise the right of association, the 
right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs. These topics are in my view 
important when it comes to transnational bargaining. It has been argued 
that, should article 94 of the EC Treaty be used as a basis for Community 
legislation, the exception of article 137.5 of the EC Treaty does not apply. 
Article 137.5 of the EC Treaty specifically states that “the provisions of this 
article shall not apply to pay the right of association, that the right to strike 
or the right to impose lock-outs” (emphasis added). This may mean that said 
provision does not necessarily block the topics outlined in paragraph 5 from 
all Community legislation. It has been argued that these topics may be dealt 
with, if  another legal basis than article 137 of the EC Treaty is used. Engels 
1925  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 36.
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and Salas, for example, claim that article 94 of the EC Treaty could perfectly 
well be applied to introduce Community legislation on minimum pay, if  the 
Community act concerned will pass the aforementioned three step approach. 
In their view, the same applies to all other topics that are, on the basis of 
paragraph 5, excluded from the scope of article 137 of the EC Treaty.1926 Other 
– but as will be set out below not all – scholars agree to this point of view.1927 
hellsten, for instance, also agrees to the line of reasoning of Engels and Salas 
stated above, but views that article 94 of the EC Treaty is not appropriate 
for a topic like pay alone,1928 as pay does not fit the target of article 94 of the 
EC Treaty: approximation should cover laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions, not the (pay) interests concerned.1929
The above position is not generally accepted. Article 137.5 of the EC 
Treaty may very well have to be interpreted “rigidly”, fully excluding the 
topics of paragraph 5 from Community legislation, in consequence making 
these topics exclusively a national affair.1930 Clear on that was, for instance, 
Advocate-General Mengozzi in his opinion in the Laval case. he argued that 
the effectiveness of article 137.5 of the EC Treaty would be violated if  the 
Community institutions were allowed to resort to other legal bases in order 
to adopt measures designed to approximate the laws of the Member States 
on the topics that are excluded by article 137.5 of the EC Treaty.1931 Scholars 
defending this position probably feel strengthened by the Del Cerro Alonso 
and Impact cases, in which the European Court of justice held that “(…) the 
exception relating to ‘pay’ set out in Article 137(5) EC is explained by the fact 
that fixing the level of pay falls within the contractual freedom of the social 
partners at a national level and within the relevant competence of Member 
1926  C. Engels and L. Salas, Labour Law and the European Union after the Amsterdam 
Treaty, pages 88 and 89.
1927  Such as A. Lyon-Caen, Lord Wedderburn and B. Fitzpatrick. See j. hellsten, 
Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative Process 
Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective Agreements, page 
65, who refers to these authors.
1928  Which specific topic was subject to hellsten’s research. 
1929  j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative 
Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, pages 65 and 66.
1930  For examples of scholars who support this “rigid” approach, see: j. hellsten, 
Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative Process 
Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective Agreements, page 
34. See also, R. Kowanz, Europäische Kolektivvertragsordnung, Bestansdaufnahme 
und Entwicklungsperspektieven, pages 334 – 336.
1931  Opinion of Advocate-General Mengozzi, 23 May 2007, in case C-341/05, Laval, 
paragraph 57. 
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States”.1932 however, the Court followed by stating: “In those circumstances, in 
the present state of Community law, it was considered appropriate to exclude 
determination of the level of wages from harmonisation under Article 136 EC 
et seq” (emphasis added). The European Court therefore links article 137.5 of 
the EC treaty explicitly to the articles 136 ff of  the EC Treaty. That may imply 
that another legal basis for an act on transnational collective labour still is 
possible, without the limitations of article 137.5 of the EC Treaty, although I 
must say that this position seems doubtful.
In summary, an act on transnational collective bargaining may likely (also) be 
based on article 94 of the EC Treaty. It is, however, doubtful whether that may 
lead to the circumvention of the exceptions of article 137.5 of the EC Treaty. 
It therefore does not seem to be a better or stronger basis than article 137 of 
the EC Treaty. It may at best be a more appropriate basis together with article 
137 of the EC Treaty. 
2.4 Article 308 of the EC Treaty
The system of conferred powers may leave gaps. here the doctrine of implied-
powers may step in. Even if  an article of the EC Treaty in itself  does not seem 
to confer powers to a Community institution to draft an act, that institution 
may still proceed on the basis of the implied-powers doctrine, if  that act is 
necessary for that institution to carry out its tasks expressly conferred to it by 
the EC Treaty.1933 Article 308 of the EC Treaty plays an important role when 
filling in potential lacunae in the EC Treaty. It stipulates: 
If  action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of 
the operation of the Common Market, one of the objectives of the Community, 
and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
There are two important considerations when it comes to applying article 
308 of the EC Treaty. First, the lacunae must be in the powers granted, not in 
the sum of objectives of the Community.1934 These objectives can be found in 
1932  European Court of justice, 13 September 2007, C-307/05, Del Cerro Alonso, 
paragraph 40 and European Court of justice, 15 April 2008, C-268/06, Impact/
Minister, paragraph 123.
1933  See for example: European Court of justice, 9 july 1987, C-281/85, Germany v. 
Commission.
1934  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 236.
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articles 2 and 3 in particular of the EC Treaty, but also further on in the EC 
Treaty. The European Court of justice was clear on this, and stated that article 
308 of the EC Treaty “being an integral part of an institutional system based 
on the principle of conferred powers, cannot serve as a basis for widening the 
scope of Community powers beyond the general framework created by the 
provisions of the Treaty as a whole and, in particular, by those that define the 
tasks and the activities of the Community”.1935 Second, article 308 of the EC 
Treaty only applies if  the Treaty has not otherwise conferred the necessary 
powers; it is a “last resort”.1936 That is not to say that article 308 can only 
be invoked if  the necessary powers do not exist at all. It may very well be 
that they do exist but are insufficient to provide a satisfactory and effective 
solution.1937
Article 308 of the EC Treaty has served as a legal basis before in the social 
field. The directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European 
company with regard to the involvement of employees,1938 for instance, was 
based on this article. Even more so, the heads of State and governments 
invited the Community institutions in 1972 to draft an action plan for social 
policy, based on several provisions of the EC Treaty, including the current 
article 308, which would also facilitate the conclusion of European collective 
agreements in the appropriate sectors.1939 Apparently, article 308 of the EC 
Treaty was considered as an appropriate basis for drafting legislation on 
1935  European Court of justice, 28 March 1996, Opinion 2/94, on the accession to the 
European Convention on human Rights.
1936  See for example: European Court of justice, 26 March 1987, C-45/86, Commission 
v. Council, in which the Court stated: “it follows from the very wording of article 
[308] that its use as the legal basis for a measure is justified only where no other 
provision of the Treaty gives the Community institutions the necessary power to 
adopt the measure in question”. 
1937  Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, page 236. This may, for example, be the case if  another article that 
confers powers describes a directive in a situation in which a regulation would be 
necessary.
1938  directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European 
company with regard to the involvement of employees, Oj L 294, 10 November 
2001, pages 22 – 32.
1939  j. hellsten, Reviewing Social Competence of European Communities, EC Legislative 
Process Involving Social Partners and Legal Basis of European Collective 
Agreements, page 84.
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transnational collective labour agreements, if  no other provision could serve 
as a basis.1940 
Given the above, article 308 of the EC Treaty might constitute on appropriate 
basis for such legislation, next to articles 137 and 94 of the EC Treaty. Article 
308, however, has a clear advantage over articles 137 and 94 of the EC Treaty. 
The latter articles only permit the use of the instrument directive, while article 
308 of the EC Treaty allows the use of regulations. The clear advantage of 
a regulation is that it has a general and direct effect in all Member States. A 
directive needs to be implemented nationally, possibly changing its content 
to some extent. That would in my view potentially jeopardise the uniform 
applicability of the transnational collective labour agreement in all Member 
States.1941 Besides, the implementation of a possible directive on transnational 
collective labour agreements may prove difficult in certain Member States, as 
this implementation into national law might be at odds with already existing 
national laws on collective labour agreements, resulting in complicated 
changes of these national laws. I would therefore be inclined to choose the 
instrument “regulation” over the instrument “directive” in order to implement 
Community legislation on transnational collective labour agreements. That 
means that the general article 308 of the EC Treaty would have to be chosen 
as a basis for legislation on transnational collective labour agreements over 
the specific articles 137 and 94. 
But there may also be another argument to choose for a regulation based 
on article 308 of the EC Treaty. It may circumvent the applicability of the 
exceptions stated in article 137.5 of the EC Treaty, should these exceptions 
have a broader scope than “just” article 137 of the EC Treaty, as the Del Cerro 
Alonso and Impact cases seem to entail. Let us again look at these cases. The 
Court ruled:1942
1940  But also other scholars opted for article 308 of the EC Treaty. See, with 
reference to other scholars, R. Kowanz, Europäische Kolektivvertragsordnung, 
Bestansdaufnahme und Entwicklungsperspektieven, page 336. 
1941  See also F. de Ly, Europese Unie en Eenvormig Internationaal Privaatrecht 
[European Union and Unified Private International Law], in F. de Ly and j. Wouters, 
Europees Gemeenschapsrecht en Internationaal Privaatrecht [European Community 
Law and Private International Law], Mededelingen van de Nederlandse Vereniging 
voor Internationaal Recht, 1996, page 37.
1942  European Court of justice, 13 September 2007, C-307/05, Del Cerro Alonso, 
paragraph 40 and European Court of justice, 15 April 2008, C-268/06, Impact/
Minister, paragraph 123. 
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(…) the exception relating to ‘pay’ set out in Article 137(5) EC is explained by the 
fact that fixing the level of pay falls within the contractual freedom of the social 
partners at a national level and within the relevant competence of Member States. 
In those circumstances, in the present state of Community law, it was considered 
appropriate to exclude determination of the level of wages from harmonisation 
under Article 136 EC et seq” (emphasis added). 
Substantive harmonisation of  national rules on the topics stated in article 
137.5 of the EC Treaty is apparently not allowed. harmonisation of the 
various laws by directives – which is the aim of both article 137 and article 
94 of the EC Treaty – is therefore not possible with regard to these topics. 
however, if  new rules are designed, rules that do not yet exist in the laws 
of the Member States, there cannot be any harmonisation. Consequently, it 
may be argued that upon the introduction of a fully new act on transnational 
collective bargaining by means of a regulation, arranging for rules that solely 
apply to said transnational collective bargaining, the exception of article 
137.5 of the EC Treaty may not apply. As Member States do not yet have laws 
on transnational collective labour agreements (they may apply the laws on 
national collective labour agreements to these transnational collective labour 
agreements), it may be argued that a regulation on transnational collective 
labour agreements is not a harmonisation operation, but the introduction of 
something new. In fact, this has been argued by Kowanz, who claims that a 
regulation based on article 308 of the EC Treaty circumvents the applicability 
of the exceptions stipulated in article 137.5 of the EC Treaty.1943
In summary, although article 308 of the EC Treaty should be considered a 
last resort, there are good reasons to fall back on that article, as it (i) opens 
the possibility to base the act on transnational collective bargaining on a 
regulation instead of a directive, thus guaranteeing the uniform applicability 
of the transnational collective labour agreement in all Member States and (ii) 
possibly circumvents the applicability of the exceptions stipulated in article 
137.5 of the EC Treaty.
2.5 Article 137.5 of the EC Treaty revisited
Falling back on article 308 of the EC Treaty may, given the above, very well 
solve the possible problems surrounding article 137.5 of the EC Treaty. 
however, if, in spite of the above-mentioned arguments, that article would 
still exclude all Community legislation on, as is particularly relevant for this 
1943  R. Kowanz, Europäische Kolektivvertragsordnung, Bestansdaufnahme und 
Entwicklungsperspektieven, pages 334 – 336. 
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thesis, the right of association and the right to strike, even if  solely arranged 
for in connection with transnational bargaining, there are a few “solutions”.
First and foremost, the EC Treaty itself  could (should) be adapted and article 
137.5 should be changed or revoked altogether in order to legitimately draft 
European legislation on transnational collective bargaining, including on the 
recognition of the currently exempted right of association and the right to 
strike.1944 
Alternatively, the act on transnational collective bargaining could simply 
not provide for the Community recognition and support of these two rights. 
These rights would, in consequence, solely be governed by national laws. 
That would certainly not have my preference, as will be set out in section 5 
below, but it would be an option nonetheless. That option has become slightly 
easier to accept, due to the facts that the EU Charter is signed by the relevant 
Community institutions and the Union shall accede to the Convention 
(provided that the Lisbon Treaty will be ratified). Both the EU Charter and 
the Convention recognise the classical rights at stake. Unfortunately, the 
United Kingdom and Poland are only partially influenced by these steps due 
to the protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom. Consequently, 
both countries may stricter limit the classical bargaining rights than other 
Member States see fit on the basis of the EC Charter. That would, in my view, 
not necessarily prevent an act on transnational collective bargaining from 
becoming effective. The act may state that, just as has been done with the 
Regulation on the functioning of the internal market in relation to the free 
movement of goods among the Member States and the Service directive,1945 
that it will not affect the national rules on the right of association and the right 
to strike. In these circumstances adopting the act on transnational collective 
bargaining, although in a somewhat adapted manner when compared with 
the proposal set forth in this thesis, seems still possible. 
A final “solution” could be that the Community institutions and the Member 
States may once again revert to a two-track system, in which all countries 
save for Poland and the United Kingdom would go ahead with the act on 
transnational collective bargaining. Although this is not a situation I would 
prefer, it has been done before in the field of social policy (the Protocol on 
Social Policy). It has eventually even resulted in the party that originally 
1944  See also B. Bercusson, European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights – summary version -, page 27.
1945  See chapter 8, sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.
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opted-out, the United Kingdom, to opt-in again. Reference is made to chapter 
2, section 2.3.
2.6 The principle of subsidiarity 
But even when a proper legal basis is found for the act on transnational 
collective bargaining, the subsidiarity test must still be applied. As explained 
in chapter 2, section 3.1, given article 5 of the EC Treaty, three (intertwined) 
subjects are relevant: (i) the Community can only take action if  the objectives 
of that action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, (ii) the 
Community can better achieve the action and (iii) if  the Community does act, 
it should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the EC 
Treaty. 
As concluded in chapter 7, section 6, there is (i) a need or demand for 
transnational collective labour agreements and (ii) for new legislation in 
that field, that should obviously cope with important subjects such as the 
status of the transnational collective labour agreement, the parties involved, 
the consequences of such an agreement, the manner of conclusion and 
enforcement, the applicable law and the termination of transnational 
collective labour agreements. This is something that the laws of the Member 
States cannot (adequately) cope with. They lack the power to introduce an 
arrangement that stretches out over the entire EU, giving rules on how to deal 
with the aforementioned subjects. Member States clearly lack authority to 
impose on individuals outside their borders (such as companies, employees 
and possible third parties situated outside the jurisdiction of the Member 
State concerned) the applicability of the terms and conditions set out in the 
transnational collective labour agreement. They lack the power to stipulate 
that a transnational collective labour agreement has an equal effect in all 
Member States, which equal effect is needed for a uniform application of 
the transnational collective labour agreement. They cannot impose rules 
of enforcement on parties situated in different Member States, and cannot 
claim exclusive jurisdiction over these matters in order to try to achieve that. 
Member States do not have authority to adequately arrange for matters 
concerning applicable law in contracts. They cannot regulate which parties 
must be involved in bargaining on a transnational collective labour agreement 
in EU perspective. In short: Member States cannot satisfactorily regulate 
transnational collective labour agreements.
The above can be done by the Community institutions. In any event, it can 
be better achieved by these institutions than by the individual Member States 
(who, in my view, cannot achieve these matters at all, let alone adequately). 
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Community action would furthermore have scale advantages, making 
certain that the entire EU is covered (unless the two-track option is called 
for, as mentioned in section 2.5 above). Such coverage is important, as issues 
addressed in the transnational collective labour agreements may often have a 
European (or even global) reach. 
Given the above, Community action is, from a “comparative efficiency” 
perspective, opportune. But are there, from a “proportionality perspective”, 
other, less far-reaching measures possible to cope with the issues at hand? 
The answer to this question is negative, as explained in chapter 7, section 10. 
Alternative tools like the open method of coordination, mutual recognition 
and regulatory competition cannot (adequately) solve the problems that are 
involved with transnational collective bargaining. 
An act on transnational collective labour agreements therefore, in my view, 
passes the (vertical) subsidiarity test of article 5 of the EC Treaty. But what 
about horizontal subsidiarity? Can (European) social partners take matters 
in their own hand? I believe not. This option has been suggested by Schiek. 
As substantiated in chapter 5, section 7.4, it is my view that this will not 
work. European and national social partners lack authority to draft rules 
on transnational collective bargaining that apply on equal footing to all 
Member States. Alternatively, the European social partners may enter into 
an agreement on transnational collective bargaining, which is subsequently 
implemented by a Council decision. That, however, would certainly not 
circumvent the applicability of article 137.5 of the EC Treaty (and would 
normally, but not necessarily, give rise to a directive instead of a regulation). 
Notwithstanding this, the European social partners should definitively be 
involved in the drafting process of the act on transnational collective labour 
agreements. 
To sum up: drafting an act on transnational collective labour agreements will 
in my view pass the subsidiarity test of article 5 of the EC Treaty. Reverting 
to horizontal subsidiarity by letting the (European) social partners draft an 
equivalent of such an act will not work. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Given the above it should be concluded that article 308 of the EC Treaty is 
the most appropriate legal basis for Community legislation on transnational 
collective labour agreements. That article permits the use of regulations. As 
regulations have important advantages over directives, I would be inclined to 
choose article 308 of the EC Treaty over article 137 and 94 of the EC Treaty. 
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Moreover, the use of a regulation on the basis of articles 308 of the EC 
Treaty may possibly circumvent the applicability of the exceptions stipulated 
in article 137.5 of the EC Treaty. drafting a regulation on transnational 
collective labour agreements will in my opinion pass the subsidiarity test of 
article 5 of the EC Treaty, while reverting to horizontal subsidiarity by letting 
the (European) social partners draft an equivalent of such an act will not 
work. 
The above means that the Council can, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission, and after consulting the European Parliament, issue 
a regulation on transnational collective bargaining. Article 308 of the EC 
Treaty does not confer a formal role to the European social partners in the 
legislative process. however it is, in my view, a sound plan to involve these 
social partners as much as possible in this process, in the same manner as has 
been done with regard to the proposals laid down in the Report. In any event, 
the European social partners should be consulted on the basis of article 138.2 
of the EC Treaty. 
3. Relation to the European social dialogue / 
extension of collective labour agreements
The system of transnational (European) collective bargaining that I 
envisage should not be considered a replacement of the existing European 
social dialogue. That is, to a certain extent, self-explanatory. The European 
social dialogue has not only a bargaining function, but also a consultation 
function. Consultation is a topic that is not touched in the proposed system 
of transnational collective bargaining. Furthermore, an important goal of 
the bargaining embedded in the European social dialogue is to overcome the 
on occasion failing European legislative process; it should be considered a 
regulatory technique.1946 There is no real reason to abolish that. however, 
the fact that bargaining within the European social dialogue is a regulatory 
technique makes it vulnerable to flaws, as is set out in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
The system of autonomous transnational collective bargaining I pursue is 
based on the traditions of industrial relations in the EU, which makes it less 
vulnerable to these flaws.1947
Upon closer inspection, it should be noted that collective bargaining, as 
embedded in the European social dialogue, bears great resemblance to the 
extension of collective labour agreements as is in place in many Member States. 
1946  Chapter 6, section 2.
1947  Chapter 7, section 9.
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As set out in chapter 13, section 9, extension of collective labour agreements in 
the different Member States is often made subject to at least the following three 
requirements: (i) a public act or decree, issued by the government authority in 
charge of labour matters; (ii) a request of one of the social partners party to 
the collective labour agreement or another social partner; and (iii) a minimum 
requirement for extension, most notably minimum rates for coverage of the 
relevant agreement prior to extension. Moreover, on occasion (iv) a collective 
labour agreement has, prior to its extension, be tested against the public 
interest.1948 The consequences of the extension are that the agreement applies 
in a mandatory fashion to all employers and employees falling within the 
scope of applicability of the extended collective labour agreement. 
These requirements fit perfectly well within the “extension” process of 
European collective labour agreements by a Council decision. After all, there 
must be a public act implementing the European collective labour agreement, 
which, until today, has always been a directive. The signatory parties must 
furthermore jointly request the Commission to submit their agreement to the 
Council to have it implemented. The signatory parties must also meet certain 
minimum requirements for their agreement to be extended; they must, taking 
into consideration the content of the agreement in question, taken together, be 
sufficiently representative. Finally, the agreement requires a general (political) 
approval prior to its implementation; it must serve the public interest. 
Once implemented, the European collective labour agreement applies in a 
mandatory fashion to all employers and employees falling within the scope 
of applicability of the (implemented) European collective labour agreement. 
In other words, implementing European collective labour agreements by a 
Council decision closely relates to the extension process of collective labour 
agreements as is in place in many Member States.
The above gives sufficient reason, in the remainder of this thesis, to focus 
on the effects of a normal, i.e. non-extended, transnational collective labour 
agreement under a new collective bargaining system, and not on the extension 
of such agreements. A system of extension of transnational (European) 
collective labour agreements simply is already in place.1949 That is not to say 
that the proposed new system on transnational collective bargaining cannot 
complement the European social dialogue. It should be reminded that the 
European social partners have an option to implement collective labour 
agreements concluded within the European social dialogue either by a Council 
1948  Which is, for example, the case in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.
1949  That is not to say that the European “extension process” is perfect. however, I will 
exclude that topic from the remainder of this thesis.
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decision, or in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to 
management and labour and the Member States. This second implementation 
method also has flaws, including the unclear binding effect and potential 
problems with regard to implementation.1950 here, the proposed new system 
may play a role for a new manner of “implementation” of European collective 
labour agreements, concluded in full autonomy by the social partners. 
4. Bargaining levels
Basically, there are three important levels of collective bargaining that can be 
witnessed in many Member States: company level, sectoral level and inter-
professional (national) level. The question is whether each of these levels is 
appropriate for collective bargaining in a new, transnational system. These 
levels will be discussed in sections 4.1 through 4.3 below. Subsequently, the 
geographical area in which the transnational collective labour agreements 
could apply will be set out in section 4.4. 
4.1 Company level
All Member States have bargaining at company-level.1951 This level also seems 
quite appropriate for transnational collective bargaining. deinert’s limited 
research showed that multinational companies seem to be interested in 
transnational collective bargaining,1952 and transnational collective bargaining 
already occurs at company level.1953 Moreover, company-level transnational 
bargaining may bring specific advantages to multinational companies.1954 
Finally, the commission seems rather enthusiastic about this level and intends 
to formulate rules for transnational collective bargaining (also) at company-
level:1955 
Providing an optional framework for transnational collective bargaining at either 
enterprise level or sectoral level could support companies and sectors to handle 
challenges dealing with issues such as work organisation, employment, working 
conditions, training. It will give the social partners a basis for increasing their 
capacity to act at transnational level. It will provide an innovative tool to adapt to 
1950  See chapter 6, section 4.3.
1951  Chapter 13, section 2.4.
1952  Chapter 7, section 5.
1953  Chapter 4, section 3.
1954  Chapter 7, section 3.5.
1955  Communication from the commission on the social agenda, COM (2005) 33,  
page 8.
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changing circumstances, and provide cost-effective transnational responses. Such 
an approach is firmly anchored in the partnership for change priority advocated 
by the Lisbon strategy.
Besides the above, the existence of the European Company may also play 
a role in the further development of transnational collective bargaining 
at company-level. It is conceivable that multinational companies would 
choose for a European Company to have one and the same legal structure 
throughout the European Union. It is maybe not that farfetched that the same 
multinational companies would opt for transnational collective agreements 
equally applying to all of these European Companies.
4.2 Sectoral level
All Member States have collective bargaining at sectoral level.1956 This level 
seems appropriate for transnational collective bargaining as well. This is 
clearly indicated in the aforementioned quote from the 2005 Commission 
Communication. The opportunities for transnational bargaining at sectoral 
level have been particularly recognised since 1997. Since that year there have 
been various initiatives taken by European sectoral social partners aimed 
at a more explicit European coordination of national bargaining.1957 But a 
more important development occurred in 1998. In that year the Commission 
argued that “the sectoral level is a very important area for development 
both on general issues such as employment, industrial change and a new 
organization of work and on upcoming specific demands on the labour 
market” and considered the development of negotiations at sectoral level “a 
key issue”.1958 In the same year the SSd Committees have been established 
which Committees have proven a success.1959 
Transnational collective bargaining could, in my view, really flourish between 
the social partners having seat in a SSd Committee. The conditions for 
transnational collective bargaining in such a Committee are well. The social 
partners having seat in a SSd Committee actually meet on a regular basis as 
they are part of the Commission’s consultation process on the basis of article 
138 of the EC Treaty. In that process, they are confronted with new topics 
on which they can bargain. Moreover, as in many cases only one European 
employees’ organisation and only one European employers’ organisation have 
1956  Chapter 13, section 2.4.
1957  See chapter 4, section 2.4. 
1958  COM (1998) 322, page 14.
1959  See chapter 4, section 4.
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seat in a SSd Committee,1960 the logistics of collective bargaining are fairly 
easy. To summarise, sectoral-level seems an appropriate level for transnational 
collective bargaining.
 
4.3 Cross-industry level
Not all Member States have cross-industry collective bargaining at national 
level.1961 Where that bargaining level is in place, it sometimes takes the form 
of tripartite collective bargaining. Bargaining at this level may strongly 
resemble drafting legislation: general rules are adopted, which are intended to 
be extended throughout the entire economy where possible. This level seems 
not overly appropriate for transnational collective bargaining, unless with 
the goal of drafting generally applicable, law-like arrangements. As argued 
in section 3 above, there is already an appropriate institute for these types of 
arrangements, being article 138 ff of  the EC-Treaty. Moreover, cross-industry 
social partners do not seem to be overly active in the field of transnational 
collective bargaining, besides their involvement in the European social 
dialogue. A transnational cross-industry bargaining level would also seem 
rather complicated, as it would potentially involve a great many participants. 
All in all, it does not seem an overly appropriate level for transnational 
collective bargaining and is therefore excluded from the proposals on a new 
system of transnational collective bargaining.
4.4. Geographical scope of applicability
In the Researched Countries, collective labour agreements can have a national 
scope of applicability, but also a more limited, regional scope. In order for 
transnational collective labour agreement to be truly transnational, they 
should at least apply within the jurisdiction of two Member States. That is 
the minimum threshold. As the goal of this thesis is to develop European 
legislation on transnational collective bargaining, the maximum geographical 
scope of such a collective labour agreement is the entire EU. A transnational 
collective labour agreement should therefore at least have force in two Member 
States and at a maximum in all Member States. 
1960  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 11.
1961  Chapter 13, section 2.4.
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5. The three classical rights, leading to 
autonomous collective bargaining
The new system of transnational collective bargaining should, ideally, be 
based on the three classical rights: (i) the freedom of association, (ii) the right 
to collective bargaining and (iii) the right to strike. These rights are recognised 
in the Member States at national level.1962 Their importance is repeatedly 
confirmed by multiple scholars.1963 The Committee on Employment and 
Social Affairs also stressed their importance.1964 Most importantly, these 
rights are protected by a great many international instruments and already 
apply, although with some limitations, to the European Community.1965 
The importance of these rights is well summarised by dorssemont: “Collective 
agreements constitute a spontaneous and natural outcome of the recognition 
of three fundamental workers’ rights: (a) the freedom of association, the 
right to form and join trade unions, (b) the right to strike and (c) the right to 
or freedom of collective bargaining.”1966 These rights also lead to collective 
autonomy, “the development of collective agreements as sources for the free 
definition of wage policies and working conditions”.1967 And that is exactly 
what is pursued by the Commission: European collective labour agreements 
as sources of law.1968 It is also exactly what is in place in the Member States: 
autonomous collective bargaining is recognised throughout the EU,1969 
and actually is a central element in most European bargaining systems.1970 
Autonomy can be best described by pointing at four of its essential elements: 
1962  See chapter 13, section 4. It should, however, be noted that the full recognition of 
the right to strike in Great Britain is questionable. 
1963  See for example: A. Lo Faro, Regulating Social Europe: reality and myth of 
collective bargaining, page 102 and 153, E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European 
Social Dialogue, pages 8 ff; F. dorssemont, Some Reflections on the Origin, 
Problems and Perspectives of the European Social Dialogue, page 9; d. Buda, 
On course for European labour relations? The prospects for the social dialogue 
in the European Union, page 33; and A.T.j.M. jacobs, Het recht op collectief 
onderhandelen in rechtsvergelijkend en Europees perspectief, page 65.
1964  Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Report on transnational trade union 
rights in the European Union.
1965  Reference is made to chapter 8 hereof, and section 2.5 above. 
1966  F. dorssemont, Some Reflections on the Origin, Problems and Perspectives of the 
European Social Dialogue, page 9.
1967  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 41.
1968  COM (2002) 341, page 19.
1969  See chapter 8, section 3.3.
1970  N. Bruun, The Autonomy of Collective Agreement, page 5.
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(i) independence of trade unions, (ii) independent sphere towards the state 
authorities in which the parties to the collective labour agreement can act, 
(iii) some balance of power between both parties (which balance unions can 
achieve by being representative and well organised) and (iv) instruments and 
tools for the participating parties to put pressure on their counterparties.1971 
Autonomous collective bargaining can only be sufficiently achieved by 
activeness on the side of public authority; a laissez-faire attitude does not 
suffice.1972 This certainly applies to transnational collective bargaining, as there 
is an imbalance in powers between labour and management at European level, 
justifying an active approach from Community institutions.1973 A purely laissez-
faire system shows weaknesses when external changes occur and thus cannot 
constitute real autonomy.1974 Therefore, a proper system of transnational 
collective bargaining, with true protection of the three fundamental rights, is 
indispensable. Very clear on this is Keller: “In addition to existing individual 
rights, the EU will have to guarantee social and collective rights in the future 
if  it wants to overcome the massive shortfall of popular legitimacy and 
acceptance of the Community on the part of its citizens, as well as to forestall 
possible losses in ‘social’ productivity.”1975 Equally clear is Blank, who argued: 
“If  one looks at the more long-term prospect of cross-border European 
collective bargaining with the aim of cross-border agreements, it is evident 
that one indispensable precondition is the anchoring of collective rights at 
European level. This includes freedom of association, the right to collective 
bargaining and the right to strike (…).”1976 A new system on transnational 
collective bargaining should therefore actively protect the above-mentioned 
three classical rights.1977
1971  N. Bruun, The Autonomy of Collective Agreement, page 5.
1972  F. dorssemont, Some Reflections on the Origin, Problems and Perspectives of the 
European Social Dialogue, page 14. See also chapter 6, section 3.1.
1973  See chapter 7, section 3.7 and S. Smismans, The European social dialogue between 
constitutional and labour law, pages 356 and 357.
1974  S. Sciarra, The evolving structure of Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; 
Draft General Report, page 12.
1975  B. Keller, National industrial relations and the prospects for European collective 
bargaining – The view from a German standpoint, page 63.
1976  M. Blank, Collective Bargaining in the European Union – The standpoint of IG 
Metall, pages 166 – 167.
1977  As previously mentioned, article 137.5 of the EC Treaty should be revoked or 
altered to make such an active protection possible, if  that article stands in the way 
of that protection.
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6. Voluntary and free negotiations
A logical consequence of autonomy of collective bargaining is the free and 
voluntary nature of that bargaining process, based on mutual recognition. 
The social partners are free to choose whether or not to bargain, whether or 
not to conclude a collective labour agreement and, albeit to a lesser extent as 
will be further discussed below, with whom. This is a system that basically can 
be found in the Researched Countries.1978 This is also a system that is pursued 
at European level. The Court of First Instance clearly held, with regard 
to the European social dialogue, that representatives of management and 
labour concerned in the negotiation stage are those who have demonstrated 
their mutual willingness to initiate the process provided for in article 4 of the 
Agreement on Social Policy and to follow it through to its conclusion.1979 The 
negotiation phase is therefore embedded in a free and voluntary environment. 
This is encouraged by the Commission, who in its 1998 Communication 
”Adapting and promoting the Social dialogue at Community level” 
reaffirmed that (i) it is up to the social partners to decide who sits at any 
negotiation table,1980 and (ii) the negotiation process is based upon principles 
of autonomy and mutual recognition of the negotiating parties.1981 In the 
light of all of this, the Commission also pursued an optional (as opposed 
to mandatory) framework for transnational collective bargaining.1982 The 
European Economic and Social Committee emphasised that optional 
means that it is at the social partners’ discretion whether or not to make use 
of a framework enabling them to conclude transnational collective labour 
agreements.1983 Finally, this is in line with many international instruments,1984 
including the case law of the European Court of human Rights’ under the 
Convention for the Protection of human Rights and Fundamental.1985 This 
Court clearly emphasises the voluntary nature of collective bargaining and the 
conclusion of collective agreements.1986
1978  Chapter 13, section 7.
1979  UEAPME case, paragraph 75, emphasis added.
1980  COM (1998) 322, page 12.
1981  COM (1998) 322, page 14.
1982  COM (2005) 33, page 8.
1983  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication 
from the Commission on the Social Agenda COM (2005) 33 final, paragraph 4.3.2.
1984  Reference is made to chapter 8, section 3.1. 
1985  See chapter 8, section 3.1.2.
1986  European Court of human Rights, 6 February 1976, Swedish Engine Drivers/
Sweden.
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That social partners are free to choose whether or not to enter into collective 
bargaining and whether or not to conclude collective labour agreements is one 
thing. That they are entitled to do so with every social partner of their own 
choosing is, as already referred to above, another. After all, in many Member 
States collective bargaining can only be done with representative trade unions. 
In the system I envisage trade unions only have to meet “mild” representativity 
demands in order to be entitled to enter into a transnational collective labour 
agreement. The employer does not necessarily have to enter into collective 
bargaining with, for example, the most representative trade union. however, 
the proposed system does promote bargaining with clearly representative 
trade unions, as collective labour agreements concluded with these parties 
have a stronger effect. Besides that, representative trade unions are obviously 
in a better position to “force” an employer into collective bargaining by 
threatening with, or engaging in collective actions than trade unions that are 
not representative. Consequently, the natural flow of things would likely lead 
representative trade unions to do most of the transnational bargaining. The 
proposed system of representativity in transnational collective bargaining, 
the exact meaning of that term and the requirements social partners need 
to satisfy in order to be entitled to conclude transnational collective labour 
agreements, will be scrutinised in chapter 15.
The system I propose is therefore fully free and voluntary, including the choice 
with whom to bargain, provided that the social partner meets certain basic 
demands. As a consequence, a representative social partner cannot demand a 
place at the negotiation table through law, but it has to do so by showing its 
power. The advantage of such a system is that it fully respects the autonomy 
of the social partners; they are the ones that can choose whom to bargain 
with. Another advantage is that it does not have to be established in advance 
which social partners are best equipped to bargain with each other. A lesson 
learned from the European social dialogue is that it is extremely difficult to 
establish on forehand general representativity criteria which entitle a social 
partner to participate in bargaining. 
7. The transnational collective labour agreement 
A transnational collective labour agreement should obviously be defined. 
Before proposing a definition in section 7.6, let us first turn to the potentially 
important factors of such an agreement. As is stated in chapter 13, paragraph 
5.1, at least four factors are considered important at national level: (i) the 
agreement, (ii) the bargaining agents, (iii) the content and (iv) possible 
registration. These factors will be discussed in sections 7.1 through 7.4. Section 
7.3 also discusses the types of provisions that can be found in a collective 
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labour agreement: individual normative, collective normative and obligatory 
provisions. A fifth factor should not be forgotten with regard to transnational 
collective labour agreements, which is the transnational element, which will 
be discussed in section 7.5.
7.1 The agreement
It is obvious that a collective labour agreement should be an agreement. As the 
definition of “transnational collective labour agreement” should be the same 
in every Member State, the term should be interpreted autonomously on the 
basis of international law. What could be considered “an agreement” from an 
international perspective is already discussed in chapter 5, section 5.2.1. As 
mentioned, UNIdROIT and the Commission on European Contract Law 
(also known as the Lando Commission) drafted rules on agreements, being 
the Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of 
European Contract Law respectively. Both Principles lack a definition of 
the term agreement, but give information on the different components of an 
agreement:
•	 at	least	two	parties	should	be	present	in	order	to	be	able	to	enter	into	an	
agreement;
•	 these	parties	must	have	the	intention	to	be	legally	bound	and	they	must	
reach sufficient agreement in order to conclude an agreement;
•	 the	agreement	must	have	a	certain	(legal)	effect	on	the	parties;	either	one	
or more of the parties must perform. 
When it comes to collective bargaining, the agreement must not only affect 
the relation between the signatory parties, but more importantly, when it 
concerns organisations, the relation between their members (ultimately being 
employers and employees). 
Given the above, a general international definition of “agreement” could be 
“an act whereby two or more parties reach sufficient consent as to do or omit 
from doing something that affects their and, in the case of organisations, their 
members’ legal relation”.
It is rather common in the national laws on collective bargaining to require the 
agreement to be laid down in writing.1987 This demand can also be found in the 
definition of collective labour agreement in ILO Recommendation R91 and in 
the proposals to draft legislation on transnational collective bargaining from 
1987  See chapter 13, section 5.1.
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the expert group lead by Ales.1988 In my opinion, this demand makes perfectly 
sense. In the end, the consequences of the agreement have a broad range. 
In other words, the agreement does not merely affect the bargaining parties, 
but (a great number of) other parties – most notably being the employer and 
employees – as well. All these parties must know the exact content of the 
agreement, which is particularly difficult if  it concerns transnational collective 
agreements that inherently have a potentially large scope. Sufficient knowledge 
on the exact content of the agreement can only be properly achieved if  the 
agreement is agreed on in writing. 
7.2 The bargaining agents
National legislation makes clear that only specific parties are entitled to 
act as a bargaining agent and consequently to conclude a collective labour 
agreement.1989 On the one hand there should be employers or employers’ 
organisations. On the other hand there should be trade unions. That these 
parties are entitled and legitimised to conduct collective bargaining is beyond 
dispute in all Member States. In some Member States, however, parties other 
than trade unions may also conclude collective labour agreements, such as 
authorised employee representatives or Works Councils. As explained in 
chapter 1 section 2.2, there are a number of arguments as to why the role of the 
Works Council should be limited in collective bargaining, for which reasons I 
exclude this institution (and other authorised employee representatives apart 
from trade unions) from being a bargaining agent. Collective bargaining at 
labour’s side should therefore be limited to trade unions.1990 The requirements 
that employers’ organisations and trade unions should satisfy in order to 
conclude transnational collective agreements will be discussed in chapter 15, 
section 6. 
1988  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 39.
1989  See chapter 13, section 5.1.
1990  It should be noted that in the proposals forwarded in the report Transnational 
Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, the trade unions also were in 
charge of bargaining on labour’s side, although the European Works Council could 
be awarded an advisory role in this process. See E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, 
S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-Ré, Transnational Collective 
Bargaining: Past, Present and Future.
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7.3 The content
National legislation makes clear that collective labour agreements should 
concern employment conditions.1991 This can equally be derived from the 
definition of a collective labour agreement in ILO Recommendation R91 
(“agreements … regarding working conditions and terms of employment”). 
These employment conditions should at a minimum be the same conditions 
that can be arranged in an individual employment agreement. These conditions 
concern the individual normative provisions: the rights and obligations 
between the employer and employee. The individual normative provisions 
could, for example, concern on the one hand, working hours, working place 
and organisation of labour, and on the other, the classification of positions, 
wage scales, education and wage indexation. 
Besides these individual normative provisions, the social partners should also 
be able to agree on collective normative provisions. These provisions basically 
arrange the collective employment relations. Although such provisions are not 
in place in all Member States – Great Britain, for example, does not have such 
provisions – social partners in many Member States value the possibility of 
including collective normative provisions in the collective labour agreement. 
It is ultimately up to the contracting parties (and in line with their autonomy 
which is pursued in the underlying system) whether or not to actually use 
their power to arrange collective employment relations. Furthermore, there is 
a practical argument which gives reason to grant social partners the right to 
arrange collective employment relations, being the fact that many countries 
struggle with the exact difference between individual and collective normative 
provisions. This exact difference is less relevant if  both types of provisions 
may be inserted in a transnational collective labour agreement. These 
arguments also imply that the social partners should – in full autonomy – be 
able to provide for rights and obligations that arrange the relation between 
the employer and the employees vis-à-vis third collective parties, most notably 
funds. In, for example, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium it is possible to 
arrange (binding) legal relations concerning such funds. Obviously, it should 
concern third collective parties that directly attribute to the well-being of the 
employers and employees, such as social funds, or associations arranging 
for education. The collective normative provisions will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 15, section 4.4.
Besides (individual and collective) normative provisions, a transnational 
collective labour agreement should also be able to set out rights and obligations 
1991  See chapter 13, section 5.1.
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between the contracting parties. Consequently, in accordance with national 
law on collective bargaining, transnational collective labour agreements 
should deal with obligatory provisions as well. These provisions may include 
stipulations on the manner of termination of the collective labour agreement, 
the possible obligations to consult the counterparty in specific circumstances 
and an obligation to inform members on the collective labour agreement. 
Whether these obligatory terms should also include an implied principle of 
good faith and an implied peace obligation will be discussed in chapter 15, 
section 4.2.
The proposed topics that can be arranged in a transnational collective labour 
agreement are undeniably broad in range. In fact, the range is broader than is 
common in some Member States. however, in a system that is based on the 
autonomy of the social partners, it makes sense to leave it at their discretion 
to decide on which topics they wish to bargain. This especially holds true, 
as many of the common problems that social partners may wish to tackle 
on a transnational level are broad in nature, giving reason to broadly define 
the subject matter on which transnational collective agreements can be 
concluded. In any case, social partners active in the European social dialogue 
(should) address, according to the Commission, topics linked to vocational 
training, industrial change, the knowledge society, demographic patterns and 
globalisation.1992 Furthermore, currently popular transnational bargaining 
topics – corporate social responsibility and restructuring – are also “broad” 
topics, at least broader than strictly defined employment conditions.1993 
Finally, a current European trend in national collective bargaining is that the 
scope of content of collective labour agreements is broadening as well.1994 
To summarise, a broad scope of content of transnational collective labour 
agreements is logical.
7.4 Registration
In many Member States collective labour agreements must be registered 
at the proper authorities.1995 This demand may prove useful with regard to 
transnational collective agreements, as these agreements have a potentially 
large scope. If  transnational collective labour agreements are registered at the 
proper authorities, these authorities can subsequently make the agreements 
public (for instance, through their publication on the internet). This will 
1992  Many of these topics derive from COM (2002) 341, page 16.
1993  See chapter 4, section 3.
1994  See chapter 13, section 2.3.
1995  See chapter 13, section 5.1.
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make it easier for the ultimate “consumers” of the agreement to exactly know 
their content. As already stated in section 7.1 above, this is of the utmost 
importance.1996 
Moreover, said authorities may also be empowered to verify specific items 
relating to the transnational collective labour agreement, as will be set out 
in the following chapters, and specific formal requirements. I would be 
inclined to require that the agreement meet formal requirements in order 
for that agreement to be a proper transnational collective agreement. These 
requirements derive from article 16 BACLA1997 combined with annex 3 of the 
2004 Commission Communication “Partnership for change in an enlarged 
Europe – Enhancing the contribution of European social dialogue”.1998 The 
transnational collective labour agreement should include:
a. the names of the signatory organisations;
b. the identity of the persons concluding the agreement and the capacity in 
which these persons act;
c. the group of employees on the one hand and the employer, group of 
employers or sector on the other to which the agreement applies, and the 
geographic territory in which the agreement applies;
d. the term of the agreement, if  it is concluded for a fixed period of time, 
or the manner in which the agreement can be terminated, including the 
notice period, if  it concerns an agreement concluded for an indefinite pe-
riod of time or for a definite period of time containing a (tacitly) renewal 
clause;
e. the date of entrance into force;
f. the date of conclusion of the agreement;
g. the signature of the persons that are entitled to execute the agreement; 
h. a stipulation as to which language(s) is/are the original; and
i. a stipulation as to which law applies to the (obligatory provisions of) the 
agreement.1999 
1996  In the report Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, it is also 
proposed that the collective labour agreements should be registered in order to be 
accessible to interested parties. See E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. 
Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, 
Present and Future, page 39.
1997  Article 16 BACLA summarises the minimum content of the Belgium collective 
labour agreement.
1998  COM (2004) 557.
1999  Reference is made to chapter 16, section 2.2 of this thesis. 
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Should the agreement not meet these minimum demands, the agreement 
should be refused and should therefore not be regarded as a transnational 
collective labour agreement. 
7.5 Transnational
A transnational collective labour agreement should – obviously – be 
transnational. That means that the normative parts of the collective labour 
agreement should not be “connected with one country only”.2000 On the 
contrary, the norm setting power of the collective labour agreement should, in 
line with the European Works Council directive which regards transnational 
information and consultation of employees, have an impact in at least two 
different Member States. As follows from the above, the transnational part 
should focus on the normative provisions of the collective agreement, as these 
provisions form the basis of the entire collective labour agreement. Should the 
normative provisions not have a transnational effect, but only the obligatory 
provisions (the signatory parties are, for instance, established in two Member 
States), the agreement does not qualify as a transnational collective labour 
agreement. 
7.6 Definition of a transnational collective labour agreement
Given the above, a definition of a transnational collective labour agreement 
could read as follows: “a transnational collective labour agreement is an 
agreement in writing which is registered at the designated authorities, meeting 
the required minimum formalities and concluded between one or more 
employees’ organisations and one or more employers’ organisations or one 
or more employers, in which individual and collective relations between 
employers and employees, in enterprises or in a sector, are set out as having 
an impact in at least two Member States, and which can deal with the rights 
and obligations of the contracting parties. These collective relations may also 
concern the relation between employers and employees vis-à-vis third parties, 
established for the well-being of the employers and employees.”
8. Summary
A European system on transnational collective labour agreements must be 
based on an appropriate foundation in the EC Treaty. Article 308 of the EC 
Treaty is in my view the best possible basis for that, as it (i) opens the possibility 
to base the act on transnational collective bargaining on a regulation instead 
2000  See article 3.3 of the Treaty of Rome. 
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of a directive, thus guaranteeing the uniform applicability of the transnational 
collective labour agreement in all Member States and (ii) possibly circumvents 
the applicability of the exceptions stipulated in article 137.5 of the EC Treaty. 
drafting a regulation on transnational collective labour agreements will in my 
opinion pass the subsidiarity test of article 5 of the EC Treaty, while reverting 
to horizontal subsidiarity by letting the (European) social partners draft an 
equivalent of such an act will not work. This means that the Council can, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, and after consulting 
the European Parliament, issue a regulation on transnational collective labour 
agreements. 
Collective bargaining, as embedded in the European social dialogue, leading to 
the implementation of European collective agreements by a Council decision, 
bears great resemblance to the extension of collective labour agreements, 
as is in place in many Member States. A European “extension mechanism” 
is thus already in place. That gives reason to focus in the remainder of this 
thesis on the effects of a normal, i.e. non-extended, transnational collective 
labour agreement under a new collective bargaining system, and not on the 
extension of such agreements. This system may, however, be applied as a 
new implementation method, for the implementation of European collective 
agreements agreed on in the European social dialogue. This can be useful, 
as implementation of European collective labour agreements in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the 
Member States suffers from flaws, which may be overcome by the proposed 
system of transnational collective bargaining. 
Transnational collective bargaining may play a role at company and sectoral 
level. Transnational collective bargaining at cross-industry level seems the 
least appropriate. As for the scope of transnational collective bargaining, 
the agreement should at least apply within the jurisdictions of two Member 
States, and at a maximum in all Member States. 
The new system of transnational collective bargaining should be based on the 
three classical rights: (1) the freedom of association, (2) the right to collective 
bargaining and (3) the right to strike. These rights should be actively protected. 
The transnational collective bargaining process should be free and voluntary. 
The social partners should be free to choose whether or not to bargain and 
whether or not to conclude a collective labour agreement. The social partners 
should furthermore be free to choose with whom they wish to bargain, 
although transnational collective labour agreements concluded with clearly 
representative trade unions have a stronger effect in the proposed system. All 
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social partners should meet specific “mild” representativity demands in order 
to be entitled to participate in transnational collective bargaining.
The definition of transnational collective labour agreements should contain 
five components. First, there should be an agreement, being an act whereby 
two or more parties reach sufficient consent as to do or omit from doing 
something that affects their and, in the case of organisations, their members’ 
legal relation. Second, that agreement should be concluded between, on one 
side, employers or employers’ organisations, and on the other, trade unions. 
Third, transnational collective labour agreements should be able to deal with 
individual normative, collective normative and obligatory provisions. The 
scope of content of transnational collective labour agreements should be 
broad. The transnational collective labour agreement should furthermore be 
registered and meet a number of specific formalities. Finally, the agreement 
should be truly transnational, meaning that the normative provisions of the 
collective agreement should have an impact in at least two different Member 
States. Given these components, a definition of a transnational collective labour 
agreement could read as follows: “a transnational collective labour agreement 
is an agreement, in writing, which is registered at the designated authorities, 
meeting the required minimum formalities and concluded between one or 
more employees’ organisations and one or more employers’ organisations or 
one or more employers, in which individual and collective relations between 
employers and employees in enterprises or in a sector are set out as having 
an impact in at least two Member States, and which can deal with the rights 
and obligations of the contracting parties. These collective relations may also 
concern the relation between employers and employees vis-à-vis third parties, 
established for the well-being of the employers and employees.”
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ChAPTER 15
ThE PARTIES INVOLVEd ANd ThE BINdING POWERS
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter explained on which levels transnational collective 
bargaining that is embedded in a new system can take place, what constitutes 
a transnational collective labour agreement and whom it may concern. This 
chapter focuses on the binding power of the transnational collective labour 
agreement and the requirements that the signatory parties should satisfy 
in order to be involved in its conclusion. These two topics are very much 
intertwined. The binding power of a collective labour agreement may depend 
on the requirements the social partners involved must meet (the representativity 
of the social partners), but also on the coverage rate of a collective labour 
agreement (the representativity of the collective labour agreement). This will 
be explained in section 2 hereof. The Researched Countries will serve as a 
model for this explanation as their systems will be scrutinised.
The above already betrays that “representativity” is an important topic, just as 
was announced in chapter 7, section 4.1. This gives sufficient reason to further 
discuss representativity in its different forms, when and why it is of relevance, 
and whether representativity should simply boil down to numbers. These topics 
will be set out in section 3. Section 4 explains the basics of the new system 
of transnational collective bargaining that I envisage. It deals with the basic 
questions of the sort of binding power that the collective labour agreement 
should have (in honour or by law) and which parties are to be bound by that 
agreement. The main difficulties, of course, relate to the normative effects 
of the transnational collective labour agreement. For that reason, section 5 
explains in detail which employees are to be bound by the collective labour 
agreement that applies to their employer. Section 6 describes the requirements 
that the parties to a transnational collective labour agreement should satisfy 
in order to conclude such an agreement. Section 7 summarises this chapter. 
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2. The binding powers of collective labour agreements and 
representativity demands in the Researched Countries 
There are important differences and similarities between the Researched 
Countries concerning their respective position towards representativity in 
collective bargaining. The term “representativity” will be discussed in more 
detail in section 3 below. In the previous chapters, this term was placed 
in the key of requirements that the social partners involved in collective 
bargaining should satisfy with regard to minimum size (including a minimum 
number of members), a certain level of power or a specific status (apart from 
independence of the social partners).2001 Representativity in this section is 
regarded broader and focuses on (i) the demands that the contracting social 
partners should meet on the aforementioned topics in order to be qualified 
to represent the parties to whom the collective labour agreement should 
apply (representativity of the social partners), and (ii) the demands that the 
collective labour agreement itself  should satisfy on the same topics in order 
to apply to a large group of individuals (representativity of the collective 
labour agreement).2002 In other words, representativity is placed in the key 
of recognition of the legitimacy of  (a) social partners to negotiate collective 
labour agreements and (b) a collective labour agreement to apply to a large 
group of individuals.2003 
The importance of representativity in relation to the binding powers of a 
collective labour agreement in the Researched Countries can be best explained 
for the following three situations:
1. representativity on the side of management when it comes to “normal” 
(i.e. non-extended) collective labour agreements;
2. representativity on the side of labour when it comes to “normal” (i.e. 
non-extended) collective labour agreements; and
3. representativity on the both sides of the industry when it comes to exten-
ded collective labour agreements.
2001  Reference is made to chapter 8, section 7.
2002  In short, it is verified whether the collective labour agreement should have a specific 
“size” (coverage) or strength in order to apply to a larger group than the original 
group. 
2003  This is not a unique notion. The Institut des Sciences du Travail also placed 
representativity in the key of recognition of legitimacy. Reference is made to their 
report: Report on the representativeness of European Social Partner Organisations, 
page 5. 
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2.1 Management’s representativity concerning 
normal collective labour agreements
On management’s side, there are only two important parties in the Researched 
Countries, those being the individual employers and the employers’ 
organisations. Although this may be an open door: none of the Researched 
Countries requires the employer to satisfy specific representativity demands 
when concluding a company-level collective labour agreement. This is self-
evident, since the employer must be regarded “representative” as it acts on its 
own behalf. There is, in other words, no actual situation of representation. 
When it concerns collective labour agreements that surpass company-level, 
the only Researched Country that has strict representativity demands on 
management’s side is Belgium. In Belgium only representative employers’ 
organisations are empowered to conclude collective labour agreements. As 
previously mentioned,2004 the representativity demands in Belgium introduce 
a form of institutional representativity, as opposed to factual representativity. 
Factual representativity demands are not in place in Belgium. The mere fact 
that the law qualifies an organisation as being representative suffices in Belgium 
in order for that party to conclude legally valid collective labour agreements, 
regardless of whether or not that organisation is factually representative in 
the specific situation at hand. Germany has mild representativity demands, as 
it does not require the employers’ organisations to have a certain size or power 
in a specific sector, but it does require these organisations to be competent in 
that sector and to surpass company level.2005 In the Netherlands and in Great 
Britain there are no representativity demands at all.
do representativity demands for management really matter in the Researched 
Countries? In my opinion they do not. After all, in all these countries 
collective labour agreements only apply to employers that are either bound by 
that agreement (by signing the agreement themselves or by being a member 
of a contracting employers’ organisation) or choose to apply it voluntarily. In 
other words, all employers to which the collective labour agreement applies 
are, to a certain extent, involved in the conclusion or applicability of that 
agreement; all employers have a vote in it. There are therefore no pressing 
reasons for the Researched Countries to require specific representativity 
demands on management’s side for the applicability of normal collective labour 
agreements. The fact that Belgium nevertheless requires strict representativity 
2004  See chapter 11, section 5.
2005  It must be admitted that the second demand – the employers’ organisation should 
surpass company level – is probably one that each employers’ organisation will 
satisfy. It is not much use having an employers’ organisation that merely consist of 
or concludes collective labour agreements for just one employer.
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on management’s side still makes sense for the Belgian situation, as the 
employers’ organisations that are entitled to conclude collective labour 
agreements2006 must have a seat in a joint body, a body which has a public 
function. In order to be eligible to have a seat in such a public body, it is 
logical that the organisation involved has to have a certain power, a certain 
level of support in society, and should therefore be a representative employers’ 
organisation.
2.2 Labour’s representativity concerning normal 
collective labour agreements
On labour’s side, only employees’ organisations, in particular trade unions, 
are of relevance in the Researched Countries. In these countries, basically 
three systems of representativity combined with specific binding powers of 
the collective labour agreements can be distinguished. These systems all have 
their advantages and disadvantages, which will also be discussed in general 
terms. 
2.2.1 The Netherlands and Germany
First, there is the system as it applies in the Netherlands and in Germany. 
In the Netherlands, there are no representativity demands that employees’ 
organisations should satisfy at all. In Germany, the employees’ organisations 
should meet the same mild representativity demands as the employers’ 
organisations, as described above, but they should also possess “real powers”. 
In this dutch/German system, a trade union that has little members amongst 
the employees of an employer (a non-representative trade union) could 
nonetheless still conclude a valid collective labour agreement with that 
employer.2007 does this lack of (strict) representativity demands make sense?
A collective labour agreement concluded with a non-representative trade 
union is not necessarily overly burdensome in the Netherlands and Germany. 
Collective labour agreements in both countries only directly apply to the 
members of the contracting trade unions (the bound employees). These 
employees chose to be member of that (non-representative) trade union, they 
normally had the chance to vote on the draft agreement prior to it becoming 
a real collective labour agreement as a consequence whereof the collective 
2006  More in specific: collective labour agreements surpassing company-level, as only at 
those levels employers’ organisations play a role.
2007  In this example it concerns a company-level collective labour agreement, which 
example will be followed throughout the analysis that follows. however, the same 
applies mutatis mutandis to collective labour agreements surpassing company-level. 
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labour agreement justifiable applies to them. So far, there are in my view no 
problems.
The above, however, does not accurately describe the situation in said 
jurisdictions. First, in both countries the employer often uses reference 
clauses in the standard employment contracts, stating that a specific collective 
labour agreement applies. Consequently, the same collective labour agreement 
concluded with a non-representative trade union applies to all employees of 
the employer. Second, in the Netherlands the collective labour agreement may 
not apply directly to the employees that are not bound, but the employer is 
nonetheless by law obliged to apply the collective labour agreement to these 
employees, unless the collective labour agreement stipulates otherwise (article 
14 ACLA). do these circumstances change the above analysis?
Let us first focus on the reference clauses. These can only potentially 
be burdensome to employees that are not directly (through trade union 
membership) bound by the collective labour agreement. After all, the bound 
employees chose to be member of the trade union and normally had the 
opportunity to vote on the draft agreement. The analysis below therefore 
focuses on the position of the employee who is not bound by the collective 
labour agreement, i.e. the employee who is not a member of a contracting 
trade union.
When an employee who is not bound by a collective labour agreement enters 
into service with an employer who offers him an employment contract, 
including a reference clause referring to a collective labour agreement, in 
my view there is no real problem for that employee if  that collective labour 
agreement is agreed on with a non-representative trade union. The employee 
knows (or at least has the opportunity to know)2008 the content of the collective 
labour agreement upon deciding whether or not to sign the employment 
agreement, including the reference clause. The fact that the employee is “the 
weaker party” – and therefore in the most negative situation has no choice but 
to sign the agreement – does not change this. After all, the employer could 
as well have put the content of the collective labour agreement in standing 
2008  The employer is by law obliged to inform the employee in writing of the collective 
labour agreement governing the employee’s conditions of work, or in the case of 
collective agreements concluded outside the business by special joint bodies or 
institutions, the name of the competent body or joint institution within which the 
agreement was concluded. Reference is made to article 2.2 of Council directive 
91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an employer’s obligation to inform employees of 
the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship. See Oj L 288, 
18 October 1991, pages 32 – 35.
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employment conditions, and could give the same “weak” employee the choice 
to either accept it and enter into service, or not accept it and not be employed 
by the employer.
There is one “but” to the above. Collective labour law in Germany and the 
Netherlands allow the parties to an employment agreement to deviate from 
specific statutory provisions if  an applicable collective labour agreement 
specifically permits them to do so (¾ mandatory law). This deviation is 
usually to the detriment of the employee, and provides more flexibility 
for the employer. here the fact that the employee is the weaker party and 
simply needs to swallow the unfavourable employment conditions may be an 
argument against permitting a collective labour agreement that is agreed on 
with a non-representative trade union. This is an issue I will address further 
on in this chapter.
Things are getting more complicated in the course of the employment 
agreement. Once a new collective labour agreement is concluded during the 
course of the employment agreement, the content of that new agreement 
directly applies through the reference clause to the individual employment 
agreement of the employee who is not bound by the collective labour 
agreement. The individual employee does, in this situation, not have a chance 
to verify the content of the new agreement and to decide whether he thinks 
that it is agreeable or not. In my opinion, this is not necessarily troublesome. 
The employee chose, at the moment of entering into the service of the 
employer, that (part of) his employment conditions would be arranged by a 
particular collective labour agreement. he subsequently had the opportunity 
to become a member of that trade union, as a consequence whereof he would 
have been in the situation to influence the content of the (renewed) collective 
labour agreement as a member. Should the employee have chosen not to do 
that, he also chose that he could be confronted with employment conditions 
that were drafted without his involvement. In my opinion, the prevention of 
such a situation – which was apparently acceptable to the employee involved, 
as he did not become a member of the contracting trade union – is not worth 
defending by law.
There is, not surprisingly, again a “but” to the above. The employer could 
have agreed on a renewed collective labour agreement with another than the 
original trade union(s), or one or more of the original trade unions that signed 
the original collective labour agreement, refuse to sign the renewed collective 
labour agreement (while at least one of them is willing to sign the renewed 
collective labour agreement). This is a new situation for the employee, and 
places him in a different position when compared to the paragraph above. 
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him potentially having become a member of (one of) the original contracting 
trade union(s) would not have helped him to influence the renewed collective 
labour agreement (unless he became a member of the trade union that was 
willing to sign the renewed collective labour agreement). This is a situation 
which has appeared troublesome, at least in the Netherlands.2009 This is again 
an issue I will address further on in this chapter.
Now I will focus on article 14 ACLA, as applicable in the Netherlands. This 
article obliges the employer to apply the collective labour agreement to all of 
its employees, unless stipulated otherwise in the collective labour agreement 
itself. An employer typically obliges with this provision by using a reference 
clause in all employment agreements. however, not all employment agreements 
contain a reference clause. If, for example, the employer decides together with 
one or more trade unions to conclude a collective labour agreement after the 
company of the employer already is active for many years, it is very unlikely 
that the employment agreements of the employees contain a reference clause. 
The employer is in these circumstances obliged to offer the terms of the 
collective labour agreement to all employees, including employees who are 
not bound by the collective labour agreement.2010 This gives the employees 
not bound by that collective labour agreement the opportunity to pick the 
situation that fits them best: they either chose to stick to the already applicable 
employment conditions, or they pick the new terms. This gives the employees 
an important disincentive to become a trade union member: employees are 
better off  awaiting the results of the collective bargaining and then chose to 
either accept these new terms, should these fit well in their personal situation, 
or to deny them, should they feel better off  with their “old” employment 
conditions. The employees that are not bound by the collective labour 
agreements become “free riders”,2011 and take free advantage of the results 
achieved by trade unions, also made possible by the money and efforts of the 
bound employees. 
2009  Reference is made to chapter 9, section 9.2. Reference is also made to S. Sagel, 
Representativiteit van vakbonden en gebondenheid van werknemers aan cao’s.
2010  In Germany this situation would not occur, as the employer is not obliged to offer 
the terms of the collective labour agreement to employees who are not bound by 
the agreement.
2011  See for example F.B.j. Grapperhaus, De wenselijkheid van een nieuwe regeling voor 
de verhouding van niet-gebonden werknemers tot een CAO, pages 184 ff. See also 
 j. Visser, Union membership statistics in 24 countries, page 39.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 15
680
The above analysis leads to the following interlocutory findings:
•	 as	the	collective	labour	agreement	by	law	only	applies	to	bound	employ-
ees, the lack of (strict) representativity demands is not burdensome;
•	 this	is	somewhat	different	due	to	reference	clauses,	which	bind	the	other	
employees to the collective labour agreement as well. The “pain” is espe-
cially felt with regard to issues of ¾ mandatory law and once a collective 
labour agreement is renewed involving other than all original signatory 
trade unions;
•	 article	14	ACLA	adds,	for	the	Dutch	situation	only,	further	pain	to	this,	
as it “rewards” employees that are not bound and leads to a free riders 
effect. 
In Germany, some of the “pains” mentioned in the second bullet point 
are softened by law. Collective labour agreements in Germany may only 
contain minimum provisions: the principle of favour. A renewed collective 
labour agreement cannot, therefore, deteriorate the employment conditions 
that already applied to the individual employment agreement. The renewed 
collective labour agreement can therefore do little damage to the employment 
conditions of the employees who were not bound.2012 This is different with 
regard to possible provisions of ¾ mandatory law; these provisions may 
be to the disadvantage of the employees. here, it is relevant that German 
law has mild representativity demands. The trade unions should therefore 
be regarded a sufficient match against the employer; they should, after all, 
possess real powers. Moreover, the competency demand in Germany makes 
the competition for a trade union to conclude a collective labour agreement 
considerably smaller when compared to the Netherlands.2013 The situation 
that a small trade union from another branch suddenly enters into a collective 
labour agreement with an employer is therefore less likely to occur in Germany 
than in the Netherlands.
The principle of favour, as mentioned in the paragraph above, constitutes a 
clear advantage for the employees and reduces the importance of concluding 
collective labour agreements with representative trade unions. however, what 
is an advantage for one party is usually a disadvantage for the other. The 
principle of favour excludes the possibility for the employer to respond to 
2012  A new collective labour agreement in Germany can, however, terminate the 
after-effects of the previous collective labour agreement, which may also be to 
the detriment on the employees involved. This is a topic that will be discussed 
in chapter 16, section 5 with regard to the proposed European system on 
transnational collective bargaining. 
2013  See chapter 10, section 9.2.
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economical unfavourable circumstances by cutting back on employment 
conditions. 
A disadvantage of both the German and dutch system is that it can sometimes 
prove impossible for the employer to apply one collective labour agreement 
to all of its employees. Employees who are not bound by the collective labour 
agreement and who refuse to sign a reference clause (which can be the case 
if  the employees already work for the employer once the employer decides to 
enter into collective bargaining for the first time) cannot, under the system 
of collective labour law in said jurisdictions, easily be forced to accept the 
applicability of that agreement. This can stand in the way of uniformity of 
employment conditions, an important reason to conclude a collective labour 
agreement in the first place, and can be particularly difficult in times of 
economic distress.
2.2.2 Belgium
Things are radically different in Belgium. here, the employees’ organisations 
require the same institutional representativity as employers’ organisations do 
when it comes to concluding collective labour agreements. It is a system of 
institutional representativity: trade unions are considered representative, at 
all times, once declared so by the government. The question should be asked 
whether these representativity demands make sense.2014 
In Belgium the terms of a collective labour agreement apply to all employees 
of the bound employer, regardless of whether the employees are member of 
the contracting trade union(s) or not, and regardless of whether they signed a 
reference clause. The collective labour agreements have an erga omnes effect. 
Therefore, employees who are not involved in (the drafting of) the collective 
labour agreement, who are not represented by an organisation of their 
choosing in the collective bargaining process, and who have not agreed to the 
applicability of the collective labour agreement, are still confronted with its 
effects. This needs justification. This justification can be found by the fact that 
the trade unions are respresentative; the trade unions in Belgium are obliged 
to take into consideration the position of all employees when bargaining, not 
just the position of their members. For the same reason the trade unions are 
entitled to agree on minimum, standard and maximum provisions in collective 
labour agreements. 
2014  For the difference between the Belgian institutional model and the dutch 
contractual model reference is made to M. Rigaux and T. van Peijpe, Knelpunten 
in Nederlands en Belgisch cao-recht [bottlenecks in dutch and Belgian CLA-law], 
Samson h.d. Tjeenk Willink, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1994, pages 26 – 28.
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This system has the important advantages that the collective labour agreement 
applies to all employees (who fall within the scope of application of the 
collective labour agreement) and that, particularly in times of economical 
distress, measures can be taken that lead to the cutting back of employment 
conditions. Nonetheless, it also has certain disadvantages. First, the system 
attributes the right to collective bargaining only to a limited number of trade 
unions that are considered representative. It would therefore seem logical 
that the criteria of being entitled to obtain the status “representative” are 
clear and unambiguous. In the Belgian situation, the lack of such clarity was 
held to violate ILO-principles according to the ILO Committee on Freedom 
of Association. Furthermore, the Belgian institutionalised system is rather 
hostile to new or small trade unions: the Belgium system requires only a 
limited number of trade unions, which need to be strong and representative. 
New and/or small trade unions will not have a chance to enter into collective 
bargaining. This leads to “static” situations,2015 and is at odds with the general 
position in Europe that tends to favour pluralism.2016
2.2.3 Great Britain
In Great Britain there are no representativity requirements that employees’ 
organisations have to meet in order to be entitled to conclude collective labour 
agreements, but representativity does play a role in (statutory) recognition of 
trade unions. 
Let us begin with the demands in the (statutory) recognition process. Trade 
unions that are recognised have specific rights, such as the right to receive 
information that can be helpful to conclude a collective labour agreement. 
An employer can voluntarily recognise a trade union, in which case that trade 
union does not have to meet specific requirements. In my opinion, that lack of 
specific requirements makes sense in said situation, as the employer chose to 
recognise that trade union, and consequently voluntarily committed itself  to 
2015  A.Ph.C.M. jaspers, Representativiteit: representeren of vertegenwoordigen?, page 40.
2016  E. Franssen and A.T.j.M. jacobs, The question of representativity in the European 
social dialogue, page 1309 and S. Sciarra, The evolving structure of Collective 
Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; Draft General Report, page 6. Pluralism is 
important in order to prevent “insiders” in the employment process to exclude 
“outsiders” from that process. See F. dorssemont, Green Paper Modernising Labour 
Law to meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, ‘Collectief Arbeidsrecht, waer bestu 
bleven?’, page 152 (although dorssemont disagrees with the criticism expressed in 
relation to the Belgian demands on representativity).
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fulfil certain obligations. In case the employer refuses to voluntarily recognise 
the trade union, that trade union can still force the employer to do so. If  a 
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit of the employer is a member 
of the union applying for recognition, or if  the majority of the employees 
that voted in the ballot supports the trade union, that union must, by law, 
be recognised. These requirements for statutory recognition also make sense 
in my view. After all, if  the employer is unwilling to voluntarily award the 
trade union specific rights that recognised trade unions enjoy, there should 
be a justification for the trade union’s entitlement to still enforce its rights. 
This justification can be found in the representativeness of the trade union 
involved.
does the lack of representativity demands when concluding collective labour 
agreements make sense? To a certain extent it does. The terms of collective 
labour agreements in Great Britain do not have a binding force. It is therefore 
at the discretion of the parties involved – in this analysis the employer and the 
employee – to decide whether or not to apply the terms of the collective labour 
agreement. In this respect, representativity demands are not needed. however, 
the terms of a collective labour agreement do apply if  these are incorporated 
in the collective labour agreement via a reference clause. With regard to this 
situation, the same analysis as was put forward in the dutch and German 
situation is applicable. Briefly put, that means that the lack of representativity 
demands is most burdensome with regard to issues of ¾ mandatory law and 
once a collective labour agreement is renewed with anything other than all 
original signatory trade unions.
 
2.3 Representativity concerning extended collective labour agreements
Concerning the extension of collective labour agreements, merely the position 
of the social partners in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany is of relevance, 
as extension is not possible in Great Britain. dutch and German law require, 
among others, specific demands on coverage of a collective labour agreement, 
before it can be extended. Broadly put, in both countries the collective labour 
agreement that is to be extended has to cover at least 50% of the employees 
working within the scope of application of the collective labour agreement. 
There are no additional representativity demands in place when it comes to 
extending collective labour agreements in Belgium; the “standard” demands 
as described above are deemed to suffice. Consequently, all countries have 
representativity demands in place. But are these representativity demands 
logical? 
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Extended collective labour agreements apply to all employers and employees 
that fall within the scope of application of these agreements, regardless of 
whether they were in any way involved in (the drafting of) these agreements. 
There should be a justification for this wide applicability. This justification can 
be found in several demands, such as the fact that the legislator is involved in 
the extension process (it requires an extension decree) and that the extension 
should promote the general interests of society, or at least not contravene 
these interests. Another justification – and the one relevant for this part of the 
thesis – can be found in the existence of representativity demands the collective 
labour agreement should meet: it should apply to at least 50% of the employees 
working within the scope of application of the collective labour agreement. In 
the Netherlands and Germany, the existence of this representativity demand 
is explained by pointing at the circumstance that “only a majority can bind 
a minority” and the rule that “a minority should not be able to model the 
working conditions of a majority” respectively. The legislators of these 
countries therefore apparently view that employers and employees who are 
not involved in a specific collective labour agreement, can only be obliged to 
follow one if  that collective labour agreement is “democratically chosen” by 
a majority.2017 In Belgium, the government chose to only award important 
entitlements as drafting collective labour agreements (that could be extended) 
to such organisations that have an important influence on the social and 
economic situation in Belgium, being the representative organisations. The 
power and prestige of these organisations therefore entitles them to conclude 
collective labour agreements that can have an important general impact if  
extended.
2.4 Conclusion
On the basis of the above, the following general conclusions can be drawn:
•	 If 	only	employers	and	employees	that	are	involved	with	the	collective	la-
bour agreement – either by signing the collective agreement, or by being 
a member of the contracting organisations, or by agreeing to follow that 
agreement via a reference clause – are bound by that agreement, there 
is little need for representative parties to conclude that collective labour 
agreement.
•	 The	above	is	different	(i)	if 	the	collective	labour	agreement	permits	devi-
ation from ¾ mandatory law and (ii) for employees who are not bound 
2017  An analogy with the UEAPME case is easily made. In that case the Court of First 
Instance required a democratic legitimisation for the entitlement of the European 
social partners to have their collective labour agreement “extended” by a Council 
decision. Reference is made to chapter 5, section 3.3. 
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by a collective labour agreement through membership of a contracting 
trade union, but are instead bound by it though a reference clause, in 
case the renewed collective labour agreement is concluded by different 
parties than the ones that concluded the original collective labour agree-
ment.
•	 If 	 all	 employees	 are	 directly	 bound	 by	 a	 collective	 labour	 agreement,	
there should be a justification for that, for example, the demand that the 
contracting trade unions should be representative.
•	 If 	all	employers	and	employees	that	fall	within	the	scope of application 
of a collective labour agreement are to be bound by that agreement, 
there should be a justification for that, a justification which could in-
clude that the agreement should, prior to be extended, already apply to 
a majority of the employees that fall within the scope of application of 
that agreement. 
3 Representativity and collective bargaining 
The above conclusions show that representativity – either of the parties that 
conclude the collective labour agreement, or of the collective labour agreement 
itself  given its large coverage – is relevant in relation to the binding powers 
of a collective labour agreement. That gives sufficient reason to further define 
representativity and to analyse when and why it is important.
3.1 Forms of representativity
According to Black’s Law dictionary, representative means “one who stands 
for or acts on behalf  of another”.2018 That is a very narrow definition of 
“representative” and one that does not fit well in the context of collective 
bargaining. In that context, two important forms of representation should 
be distinguished.2019 First, representativity can be viewed as a part of general 
employment relations in a state: an organisation (social partner) is representative 
if  a government recognises or appoints that organisation as discussion 
partner or as a party that can act on behalf  of third parties. This is a form of 
institutional representativity that, for example, is in place in Belgium. Second, 
representativity can be viewed as the circumstance that an organisation can 
be considered a trustworthy spokesperson for a group of individuals whose 
interest it claims to defend. This is representation in a more sociological sense. 
2018  B.A. Garner, Black’s Law dictionary, Eight Edition.
2019  See, including references, F. dorssemont, Over de ‘representativiteit’ van ‘sociale 
partners’ in de Europese Sociale Dialoog, page 143. The forms of representativity 
derive from his text.
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This form of representation is normally connected to factual representativity, 
meaning that an organisation should have a sufficient number of members 
amongst the group of employees whose interests it claims to defend. In other 
words: if  an organisation has at least an x-percentage of members in the entire 
group it claims to represent, it can be considered a trustworthy spokesperson 
of that group. Obviously, institutional and sociological representativity do not 
rule each other out and can even coincide: an organisation can be appointed 
as representative because it (validly) claims to be a trustworthy spokesperson 
of a certain group of individuals. Factual representativity can for that reason 
also be important for institutional representativity. 
The above describes the forms of representativity. It does not necessarily 
describe the concept of representativity in collective bargaining. In order to 
give such a description, we need to dig deeper. The main goal of collective 
bargaining, brought back to its base, is that two parties – on the one side 
the employer or employers’ organisation and on the other side the trade 
union – arrange the legal relations of other parties, being the employer and 
its employees, by means of a collective labour agreement. The terms of the 
collective labour agreement consequently directly apply to this employer, 
or the employers that were represented by the employers’ organisation, and 
the employees that were represented by the trade union.2020 here the core of 
representativity in collective bargaining emerges, regardless of which form of 
representativity is used: representative organisations are organisations that 
are recognised in a legal system to act legitimately on behalf  of and bind 
others.2021 
3.2 When is representativity important?
The above describes representativity and its different forms. It does not 
explain when representativity is of importance and to whom this in particular 
applies. Should the social partners merely represent the interests of their own 
members, questions on representativity are not overly important. After all, 
employers’ and employees’ organisations can be considered to represent – 
to act on behalf  of – their members. Membership normally implies that the 
members wish the organisation to represent their interests and as a general 
rule means that the organisations may, in the field of collective employment 
law, represent their members. Often the organisation’s articles of association 
2020  Which in many systems in the EU are all employees employed by a bound 
employer. 
2021  This applies regardless of whether the collective labour agreement only binds in 
honour and regardless of whether it has erga omnes effects.
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arrange for such representation.2022 In other words, social partners should be 
considered trustworthy spokespersons for their own members, they should be 
deemed able to represent and bind their own members. 
however, it is rather common that the representational powers of the 
social partners exceed merely the interests of their own members. Tripartite 
consultation and negotiation, for instance, clearly show this. Trade unions 
are in such a case considered to represent the interests of all employees, and 
employers’ organisations of all employers. The same can apply to collective 
bargaining. A collective labour agreement can, as follows from chapter 
13, apply to all employers and all employees that fall within the scope of 
applicability of that agreement, even to those who are not members of the 
contracting social partners. In these situations the concept of representativity 
is of particular importance. It should be established whether the social 
partners should be entitled to act on behalf  the entire group of employers 
and employees and bind them in collective bargaining. 
As said, social partners often serve the interests of a larger group than 
merely their members. This certainly holds true with regard to trade unions: 
they often have to serve the interests of all employees, and not just of their 
members. This is obvious in countries in which a collective labour agreement 
automatically applies to all employees working for the bound employer. The 
contracting trade unions need in such an event to represent the interests of all 
employees, regardless of their membership.2023 But also in countries in which 
the collective labour agreement merely automatically applies to the members 
of the contracting trade unions, the contracting trade unions very often in 
fact also arrange the employment conditions of other, unbound employees. 
In the end, these latter employees are often covered by the content of the 
collective labour agreement through reference clauses.2024 
Member States are far more hesitant to apply collective labour agreements 
to employers who are not directly bound by the collective labour agreement. 
An employer is normally not automatically bound by a collective labour 
agreement, but only if  it is a member of a contracting employers’ association 
or executed the agreement itself. By way of exception, this employer (and 
its employees) can also be bound by the collective labour agreement once 
2022  F. dorssemont, Over de ‘representativiteit’ van ‘sociale partners’ in de Europese 
Sociale Dialoog, page 144.
2023  See for example Belgium, chapter 11, section 7.3.1.
2024  See for example the Netherlands and Germany, respectively chapters 9, section 
7.3.2 and 10, section 7.3.
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that agreement is extended, and the employer falls within the scope of 
applicability of that extended collective labour agreement. It should be noted 
that a number of Member States disputed whether such an extension is 
permitted.2025 This discussion pays particular attention to the position of the 
employers, and not so much to the position of its employees. For example, 
in Poland scholars argue that extension of collective labour agreements 
(to unbound employers and employees) is at odds with the private parties’ 
freedom to bargain, for which reason such an extension in fact never occurs. 
Surprisingly, this argument is not applied in Poland to employees employed 
by a bound employer, as a collective labour agreement automatically applies 
to all employees of such an employer, including to those employees who are 
not a member of the contracting union(s).2026 More in general, extension of  
collective labour agreements to employers and employees who are not bound 
by that agreement is normally only permitted if  specific requirements are met. 
As a rule, extension requires a public act or decree, issued by the government 
authority in charge of labour matters and the collective labour agreement that 
is to be extended should have a minimum coverage rate. These requirements 
are not in place in countries in which collective labour agreements only have 
an erga omnes effect towards employees, covering the employment conditions 
of all employees employed by the bound employer.
All in all, in collective bargaining representativity demands are particularly 
important with regard to trade unions, as they typically serve the interests of 
all employees employed by a bound employer and falling within the scope of 
application of the collective labour agreement. Representativity demands are 
less important with regard to employers’ organisations, as collective labour 
agreements only apply to their members – and employers’ organisations are 
deemed to be representative for their own members – with the exception 
of extended collective labour agreements. As this thesis does not focus on 
extended transnational collective labour agreements, as set out in chapter 
14, section 3, but merely on normal (non-extended) transnational collective 
labour agreement, representativity is particularly relevant for trade unions. 
This particularly holds true since my suggestions for a transnational system 
on collective bargaining will be based on the rule that only employers that 
either are member of the contracting employers’ organisations or executed 
the agreement themselves are bound by that agreement, while the employment 
conditions of employees who are not a member of the contracting trade 
union(s) but are employed by a bound employer and fall within the scope of 
applicability of a collective labour agreement, may in specific circumstances 
2025  See chapter 13, section 9.
2026  See chapter 13, sections 8.3 and 9.
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also be governed by that agreement. Given these arguments, the further 
analysis on representativity will primarily focus on the position of trade 
unions. 
3.3 Why is representativity of trade unions relevant?
The above shows that representativity of trade unions in collective bargaining 
is relevant. It does, however, only partially explain why it is relevant and what 
its advantages are. The analysis below tries to explain in further detail why 
representativity of trade unions is so important for the purpose of collective 
bargaining.
First, not every party should be able to act on behalf  of a large group of 
employees for the purpose of setting employment conditions; not every party 
can be considered a trustworthy spokesperson for that group of employees. 
This power should be legitimatised. A legitimating factor can be found in the 
special position that is awarded to trade unions throughout the EU: they are 
entitled in every Member State, and often on an exclusive basis, to enter into 
collective bargaining in order to establish employment conditions.2027 Another 
legitimating factor can be found in the representativeness of the trade unions, 
regardless of how this concept is exactly shaped in each country. The role 
of trade unions can be put in the key of “participatory democracy;”2028 they 
play because of their representativity a role in shaping the society. This is not 
new at European level, as the Court of First Instance already ruled in the 
UEAPME case that the social partners, while executing their entitlements 
based on articles 138.4 and 139 of the EC Treaty, play a part in the democracy 
of the EU. It ruled:2029
(…) the principle of democracy on which the Union is founded requires – in the 
absence of the participation of the European Parliament in the legislative process 
– that the participation of the people be otherwise assured, in this instance through 
the parties representative of management and labour (…).
The more representative a trade union is – the better spokesperson it is 
for the employees – the better it can fulfil its function in the participatory 
democracy,2030 i.e. by shaping proper employment conditions.
2027  See chapter 13, section 5.1.
2028  See chapter 6, section 3.3.
2029  UEAPME case, paragraph 89.
2030  See chapter 6, section 3.3.
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This brings us to the following argument: representative trade unions are best 
able to arrange the optimum employment conditions for the employees.2031 
After all, historically, trade unions were primarily formed to counterbalance 
management’s powers. Trade unions had to struggle to persuade management 
to give up its managerial power to unilaterally set employment conditions.2032 
In order to be able to counterbalance these managerial powers, the trade 
unions had to rely on the power of the employees’ collective, their great 
numbers. If  trade unions represent only an insignificant number of employees, 
that would jeopardise their possibility to truly counterbalance management’s 
powers. Closely related to that is the fact that the trade unions’ strongest 
means to counterbalance these powers is by engaging in collective actions, 
most notably strikes. In order for a strike to be effective, the trade unions 
require a sufficient number of participating employees. having a significant 
number of members amongst the employees will certainly help to promote 
the employees’ willingness to participate in collective actions.2033
Furthermore, trade unions that have a sufficient number of members amongst 
the relevant group of employees can benefit from these members’ knowledge, 
experience and manpower, necessary to conduct proper collective bargaining. 
This is also a benefit that enables the trade unions to get a proper feeling 
of what really matters to the employees working for a specific company or 
in a specific sector. Moreover, trade unions with a significant number of 
members have a steady flow of income due to the membership contributions. 
This income is necessary for the financial independence of the trade union. 
In summary, there are many arguments that establish the importance of the 
representativeness of trade unions in collective bargaining. 
3.4 Just factual representativity?
In section 3.1 it is stated that factual representativity is relevant for both 
institutional and sociological representativity. The relevance of factual 
representativity is also confirmed in section 3.3 above, as many advantages 
of representativity relate to the number of members trade unions have 
amongst the group of employees whose interests they claim to represent. 
2031  See F.B.j. Grapperhaus, Representativiteit van werknemersorganisaties 
[Representativity of employees’ organisations], in: CAO-recht in beweging [CLA-law 
in motion], SdU, The hague, 2005, page 108. This argument, as well as the two 
following arguments derive from this article.
2032  See chapter 13, section 3.
2033  After all, one of the roles trade unions specifically have in Europe is to mobilize 
their members. Reference is made to: European Commission, Industrial Relations 
in Europe 2006, page 19.
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This, however, does not mean that factual representativity alone suffices when 
it involves collective bargaining, as this would not be true. The mere fact 
that a trade union has a certain number of members amongst the employees 
does not necessarily and automatically make that trade union a trustworthy 
spokesperson.2034 Other requirements are of importance as well.2035 Some of 
these requirements, referred to as “mild representativity requirements”, are in 
place in the Researched Countries.
Trade unions are only in a position to achieve a proper bargaining result if  they 
are independent from their counterparty, most notably from the employer(s). 
That means that they should be financially independent, but also independent 
from facilities provided by the employers. The trade unions should preferably 
surpass company level, which also improves their independence. These 
demands can, to a differing degree, be found in Germany and Great Britain. 
Moreover, trade unions should have sufficient feeling with the employees 
whose interest they claim to represent. That feeling can, as set out above, be 
provided by the members. But it can also be further developed should the 
trade unions focus on the specific sector in which the employees work. If  trade 
unions were to focus exclusively on a specific area of expertise, they would 
be able to develop a specific competence in that area and could conclude 
better collective labour agreements. This principle is applied in Germany 
and is referred to as Tarifzuständigkeit.2036 Furthermore, the trade unions 
should have an efficient and proper organisation, in which their members 
have a genuine influence on the decision-making process. Only in such an 
environment can a trade union truly represent anyone. This demand can 
clearly be observed in Germany and Great Britain. The trade unions should 
also possess real powers. They should be able to persuade the counterparty 
to enter into collective bargaining and to agree on reasonable proposals. The 
trade unions should be able to cope with a genuine labour struggle and should 
be able and willing, if  necessary, to engage in industrial action. This is what 
the Germans refer to as Mächtigkeit. Other factors that can also play a role 
in making the trade unions a trustworthy spokesperson for the employees in 
2034  See also paragraph 102 of the UEAPME case: “Even if  that criterion [the criterion 
relating to factual representativity; author] may be taken into consideration 
when determining whether the collective representativity of the signatories of the 
framework agreement is sufficient, it cannot be regarded as decisive (…)”.
2035  See F. dorssemont, Over de ‘representativiteit’ van ‘sociale partners’ in de Europese 
Sociale Dialoog, pages 148 and 149. See also S. Sagel, Representativiteit van 
vakbonden en gebondenheid van werknemers aan cao’s, pages 40 ff. The “other 
requirements” partially derive from both authors. 
2036  See chapter 10, section 6.
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collective bargaining are their past performance and, closely connected to 
this, the way they are regarded by employers and employees (their status).
3.5 Representativity and coverage
The analysis above is based on the position of the social partners, more in 
particular of the trade unions, towards their members. It sets out relevant 
requirements that trade unions need to satisfy in order to be a trustworthy 
spokesperson in collective bargaining for the employees in general, not merely 
for their members. A different approach is to analyse the position of the 
collective labour agreement itself, rather than the position of the parties that 
concluded the collective labour agreement. 
Taking the collective labour agreement instead of, or besides, the status of 
the contracting parties as a point of reference in collective bargaining is not 
unique. In fact, it is regularly applied in many Member States, especially when 
it concerns the extension of collective labour agreements. In Member States 
where collective labour agreements can be extended, a common requirement 
is that said collective labour agreement, prior to the extension, must have a 
minimum coverage rate.2037 Such minimum coverage is apparently seen as a 
reason, or justification, to apply the agreement to a greater group than the 
group to which it originally applied. This is an interesting notion and is 
closely related to representativity of social partners. In the end, representative 
organisations are organisations that are deemed able, in a legal system, to 
act on behalf  of and bind others. The same applies to the coverage rate of 
a collective labour agreement; because a collective labour agreement has a 
high coverage – and therefore apparently is deemed as a proper standard in a 
specific group or sector by a great number of individuals – it can, in specific 
circumstances, bind a larger group of individuals than the original group. Or, 
in other words, a collective labour agreement is representative if  it is deemed 
able in a legal system to bind others.
The above does not explain why a collective labour agreement with a specific 
minimum coverage rate can, in specific circumstances, bind a larger group 
of individuals than the original group. In the Netherlands and in Germany, 
countries that require a coverage of over 50% of the employees in the relevant 
sector in order for a collective labour agreement to be extended, this is justified 
by pointing at the circumstance that “only a majority can bind a minority” and 
the rule that “a minority should not be able to model the working conditions 
of a majority” respectively. Apparently, some sort of democratic principle is 
2037  See chapter 13, section 9.
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in place to justify the general applicability of a collective labour agreement. 
This can, to a certain extent, be compared to the “participatory democracy” 
in which the social partners operate. If  a collective labour agreement applies 
to most employers and/or employees in a specific sector, employers and 
employees who are important players within society, democracy can bring 
forth that it should apply to all employers and employees; the collective labour 
agreement is “democratically chosen” by a majority. Closely related hereto is a 
reasonableness test. If  at least a certain minimum number of targeted people 
accept the collective labour agreement, it must be considered a reasonable 
collective labour agreement within a certain sector.2038 
Of course, the above arguments should be regarded with reticence. After all, 
it is not always reasonable that a majority binds a minority. For the same 
reason Member States are not only based on the principle of democracy (the 
majority of votes is decisive), but also on principles as constitutional rights, 
protecting minorities. Moreover, most extension procedures require a number 
of demands that should be satisfied, not only the demand that the collective 
labour agreement has a minimum coverage rate. Nevertheless, the fact that 
an agreement does cover a minimum number of individuals is frequently 
considered as a requirement to bind a larger group of individuals than the 
original group.
3.6 Representativity and collective bargaining 
in the European social dialogue
just to recall, chapter 5 of this thesis sets out that representativity plays an 
important role in the European social dialogue as well. Only “representative” 
organisations may participate in the dialogue, and agreements reached between 
these organisations can only be implemented by a Council decision if, having 
regards to the content of the agreement, the signatories, taken together, are 
sufficiently representative. 
4. Fundamental choices in a new system of 
transnational collective bargaining
There are many fundamentals possible in a transnational collective bargaining 
system. This calls for choices. Although these choices inherently carry certain 
subjective elements to them, they inevitably have to be made. First, in section 
4.1, it will be decided whether transnational collective labour agreements 
should bind by law or in honour only. Second, it will be decided which 
2038  See section 2.3 above.
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parties are to be bound by the collective labour agreement. In this respect, 
the positions of (i) the contracting parties, (ii) the employers and employees 
and (iii) third parties are to be distinguished. In this part the question whether 
to choose for a institutional system or rather a system that has a contractual 
basis will be addressed as well. This will be discussed in sections 4.2 through 
4.4. 
4.1 Binding by law or in honour?
Collective labour agreements can have two types of binding power: they can 
be binding by law or in honour only. In almost all Member States the collective 
labour agreement is binding by law. Exceptions to this rule can be found in 
Great Britain and Ireland; in these countries collective labour agreements are 
binding in honour only, unless stipulated otherwise in the collective labour 
agreement.2039 Because most Member States favour a system in which collective 
labour agreements are binding by law, it makes sense to apply this system in 
a transnational context as well. If, however, there are fundamental objections 
against such a system, this choice obviously needs reconsidering. 
Let us focus on the reasons for Great Britain to chose for a system in which 
collective labour agreements are binding in honour only. Insightful is the 
following quote in the report of the Royal Commission on trade unions and 
employers’ associations:2040
In this country collective agreements are not legally binding contracts. This is not 
because the law says they are not contracts or that the parties to them may not give 
them the force of contracts. (…) It is due to the intention of the parties themselves. 
They do not intend to make a legally binding contract, and without both parties 
intending to be legally bound there can be no contract in the legal sense.
Apparently, collective labour agreements in Britain can be legally binding if  
the contracting parties wish so. Because mostly these parties do not favour this 
sort of binding power, it is assumed that collective labour agreements do not 
have such power, unless stated otherwise in the agreement. This explains the 
principle set out in article 179.1 TULRA. This reason cannot be considered 
fundamental, but merely practical. It furthermore does not seem to apply 
within most countries of the EU, as nearly all Member States consider 
2039  For the Irish situation reference is made to A. Kerr, The evolving structure of 
Collective Bargaining in Europe 1990 – 2004; National Report Ireland, page 6.
2040  Royal Commission on trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 1965 – 1968, 
Report presented to Parliament by Command of her Majesty june 1968, 
paragraph 470. 
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collective labour agreements binding by law. If  it is assumed that most social 
partners in countries that have a system of legally binding collective labour 
agreements favour such a system, which seems a relatively safe assumption, 
it should be concluded that most social partners in the EU would opt for a 
system of legally binding collective labour agreements. 
But also for other reasons I favour a system providing for legally binding 
agreements. After all, important goals of collective labour agreements are 
(i) to arrange in a uniform fashion the employment conditions between the 
employers and employees to which the collective labour agreement applies 
and (ii) to secure peace and tranquillity within the company or sector to 
which the collective labour agreement applies. This uniform applicability of 
employment conditions can more easily be achieved if  the parties involved are 
by law obliged to observe the provisions of the collective labour agreements. 
Moreover, peace and tranquillity within the company or sector are more easily 
secured if  the provisions of a collective labour agreement can be enforced in 
a legal manner, instead of through collective actions, which are ultimately 
necessary to enforce collective labour agreements that bind in honour only.
however, should the parties concluding the collective labour agreement chose 
the agreement to bind only in honour, in my opinion, the will of the parties 
should prevail. This fits in the important principle of autonomy of the social 
partners. Therefore, transnational collective labour agreement should be 
binding by law, unless stipulated otherwise by the contracting parties.
4.2 The parties to the collective labour agreement
Once the primary choice is made that the provisions of the collective labour 
agreement in principle bind by law, the choice that the contracting parties are 
by law obliged to abide by the obligatory provisions of the collective labour 
agreement is only logical. This means that the signatory parties are responsible 
by law for the proper execution of the collective labour agreement. Should 
they fail to fulfil the obligations arising from the collective labour agreement, 
their counterparties should in principle be entitled to start proceedings and 
claim specific performance, payment of damages or even dissolution of the 
collective labour agreement. This system is in place in the Netherlands and in 
Germany. In Belgium, however, the contracting organisations may pursuant 
to article 4.2 BACLA not be forced to pay damages upon a failure to observe 
the provisions of the collective labour agreement.2041 I am not in favour of such 
2041  The situation in Great Britain is excluded from this analysis, as the provisions of 
the collective labour agreement are not binding by law in that jurisdiction.
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a provision. The proposed system concerning transnational collective labour 
agreements attributes important powers to the signatory organisations. With 
great power, there must also come great responsibility.2042 This responsibility 
should include being liable for payment of damages upon breach of a 
provision. Moreover, the Belgian provision on payment of damages is in my 
view somewhat unfair, as it only excludes organisations from financial liability, 
but not individual companies. Consequently, should a company under the 
Belgian system breach an obligatory provision of a company-level collective 
labour agreement, said company can be held liable and can be forced to pay 
damages to the contracting trade union. Should this contracting trade union 
breach an obligatory provision of the same company-level collective labour 
agreement, it can be held liable, but cannot be forced to pay damages to 
the company. This constitutes in my view an inequality of arms. I therefore 
propose that each party is fully liable for damages resulting from a breach of 
the obligatory provisions of a collective labour agreement. This should, in 
line with what is argued above, be different if  the contracting parties explicitly 
chose so. In other words, the signatory parties should be free to arrange that 
they cannot be held liable (to pay damages).
A different question is whether the contracting organisations should 
automatically be bound by the principle of good faith. As already mentioned,2043 
many countries oblige contracting associations on the basis of national law to 
take adequate measures to ensure that their members abide by the collective 
labour agreement, which is often referred to as the principle of good faith. 
Some scholars and the Commission argue that such an obligation equally 
rests on the European social partners in the European social dialogue.2044 I am 
in favour of such an implied principle of faith and see no reason to deviate 
from that rule in transnational collective bargaining. Another issue is whether 
the contracting organisations should be held liable for the non-performance 
of their members of specific provisions of the collective labour agreement. 
here, two scenarios should in my view be distinguished. The first scenario 
regards the liability of the contracting organisation for its members that are 
2042  Quote from: j.M. Straczynski, The amazing Spider-Man, Amazing Fantasy number 
15, Marvel Comics, August 1962.
2043  See chapter 13, section 5.2.
2044  Franssen argues that the obligation of good faith rests on the European social 
partners within the European social dialogue. She also refers to G. Schnorr who 
subscribes to this point of view. See E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European 
Social Dialogue, page 126. The Commission also takes this opinion. It states: “there 
is an obligation (…) for the signatory parties to exercise influence on their members 
in order to implement the European agreement”; COM (2004) 557, page 16. 
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also organisations (and not individual employers or employees).2045 In such 
a case, the contracting organisation should in my view be liable for the non-
performance of its members, and, in any event, these members should by law 
be obliged to fulfil their part of the (obligatory provisions of the) collective 
labour agreement, if  any.2046 Should this be different, the members of the 
contracting organisation could hide behind the façade of the contracting 
organisation, and could in effect block the proper execution of the obligatory 
parts of the collective labour agreement (if  any part would be directed at 
these members), without such a member and contracting organisation being 
directly liable on the basis of the collective labour agreement. The second 
scenario regards the liability of the contracting organisation (or its members 
that are also organisations) for the non-performance of employers or 
employees. Liability in such a case would, in my opinion, be a bridge too far. 
It is impossible for organisations to influence, let alone to steer, all the actions 
of the employers and employees. In brief, I would choose for the system in 
place in Germany: the contracting association is obliged to promote that its 
members fulfil the obligations arising from the collective labour agreement; it 
does not have to guarantee this with regard to the individual employers and 
employees. The contracting association is, however, liable for the performance 
of the collective labour agreement of its members should these members also 
be organisations, and these members are likewise responsible for the proper 
execution of their part of the transnational collective labour agreement, if  
any. In deviation of these rules the contracting parties may, if  they so choose, 
stipulate different rules with regard to liability, including that the association 
has to guarantee the proper performance of the employers or employees of 
the collective labour agreement.
Whether or not to also opt for an implied peace obligation in a new system 
of transnational collective bargaining is a different matter. A peace obligation 
is implied in the laws of some Member States, but definitely not in all.2047 
Furthermore, it is highly doubtful whether a peace obligation is in place with 
2045  For example, a transnational organisation that has as members national 
organisations, which national organisations in turn have as members employers 
or employees. These parties are given section 6.2.1 below allowed to participate in 
transnational collective bargaining. 
2046  Please note that in Germany central organisations can also conclude a collective 
labour agreement, in which case both the central organisation and its members are 
bound by the obligations arising from the collective labour agreement. See chapter 
10, section 7.1. 
2047  See chapter 13, section 5.2.
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regard to collective agreements concluded in the European social dialogue.2048 
Finally, an implied peace obligation has potentially far-reaching consequences 
for the parties involved, and must at least have their full consent in order not 
to violate their right to collective actions.2049 All in all I would not choose 
to incorporate an implied peace obligation in the system on transnational 
collective bargaining at this moment.2050
4.3 The employers and employees
It is elementary to decide which employers and employees are to be bound 
by the collective labour agreement. This decision also involves the choice 
between either an institutional or a contractual system. In section 4.3.1 it will 
be explained what, for the purpose of this thesis, is meant by an institutional 
and contractual system, and what its main consequences are. Sections 4.3.2 
and 4.3.3 will set out which choices will be made for the employers and 
employees respectively. 
4.3.1 The collective labour agreement: institution or contract? 
Although my primary intention is to develop a pragmatic, workable system 
of international collective labour agreements, some basic background 
information on the theory on institutes is indispensable. The foundations of 
this theory were laid by M. hauriou.2051 This theory is based on a democratic 
system of institutions – the consciousness and responsibility of each person 
is maximised.2052 According to hauriou, an institution is “an idea of a work 
or enterprise that is realised and endures juridically in a social milieu”. 
Institutions comprise three elements: (i) the idea of the work or enterprise to 
be realised in a social group, (ii) the organised power put at the service of this 
2048  I.h.B. Waas, Omtrent het bestaan en de rechtsgrondslag van een vredesplicht in 
Europese collectieve (arbeids)overeenkomsten, pages 152 ff.
2049  F. dorssemont, review of E. Franssen’s Legal aspects of the European Social 
Dialogue, SMA 2003-6, page 278.
2050  In my view additional research is required in order to have a clear opinion on the 
consequences and reach of a potential implied peace obligation prior to deciding 
whether such obligation should be incorporated in a new system on transnational 
collective bargaining.
2051  M. hauriou, La théorie de l’institution et de la fondation, Cahiers de la Nouvelle 
journée, 1925-4, pages 2 – 45. For an in depth discussion about the theory of 
hauriou and his successors, reference is made to F. dorssemont, De onderneming: 
Arbeidsgemeenschap of Rechtsorde? [Is the Enterprise a Working Community or a 
Legal Order?], Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht, 2003, pages 1313 – 1412. 
2052  Reference is made to the Maurice hauriou website: www.hauriou.net.
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idea for its realisation and (iii) the manifestations of communion that occurs 
within the social group with respect to the idea and its realisation. This is 
linked with the three stages the institution has to pass: the interiorisation of 
the idea by the group, followed by incorporation and finally by personification 
of the institution. The consequence of the presence of an institution is that 
it forms a juridical personality. This juridical personality should be seen as a 
“third” legal entity, separate from state and individual. The institution cannot 
be reduced to contract or multiple contracts, but is more than that: it has 
its own legal character. The consequence hereof is that the content of the 
mutual legal rights and obligations for persons involved with the institution 
is not so much determined by contract, but rather by what is necessary for 
the proper performance of that institution. This is quite the opposite of the 
point of departure of the contractual system. In this system, the individuals 
as opposed to the institutions are placed central. The arrangements between 
the individuals are binding in their mutual rights and obligations, regardless 
of whether they operate within an institution.2053
According to the institutional theory, the specific area to which a collective 
labour agreement applies – be it a company, sector or state – can be viewed as an 
institution. The interests of the individuals should be adjusted to the interests 
of the institution, which is shaped by the collective labour agreement. As a 
consequence, the collective labour agreement should be applied to all parties 
that fall within the scope of application of the collective labour agreement, 
setting aside the individual interests.2054 This is different in the contractual 
theory. In a contractual system the collective labour agreement only applies 
to those parties that (directly or indirectly) chose to be bound by it. The 
employers that are bound by the collective labour agreement in such a system 
are the employers that either are members of the contracting employers’ 
association or that signed the collective labour agreement themselves. The 
employees who are bound are those who are a member of the contracting 
2053  It must be admitted that the above-mentioned difference between the institutional and 
contractual approach is stated rather strongly. dorssemont, for example, argues that 
the difference between the both approaches is not that strong, and that the both can 
even be brought together. See F. dorssemont, De onderneming: Arbeidsgemeenschap 
of Rechtsorde?, pages 1406 – 1408.
2054  See for instance: F. Koning, Het systeem van het collectieve arbeidsvoorwaardenrecht, 
pages 139 – 140 and j.A.M. Cornelissens, Van Individualistische naar Institutionele 
Vorming van Arbeidsvoorwaarden [From Individualistic to Institutional shaping of 
Employment Conditions], Kluwer, deventer, 1959, in particular pages 100 – 105 and 
139. That collective labour agreements may supersede the individual norms also 
follows from Romano’s theory on institutions. Reference is made to F. dorssemont, 
De onderneming: Arbeidsgemeenschap of Rechtsorde?, pages 1366 – 1368.
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trade unions, or those who agree with the applicability of the collective labour 
agreement.2055
I do not want to discuss whether the institutional theory of hauriou can 
(fully) be applied to collective labour agreements, let alone to transnational 
collective labour agreements. As said, my approach is much more pragmatic. 
It can be observed that many Member States have introduced a system what I 
would call institutional. By “institutional system” I mean a system which has 
as a consequence that the collective labour agreement applies to all individuals 
who operate within the agreement’s scope of applicability, regardless of 
whether or not they are bound to the agreement by contract. This definition 
of institutional system does not do justice to the theory of hauriou, but 
suits the purposes of this thesis.2056 Belgium, for example, has an institutional 
system (according to my definition). The collective labour agreement has 
an erga omnes effect on the employees; it applies to all employees working 
for a bound employer, regardless of the fact whether they agreed to the 
applicability hereof by trade union membership or contract. The same applies 
to the system of extended collective labour agreements in the Netherlands 
and in Germany. Other Member States have chosen a contractual system. 
By “contractual system” I mean a system which has as a consequence that 
collective labour agreements only apply to individuals who are bound by 
that agreement by contract. When it concerns non-extended collective labour 
agreements, the Netherlands and Germany, for example, have a contractual 
system. Only those employers are bound by the collective labour agreement 
that either are members of the contracting employers’ association or that 
signed the collective labour agreement themselves. Furthermore, only those 
employees are bound by the collective labour agreement who are a member 
of the contracting trade union(s), or who agreed to the applicability of the 
collective labour agreement. Obviously, choosing for either the institutional 
or the contractual system has consequences which, depending on personal 
preference, can be called advantages or disadvantages. In my opinion, there 
are at least three major consequences.
2055  Again it must be noted that the difference between the contractual and institutional 
approach is applied strongly.
2056  here, I am one of the many authors that refer to the institutional theory without 
fully and consistently applying that theory. My only excuse is that I have no intention 
to draft a system that fits within the institutional theory, or whatever other theory for 
that matter. I merely intend to suggest some principles for a system on transnational 
collective labour agreements that, in my view, could make it to a workable system.
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First, in the contractual system individualism and voluntarism prevail 
over collectivism and non-voluntarism, while this is the other way around 
in the institutional system. After all, the contractual system is based on the 
individual and his free choice how to shape his employment conditions. The 
institutional system thrives on collectivism and means non-voluntarism: if  
the social partners – which are deemed to represent the collectivities – wish 
so for the good of the collective, individuals can simply be “confronted” with 
the terms of a collective labour agreement, regardless of whether they wish 
so or not. In my view, one should be careful to force terms on individuals to 
which they did not consent. As discussed in chapter 13, section 9, a number 
of Member States fiercely disputed extension of collective labour agreements 
to employers and employees that were not bound by the collective labour 
agreement. The constitutional Court of the Czech Republic held extension of 
collective labour agreements unconstitutional, as it would violate contractual 
freedom. Also in Poland scholars argue that such an extension is at odds with 
the private parties’ freedom to bargain. Still, in the majority of the Member 
States extension of collective labour agreements is possible. however, these 
collective labour agreements must as a rule satisfy multiple demands. These 
demands often include that extension requires a public act or decree, issued by 
the government authority in charge of labour matters and that the collective 
labour agreement has a minimum coverage rate. To summarise, extension 
should be applied reticently and requires strong justification. 
This brings us to the second consequence: the institutional system requires 
strong social partners or a high coverage rate of the collective labour agreement, 
while the contractual system does not. These requirements are necessary in 
an institutional system because the effects of the collective labour agreement 
are comparable to that of an act; all parties that fall within the collective 
labour agreement’s scope of applicability need to apply that agreement. In 
the Belgian institutional system, for example, only a limited number of strong 
social partners are appointed by the government as they are deemed to be 
representative in all circumstances. A consequence of this requirement is that 
clear and unambiguous rules must be drafted on forehand on the requirements 
that an organisation must satisfy in order to become representative. These rules 
should single out those organisations that are in principle always, within the 
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entire sector for which they are appointed, sufficiently representative.2057 In the 
Netherlands and in Germany, for example, collective labour agreements can 
only be extended (gaining an erga omnes effect) if  they have a certain minimum 
coverage.2058 These strong (representative) social partners respectively this high 
coverage rate justify the erga omnes effect of the collective labour agreement. 
In a contractual system collective labour agreements can also be applied to 
companies or sectors if  they are concluded by less strong social partners, or 
in situations in which there is a less significant coverage ratio. In the end, only 
those parties that chose to are governed by the collective labour agreement. In 
this system there can be a collective labour agreement in companies or sectors 
that do not have strong social partners or a high coverage rate of the collective 
labour agreement, and there can be a higher level of diversity of trade unions. 
The possible representativity demands these social partners must meet should 
obviously also be clear, but can easier be tested on a case-by-case scenario 
(that is, per concluded collective labour agreement, since the social partners 
do not have to be automatically representative in all circumstances in a specific 
sector, as opposed to the institutional system in place in Belgium) and have 
to be less strict.2059
Third, it should be noted that the institutional system is much more inclusive 
than the contractual system. In its pure form, it includes all employees and 
employers that fall within the scope of applicability of the collective labour 
agreement. In a more moderated form, it covers all employees working for the 
bound employer (and falling within the scope of application of the collective 
labour agreement), not just the employees who are bound by their membership 
of the contracting trade union(s) or by a reference clause. This has specific 
consequences, which I would consider advantages. The first advantage is of 
a fundamental nature. Most employers wish to treat their employees equally. 
This goal is obviously better attained if  the agreement applies to all employees. 
2057  When applied to the European Union, it appears be difficult to draft clear 
and unambiguous rules that social partners must meet in order to be generally 
representative, which would be a consequence if  the institutional system as is 
in place in Belgium is chosen. After all, the criteria drafted by the Commission 
in order to single out social partners that are representative have been heavily 
criticised. Reference is made to chapter 6, sections 3.2 and 3.3. Furthermore, it 
also has been proven difficult to draft general rules on representativity at European 
level in specific cases (relating to a single European collective labour agreement), 
justifying that such single European collective labour agreement has erga omnes 
effect. Reference is made to the UEAPME case. 
2058  As trade union density in Europe is dropping, it can prove pretty difficult to 
fall back on a general system that requires a high coverage of collective labour 
agreements. 
2059  See the conclusions in section 4.2 above.
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Such equal treatment is normally considered an important rationale of 
collective labour agreements: they should lay a uniform fundament under 
the employment conditions applicable in a company or multiple companies. 
The second advantage is of practical nature. From an EU law perspective 
it is difficult to differentiate between employees who are a contracting trade 
union’s member and those who are not. Article 8.1 of the directive 95/46/EC 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data (“the Privacy directive”) prohibits 
the processing of personal data revealing, amongst others, trade union 
membership.2060 There are only limited exceptions to this rule. In practice, it is 
therefore very difficult in many Member States for an employer to differentiate 
between employees who are a trade union member and those who are not. It 
is therefore more practical to treat them equally.
Taking into consideration these three consequences the following observations 
can be made:
1. Extension of collective labour agreements should be applied reticently 
and requires strong justification.
2. The institutional system requires strong social partners or a high cover-
age rate of the collective labour agreement, while the contractual system 
does not. The aforementioned strong social partners should in principle 
meet clear and unambiguous rules, that, in an institutional system as is 
in place in Belgium, must be drafted on forehand and apply generally 
(as opposed to in a specific situation, in relation to a specific collective 
labour agreement).
3. Extension of collective labour agreements to all employees has impor-
tant advantages as all employees are treated equally and potential dif-
ficulties on privacy issues can easily be tackled. 
While the first two observations would favour a contractual system, the 
third observation points at an institutional system. This is not necessarily 
troublesome. On balance, a system does not necessarily have to be purely 
contractual or purely institutional. The dutch system of normal (non-
extended) collective labour agreements, for example, is a contractual system 
but a bit out of tune when it concerns the position of article 14 employees; the 
employer is also obliged to apply the employment conditions to the employees 
who are not bound by the collective labour agreement. The Belgian system for 
normal (non-extended) collective labour agreements on the other hand is an 
2060  directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995, Oj L 
281, 23 November 1995, pages 31 – 50.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 15
704
institutional system, but only when it regards the position of the employees, 
as the employers merely need to apply the collective labour agreement if  they 
have concluded it or are a member of the contracting employers’ association(s). 
The systems can thus be applied flexibly. 
4.3.2 The position of the employers
What does the above mean for the position of the employers? It should be 
noted that in the Researched Countries collective labour agreements only 
apply to the employers that are bound by it. The institutional system does not 
apply to employers. This is only different when it comes to extended collective 
labour agreements. however, as noted in chapter 14, section 3, a system of 
extension is not pursued in the underlying thesis. Therefore, it seems logical 
to follow the contractual system with respect to employers. This is also in 
line with the argument that extension of collective labour agreements should 
be reticently applied. Consequently, only those employers that are either a 
member of (one of) the contracting employers’ organisation(s) or signed 
the transnational collective labour agreement themselves, are bound by that 
agreement. 
4.3.3 The position of the employees
Things are somewhat different when it comes to the position of the employees. 
In most Member States a collective labour agreement applies to all employees 
of the bound employer (and falling within the scope of application of the 
collective labour agreement), as follows from chapter 13, section 8.3. Even 
in Poland – a country which has reservations against extending collective 
labour agreements to employers and employees to whom no agreement 
applies (enlargement of the collective labour agreement) – a collective labour 
agreement does apply to all employees of the employer bound by a collective 
labour agreement, including those employees who are not members of the 
contracting trade union. As already mentioned, such a general binding 
effect has important advantages, as all employees are treated equally and no 
problems occur with regard to privacy issues. however, the above analysis also 
shows that such a system requires justification, as employees can be bound by 
terms that were not of their choosing. 
The best method of justification would, in my opinion, be the principle 
of favour. This allows departure from the terms of the collective labour 
agreement in the individual employment contract in favour of the employee, 
and prohibits in consequence that collective labour agreements deteriorate 
existing employment conditions. This principle is also rather commonly used 
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in Member States,2061 and is recommended by the ILO.2062 It is, therefore, a 
valuable point of departure in a transnational system. Should the collective 
labour agreement by law be a minimum agreement, this would be sufficient 
justification for its applicability to all employees. In any case, a minimum 
collective labour agreement cannot harm any of the employees.2063 however, all 
national laws that apply the principle of favour have exceptions to this rule.2064 
This will also be the case in the proposed European system for transnational 
collective labour agreements. These exceptions require justification which can 
amongst others be found in mild representativity demands on the side of the 
trade unions, as will be discussed in section 6 below. 
If  the contracting parties wish to fully depart from the principle of favour, 
for example, because times of economic distress warrant a cut back in wages, 
there must be sufficient justification to apply the collective labour agreement 
to all employees. If  such justification is lacking, the contractual system should 
be taken as a starting point. Only if  a sufficient level of justification is in 
place, a collective labour agreement (also) containing maximum or standard 
provisions may apply to all employees working for the bound employer. Once 
it is established that a transnational collective labour agreement applies in the 
relation between the employer and employee, it has, in line with the choice that 
a collective labour agreement is intended to bind by law, a direct mandatory 
effect on the individual employment agreement. This entire system will be 
explained in detail in section 5 below.
4.4 Third parties
As argued in chapter 14, section 6.3, transnational collective labour agreement 
should also be able to deal with collective normative provisions. As noted 
in chapter 13, section 8.4, there are two important constructions when it 
concerns such provisions. 
First, these provisions may provide for rights and obligation that arrange 
the relation between the employer and its entire personnel or an employee 
representative body. The employer who is bound by the collective labour 
agreement should apply these collective normative provisions in the 
2061  See chapter 13, section 8.2.
2062  Reference is made to article 3.3 of the 1951 ILO recommendation number 91 (R91) 
on collective agreements.
2063  With the notable exception of the minimum collective labour agreement offering 
less than the previous minimum collective labour agreement. This topic will be 
discussed in depth in chapter 16, section 5.2. 
2064  See chapter 13, section 8.2.
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Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. In an international system, there is in 
my view no real reason to oppose to a system that allows the contracting 
parties to a collective labour agreement to give additional rights to the entire 
personnel or to an employee representative body. If  the contracting parties 
consider such provisions useful, they should have the opportunity to include 
these in a collective labour agreement, provided that the principle of favour 
is observed. When it comes down to it, employers are, given paragraph 4.3.2, 
bound by contract to the collective labour agreement and therefore chose 
to be bound by a collective labour agreement that could have this content. 
Employees who are employed by the bound employer are, given section 
4.3.3, in principle automatically bound by a collective labour agreement, 
but this does not constitute a concern if  it is a minimum agreement. I see 
no compelling reason why the contracting parties should be allowed to limit 
rights of the entire personnel or of an employee representative body. This 
could very well violate national law and disrupt the balance between trade 
unions and works councils. If  this nonetheless proves necessary and does not 
violate any laws, such limitation should be justified. This justification should 
be found in representativity, in which case the same criteria apply as are in 
place for collective labour agreements that depart from the principle of favour 
and will be set out in section 5 below. Another matter is that the contracting 
parties should be allowed to discontinue the additional rights granted to the 
entire personnel or to an employee representative body. If  this would not 
be possible, this would lead to a very static system. The discontinuation of 
additional rights granted will be discussed and justified in chapter 16, section 
5.3. 
Second, as argued, the transnational collective labour agreement may provide 
for rights and obligations that arrange the relation between the employer and 
the employees vis-à-vis third parties. If  the transnational collective labour 
agreement arranges for payment to these third parties by the employer, while 
the employees (who satisfy certain requirements set out in the collective 
labour agreement) can enjoy the benefits, there are in my opinion – following 
the explanation given in the paragraph above – no real reasons against this 
system. This would be different if  the employees, for example, were obliged 
to pay a contribution to the third parties. Although I can imagine that 
reasonable contributions of the employees can be required – it does not 
seem unreasonable that an employee contributes to a fund established in his 
interest, or to a personal education – the fact remains that the employee in 
such a case is confronted with obligations. These obligations need justification. 
This justification should be found in representativity, in which case the same 
criteria apply as are in place for collective labour agreements that depart from 
the principle of favour and will be set out in section 5 below (criteria which 
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include, as seems especially relevant in this respect, the possibility that the 
employee voluntarily chooses to pay his dues in order to be eligible to enjoy 
the benefits offered by the third parties). 
Once it is established that the collective normative provisions apply in a 
specific situation, they apply directly and with mandatory effect to the parties 
concerned. This is a logical consequence of the choice made in section 4.1 
above that collective labour agreements are intended to bind by law.
5. The position of the employees of the bound employer in detail
Taking into consideration the section above, I suggest the following system 
with regard to the position of the employees of the bound employer:
1. A transnational collective labour agreement that merely contains mini-
mum provisions automatically applies to and has mandatory effects on 
all employees of the bound employer who fall within the scope of ap-
plicability of that agreement. By way of exception, however, the trans-
national collective labour agreement may (i) allow the employer and em-
ployee to deviate from ¾ mandatory law if  either permitted at European 
or relevant national level, (ii) oblige each employee to pay a reasonable 
compensation to the contracting trade union(s) and (iii) provide for an 
opening clause that can be filled in by social partners at national level. 
2. A transnational collective labour agreement that (also) contains standard 
and/or maximum provisions only applies to and has mandatory effects 
on bound employees who fall within the scope of applicability of that 
agreement. It also, however, applies to, and has mandatory effects on, 
employees who are not bound by it, but who do fall within the scope of 
applicability of that agreement if:
a. the contracting trade union(s) has (have) sufficient members amongst (i) 
all employees (the bargaining group) and (ii) each individual group of 
employees (the bargaining units) to which the transnational collective 
labour agreement applies; or
b. the contracting trade union is or trade unions are recognised by the em-
ployees of each relevant bargaining unit; or
c. the individual employee accepts the collective labour agreement; or
d. it already applies to an important majority of the employees in the rele-
vant bargaining group, and to a sufficient number of employees in each 
individual bargaining unit.  
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5.1 The minimum transnational collective labour agreement 
In the first suggestion above, the collective labour agreement containing (i) 
only minimum provisions will apply to (ii) bound employees and employees 
who are not bound, provided (iii) that they fall within the scope of applicability 
of the collective labour agreement. The suggestion also contains (iv) three 
exceptions to the principle of favour. 
5.1.1 Minimum provisions
The collective labour agreement should solely contain minimum provisions. A 
minimum provision allows departure in the individual employment contract in 
favour of the employee only. That means that existing employment conditions 
may not be deteriorated by the transnational collective labour agreement. 
It also means that, during the term of the transnational collective labour 
agreement, the employers and employee may agree on different employment 
conditions than those stipulated in the collective agreement, provided that 
these employment conditions are in favour of the employee.
There are two important difficulties concerning minimum collective labour 
agreements. First, the situation may arise that specific advantageous 
employment conditions may be offered to the employee in a minimum 
collective labour agreement (which were not set out in the individual 
employment agreement), which advantageous conditions are not offered 
anymore, or to a lesser extent, in the subsequent minimum collective labour 
agreement. This is a situation that relates to after-effects of provisions set out 
in a collective labour agreement, an issue that will be discussed in depth in 
chapter 16, section 5.2.
Second, a problematic issue in practice is to establish what exactly a 
favourable provision is. does the entire content of the minimum collective 
labour agreement, as a package, have to be more favourable to the employee 
involved than his entire package of employment conditions deriving from 
his employment agreement, or should each individual employment condition 
in the minimum collective labour agreement be more favourable than each 
individual employment condition deriving from his employment agreement, 
or perhaps should relating employment provisions be taken together? 
Furthermore, who should establish which conditions are more favourable: is 
this the subjective opinion of the employee involved (who ought to know and 
decide which provisions are more favourable to him) or should an objective 
method be applied? 
THE PARTIES INVOLVED AND THE BINDING POWERS
709
Although it goes beyond the scope this thesis to thoroughly scrutinise these 
problems, I would favour a system in which (closely) relating provisions 
of the minimum collective labour agreement are compared with (closely) 
relating provisions deriving from the employee’s employment agreement. If, 
for example, the minimum collective labour agreement prescribes a minimum 
salary of EUR 2,000 per month and a minimum holiday allowance of 10% 
payable once a year (both provisions directly relating to minimum pay), the 
employer should in my view be permitted to pay an all-inclusive salary of 2,500 
per month, while stipulating not to pay an additional 10% holiday allowance. 
Such a system gives – albeit limited – room for flexibility and reasonableness 
and fairness, which would potentially be lacking if  each individual provision 
of the minimum collective labour agreement would be compared with each 
individual provision deriving from the employee’s employment agreement. 
Comparing entire employment packages, however, is in my view impractical. 
It would be very difficult, if  possible at all, to establish exactly how valuable 
the entire collective labour agreement package is when compared with the 
entire package of employment conditions deriving from the employee’s 
employment agreement. 
Furthermore, it is ultimately at the discretion of the competent court to 
establish which provisions are more favourable. That court should, from an 
objective point of view, establish which conditions are more favourable: those 
deriving from the minimum collective labour agreement or those from the 
individual employment agreement? The (subjective) opinion of the employee 
should not be decisive. If  that would be the case, it would be impossible 
for the social partners, including the employer, to establish in advance how 
to deal with the minimum collective labour agreement in relation to the 
individual employee’s existing employment conditions. They should in such 
a case discuss the employment conditions with all employees in order to find 
out what each individual employee would hold more dearly: the employment 
conditions deriving from his employment agreement, or those deriving from 
the minimum employment agreement. Moreover, it would not lead to uniform 
employment conditions, uniformity which is an important goal pursued by 
collective bargaining.
5.1.2 Binding power of the transnational collective labour agreement
That the collective labour agreement applies to bound employees – employees 
who are a member of (one of) the contracting trade union(s) – is, in my view, 
rather self-explanatory. The bound employees chose to become a member of 
the trade union and had a chance to vote on a draft agreement. The terms of 
the collective labour agreement should be applied to them. That the agreement 
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should also apply to employees who are not bound by the collective labour 
agreement can be explained by the fact that such an “erga omnes system” 
is in place in most Member States, while it also offers specific advantages, 
as all employees are treated equally and no problems occur with regard to 
privacy issues. The justification that the collective labour agreement also 
applies to the employees who are not bound by the agreement, can be found 
in the mild representativity demands that apply to the trade union(s), as set 
out in detail in section 6 below, and the fact that the agreement only contains 
minimum provisions. The employees who are not bound by the collective 
labour agreement can therefore not be confronted with a deterioration of their 
existing employment conditions, but only with an improvement. The minimum 
transnational collective labour agreement has, in line with the choice made 
in section 4.1 above that a collective labour agreement is intended to bind 
by law, a direct mandatory effect on the individual employment agreements 
of the employer and employees bound by the transnational collective labour 
agreement.
5.1.3 Scope of applicability of the transnational collective labour agreement
The contracting parties are, given their autonomy, free to determine the scope 
of applicability of the collective labour agreement. The social partners should 
in that respect take the following four elements into account:2065 (i) the group 
of employees falling within the scope of the collective labour agreement; (ii) 
the employer or group of employers falling within the scope of the collective 
labour agreement; (iii) the geographical territory; and (iv) the duration. The 
transnational collective labour agreement should only be applied to the 
employees who fall within the scope of application of that agreement.
5.1.4 Exceptions to the principle of favour
The principle of favour has three exceptions in the current suggestions on 
a new system. First, the parties to the collective labour agreement may, if  
necessary to the detriment of the employees, deviate from ¾ mandatory law if  
either permitted by European law, or by the law applicable in the jurisdictions 
in which the agreement has force. The possibility of such a deviation has 
certain advantages. It gives the contracting parties the opportunity to tailor 
statutory law at the appropriate level. It furthermore introduces flexibility 
at the side of the employer, while trade unions are present to warrant the 
interests of the employees in the negotiation process. As discussed in chapter 
2065  See chapter 13, section 8.1.
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13, section 8.6, this system sits well in a European context and an increasing 
number of Member States apply it. 
As already explained, ¾ mandatory law concerns law of which the minimum 
standards protecting the employee may be dropped in an employment 
agreement, provided that the social partners agree to it in a collective labour 
agreement. The fact that the trade union has to observe mild representativity 
criteria, as discussed in section 6, and the fact that either the European 
legislator or the legislator of the Member State in which the international 
collective labour agreement has force permits such a deviation, should warrant 
a reasonable outcome and can be considered sufficient justification for this 
exception.
At European level there are already instruments that give social partners room 
to adapt or complement a European directive. Important examples of such 
European laws concern the directives on working time, fixed-time and part-
time work. Member States, however, can prevent that social partners introduce 
more flexible arrangements than the ones described in the directives, even if  
the directives allow the social partners to do so. In the end, Member States 
may introduce more favourable national law in their jurisdiction, taking away 
the possibility of deviation by collective labour agreement. I can imagine that, 
upon introduction of a law on transnational collective labour agreements, 
future European legislation in a mandatory fashion attributes the right to 
deviate from the core content of that legislation by (transnational) collective 
labour agreement. Individual Member States are in such a situation not 
entitled to limit the social partners’ powers.
Besides the above, the transnational collective labour agreement may in the 
current proposal also deviate from national ¾ mandatory law, provided that 
the collective labour agreement satisfies the national requirements in order 
to deviate from that national law. In the Netherlands, for example, there are 
no specific requirements that the social partners should satisfy in order to 
deviate from dutch ¾ mandatory law. It seems illogical that “European” 
social partners would, in such a case, be unable to deviate from dutch ¾ 
mandatory law in a transnational collective labour agreement. The fact that 
national legislation permits deviation from national ¾ mandatory law is, in 
my view, as said, sufficient justification that at transnational level this can also 
be done under the same conditions.
Second, the contracting parties should be able to arrange that every employee 
should contribute a reasonable amount of money to the contracting trade 
union(s). All employees falling within the scope of applicability of the 
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collective labour agreement may benefit from the agreement. If  an individual 
employee does not benefit himself, some of his colleagues may do so. A 
limited level of solidarity can reasonably be expected from an employee. 
Such mandatory contribution prevents a free riders effect. It is, in my view, 
quite unfair that everybody can enjoy the advantages of a good transnational 
collective labour agreement, while only the members of the trade unions 
make a financial sacrifice in terms of contribution. however, such mandatory 
contribution may not force employees to become a member of the trade 
union, as that would be at odds with the negative freedom of association. 
The mandatory contribution may therefore not depend on the employee’s 
trade union membership (everybody has to pay; members of contracting 
trade unions must pay the contribution due and non-members a fee set 
out in the transnational collective labour agreement) and may not exceed a 
reasonable amount. The reasonable contribution must be aimed at covering 
the actual costs for concluding the transnational collective labour agreement 
and, if  necessary, to enforce that agreement. The reasonable contribution 
should at all times be lower than the normal contribution an employee should 
pay to the trade union in order to be a member during the duration of the 
collective labour agreement. Most trade unions provide multiple services, not 
merely the service of negotiating (and, if  necessary enforcing) a collective 
labour agreement. It would be unfair for an employee, who does not want 
to become a trade union member, to pay the full membership fee, merely for 
the trade union’s activity of negotiating a collective labour agreement. For 
these reasons, the mandatory contribution must be set at covering the actual 
costs for concluding the transnational collective labour agreement and, if  
necessary, to enforce that agreement, and may per annum not exceed 50% 
of the normal annual membership contribution and may furthermore not 
exceed a reasonable fixed amount, for example, EUR 100 per annum.
The above system is, as said, in my view compatible with the negative freedom 
of association, as employees are not compelled to join the contracting trade 
unions; they merely have to pay a reasonable (not excessive) contribution in 
order for a proper transnational collective labour agreement to be concluded 
and, if  necessary, to be enforced, for the good of all employees. The fees 
paid by the employees not being a member of the contracting employees’ 
organisations should not be allocated to fund other (general) activities of the 
contracting employees’ organisations. It should also be noted that this system 
does not unjustifiably violate property rights of the employees not being a 
member of the contracting employees’ organisations. Article 1 Protocol I 
of the Convention for the Protection of human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocol xI, guarantees the peaceful enjoyment 
of a person’s possessions and prohibits that person to be deprived of 
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his possessions, except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. Proper 
functioning of a transnational collective bargaining system, that reasonably 
and equally apportions the costs actually incurred for that goal, is in my 
view in the public interest. As long as the fees to be paid by employees not 
being a member of the contracting employees’ organisations indeed are used 
for the conclusion of the transnational collective labour agreement and, if  
necessary, for the enforcement thereof for all employees concerned (and thus 
are proportionate) there is no violation of any property right. If, by contrast, 
these fees are used by the contracting trade unions to finance general trade 
union work, there would be a violation of property rights. The employees 
organisations’ must make it transparent that the fees due are spend properly 
and for the right causes. The above system seems to fully comply with the 
ruling of the European Court of human Rights, in which a similar system in 
Sweden was held legitimate in the core, but was held disproportionate with 
regard to the amount of money that needed to be contributed by employees 
not being a member of the contracting employees’ organisations as set off  
against the services rendered by the employees organisations financed by 
those fees.2066 
The third suggested exception that applies to the principle of favour concerns 
opening clauses: the transnational collective labour agreement may allow – 
whether or not with restrictions set out in the transnational collective labour 
agreement – the national social partners to fill in a transnational collective 
labour agreement at national level, including to apply a national collective 
labour agreement that contains standard or maximum provisions. This 
national collective labour agreement should obviously satisfy the national 
requirements for such a collective labour agreement. In this manner the 
transnational collective labour agreement can give national social partners 
room to tailor that agreement at national level, which in my view could be 
particularly useful with regard to sectoral transnational agreements. This 
exception to the principle of favour is legitimised by the fact that at national 
level the statutory provisions on collective labour agreements that are already 
in place must be observed. 
This third exception may possibly be further amplified, but such amplification 
is insufficiently researched in this thesis in order to fully comment on that. In 
some countries it is possible that collective labour agreement leave an opening 
2066  European Court of human Rights, 13 February 2007, Evaldsson and others / 
Sweden. It should be noted that the European Court of justice did not assess 
whether the system was compliant with the negative freedom of association. 
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 15
714
clause that a Works Council or other (democratically chosen) employee 
representative body could use to work out. Works Councils may play a role in 
fixing employment conditions through means of an opening clause in Austria, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
authorised representatives of employees are entitled to conclude collective 
labour agreements at company level.2067 It is conceivable that in a European 
system Works Councils could be attributed the right – through an opening 
clause, and, if  desired by the parties of the collective labour agreement, under 
specific conditions set out in that transnational collective labour agreement – 
to adapt the employment conditions of the employees working for the bound 
employer to the detriment of the employees. The justification for that would lie 
in the fact that (i) a collective labour agreement applies, that was concluded with 
a trade union or trade unions that has or have to observe mild representativity 
criteria and leaves a matter open for employee representatives2068 via an opening 
clause, (ii) after which that employee representative body agreed hereto. It 
is also conceivable that the law would only allow such deterioration under 
these conditions for specific topics, such as working hours, working place and 
organisation of labour. There are obviously also arguments against such a 
system, such as the fact that employee representatives are in a position that is 
too weak to really bargain with the employer and that such bargaining is the 
task for the trade unions. It should be noted that, given the table presented 
in chapter 13, section 5.1, a majority of Member States does not attribute a 
role to Works Councils or other employee representative bodies to bargain on 
employment conditions. Anyway, the topic “Works Council” was excluded 
from the scope of this thesis, for which reason I will lay this additional 
potential exception to the principle of favour to rest. 
5.2 The transnational collective labour agreement 
containing maximum and/or standard provisions
A transnational collective labour agreement that (also) contains standard 
and/or maximum provisions only applies to and has mandatory effects on 
bound employees who fall within the scope of applicability of that agreement. 
It also, however, applies to and has mandatory effects on employees who are 
2067  Reference is made to chapter 13, section 5.1.
2068  Which representatives should, according to the choice made by Member States, in 
some form be available in undertakings employing at least 50 employees in any one 
Member State, or establishments employing at least 20 employees in any one Member 
State. See article 3 of directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and 
consulting employees in the European Community, Oj L 80, 23 March 2002, pages 
29 – 34.
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not bound by it, but who do fall within the scope of applicability of that 
agreement if:
a. the contracting trade union(s) has (have) sufficient members amongst (i) 
all employees (the bargaining group) and (ii) each individual group of 
employees (the bargaining units) to which the transnational collective 
labour agreement applies; or
b. the contracting trade union is or trade unions are recognised by the em-
ployees of each relevant bargaining unit; or
c. the individual employee accepts the collective labour agreement; or
d. it already applies to an important majority of the employees in the rele-
vant bargaining group, and to a sufficient number of employees in each 
individual bargaining unit. 
Given the autonomy of the social partners and also given the third exception 
that applies to the principle of favour with regard to minimum transnational 
collective labour agreements, the contracting social partners of the 
transnational collective labour agreement (also) containing standard and/or 
maximum provisions may allow derogations via collective labour agreements 
at national level through opening clauses.
5.2.1 Main rule: contractual system
As mentioned in section 4 above, applying a collective labour agreement to 
employees who are not bound by it through contracting trade union membership 
requires justification. The main justification ground is the principle of favour, 
which does not apply in this situation. The mild representativity demands 
are, in my view, insufficient to justify the applicability to all employees of 
the collective labour agreement also containing standard and/or maximum 
provisions. This leaves us with the contractual system: an employee is merely 
bound to the collective labour agreement if  he is a member of (one of) the 
contracting trade union(s).
This also leaves us with a practical difficulty: how can employers establish 
which employee is bound by the collective labour agreement and which is 
not? As already mentioned, article 8.1 of the Privacy directive prohibits the 
employer to process personal data on trade union membership. I would argue 
that in this case the exception of article 8.2 (b) should apply. This article 
stipulates that the exception of paragraph 1 does not apply, where processing 
is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and specific 
rights of the controller (employer) in the field of employment law, in so far as 
it is authorised by national law providing for adequate safeguards. A law on 
international collective labour agreements should arrange that the employer 
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can, in this situation, at all times call upon the aforementioned exception. 
The trade unions must, in such a case, give information on the names of their 
members working for the employer. Should this be considered too “touchy”, 
or an unacceptable violation of the trade unions’ autonomy,2069 another 
solution seems possible as well. In such a case, the individual employees that 
are a member of (one of) the contracting trade union(s), should have an 
option of whether or not to inform their employer of their membership.2070 It 
will, in that case, be at the discretion of the individual employee whether or 
not to step forward. From a privacy point of view this solution would work as 
well. In the end, the prohibition of article 8.1 of the Privacy directive on the 
processing of personal data revealing trade union membership, is, pursuant 
to article 8.2 (a), not applicable if  the data subject (the employee) has given 
his explicit consent to the processing of those data (except where the laws 
of the Member State provide that the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 
may not be lifted by the data subject’s giving his consent, which in my view 
should in the underlying situation be excluded by law, as the employee can 
voluntarily chose whether or not to give the membership information to his 
employer; he is not forced to do so). 
5.2.2 Exceptions to the main rule
It is self-evident that the situation described above is not optimal. Collective 
labour agreements should not only be fully put to use in good times, resulting 
in favourable employment conditions, but also in bad times, resulting in 
stringent measures needed for the continuance of a company or companies.2071 
however, there should be a justification for the general applicability (i.e. to 
all employees, bound or not) of the collective labour agreement that also 
contains standard and/or maximum provisions. If  any of the following 
exceptions applies, that would, in my view, sufficiently justify the applicability 
of such collective labour agreement to all employees. If  the exceptions do 
not apply, the collective labour agreement only applies to the employees 
referred to in section 5.2.1 above. Once it is established that the transnational 
collective labour agreement applies to the relation between the employer and 
the employee that collective labour agreement has, given that a transnational 
2069  Which, for example, Bercusson presumably would argue as he already stated that 
checks on representativeness and mandate of the signatory parties “go to the heart 
of the autonomy of the social partners”. B. Bercusson, Democratic Legitimacy and 
European Labour Law, page 162.
2070  If  they would step forward and state that they are a member, it makes sense that 
they are obliged to furnish sufficient evidence of that membership. 
2071  It is no coincidence that current company-level transnational collective bargaining 
focuses on transnational restructuring as well. 
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collective labour agreement is intended to bind by law, a direct mandatory 
effect on the individual employment agreement.
5.2.2.1 Factual representativity
The first exception applies in the case that the contracting trade union is, or 
in the case of several contracting trade unions taken together are, sufficiently 
representative in the bargaining unit(s) of the company or sector to which the 
collective labour agreement applies. In such a case, the factual representativity 
of the contracting trade union(s) justifies the fact that the agreement applies 
to all employees in the relevant bargaining unit(s). 
Exactly what should constitute the bargaining unit and when a trade union or 
several trade unions is/are sufficiently representative in this unit or these units 
is a matter of choices. The bargaining group can be described as the entire 
group of employees to which the collective labour agreement would, given its 
own scope of applicability, apply.2072 This bargaining group can, depending 
on the scope of applicability of the collective labour agreement, be divided 
into several bargaining units. For the definition of these bargaining units I 
suggest to link up with the definition of entity as has been defined by the 
European Court of justice in the light of the European directive on Transfer 
of Business.2073 This definition reads as follows: “an entity is an organised 
grouping of persons or assets facilitating the exercise of an economic activity 
which pursues a specific objective”.2074 The entity should also, in the light 
of established jurisprudence, be stable.2075 In a transnational situation, it is 
quite likely that each country has one or more separate bargaining units. If  
at least 25% of the employees of the entire bargaining group is a member of 
the contracting trade union(s), and in each individual bargaining unit this 
2072  That means that the employees that do not fall within the scope of application of 
the collective labour agreement – for example the “higher-level” employees, such as 
managers – are excluded from the definition.
2073  Council directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event 
of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses. Oj 
L 82, 22 March 2001, pages 16 – 20.
2074  See for example European Court of justice, 2 december 1999, Case C-234/98, G.C. 
Allen and Others v Amalgamated Construction Co. Ltd.
2075  See for example European Court of justice, 11 March 1997, Case C-13/95, Ayse 
Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung GmbH Krankenhausservice.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 15
718
number is at least 20%,2076 the trade union(s) is/are, in my view, sufficiently 
representative.2077 If  one or more individual bargaining units do not reach 
that 20%, the collective labour agreement should not apply to the employees 
of that unit.2078 
In the bargaining process, the contracting trade union(s) should be able to 
determine, after the employer or employers’ organisation(s) have provided full 
details on the total number of employees of the bargaining group and units 
(that fall within the scope of applicability of the collective labour agreement), 
whether they have sufficient members amongst the employees. The institution 
where the collective labour agreement is registered,2079 should ultimately verify 
these numbers. 
5.2.2.2 Recognition of the trade union(s)
In certain companies and in certain sectors the density of trade union 
membership may be lower than 25%. It would in my view be unjust that in 
these companies or group of companies constituting the relevant sector an 
employer or a group of employers would be unable to adjust the employment 
conditions, an adjustment which may also be to the detriment of the employees. 
In such companies or group of companies the employees could be offered 
a chance to vote whether they wish that the package of their employment 
conditions is arranged by a specific trade union or trade unions.2080 2081 The 
trade union can, consequently, be recognised by the employees as competent 
2076  In analogy of the UEAPME case, each bargaining unit should be scrutinised 
separately. After all, the Court of First Instance ruled in paragraph 94 of the 
UEAPME case that all categories of workers need to be represented. The same 
should in my view apply to all bargaining units. 
2077  These numbers are undeniably subjective and can be replaced by other numbers. I 
have not conducted any research on the reasonableness of these numbers. however, 
an overall factual representativity of 1 out 4 seems reasonable to me.
2078  That is, the collective labour agreement does not apply on the basis of this 
first exception. That does not exclude the possibility that the collective labour 
agreement applies on the basis of the contractual system of section 5.2.1 above, or 
on the basis of the other exceptions. 
2079  See chapter 14, section 6.4.
2080  In the following text I will, in order to improve the readability, just refer to the 
recognition of a single trade union, instead of several trade unions.
2081  It may be that employees are willing to recognise a trade union in order to 
arrange employment conditions, even if  these are to the detriment of these 
employees. Employees may be better off  with a strong trade union arranging their 
(deteriorated) employment conditions, than dealing with their employer on an 
individual basis. 
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to arrange their employment conditions. This is a situation that could, for 
example, occur once an employer chooses (or is forced to choose by the 
relevant trade union) that in the future the employment conditions should be 
arranged by a collective labour agreement, or that the employer together with 
the relevant trade union wishes to offer the employees a choice in that matter. 
I expect that recognition of a trade union is more likely to occur on company-
level than on sectoral-level, as it is in my view unlikely that all employees of all 
companies within a sector would often agree on the recognition of the same 
trade union.
The second exception to the main rule applies to the trade union that is 
recognised as representative by the employees of the bargaining group. If  the 
employees have appointed a trade union as eligible to represent their interests, 
that trade union may also agree on a collective labour agreement that contains 
standard and/or maximum provisions. The justification for this lies in the 
appointment (and with that: the representativity) of the trade union.
For this system, I suggest following closely the system of Great Britain when 
it comes to statutory recognition and derecognition. This transnational 
recognition process should in my view relate to collective bargaining in general 
and not, as is the case in Great Britain, only to certain topics. Furthermore, 
the role of the British CAC should be fulfilled by a European body. If  a 
majority of the employees in the bargaining group2082 is a member of the 
union applying for recognition, the trade union involved must be declared 
as recognised as to conduct collective bargaining on behalf  of the employees 
constituting the bargaining group. This is different if  any of three specific 
conditions apply. In that case there should be a secret ballot held in which 
the employees constituting the bargaining group are asked whether they 
want the trade union to conduct collective bargaining on their behalf. These 
conditions are: (i) the European body rules that a ballot should be held in 
the interests of good industrial relations, (ii) a significant number of trade 
union members within the bargaining group informs the European body that 
they do not want the union to conduct collective bargaining on their behalf, 
2082  The social partners involved in collective bargaining must determine the bargaining 
group. The recognition concerns the group as a whole and not the individual 
bargaining units. however, if  a bargaining unit opposes to being part of the group, 
that unit can apply for derecognition in accordance with the procedure set out 
below. This system advances equality within the original bargaining group, prevents 
bargaining units from backing out of the bargaining group too easily during 
the recognition phase, but leaves room for these units to initiate derecognition 
procedures.
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and (iii) “membership evidence”2083 is produced which brings doubts whether 
a significant number of trade union members within the bargaining group 
want the union to conduct collective bargaining on their behalf  - even if  they 
do not openly admit it. A secret ballot should also be held if  the European 
body concludes that the number of employees in the bargaining group who 
are union members fall short of a majority. Should the union be supported 
by (i) a majority of the employees that voted in the ballot and (ii) at least 40% 
of the employees constituting the bargaining group, the European body must 
issue a declaration that the trade union involved is recognised as to conduct 
collective bargaining on behalf  of the employees constituting the bargaining 
group. If  the result is otherwise, the European body must state that the union 
is not entitled to be recognised for this bargaining group.
derecognition should be possible on the request of the employer or of a certain 
minimum number of employees. derecognition on request of management 
would in my view not be overly important in most situations, as the employer 
or employers’ organisation(s) could simply decide not to bargain with the 
recognised trade union anymore.2084 derecognition of a trade union requested 
by employees is more important, as they could have been disappointed in 
the performance of that trade union. A request signed by a minimum of 
10% of employees of the entire bargaining group, or a minimum number of 
for instance 150 employees should that be less than said 10%, would seem 
reasonable to initiate a derecognition process for the bargaining group. In 
analogy of the model in Great Britain, first there should be the procedure in 
which it is requested that the recognition ends on the ground that there now 
is only a minority support for the trade union within the bargaining group. 
This procedure is a mirror-image of the recognition procedure, and normally 
leads to a secret ballot. Should the party asking for derecognition of the trade 
union be supported by (i) a majority of the employees that voted in the ballot 
and (ii) at least 40% of the employees constituting the bargaining group, the 
trade union will be derecognised. Second, the same procedure can be started 
with regard to derecognition of the trade union that was “automatically” 
recognised – that is, recognised without a ballot, since a majority of the 
employees of the bargaining group was a member of the trade union – on the 
2083  Membership evidence is (a) evidence about the circumstances in which union 
members became member and (b) evidence about the length of time for which 
union members have been members, in case where the competent European body is 
satisfied that such evidence should be taken into account.
2084  This possibility would gain in importance if  it is decided that employers or employers’ 
organisations would be obliged to only conduct bargaining with recognised trade 
unions (once it or they are recognised). As set out in chapter 14, section 6, I am not 
in favour of such an obligation.
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ground that fewer than half  of the employees in the bargaining group now 
belong to the union and there is now only minority support for that union. If  
it is established that indeed fewer than half  of the employees in the bargaining 
group is a trade union member, the trade union will be derecognised should 
there also be a minority support for the trade union. In order to establish 
the latter, a similar derecognition procedure as mentioned above should be 
followed.2085
Besides this derecognition of the trade union for the entire bargaining 
group, it should also be possible that an individual bargaining unit asks for 
derecognition, especially since the recognition procedure focuses on the entire 
bargaining group. After all, as said in section 5.2.2.1 above, the position of each 
bargaining unit is of relevance. In my view, however, an individual bargaining 
unit should meet relatively high standards in order to withdraw from the 
recognised trade union, as such a withdrawal jeopardises an important goal 
of collective bargaining: equal treatment of the employees. I would propose 
that a bargaining unit can only withdraw from the recognition of the trade 
union in case 25% of the employees constituting said bargaining unit request 
a derecognition procedure concerning that bargaining unit, followed by a 
secret ballot in which over 50% of the employees constituting that bargaining 
unit vote for derecognition.
5.2.2.3 Acceptance of the transnational collective labour agreement
A third exception applies if  the employee accepts the collective labour 
agreement (also) containing maximum and standard provisions. In such a 
case that collective labour agreement would also apply to that employee. This 
exception is, in deviation to the two exception grounds stated above and the 
one stated below, an exception that applies to an individual (the employee 
who accepted the collective labour agreement) and not to the entire group (all 
employees within the bargaining group). 
This acceptance can occur both before and after the collective labour 
agreement has been concluded. In the latter case the employee commits 
himself  voluntarily to the new collective agreement, which forms sufficient 
justification for applying the collective labour agreement to an employee who 
is not a contracting trade union’s member. The acceptance can also occur on 
2085  A derecognised trade union may still have sufficient members to be factually 
representative. I would, however, expect such a trade union to be very reluctant to 
continue collective bargaining. I furthermore expect that many employees cease 
their membership upon derecognition, leading to the loss of factual representativity 
of that trade union.
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forehand by means of a reference clause. Upon acceptance of the collective 
labour agreement at the moment the employee enters into service, he knows 
(or at least has the opportunity to know) the content of the collective labour 
agreement. As already explained in section 2.2.1 above, the fact that the 
employee is “the weaker party”, and consequently has no choice but to sign 
the agreement, does not change this. After all, the employer could as well have 
put the content of the collective labour agreement in standing employment 
conditions, and could have given the same “weak” employee the choice to 
either accept it and enter into service, or not accept it and not be employed by 
the employer. The fact that the collective labour agreement may also deviate 
from ¾ mandatory law, is sufficiently justified by the facts that (i) the employee 
knows the content of the agreement and accepts it, (ii) the trade unions should 
satisfy mild representativity demands and (iii) either the European legislator 
or the legislator of the Member State in which the international collective 
labour agreement has force permits such a deviation.
Should, during the course of the employment agreement, the content of the 
transnational collective labour agreement referred to in the reference clause 
change – for example, from a minimum collective labour agreement to an 
agreement containing standard and/or maximum provisions – the question 
arises whether the reference clause is sufficient justification to apply the 
altered transnational collective labour agreement to the unbound employee. 
The individual employee does, in this situation, not have a chance to verify 
the content of the new agreement and to decide whether he thinks it is 
agreeable or not. As already stated above, this is, in my opinion, not overly 
troublesome. The employee chose, at the moment of entering into the service 
of the employer, that (part of) his employment conditions would be arranged 
by a particular transnational collective labour agreement. he subsequently 
had the opportunity to become a member of the contracting trade union, as 
a consequence whereof he would have been in the position to influence the 
content of the (renewed) collective labour agreement as a member. Should the 
employee have chosen not to do that, he accepted that he could be confronted 
with employment conditions that were drafted without his involvement. In my 
opinion, the prevention of such a situation – which was apparently acceptable 
to the employee involved, as he did not become a member of the contracting 
trade union – is not worth defending by law. This analysis is different should a 
renewed transnational collective labour agreement be concluded with another 
than the original trade union, or one or more of the original trade unions 
that signed the original transnational collective labour agreement refuse to 
sign the renewed transnational collective labour agreement (while at least one 
of them is willing to sign that renewed agreement). This is a new situation 
for the employee, and places him in a different position when compared to 
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his position described above. him potentially having become a member of 
(one of) the original contracting trade union(s) would not have helped him 
to influence the renewed transnational collective labour agreement (unless he 
became a member of the trade union that was willing to sign the renewed 
agreement). In this situation there is, in my opinion, insufficient justification 
that the transnational collective labour agreement, containing maximum and/
or standard provisions, applies to the employee who is not bound by that 
agreement through trade union membership.
Should employees have accepted a reference clause, and should they be 
unsatisfied with the performance of the contracting trade union, they should 
be entitled to derecognise this trade union. On balance, there is, in my view, 
no good reason to, on the one hand, entitle employees to a derecognition 
procedure once they have recognised the trade union through a recognition 
procedure, but on the other, not entitle them to do the same once they have 
accepted that a specific trade union arranges their employment conditions by 
agreeing to a reference clause. The same derecognition procedure as stated 
above should therefore apply with regard to a trade union that is empowered 
to arrange the employment conditions of employees on the basis of a reference 
clause. 
5.2.2.4 Applicability of the transnational collective labour agreement to a 
sufficient number of employees
Finally, I propose a fourth exception to the main rule that transnational 
collective labour agreements that contain maximum and/or standard 
provisions only apply to bound employees: if  the employment agreement 
already applies to an important majority of the employees in the bargaining 
group, it should apply to all employees within that group. I anticipate that 
this exception is mainly applied by companies in financial trouble, who wish 
to address these issues by means of a collective labour agreement, but (i) have 
insufficient trade union members amongst their employees to rely on the first 
exception, (ii) have insufficient time to go through the recognition process as 
mentioned in the second exception, and (iii) have no general reference clause 
in all their standard employment agreements to bind all employees by means 
of contract. The justification for this fourth exception lies in the fact that (i) an 
important majority should be able to bind a minority,2086 (ii) such a majority 
acceptance normally implies that the content of the agreement is reasonable 
and (iii) mild representativity demands should be met by the trade union(s). 
2086  Which principle is, as set out in section 3.5 above, applied regularly within the 
Member States with regard to extension of collective labour agreements.
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A collective labour agreement applies to the employees who are either bound 
by it through membership of the contracting trade union, or who accepted 
the collective labour agreement by means described in section 5.2.2.3 above. 
Should the collective labour agreement already apply to, for example, 60% or 
more of the employees constituting the entire bargaining group that collective 
agreement should, given the paragraph above, apply to all employees within 
the bargaining group. This rule, however, needs optimising. On balance, if, for 
example, the collective labour agreement is very positive for several specific 
bargaining units, but rather negative for another bargaining unit, it is unfair 
to apply the collective labour agreement to that other bargaining unit. Each 
bargaining unit should therefore exceed a certain threshold in order for the 
collective labour agreement to apply to that unit. Although fixing this threshold 
again is undeniably subjective, I would suggest putting it on the applicability 
of the collective labour agreement to at least 40% of the employees within a 
specific bargaining unit.2087 If  that threshold cannot be reached in a specific 
bargaining unit, the collective labour agreement should not apply to all of the 
employees in that bargaining unit.2088 To sum up, that means that a collective 
labour agreement that contains maximum and/or standard provisions applies 
to all employees in all bargaining units (that is the entire bargaining group), 
provided that it already applies to (i) an important majority of at least 60% 
of the employees in the entire bargaining group, and (ii) at least 40% of the 
employees in each individual bargaining unit. 
6. The contracting parties / social partners
The binding powers of the transnational collective labour agreements are 
set out above. The next step is to establish the proper parties that should be 
involved in the bargaining process. In that respect, it should be noted that 
there are already European criteria in place that social partners must meet in 
order to participate in European bargaining in the European social dialogue. 
That gives rise to the preliminary question of whether these parties should 
not also be allowed to participate in transnational collective bargaining in 
the current proposed system. This question will be answered in section 6.2 
below.
2087  Both the 60% and the 40% figures are subjective. I have not conducted any research 
on the reasonableness of these numbers. 
2088  That is, the collective labour agreement does not apply on the basis of this 
fourth exception. That does not exclude the possibility that the collective labour 
agreement applies on the basis of the contractual system of section 5.2.1 above, or 
on the basis of the other exceptions.
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If  the answer to the above question is negative, individual sets of rules should 
be developed for the participating social partners. In that context, the position 
of management and labour should be distinguished. After all, it is not 
overly important to draft representativity demands for management’s side, 
as in the proposed system only those employers are bound by the collective 
labour agreement that are either a member of the contracting employers’ 
organisation(s) or signed the collective labour agreement themselves. That 
gives, taken into consideration section 3.2 above, no need for representativity 
demands on the side of management. It is, however, important to draft 
representativity demands on labour’s side, as the transnational collective 
labour agreement applies as a general rule to all employees working for the 
bound employer. The starting point of the principle of favour rules out 
the need for strict representativity demands. The fact that the contracting 
parties may deviate from ¾ mandatory law, however, gives reason for mild 
representativity demands. Besides mild representativity demands for trade 
unions, both employers’ organisations and trade unions should meet specific 
organisational demands, in order to guarantee an efficient participation of 
the organisation in the bargaining process and a democratic participation of 
the organisations’ members. These demands, obviously, do not apply should 
an individual employer (or a number of individual employers) be a signatory 
party (or parties) to the collective labour agreement, although some remarks 
will be made with regard to these parties in section 6.1. The organisational 
demands are discussed in section 6.3 and the mild representativity demands 
for the trade unions in section 6.4.
6.1 The employers
The position of employers in transnational collective bargaining is not 
overly complicated: as long as they are truly employers based on the rules 
of the Member State in which they are situated, they should be deemed 
capable of participating in the conclusion of transnational collective labour 
agreements applying to their own organisation. This possibility will obviously 
be particularly interesting for multinational companies. These multinational 
companies normally consist of a great number of (and over time, changing) 
legal entities situated in different Member States. Each of these subsidiaries 
should, if  so desired by the parties involved in collective bargaining, be able 
to fall under the scope of application of the transnational collective labour 
agreement. That can be achieved by simply letting that subsidiary execute the 
agreement, or providing a sufficient mandate to another party who executes 
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the agreement (also) on behalf  of the subsidiary.2089 Still, in very big groups 
of companies this could prove problematic, as a great many of powers of 
attorney should be provided, not to mention the fact that the configuration of 
the companies’ network constantly changes.2090 A solution could be found by 
applying the provisions that are developed in the directive on the establishment 
of a European Works Council in that respect. If  the controlling undertaking 
of a group of companies concludes the agreement, that agreement can apply 
to all undertakings within that group.2091 
6.2 Apply the Commission’s requirements to organisations?
The Commission set out the criteria that organisations must meet in order to 
participate in the European social dialogue.2092 They should:
1. be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or categories and be orga-
nised at European level;
2. consist of organisations which are themselves an integral and recognized 
part of Member State social partner structures and with the capacity 
to negotiate agreements, and which are representative of all Member 
States, as far as possible; and
3. have adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the 
consultation process.
Based on these criteria, the Commission drafted a list pointing out the 
participating social partners. It may make sense to simply follow these criteria 
and this list in order to establish which parties should be entitled to participate 
in transnational collective bargaining in the current proposed system. This 
would surely be logical should the Commission’s criteria be widely accepted. 
however, they are not. The criteria have been criticised mainly on the grounds 
that they (i) do not lead to sufficient participation of the people in the EU and 
(ii) exclude national social partners’ direct participation.2093 This first point of 
critique is not overly relevant in this respect, as the transnational collective 
labour agreements proposed in this thesis are not intended to substitute 
2089  A. Sobczak, Legal dimensions of international framework agreements in the field of 
corporate social responsibility, page 117.
2090  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 22.
2091  E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 22.
2092  See chapter 5, section 2.2.
2093  Reference is made to chapter 6, section 3.2 and 3.3.
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Community legislation, as is the case when it comes to collective agreements 
concluded within the European social dialogue. Moreover, the participation 
of the employees involved is sufficiently guaranteed in the proposed system 
when it concerns a collective labour agreement that is potentially burdensome 
for the employees involved, being an agreement (also) containing maximum 
or standard provisions. The second point of critique is, however, relevant, 
particularly because the transnational collective labour agreement can also 
apply to just a part of the European Union, and probably, in practice, most 
often will. There is no need to exclude national social partners from this system, 
quite on the contrary. In order to have the most inclusive representativity level 
as possible, both national social partners and European social partners should 
be able to participate. That gives reason to formulate new requirements, which 
social partners need to satisfy in order to be able to participate in transnational 
collective bargaining.2094
The above obviously does not mean that the “successful” requirements 
established for the European social dialogue for social partners to satisfy 
should be left aside. Moreover, general remarks addressed to European social 
partners should also be taken into account. Important remarks were made in 
the 2006 Industrial Relations in Europe report. It stated that European social 
partners are only able to live up to their expectations “if  their organisational 
structure, their representativeness and their interaction patterns are adequate 
to play a role at the workplace and in participative democracy”.2095 Social 
partners involved in transnational collective bargaining should, in summary, 
be as close to the employees and employers as possible. This should, in my 
view, also apply to the social partners involved in transnational collective 
bargaining in the proposed system.
6.3 Organisational demands
Taking the above into consideration, organisations that participate in 
transnational collective bargaining should satisfy the following organisational 
requirements. 
6.3.1 National and transnational organisations
As mentioned in the section above both organisations that are structured 
nationally, and those that are structured internationally, should, in my 
view, be permitted to participate in transnational bargaining. National 
2094  See also the last footnote in section 2.2.2 of this chapter.
2095  European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2006, page 8.
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and transnational organisations may also join forces. If, for example, a 
transnational trade union covering the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg 
is established, that transnational trade union may team up with national trade 
unions in order to increase its level of representativity. There are, in my view, 
three different organisations that should be able to participate in transnational 
collective bargaining. 
First, there are participating national organisations. These organisations must, 
in analogy of the above-mentioned Commission’s demands, be “an integral 
and recognized part of Member State social partner structures and have the 
capacity to negotiate agreements”. More specifically: a national organisation 
needs to satisfy the national demands as applicable in its jurisdiction in order to 
qualify as a social partner that is entitled to negotiate collective agreements.2096 
These national demands need to be automatically accepted for the purpose of 
transnational collective bargaining, provided that the sum of all participants 
of each side of the industry satisfies all of the requirements stated in this 
section. Furthermore, there are participating transnational organisations 
consisting of national members. These organisations must, again in analogy 
of the above-mentioned Commission’s demands, consist of members that are 
“an integral and recognized part of Member State social partner structures 
and have the capacity to negotiate agreements”. This situation is not very 
different from the above; the national organisations “merely” organised 
themselves internationally.2097 The remarks made above apply mutatis mutandis 
to this situation. Last, there are participating transnational organisations 
that are truly international, i.e. that are not built up from national members 
but directly represent the individual employers or employees in different 
countries. It makes no sense that these organisations have to be recognised 
at a national level. In the end, if  viewed differently, a Member State could 
effectively bar these organisations from transnational collective bargaining. 
These organisations must, nonetheless, satisfy all of the other requirements 
stated in this section. 
2096  The national social partner’s entitlement to enter into collective bargaining is 
obviously of the utmost importance. This was also clearly demanded from the 
members of European social partners by the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee. Reference is made to chapter 5, section 2.2.
2097  Also from a liability view there are not that many differences. As argued in section 
4.2 above, the national organisations should also ensure that the obligatory 
provisions of the transnational collective labour agreement that relate to them are 
diligently observed. 
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6.3.2 The organisations should cover all relevant Member States 
As mentioned before, it is likely that the transnational collective labour 
agreement covers a number of Member States, but not all Member States. 
There is no reason to demand that the signatory organisations have coverage 
outside the jurisdictions to which the collective labour agreement applies. 
however, within the jurisdictions to which the agreement applies, the 
signatory organisations should have coverage, as they directly affect the 
employment conditions of individuals in that jurisdiction. Said coverage can 
be obtained by participating national social partners (either as a member of 
a transnational organisation, or as an individual signatory party) or by the 
transnational organisation itself, directly representing members (employers or 
employees) it should have in that jurisdiction. 
6.3.3 The organisational structure of the organisations must guarantee 
a proper defence of the interests they claim to represent
Organisations involved in collective bargaining must be a trustworthy 
spokesperson for the group of individuals they claim to represent. That 
should, in my view, mean that the organisation must make sufficiently clear 
whose interests it claims to protect. National organisations need to satisfy the 
national requirements in this respect, which should be accepted for the purpose 
of transnational collective bargaining. Transnational organisations should 
make sufficiently clear whose interests they claim to represent, preferably by 
means of the articles of association. The bottom-line, however, should be 
that it is sufficiently clear for every party involved – including the individual 
employers and employees – whose interests the collectivity of each side of the 
industry represents in collective bargaining.
Furthermore, it is reminded that an organisation should at least be representative 
for its own members. This is, however, only true if  that organisation actually 
listens to its members, or, put differently, these members are in a position 
to materially influence the decision-making process of that organisation. I 
would view the exact arrangement to guarantee this democratic structure 
as an internal matter if, however, it is guaranteed that the outcome of the 
process is democratic and (thus) includes all members. This should, in my 
view, also mean that transnational organisations consisting of national social 
partners, have obtained a sufficient mandate of these national social partners 
to guarantee that indeed finally the employees or employers, whatever may 
be the case, are truly represented.2098 This is in line with the general remark 
2098  I refer to chapter 6, section 3.2.
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made in the 2006 Industrial Relations in Europe report, basically requiring 
the social partners to be as close to the employees and employers as possible.
Finally – and this concerns the employees’ organisations in particular – 
the organisations must guarantee that every individual that falls within the 
scope of applicability of the transnational collective labour agreement they 
conclude, must be able to become a member of at least one of the participating 
organisations.2099 Organisations can only defend the interests of individuals, if  
these individuals have the opportunity to join. 
6.3.4 Legal personality?
Although I would favour a system in which all participating organisations 
in collective bargaining have legal personality from a personal point of view 
– legal personality establishes with certainty the status of the organisation 
and prevents an organisation to denounce responsibility by denying liability 
merely on formal grounds – I have to admit that having legal personality is 
not a requirement that is generally applied in Europe. It can even be argued, 
as it is in Germany,2100 that how an organisation is shaped from a legal point 
of view falls under the freedom of association. Moreover, in the proposed 
system for transnational collective bargaining national social partners are 
recognised. These national social partners do not necessarily have to have legal 
personality. Such a demand would therefore exclude a great many of national 
organisations, jeopardising the plurality of the organisations involved.2101 
This choice means that sometimes organisations cannot be (easily) held liable 
upon breaching obligatory provisions of the transnational collective labour 
agreement, as they simply cannot be involved in litigation according to the 
national laws of that organisation. Although this is something I regret, it 
is a logical consequence of the choice above. It can, however, be a reason 
for the bargaining parties to demand from the other side of the industry 
2099  Provided of course that the individual is willing to pay the contribution and to 
abide by the (reasonable) internal rules and regulations of the organisation. 
2100  See chapter 10, paragraph 5. It should be noted that among the Member 
States there is a clear majority in favour of trade unions’ rights regarding legal 
personality. B. Bercusson (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights – summary version - , page 26. 
2101  E. Franssen, for example, demanded European organisations participating in the 
European social dialogue to have legal personality. Reference is made to  
E. Franssen, Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 112. This led to 
critical remarks from dorssemont. See F. dorssemont, review of E. Franssen’s 
Legal aspects of the European Social Dialogue, page 278.
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that all organisations join up in a transnational organisation having legal 
personality, which organisation can subsequently be addressed upon a breach 
of contract.2102
6.4 Mild representativity demands applicable to labour
As set out above, the proposed system requires mild representativity demands 
on the side of labour. I would suggest that employees’ organisations involved 
in transnational collective bargaining should, as a whole, meet the following 
representativity demands at all times. That means that all signatory employees’ 
organisations (“labour”) should be taken together, in order to verify whether 
these organisations jointly satisfy the following representativity demands. I 
am in favour of such collective approach, because if  each national trade union 
would be scrutinised, the “weakest link” would jeopardise the entire collective 
labour agreement, while labour’s side as a whole would perfectly well be able 
to satisfy the applicable requirements.
6.4.1 Labour must be independent / surpass company level
Labour must be fully independent from the other side of industry, 
management.2103 It must not be under the domination or control of an 
employer or employer’s organisation, and it may not be liable to interference 
by an employer or employer’s organisation tending towards such control. 
The Certification Officer in Great Britain drafted a very helpful set of criteria 
that could be applied to verify whether labour is indeed independent. I refer 
to chapter 12, section 5. One of the criteria mentioned by the Certification 
Officer is, in my opinion, so important that it should be considered a separate 
requirement in order for labour to be fully independent: labour should surpass 
company level. The member base of labour should be broader than only 
the employees of the company or companies with which the transnational 
collective labour agreement is concluded. 
2102  Although in such case it remains questionable whether an action against such 
transnational organisation is really worth taking, as that organisation presumably 
has little means to actually compensate losses.
2103  Which demand may, strictly spoken, not truly be considered a part of 
representativity, but rather an element of being a real trade union. See on this 
F. dorssemont, Rechtspositie en Syndicale Actievrijheid van representatieve 
werknemersorganisaties.
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6.4.2 Labour must possess real powers
Labour should possess real powers towards management. It should be able 
to persuade management to enter into collective bargaining and to agree on 
reasonable proposals. The trade unions should be able to cope with a genuine 
labour struggle and should be able and willing, if  necessary, to engage in 
industrial action. This is what in Germany is known as Mächtigkeit. 
6.4.3 Labour must be competent to conclude the collective labour agreement 
Another requirement that enables labour better to be a representative 
organisation, is that it has the ability to focus on the specific sector in which 
the employees whose interests it claims to represent work. Labour should 
only be competent to conclude collective labour agreements in the sector 
of its expertise. This requirement is based on the principle that is applied in 
Germany and is referred to as Tarifzuständigkeit. This requirement is closely 
connected with the one set out in section 6.2.3 above, stating that it should be 
sufficiently clear for every party involved – in this case also being all relevant 
employees – that labour represents the interests of employees in the sector in 
which the collective labour agreement is concluded. This demand resembles 
one of the requirements an organisation must meet in order to be “sufficiently 
representative” for the purpose of implementing the agreement by a Council 
decision in the European social dialogue. After all, that organisation must, 
according to the Commission, have a genuine interest in the matter with regard 
to which the agreement is concluded.2104 
7. Summary
7.1 Representativity and binding powers of a collective labour agreement
Representativity can be viewed as (i) the demands that the contracting social 
partners should meet with regard to (a) minimum size (including a minimum 
number of members), (b) a certain level of power or (c) a specific status in 
order to be qualified to represent the parties to whom the collective labour 
agreement should apply (representativity of the social partners), or (ii) the 
demands that the collective labour agreement itself  should satisfy on the same 
topics in order to apply to a large group of individuals (representativity of the 
collective labour agreement). In other words, representativity can be placed 
in the key of recognition of the legitimacy of  social partners to negotiate 
collective labour agreements and a collective labour agreement to apply to 
2104  Reference is made to chapter 5, section 6.2.2.1.
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a large group of individuals. When representativity within this meaning in 
the Researched Countries is scrutinised in relation to the binding powers a 
collective labour agreement has, the following conclusions can be drawn:
•	 If 	only	employers	and	employees	that	are	involved	with	the	collective	la-
bour agreement – either by signing the collective agreement, or by being 
a member of the contracting organisations, or by agreeing to follow that 
agreement via a reference clause – are bound by that agreement, there 
is little need for representative parties to conclude that collective labour 
agreement.
•	 The	above	is	different	(i)	if 	the	collective	labour	agreement	permits	devi-
ation from ¾ mandatory law and (ii) for employees who are not bound 
by a collective labour agreement through membership of a contracting 
trade union, but are instead bound by it though a reference clause, in 
case the renewed collective labour agreement is concluded by different 
parties than the ones that concluded the original collective labour agree-
ment.
•	 If 	 all	 employees	 are	 directly	 bound	 by	 a	 collective	 labour	 agreement,	
there should be a justification for that, for example the demand that the 
contracting trade unions should be representative.
•	 If 	all	employers	and	employees	that	fall	within	the	scope of application 
of a collective labour agreement are to bound by that agreement, there 
should be a justification for that, a justification which could include that 
the agreement should, prior to be extended, already apply to a majority 
of the employees that fall within the scope of application of that agree-
ment. 
7.2 Representativity and collective bargaining
In the context of collective bargaining two forms of representation should 
be distinguished. First, there is institutional representativity: an organisation 
(social partner) is representative if  a government recognises or appoints that 
organisation as discussion partner or as a party that can act on behalf  of third 
parties. Second, there is sociological representativity: an organisation can be 
considered representative if  it is a trustworthy spokesperson for a group of 
individuals whose interests it claims to represent. Institutional and sociological 
representativity do not rule each other out and can coincide. Both forms of 
representativity are normally related to factual representativity, meaning that 
an organisation has a sufficient number of members amongst the group of 
employees whose interests it claims to represent. Regardless of which form of 
representativity is used, the core of representativity in collective bargaining 
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is that representative organisations are organisations that are recognised in a 
legal system to act legitimately on behalf  of and bind others.
Representativity is of particular importance when organisations represent a 
larger group than merely their members. This definitely occurs with regard 
to trade unions: they often have to serve the interests of all employees, and 
not just of their members, as collective labour agreements often apply to 
all employees of a company or in a specific branch. Member States are far 
more hesitant to apply collective labour agreements to employers who are not 
directly bound by the collective labour agreement. Representativity demands 
in collective bargaining are therefore especially important with regard to trade 
unions, and much less when it comes to employers’ organisations.
Representativity of trade unions is important because:
•	 Not every party is entitled to act on behalf  of a large group of employ-
ees for the purpose of setting employment conditions; many countries 
awarded this entitlement exclusively to trade unions, which in turn play 
an important role in the “participatory democracy”. Trade unions can 
better fulfil this task once they are representative.
•	 Representative	trade	unions	are	best	able	to	arrange	the	most	optimum	
employment conditions for the employees. 
•	 Trade	 unions	 that	 have	 a	 sufficient	 number	 of	members	 amongst	 the	
relevant group of employees (representative trade unions) can benefit 
from these members’ knowledge, experience and manpower, which is ne-
cessary to conduct proper collective bargaining.
•	 Trade	unions	with	a	significant	number	of	members	(representative	trade	
unions) have a steady flow of income due to the membership contributi-
ons, which ensures their independence.
Factual representativity of the trade union is also relevant. however, factual 
representativity alone does not suffice in collective bargaining in order for 
trade unions to be trustworthy spokespersons for the employees whose 
interests they claim to represent. Other requirements are of importance as 
well, such as:
•	 being	independent;
•	 surpassing	company	level;	
•	 focussing	on	a	specific	area	of	expertise,	a	specific	sector;
•	 having	an	efficient	and	proper	organisation	in	which	members	have	an	
influence on the decision-making process;
•	 possessing	real	powers;
•	 having	a	strong	past	performance;	and
•	 having	a	strong	status.
THE PARTIES INVOLVED AND THE BINDING POWERS
735
The above focuses on the position of the trade unions rather than on the 
collective labour agreement itself. The coverage of the collective labour 
agreement is often taken into account in Member States when it concerns 
the extension of that agreement: a collective labour agreement that is to be 
extended must sometimes have a minimum coverage rate, possibly exceeding 
50% of the employees in the relevant sector. This minimum coverage is seen 
as a reason, or justification, to apply the agreement to a greater group than 
the original group. The reason for this is that a majority can model the 
employment conditions of a minority (a “democratic” principle) and that 
the content of the collective labour agreement is apparently reasonable as it 
applies to a majority. These arguments, however, should be reticently applied. 
In any case, it is not always reasonable that a majority binds a minority. 
7.3 Fundamental choices in a new system of 
transnational collective bargaining
Collective labour agreements can have two types of binding power: they can 
be binding by law or in honour only. Because most Member States favour a 
system in which collective labour agreements are binding by law, and there are 
no fundamental objections against such a system, a system on transnational 
collective bargaining providing for legally binding agreements seems logical. 
This is specially the case as legally binding transnational collective labour 
agreements can better attain important goals such as (i) to arrange, in a 
uniform fashion, the employment conditions between the employers and 
employees to which the collective labour agreement applies and (ii) to secure 
peace and tranquillity within the company or sector to which the collective 
labour agreement applies.
7.3.1 The parties to the collective labour agreement
Given the above-mentioned choice, it is logical that the contracting parties 
are, by law, obliged to abide by the obligatory provisions of the collective 
labour agreement. The signatory parties are responsible, by law, for the proper 
execution of the collective labour agreement. Should they fail to fulfil this 
obligation, their counterparties should be entitled to start proceedings and 
claim specific performance, payment of damages or even dissolution of the 
collective labour agreement. This should only be different if  the contracting 
parties explicitly stipulate otherwise. In the proposed system on transnational 
collective bargaining the contracting parties should observe the implied 
principle of good faith: they are legally required to take adequate measures 
to ensure that their members abide by the collective labour agreement; they 
do not have to guarantee this with regard to the individual employers and 
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employees. The contracting association is, however, liable for the performance 
of the collective labour agreement of its members should these members also 
be organisations, and these members are likewise responsible for the proper 
execution of their part of the transnational collective labour agreement, if  
any. I would not choose for the new system to incorporate an implied peace 
obligation at this moment.
7.3.2 The employers and employees
Many Member States have introduced an institutional system: a system 
which has as a consequence that the collective labour agreement applies to 
all individuals that operate within the agreement’s scope of applicability, 
regardless of whether or not they are bound to the agreement by contract. Other 
Member States have chosen for a contractual system: a system which has, as a 
consequence, that collective labour agreements only apply to individuals that 
are bound by that agreement by contract. Choosing for either an institutional 
or a contractual system has at least three major consequences:
1. In the contractual system individualism and voluntarism prevail over 
collectivism and non-voluntarism (the individual freely chooses the em-
ployment conditions) while this is the other way around in the instituti-
onal system (the individual can be confronted with employment condi-
tions which it has to accept as the signatory parties collectivity agreed 
on these conditions). Collectivism and non-voluntarism should be ap-
proached carefully: a number of Member States fiercely disputed the 
extension of collective labour agreements to unbound employers and 
employees. Extension of collective labour agreements should be applied 
reticently and requires strong justification. 
2. The institutional system requires strong social partners or a high cover-
age rate of the collective labour agreement while the contractual system 
does not. These strong (representative) social partners respectively this 
high coverage rate justify the erga omnes effect of the collective labour 
agreement in an institutional system. The strong social partners should 
meet clear and unambiguous rules, that must be drafted on forehand 
and apply generally, if  an institutional system such as the one that is 
in place in Belgium is chosen. In a contractual system collective labour 
agreements can also be applied to companies or sectors if  they are con-
cluded by less strong social partners, or in situations in which there is 
a less significant coverage ratio, since only those parties that chose so 
are covered by the collective labour agreement. The social partners must 
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also meet clear and unambiguous rules, which can be tested on a case-
by-case scenario and have to be less strict.
3. The institutional system is much more inclusive than the contractual 
system. In its pure form, it includes all employees and employers that fall 
within the scope of applicability of the collective labour agreement. This 
has advantages. The first advantage is of a fundamental nature: most 
employers wish to treat their employees equally, a goal which is better 
attained if  the agreement applies to all employees. The second advantage 
is of practical nature: from an EU law perspective it is difficult to diffe-
rentiate between employees who are a contracting trade union’s member 
and those who are not given the Privacy directive.
Taking into consideration these three consequences the following observations 
can be made:
1. Extension of collective labour agreements should be applied reticently 
and requires strong justification.
2. The institutional system requires strong social partners or a high cover-
age rate of the collective labour agreement, while the contractual system 
does not. The aforementioned strong social partners should in principle 
meet clear and unambiguous rules, that, in an institutional system as is 
in place in Belgium, must be drafted on forehand and apply generally 
(as opposed to in a specific situation, in relation to a specific collective 
labour agreement).
3. Extension of collective labour agreements to all employees has impor-
tant advantages as all employees are treated equally and potential dif-
ficulties on privacy issues can easily be tackled. 
While the first two observations would favour a contractual system, the 
third observation points at an institutional system. This is not necessarily 
troublesome. When it comes down to it, a system does not necessarily have to 
be purely contractual or purely institutional. 
7.3.2.1 The position of the employers
The institutional system does not apply to employers in the Researched 
Countries with regard to normal, non-extended collective labour agreements. 
Therefore, it seems logical to follow the contractual system with respect to 
employers. 
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7.3.2.2 The position of the employees
Things are different when it comes to the position of the employees. In most 
Member States a collective labour agreement applies to all employees of the 
bound employer (who fall within the scope of application of the collective 
labour agreement). Such a general binding effect has important advantages, 
as all employees are treated equally and no problems occur with regard to 
privacy issues. however, such a system requires justification, as employees 
can be bound by terms that were not of their choosing. The best method of 
justification would, in my opinion, be the principle of favour. This allows 
departure from the terms of the collective labour agreement in the individual 
employment contract in favour of the employee, and prohibits in consequence 
that collective labour agreements deteriorate existing employment conditions. 
This principle is also commonly used in Member States. however, all national 
laws that apply the principle of favour have exceptions to this rule. This will 
also be the case in the proposed system for transnational collective labour 
agreements. These exceptions require justification which can, amongst others, 
be found in mild representativity demands on the side of the trade unions. 
If  the contracting parties wish to fully depart from the principle of favour, 
for example because times of economic distress warrant a cut back in wages, 
there must be sufficient justification to apply the collective labour agreement 
to all employees. If  such justification is lacking, the contractual system should 
be taken as a starting point. Only if  a sufficient level of justification is in 
place, a collective labour agreement (also) containing maximum or standard 
provisions may apply to all employees working for the bound employer. This 
leads to the following system with regard to the position of the employees of 
the bound employer: 
1. A transnational collective labour agreement that merely contains mini-
mum provisions automatically applies to and has mandatory effects on 
all employees of the bound employer who fall within the scope of ap-
plicability of that agreement. By way of exception, however, the trans-
national collective labour agreement may (i) allow the employer and em-
ployee to deviate from ¾ mandatory law if  either permitted at European 
or relevant national level, (ii) oblige each employee to pay a reasonable 
compensation to the contracting trade union(s) and (iii) provide for an 
opening clause that can be filled in by social partners at national level. 
2. A transnational collective labour agreement that (also) contains standard 
and/or maximum provisions only applies to and has mandatory effects 
on bound employees who fall within the scope of applicability of that 
agreement. It, however, also applies to and has mandatory effects on 
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employees who are not bound by it but do fall within the scope of ap-
plicability of that agreement if:
a. the contracting trade union(s) has (have) sufficient members amongst (i) 
all employees (the bargaining group) and (ii) each individual group of 
employees (the bargaining units) to which the transnational collective 
labour agreement applies; or
b. the contracting trade union is or trade unions are recognised by the em-
ployees of each relevant bargaining unit; or
c. the individual employee accepts the collective labour agreement; or
d. it already applies to an important majority of the employees in the rele-
vant bargaining group, and to a sufficient number of employees in each 
individual bargaining unit. 
7.3.3 Third parties
With regard to collective normative provisions, there are two important 
constructions. First, these provisions may provide for rights and obligation 
that arrange the relation between the employer and its entire personnel or an 
employee representative body. The employer who is bound by the collective 
labour agreement should apply these collective normative provisions. There 
is no reason to oppose to a system that allows the contracting parties to a 
transnational collective labour agreement to give additional rights to the entire 
personnel or to an employee representative body. The principle of favour must 
be observed. If  this is not the case (while obviously the content of the collective 
normative provisions do not violate any laws) the limitation of rights should 
be justified. This justification should be found in representativity, in which 
case the same criteria apply as are in place for collective labour agreements 
that depart from the principle of favour with regard to individual normative 
provisions. Another matter is that the contracting parties should be allowed 
to discontinue the additional rights granted to the entire personnel or to an 
employee representative body in order to prevent a static system. Second, 
the transnational collective labour agreement may provide for rights and 
obligations that arrange the relation between the employer and the employees 
vis-à-vis third parties. If  the transnational collective labour agreement arranges 
for payment to these third parties by the employer, while the employees can 
enjoy the benefits, there are no real arguments against this system. This would 
be different if  the employees were obliged to pay a contribution to the third 
parties. In such a case the employee is confronted with obligations, which 
should be justified in the same manner (representativity) as set out above. 
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As the collective labour agreement is intended to bind by law, the collective 
normative provisions apply directly and with mandatory effect to the parties 
concerned.
7.4 The contracting parties / social partners
7.4.1 The employers
The position of employers in transnational collective bargaining is not overly 
complicated: as long as they are truly employers based on the rules of the 
Member State in which they are situated, they should be deemed capable of 
participating in the conclusion of transnational collective labour agreements 
applying to their own organisation. It seems practical for groups of companies 
to entitle the controlling undertaking to conclude the transnational collective 
labour agreement, an agreement which should subsequently apply to all 
undertakings within that group. 
7.4.2 Organisational demands for organisations 
Organisations that participate in transnational collective bargaining should 
satisfy the following organisational requirements:
•	 Both	 organisations	 that	 are	 structured	 nationally	 and	 those	 that	 are	
structured internationally should be permitted to participate in trans-
national bargaining. National organisations need to satisfy the national 
demands as applicable in their jurisdiction in order to qualify as a social 
partner that is entitled to negotiate collective agreements. The same ap-
plies to national members of participating transnational organisations. 
Participating transnational organisations that are truly international, i.e. 
that are not build up from national members, should not be required to 
meet national demands, but should satisfy all of the requirements stated 
below.
•	 The	signatory	organisations	should	have	coverage	in	all	jurisdictions	in	
which the agreement applies. 
•	 Organisations	must	make	 sufficiently	 clear	whose	 interests	 they	 claim	
to represent. National organisations need to satisfy the national requi-
rements in this respect. All organisations must place their members in a 
position that they can materially influence the decision-making process 
of their organisation.
•	 Organisations	should	not	necessarily	have	legal	personality.
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7.4.3 Mild representativity demands applicable to labour
The proposed system requires mild representativity demands on the side 
of labour. Employees’ organisations involved in transnational collective 
bargaining should, as a whole, meet the following representativity demands 
at all times:
•	 they	must	be	fully	independent	from	the	other	side	of	industry,	manage-
ment, and should surpass company level;
•	 they	should	possess	real	powers	towards	management;	and
•	 they	should	only	be	competent	to	conclude	collective	labour	agreements	
in the sector of their expertise.
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ChAPTER 16
APPLICABLE LAW, ENFORCEMENT, 
TERM, TERMINATION, AFTER-EFFECTS 
ANd OThER TEChNICALITIES
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters explained the transnational collective labour agreement, 
its binding force and the parties entitled to conclude it. This chapter concerns 
important “technicalities” of the transnational collective labour agreement.
An important topic is the enforcement of the transnational collective labour 
agreement. This is relevant for the three different types of provisions: the 
obligatory, the individual normative and the collective normative provisions. 
however, before the means of enforcement can be discussed, it should first 
be established which law applies to said different provisions. The topics 
of applicable law and enforcement will be dealt with in sections 2 and 3 
respectively. Thereafter the term and termination of the collective labour 
agreement will be discussed in section 4. Section 5 discusses the possible 
after-effects of the different provisions of the transnational collective labour 
agreement. The possible role of (mandatory) alternative dispute resolution in 
the proposed system of transnational collective bargaining will be considered 
in section 6. Section 7 concerns the reach of the social partners when it 
comes to transnational collective labour agreements: what is their relation to 
national law and national collective labour agreements? Section 8 summarises 
this chapter. 
2. Law applicable to transnational collective labour agreements
Collective labour law in the Member States is strongly embedded in the 
respective national law systems. In case a specific national act on collective 
labour agreements has procedural or material lacunas, these lacunas are filled 
in with general rules of national law. A breach of a provision of a collective 
labour agreement is, for example, often viewed as a breach of contract, 
triggering general national rules on that topic. On the basis of these rules the 
collective labour agreement is enforced. In a European system, unfortunately, 
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this embedment is lacking. There is no European civil code that could assist 
the parties concerned should a European directive on transnational collective 
labour agreements have lacunas. This means that private international law must 
play a role, selecting the applicable law to complement the proposed directive 
on transnational collective labour agreements where necessary. This system 
is somewhat disadvantageous, as in consequence issues such as enforcement 
(as discussed in more detail in section 3 below) depend, to a certain extent, 
on national law, which obviously differs from country to country. This means 
that the impact of the transnational collective labour agreement can vary in 
the different Member States. As long as there is no European code on civil 
law this, however, is a situation that cannot be prevented. Of course, the 
applicable national law must observe the European basis of the transnational 
collective labour agreements, which will ensure a reasonable level of equality: 
national law is only there to complement the European rules on transnational 
collective bargaining. 
There are two aspects that are relevant when determining which law 
applies to the different provisions of the transnational collective labour 
agreement. It should be determined (i) which law may apply on the basis 
of private international law rules applying in Europe and (ii) whether these 
private international law rules give room for a practical, workable choice of 
applicable law. In order to develop such a workable system, the different types 
of provisions – obligatory, individual normative and collective normative – of 
a transnational collective labour agreement should be distinguished.
2.1 Private international law in Europe
The Rome Convention and its future successor Rome I are relevant with 
regard to private international law in Europe. Both instruments give ample 
room to tailor the topic applicable law in Community legislation. Article 20 
of the Rome Convention stipulates that the Convention does not affect “the 
application of provisions which, in relation to particular matters, lay down 
choice of law rules relating to contractual obligations and which are or will 
be contained in acts of the institutions of the European Communities or in 
national laws harmonized in implementation of such acts”. In other words, 
the Rome Convention leaves room for an act on transnational collective 
labour agreements to arrange a law which applies to the different types of 
provisions of a transnational collective labour agreement. It successor, Rome 
I, also leaves room in article 23. To summarise, it is possible to draft practical 
rules on applicable law in the proposed act on transnational collective labour 
agreements.
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2.2 The law applicable to obligatory provisions of a 
transnational collective labour agreement
Potentially, multiple parties from different jurisdictions may be involved in 
the conclusion of a transnational collective labour agreement. This may give 
rise to complicated private international law issues when determining the law 
that governs the (obligatory provisions of) that agreement. In order to prevent 
possible discussions, thus in order to advance clarity which is of the utmost 
importance when it concerns relations involving numerous third parties such 
as collective labour agreements, I propose that the contracting parties are 
obliged to make an explicit choice on the applicable law in the transnational 
collective labour agreement. This system of “chosen law” lies at the fundament 
of the European instruments on private international law given article 3 of the 
Rome Convention and article 3 of Rome I.2105 I would be inclined to demand 
that the chosen applicable law must be of one of the Member States in which 
the transnational collective labour agreement applies. In that manner a link 
between the applicable law on (the obligatory provisions of) the transnational 
collective labour agreement and the jurisdictions in which it applies remains.
2.3 The law applicable to individual normative provisions 
of a transnational collective labour agreement
As explained in the previous chapter, the individual normative provisions of 
the transnational collective labour agreement in the current proposal become 
part of the individual employment agreement as they have direct normative 
effect. As a consequence, these provisions (as automatically incorporated in 
the individual employment agreement) need to be assessed on the basis of 
the law that applies to that employment agreement. This is the only workable 
2105  Article 6 of the Rome Convention and article 8 of Rome I do not apply, as these 
articles solely relate to individual employment contracts, as opposed to collective 
labour agreements. 
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option: the employer and employee should not be confronted with two 
different sets of law in their mutual relation.2106
2.4 The law applicable to collective normative provisions 
of a transnational collective labour agreement
In particular with regard to collective normative provisions, difficulties 
may arise in connection with private international law. The reason for 
these difficulties is that not only are the social partners and the employers 
and employees involved, but potentially also other third parties, being the 
employee representative body and third collective parties, such as funds. As 
noted in chapter 15, section 4.4, there are two important constructions when 
it concerns collective normative provisions, which will be discussed separately 
below. 
2.4.1 The law applicable to the relation between the employer and 
its employee representative body or its entire personnel
First, collective normative provisions may provide for rights and obligations 
that arrange the relation between the employer and (i) its employee 
representative body or (ii) its “entire personnel”.2107 
The law that applies between the employer and the employee representative 
body will normally be rather straightforward. National legislation may oblige 
the employer to establish an employee representative body. That national law 
subsequently applies to the relation between the employer and the employee 
representative body. If  the same employer is active in several countries, and is 
2106  If  the employment agreement already was governed by two different sets of 
law – one chosen and the other one (for the mandatory part) applicable on the 
basis of article 6.2 in conjunction with article 6.1 of the Rome Convention – the 
normative provisions of the applicable transnational collective labour agreement 
should apply in the same manner. In other words: the norms are equally governed 
by on the one hand chosen law and on the other hand (for the mandatory part) by 
the law applicable on the basis of article 6.2 in conjunction with article 6.1 of the 
Rome Convention. This is, however, a situation that is not overly practical. I would 
therefore be inclined to make an additional comment with regard to the Rome 
Convention, and its successor, Rome I. These instruments should make it possible 
that a transnational collective labour agreement stipulates that only one national 
law applies in specific crossborder situations. This would help out companies and 
employers active in the border regions. This would advance employee mobility, one 
of the potential advantages of transnational collective bargaining. Reference is 
made to chapter 7, section 3.1.
2107  Which may also be a specific group of that entire personnel. Reference is made to 
chapter 13, section 8.4.
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obliged to establish employee representative bodies in more than one country 
because of its branch offices in the several countries, the law applicable to the 
collective normative provisions will vary per branch office.
The law that applies between the employer and its entire personnel would 
ideally run parallel to the law that governs all the employment agreements 
between the employer and all its employees. This will not always, however, 
be the case. The employer may very well employ a group of employees whose 
employment contracts are governed by one national law, while it also employs 
a group of employees whose employments contracts are governed by another 
national law. The situation that the same collective normative provisions 
applying to the relation between the employer, or as the case may be, branch 
office on the one hand, and the entire personnel on the other, are governed 
by different national laws is obviously not workable (if  even possible). That 
calls for a different solution. I propose to follow the same line of reasoning, as 
applied above, concerning the relation between the employer and its employee 
representative body. If  the employer is resident and active in one country, 
the law of that country (the “country of residence”)2108 should apply to the 
relation between the employer and its entire staff. If  the employer is active 
in several countries and has branch offices situated in these countries, the 
law of the country in which the branch office is situated should apply to the 
relation between that branch office and the employees working for that branch 
office. These laws will normally run (in as far as possible) parallel to the law 
applicable to the employment agreements of most of the employees working 
for the employer or as the case may be that branch office, as the main rule 
is that the law of the country in which the employee habitually performs his 
work applies to the individual employment agreement.2109 These laws will also 
run parallel with the laws that would apply between the employer or as the 
case may be the branch office on the one hand and the employee representative 
body on the other, should the employer or branch office be obliged to establish 
such a body. This is of importance, as the employee representative body can 
be considered to represent the interests of the entire personnel, and will in 
the proposed system also be a key party with regard to the enforcement of 
collective normative provisions.2110 Things are a bit more complicated if  the 
employer is situated in one country, while it employs employees in different 
countries, without having branch offices in these different countries. In such 
2108  What exactly constitutes the employer’s country of residence is thus a factual 
decision, depending on the country in which the employer has its office(s) and is 
(primarily) active.
2109  Reference is made to article 6.2 of the Rome Convention. 
2110  Reference is made to section 3.3 below.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 16
748
a case it would in my view make sense to apply the law of the country in 
which the employer is factually situated and is primarily active (the country 
if  residence) to the collective normative provisions of the transnational 
collective labour agreement.2111 After all, collective normative provisions tend 
to relate to the employer and possibly its premises – the employer must for 
example have a policy stimulating equal opportunities or supply a room in 
which all employees are allowed to take some leisure time – for which reason 
the applicability of the law of the country of residence of the employer is the 
most logical choice. Moreover, should the employer be obliged or become 
obliged (should it pass a specific threshold with regard to the number of 
employees it employs) to establish an employee representative body, the law 
of the country in which the company is situated would apply to the relation 
between the employer and its employee representative body as well. 
2.4.2 The law applicable to the relation between the employer 
and employees vis-à-vis third collective entities
Second, the transnational collective labour agreement may provide for rights 
and obligations that arrange the relation between the employer and the 
employees vis-à-vis third parties. Also with regard to this category potential 
issues of private international law may occur. It is of course in the interest of 
the ultimate consumers of the transnational collective labour agreement – the 
employers and employees – that potential rights and obligations against third 
parties are governed by the same law that governs their employment contracts. 
It is also in their interest that possible claims from and against such third 
parties can be referred to a court in their own country. This, however, implies 
that the third collective parties (such as funds) are confronted with rights and 
obligations from and against employers and employees that are governed 
by various law systems, depending on the law applicable to the employment 
agreements of the employers or employees involved, alleged rights which 
can be submitted to courts in different countries. It also implies, should one 
and the same employer employ a group of employees whose employment 
contracts are governed by one national law, while it also employs a group of 
employees whose employments contracts are governed by another national 
law, that third collective entities can be confronted with claims governed by 
different laws from employees of one and the same company. That is a system 
that in my view is not workable. 
2111  This rule notwithstanding, if  a collective normative provision is in fact also an 
individual normative provision, that individual normative provision is in accordance 
with section 2.2 above governed by the law that governs the individual employment 
agreement. 
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The relation between the third collective entity and the employer and the 
employees it employs should be governed by one law. This should be different 
in case the company is active in several countries and has branch offices in 
these countries, in which situation the law of the country in which the branch 
office is situated should apply to the relation between the third collective 
entity on the one hand and the branch office and the employees working in 
that branch office on the other. For these reasons, the same line of arguing 
as is applied in section 4.2.1 above should be followed. That means that (i) 
should the employer be active in one country, the law of that country should 
apply to the relation between the third collective entity on the one hand 
and the employer and its employees on the other. Should (ii) the employer 
be active in several countries, and should it have branch offices situated in 
these countries, the law of the country in which the branch office is situated 
should apply to the relation between the third collective entity on the one 
hand and the branch office and the employees working in that branch office 
on the other. Should (iii) the employer be situated in one country, while it 
employs employees in different countries, without having branch offices in 
these different countries, the relation between the third collective entity on 
the one hand and the employer and its employees on the other should be 
governed by the law of the country in which the employer is factually situated 
and primarily active (the country of residence). 
3. Enforcement of transnational collective labour agreements
The above makes it clear which law applies to the different provisions a 
transnational collective labour agreement may have. It subsequently makes 
sense that this national law should be applied when enforcing these provisions. 
Consequently, the transnational collective labour agreement is enforced as if  
it were a national collective labour agreement. This means that the parties 
involved in the transnational collective labour agreement should have the same 
rights as national parties would have upon breach of a national collective 
labour agreement. It also means that, if, pursuant to national legislation, 
other parties (such as the government) play a role in the enforcement of 
national collective labour agreements, these parties should equally enforce 
transnational collective labour agreements. Should, however, a national 
system have insufficient means for the proper enforcement of the norms of the 
transnational collective labour agreement, or should these national means be 
insufficiently clear and legally certain, the Member States concerned should 
be, on the basis of the proposed system on transnational collective bargaining, 
obliged to introduce minimum means for effective enforcement. In the end, 
each Member State must guarantee that the proposed act on transnational 
collective bargaining works in its country. In the following sections the manner 
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of enforcement of the three types of provisions – obligatory, individual 
normative and collective normative – is set out, applying the general rules 
described above.
3.1 Enforcement of obligatory provisions
In the proposed European system on transnational collective bargaining, the 
party that is in breach of an obligatory provision of the transnational collective 
labour agreement, is in principle liable for the losses resulting from such a 
breach to its counterparty or counterparties. A potential claim on breach of 
such obligatory provisions needs to be assessed applying the chosen national 
law, which has to fill in procedural and material lacunas. Of course, the chosen 
law should observe the European basis of the transnational collective labour 
agreements and must therefore make filing and awarding such claims possible 
even if  these claims would not be possible or awarded under national law. This 
applicable national law should, in brief, provide the tools for enforcement of 
the obligatory provisions of the transnational collective labour agreement. 
A possible lawsuit has to be brought before a national court, preferably a 
court of the country whose law applies to the transnational collective labour 
agreement. Questions on the European system of transnational collective 
bargaining should be referred to the European Court of justice on the basis of 
article 234 of the EC Treaty. Should in a Member State in which jurisdiction 
the transnational collective labour agreement applies other techniques be 
in place to enforce obligatory provisions of a national collective labour 
agreement, these techniques should equally be applied to the transnational 
collective labour agreement.
3.2 Enforcement of individual normative provisions
The normative provisions of the transnational collective labour agreement 
become part of the individual employment agreement as they have direct 
normative effect. They are governed by the same law that governs the 
individual employment agreement. These provisions therefore become, in a 
manner of speaking, part of “national employment law”. This has two main 
consequences.
First, the individual employer and employee should turn to the same 
enforcement tools as would apply were these normative provisions incorporated 
in the individual employment agreement on the basis of an applicable national 
collective labour agreement. In other words: all national remedies following a 
breach of employment contract at the disposal of the employer and employee 
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in their mutual relation should apply equally to normative provisions deriving 
from an applicable transnational collective labour agreement.2112
Second, all other parties that have, on the basis of national law, a right to enforce 
normative provisions of applicable national collective labour agreements 
should also have the same rights to enforce individual normative provisions 
of applicable transnational collective labour agreements. If, for example, an 
employee representative body within a company has, pursuant to national 
legislation, a role in the enforcement of individual normative provisions of 
national collective labour agreements, it should also be entitled to play the 
same role in the enforcement of normative provisions of a transnational 
collective labour agreement. Obviously the same applies to trade unions. 
If  a trade union, pursuant to national law, is entitled to enforce individual 
normative provisions of a collective labour agreement, it should also be 
entitled to do the same for individual normative provisions of transnational 
collective labour agreements.2113 In my view that entitlement should not only 
be attributed to national trade unions that, pursuant to national law, are 
entitled to enforce individual normative provisions of an applicable collective 
labour agreement, but also to transnational trade unions and to trade unions 
from other countries that were involved in the transnational collective labour 
agreement concerned and have an interest in its enforcement. These trade 
unions should be treated on equal footing as national trade unions, and should 
consequently have the same enforcement rights as national trade unions.
3.3 Enforcement of collective normative provisions
In line with section 2.4 above, the two constructions of collective normative 
provisions will be discussed separately below.
3.3.1 Enforcement of collective normative provisions governing 
the relation between the employer and its employee 
representative body or its entire personnel
The most logical party to enforce these types of provisions in the proposed 
system is the employee representative body. That employee representative 
body is either the body to which these rights are directed, or the proper 
institution to defend the collective interests of the employees working in 
2112  As set out in chapter 13, section 8.2.5, this is a common model of enforcement in 
Europe.
2113  This is, for example, common in the Scandinavian countries. See chapter 13, section 
8.2.5.
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the company (or as the case may be: branch office) for which the body is 
established, in case said collective normative provisions are directed to these 
employees. In line with what is argued above, the employee representative 
body should be entitled to enforce these collective normative provisions with 
all means that are available to it on the basis of the applicable national law, as 
if  these collective normative provisions of the transnational collective labour 
agreement were collective normative provisions of a national collective labour 
agreement. Should these means be lacking or should they be insufficiently 
clear and legally certain, the Member States concerned should be obliged 
on the basis of the proposed system on transnational collective bargaining 
to introduce minimum rights for these employee representative bodies to 
enforce said collective normative provisions. In the event that the employee 
representative body is lacking altogether in a specific situation, the individual 
employees themselves should be entitled to call upon these collective normative 
provisions, if  they are ultimately addressed by these provisions.2114 If  this 
would be different, a potentially effective enforcement mechanism would be 
missing. These employees too should be entitled to enforce these provisions 
with all the means attributed to them on the basis of national law. Should 
these means not be available, or be insufficiently clear and legally certain, 
the Member States concerned should again be obliged on the basis of the 
proposed system to introduce minimum rights for these employees to enforce 
said collective normative provisions. 
Furthermore, the contracting trade unions should be empowered to enforce 
these collective normative provisions as against the individual employer (or 
as the case may be: branch office),2115 as well as other trade unions should 
applicable national law arrange for that option in respect to national collective 
labour agreements, an option which should in such a case be applied mutatis 
mutandis in respect to an applicable transnational collective labour agreement. 
This can be considered as a final security, should the employee representative 
body or the employees involved be insufficiently capable of enforcing these 
provisions themselves. Again, these trade unions should be entitled to resort 
to all enforcement techniques available on the basis of applicable national law. 
If  national law does not provide for such enforcement techniques, or if  such 
techniques are insufficiently clear and legally certain, the proposed system 
obliges the Member State concerned to introduce minimum rights for these 
trade unions to enforce the collective normative provisions.
2114  Which is in accordance with the law applied in Germany. See chapter 10, section 
7.4.
2115  See also chapter 13, section 8.5.4.
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3.3.2 Enforcement of collective normative provisions governing the relation 
between the employer and employees vis-à-vis third collective entities
The enforcement of these types of collective normative provisions may be 
somewhat complicated. After all, the proposed system means that the collective 
third parties can be confronted with claims that are governed by varying laws, 
depending on which party makes the claim, as the law of the country of 
residence of the employer (or as the case may be: the branch office) applies. In 
order to streamline this situation, I propose that each third collective entity is 
obliged to establish a representative – a specific national office – in the country 
of each Member State in which the transnational collective labour agreement 
concerned applies. These national representatives should be entitled to directly 
demand performance on the basis of the collective normative provisions of 
the transnational collective labour agreement from the employer (or, as the 
case may be, the employee)2116 in the country of residence of the employer. 
Likewise, the employee (or, as the case may be, the employer) is entitled to 
demand performance from the third collective party through this party’s 
national representative in the country of residence of the employer by whom 
he is employed.2117 
Furthermore, the signatory parties to the transnational collective labour 
agreement should be entitled to demand specific performance of these 
collective normative provisions from the parties bound by the collective 
normative provisions of the transnational collective labour agreement (the 
employers and employees) as against the third collective party,2118 as well as 
performance from the third collective party as against these employers or 
employees entitled to such a performance. 
Finally, and this remark applies to both constructions of collective normative 
provisions, I would propose in line with what has been argued above that 
2116  It is likely that only incidentally the employee is obliged to perform as against 
the third collective party on the basis of collective normative provisions arising 
from the transnational collective labour agreement, as it seems more logical that 
especially the employer has to contribute to the third collective party. If, however, 
the employee needs to perform as against the third party, the representative of the 
third party established in the country in which the employer (or as the case may be: 
the branch office) is situated should be entitled to directly address the employee. In 
most situations this will be the same country as the employee’s home country, as 
most employees live and work in the same country. 
2117  In case the employee works for a branch office of the employer, this obviously 
concerns the country of residence of the branch office. 
2118  This is in line with the system as applicable in the Netherlands, Germany and 
Belgium. Reference is made to chapter 13, section 8.5.4.
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if  national law provides for other (national) enforcement methods following 
a breach of the collective normative provisions, these methods may also be 
applied mutatis mutandis to transnational collective labour agreements in 
force in that jurisdiction.
4. Term and termination
As previously stated,2119 the freedom of contract is an important principle with 
regard to the term and termination of (national) collective labour agreements. 
I see no reason why this should be different in relation to transnational 
collective labour agreements. This freedom of contract is also in line with 
the autonomy of the social partners, another principle that is respected at 
national level2120 and forms one of the fundaments of the proposed European 
system on transnational collective bargaining.2121 Taking both principles 
into account, I propose the following system with regard to the term and 
termination of transnational collective labour agreements.
4.1 The date of entering into force
The contracting parties should be free to establish the date on which their 
collective labour agreement enters into force.2122 This is fully in line with the 
freedom of contract and the social partners’ autonomy, but also with the laws 
of the Researched Countries. The contracting parties should also, along the 
same lines, be able to decide whether or not to attribute retro-effect to the 
legal norms of the transnational collective labour agreement. 
4.2 Term
In my view the signatory parties should also be free to establish the duration 
of the transnational collective labour agreement. This includes the choice for 
either an agreement for a definite or for an indefinite period of time. Only such 
a system fully respects the freedom of contract and autonomy of the social 
partners. This system is applied in most of the Researched Countries, which 
forms an indication of its appropriateness. In the Netherlands, however, a 
different system is applied. dutch social partners cannot conclude a collective 
labour agreement with a duration exceeding 5 years. Although this dutch 
2119  See chapter 13, section 8.7.
2120  See chapter 13, section 10.1.
2121  See chapter 14, section 6.
2122  Which date should clearly be indicated in the transnational collective labour 
agreement. Reference is made to chapter 14, section 7.4.
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system is difficult to match with the freedom of contract and the social 
partners’ autonomy, it should be established whether there were fundamental 
reasons giving rise for this system. If  these fundamental reasons are there, 
they may give reason to reconsider the proposed transnational system. 
The dutch legislator deemed collective labour agreements of indefinite 
duration undesirable, as (i) the social partners can only reasonably foresee 
the near future and (ii) collective labour agreements of indefinite duration 
should be dissolved by courts should the social partners not arrange 
alternative termination manners in the agreements themselves. dissolution 
of an agreement by the court would, according to the dutch legislator, again 
be undesirable, because (a) it would be difficult for the court to judge whether 
the collective labour agreement should be dissolved and (b) the contracting 
parties would have the opportunity to consistently try to dissolve the collective 
labour agreement, which would endanger the stability that the collective 
labour agreement intended to bring.2123
These arguments seem little convincing. If  the law would arrange that collective 
labour agreements entered into for an indefinite period of time could always be 
terminated by notice – the option chosen in the proposed transnational system 
– there is little incentive for the contracting parties to turn to a court in order 
to dissolve the collective labour agreement. There should therefore be little 
fear that courts would be overwhelmed with cases concerning the dissolution 
of transnational collective labour agreements. Moreover, the possible 
termination by notice of a collective labour agreement does not necessarily 
jeopardise the stability that the collective labour agreement intended to bring. 
The parties could, for example, agree on a relatively long notice period, which 
enables them to timely arrange relevant matters during the notice period, 
ideally leading to a relatively smooth termination. They could also decide to 
agree on a collective labour agreement for a definite period of time – which 
in the proposed system cannot be terminated by notice prematurely, unless 
stipulated otherwise by the contracting parties – in order to bring stability 
in the market for a fixed period of time. The contracting parties could even 
agree that such an agreement would be prolonged for an indefinite period of 
time upon termination of the fixed term collective labour agreement. Finally, 
the transnational collective labour agreement’s after-effects prevent that 
stability is jeopardised in an intolerable manner. To summarise: there are no 
convincing reasons for the European legislator to disallow social partners to 
conclude transnational collective labour agreement of indefinite duration. 
2123  See chapter 9, section 7.7.2.
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4.3 Termination
A transnational collective labour agreement entered into for an indefinite 
period of time can be terminated by notice by each party, observing the 
applicable notice period.2124 For clarity reasons, I would be inclined to 
demand that notice should be served in writing. Moreover, I would propose 
to arrange that, should only one of multiple contracting parties of one side 
of the industry terminate the collective labour agreement, the entire collective 
labour agreement should end. This prevents a disturbance in balance of power 
between all the parties involved. 
A transnational collective labour agreement concluded for a fixed period of 
time terminates by operation of law and cannot be terminated prematurely, 
unless specifically stipulated otherwise in the agreement. This is in line with 
the law in Germany and in Belgium. It is also in line with logics: a fixed term 
agreement ends after termination of the agreed period of time. It should 
not be permitted to terminate the fixed term collective labour agreement 
prematurely by notice, unless this is specifically permitted in the collective 
labour agreement. After all, once a binding agreement is made for a fixed 
term, the parties should stick to that term. This gives stability in the market.
The signatory parties can also arrange that the transnational collective labour 
agreement entered into for a fixed period of time is automatically tacitly 
renewed, if  they explicitly stipulate this in the agreement. In that situation the 
agreement does not lapse at the end of the term, unless terminated by one of 
the parties at such term’s end.2125
Besides termination by giving notice, the contracting parties to the transnational 
collective labour agreement should also be able to terminate that agreement by 
other means – for example by mutual consent or dissolution of the contract – 
if  and in as far as permitted by the law governing the transnational collective 
labour agreement as chosen by the social partners in accordance with section 
2.1 above. This is in line with the proposed system, in which national law 
plays (and has to play given the lack of a uniform European civil law) a 
complementary role. 
2124  The termination method and notice period should clearly be indicated in the 
transnational collective labour agreement. Reference is made to chapter 14, section 
7.4.
2125  The termination method should again be clearly indicated in the transnational 
collective labour agreement. Reference is made to chapter 14, section 7.4.
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5. After-effects
The general rule of contract law is that the effects of an agreement end 
upon termination of that agreement. When it concerns collective labour 
agreements, however, this rule is not always applied. It is useful to distinguish 
between obligatory provisions, individual normative provisions and collective 
normative provisions when it concerns after-effects.
5.1 Obligatory provisions
With regard to the obligatory provisions of the collective labour agreement 
the above-mentioned general rule applies to all Researched Countries; these 
provisions lose force upon expiry of the collective labour agreement. I see 
no reason to deviate from this rule with regard to a transnational collective 
labour agreement. 
5.2 Individual normative provisions
With regard to individual normative provisions the above rule is not followed 
in the Researched Countries. In all these countries the individual normative 
provisions retain their force upon termination of the collective labour 
agreement. These after-effects do not apply in case the transnational collective 
labour agreement specifically stipulates this.2126 
As already explained, there are practical, social and even legal arguments 
to assume after-effects of individual normative provisions.2127 These effects 
should therefore be accepted. The same applies to the limitation of the after-
effects on the basis of an agreement between the signatory parties. In line 
with the laws of the Researched Countries, the freedom of contract and the 
autonomy of the social partners, the after-effects should not apply in case the 
transnational collective labour agreement specifically stipulates this. In such 
a situation the amendment of the individual employment agreement is, given 
the content of the applicable transnational collective labour agreement, only 
temporarily. In other words, unless explicitly stipulated differently, individual 
normative provisions retain their force upon expiry of the transnational 
collective labour agreement. The employer and employee are, however, after 
the termination of the transnational collective labour agreement entitled to 
change the content of the individual employment contract should they wish so, 
in effect terminating the collective labour agreement’s after-effects. Obviously, 
2126  Reference is made to chapter 13, section 8.8.
2127  Reference is made to chapter 13, section 8.8.
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they should observe the rules applicable for such a change as in force in the 
different countries. Other parties may also terminate the after-effects of the 
transnational collective labour agreement, if  that change is allowed by the law 
that applies to the individual employment agreement.2128 These limitations on 
the after-effects are hardly troublesome, as they are arranged by national law. A 
more difficult question is whether a subsequent transnational collective labour 
agreement can also terminate the after-effects of the previous transnational 
collective labour agreement. As already explained in chapter 13, section 8.8 
this is a particular touchy subject when it concerns a collective bargaining 
system that is based on the principle of favour, as in the underlying European 
system.
5.2.1 Option 1: full and unconditional after-effects
If  it were assumed that the transnational collective labour agreement fully and 
unconditionally (for indefinite duration) adapts the individual employment 
agreement that falls within the scope of application of that collective labour 
agreement, the current system would either become very static or difficult to 
execute.2129 After all, a minimum transnational collective labour agreement 
may not deteriorate existing employment conditions.2130 If  all “extras” the 
minimum transnational collective labour agreement offers unconditionally 
become part of the individual employment conditions upon expiry of said 
transnational agreement, these extras may not be revoked by a subsequent 
minimum transnational collective labour agreement. That would on the one 
hand lead to a strict protection of the interests of the employees involved. On 
the other hand this option would lead to a very static situation, only allowing 
continuous upwards movement of employment conditions, without being 
able to discontinue (to the detriment of the employees) so much as an element 
favourable to an employee introduced by a previous transnational collective 
labour agreement. That element could pursuant to this option only be removed 
or adjusted to the detriment of the employee by a transnational collective 
labour agreement containing provisions of a standard or maximum nature, 
invoking the corresponding consequences with regard to representativity. 
Choosing this option would, in brief, lead to static industrial relations only 
capable of easily improving employment conditions, but not of adapting even 
2128  These parties could for example be national trade unions in cooperation with the 
employer or relevant employers’ organisation, or an employee representative bode 
in cooperation with the employer. 
2129  In this situation there would be no real reason to speak about “after-effects”, as it 
concerns the full and unconditional change of employment conditions. Reference is 
made to chapter 13, section 8.8. 
2130  Reference is made to chapter 15, section 5.1.1.
APPLICABLE LAW, ENfORCEMENT, TERM, TERMINATION, AfTER-EffECTS AND OTHER TECHNICALITIES
759
a minor element of a previous transnational collective labour agreement to 
the detriment of the employee. 
5.2.2 Option 2: after-effects up to the introduction of 
a new collective labour agreement
Another option would be to restrict the after-effects in time. These after-effects 
could for instance, similar to German law,2131 have force up to the moment a 
new transnational collective labour agreement applies. In such a situation, 
the transnational collective labour agreement (directly and with mandatory 
effect) alters the individual employment conditions, alterations which do not 
become undone upon expiry of the transnational collective labour agreement, 
but do end once a new transnational collective labour agreement applies. 
This second option would grant the parties to a minimum transnational 
collective labour agreement much more room to manoeuvre when concluding 
a subsequent minimum agreement and therefore leads to vivid industrial 
relations. however, this option also has undesirable side-effects which will be 
explained in the following example. An employee earns a contractual salary 
of EUR 1,000 per month at the end of the year 1999. As per 1 january 2000 
a minimum transnational collective labour agreement enters into force which 
arranges a minimum salary of EUR 1,200 per month. At the end of 2004 
the employee’s salary has due to said collective labour agreement increased 
to EUR 1,500 per month, but at that time the collective labour agreement 
terminates. Given the after-effects the salary remains at the level of EUR 
1,500 per month during the year 2005. On 1 january 2006 a subsequent 
minimum transnational collective labour agreement enters into force setting 
the minimum wage at EUR 1,100 per month. If  the coming about of a new 
transnational collective labour agreement would fully terminate the after-
effects of the previous transnational collective labour agreement, the employer 
may technically apply this salary of EUR 1,100 per month to the employee, 
as it would not violate the agreement’s minimum character. The contractual 
salary was fixed at a level of EUR 1,000 per month, while the entitlement 
to the salary fixed by the previous transnational collective labour agreement 
lapsed upon the coming about of the new transnational collective labour 
agreement. Choosing this second option could in brief  lead to unacceptable 
social situations. This is even more so since the employer can conclude a 
minimum transnational collective labour agreement terminating the after-
effects of the previous transnational collective labour agreement with any 
2131  Reference is made to chapter 10, section 7.8
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employees’ organisation that meets the minimum requirements as set out in 
the previous chapter. 
This second option could also create problems with regard to collective 
labour agreements containing standard or maximum provisions. I will again 
clarify this with an example. An employee earns a contractual salary of 
EUR 2,500 per month at the end of the year 1999. As per 1 january 2000 
a transnational collective labour agreement enters into force which arranges 
a maximum salary of EUR 2,000 per month as a response to a financial 
crisis. At the end of 2004 the salary of the employee has remained at the 
same level of EUR 2,000 per month, at which time the collective labour 
agreement terminates. Given the after-effects the salary remains at the level 
of EUR 2,000 per month during the year 2005. In this period the position 
of the employer slightly improves. As a consequence, the employer is able 
to conclude a new transnational collective labour agreement that enters into 
force on 1 january 2006 setting the minimum wage at EUR 2,250 per month. 
If  the coming about of a new transnational collective labour agreement would 
fully terminate the after-effects of the previous transnational collective labour 
agreement, the employer may not apply this salary of EUR 2,250 per month 
to the employee, as it would violate the agreement’s minimum character. 
After all, the contractual salary was fixed at a level of EUR 2,500 per month 
prior to the entering into force of the previous transnational collective labour 
agreement. Consequently, even though the salary was in fact increased by 
the new transnational collective labour agreement, such a new salary would 
only be legally enforceable if  the new agreement is a transnational collective 
labour agreement containing standard or maximum provisions. That is an 
odd consequence, as the change in employment conditions is in favour of the 
employee.
5.2.3 Towards a third way
Given the undesirable consequences of the options stated above a different 
solution should be sought. The following considerations are in my view of 
importance in that respect. 
It is reminded that after-effects have important advantages. The main rule 
should therefore be that all individual normative provisions have after-
effects, unless these effects are undesirable. As set out in section 5.2.1 above, 
the after-effects are undesirable if  they lead to static situations hindering 
transnational collective bargaining. Such a static situation only occurs in case 
the new collective labour agreement (i) must have a minimum character and 
(ii) deteriorates the employment conditions that apply on the basis of the 
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after-effects. After all, if  the new transnational collective labour agreement 
is an agreement containing maximum or standard provisions that meets 
the corresponding requirements for such types of provisions, there is no 
difficulty to start with, as these type of provisions may validly change the 
employee’s employment conditions to his detriment, regardless whether these 
conditions derive from a previous transnational collective labour agreement. 
Furthermore, in case the new minimum transnational collective labour 
agreement solely introduces terms that are advantageous to the employees, 
the after-effects of the previous transnational collective labour agreement 
do not hinder the conclusion of this new collective labour agreement. To 
summarise, after-effects of individual normative provisions should be limited 
in case the new collective labour agreement has a minimum character and 
deteriorates the employment conditions that apply on the basis of the after-
effects. These limitations should be justified. In that respect there are in my 
view three important observations.
First it should be noted that after-effects of individual normative provisions 
are only of relevance if  the expired transnational collective labour agreement 
awarded additional rights to an employee involved. If  it did not, the individual 
normative provisions could not have changed the already existing employment 
conditions, as a consequence whereof there are no after-effects at all. In other 
words: in such a case the individual normative provisions do not retain their 
force, but the already existing more favourable employment conditions do. 
This is an important observation, because it means that after-effects are only 
relevant when (i) the employees’ organisation was able to achieve a positive 
result for the employee involved and (ii) that employee already enjoyed a 
benefit from the previous collective labour agreement. In my view it is to a 
certain extent acceptable that a third party that apparently was strong enough 
to award additional rights to an employee from which this employee has 
benefited may also be allowed to discontinue these additional rights if  there 
are valid reasons for such discontinuation. 
Second, an assertion deriving from the previous chapter is of relevance here 
as well: once an employee knows that (part of) his employment conditions 
are arranged by a particular transnational collective labour agreement, he 
has the opportunity to become a member of the contracting trade union. 
If  that employee becomes a member, he is in the position to influence the 
content of the renewed collective labour agreement. Should he choose not to 
become a member, he accepted that he could be confronted with employment 
conditions that were drafted without his involvement. This situation is different 
should a renewed transnational collective labour agreement be concluded 
with other than the original trade unions. This observation, just as in the 
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previous observation, suggests that it is to a certain extent legitimised that 
the employees’ organisations may discontinue additional rights previously 
granted in a transnational collective labour agreement, provided of course 
that it are the same parties that concluded the previous agreement. 
Last it should be noted that not every change to the detriment of the employee 
is unacceptable. If  (a) for good reasons (b) only “marginal” rights of the 
employee are discontinued to his detriment, this can be acceptable under 
the conditions stated in the paragraphs above. These two circumstances are 
communicating vessels: a change hardly affecting the employees requires only 
little justification, while a change that has a more important impact on the 
employees, needs strong justification. Important grounds for justification 
could for example be that specific employment conditions were traded in for 
other (more important) employment conditions, or that a specific employment 
condition cannot (reasonably) be offered anymore due to a change in 
legislation. It is ultimately up to a court to decide whether a discontinuation 
of an entitlement attributed in a previous transnational collective labour 
agreement as referred to above is deemed justified. however, any change 
to the detriment of the employee with regard to base salary2132 – being the 
core element of the employee’s remuneration – could in my view never be 
sufficiently justified by the signatory parties. Should a change in base salary 
be necessary, a collective labour agreement containing standard or maximum 
provisions should be concluded.
These three observations bring me to the following proposed system when it 
concerns the discontinuation of after-effects of individual normative provision 
due to the applicability of a new (minimum) transnational collective labour 
agreement: after-effects of a previous transnational collective labour agreement 
may only be terminated by a subsequent minimum transnational collective 
labour agreement that (i) is concluded with all employees’ organisations that 
also concluded the previous transnational collective labour agreement, (ii) 
explicitly states valid reasons justifying the discontinuation of the effects 
of specific individual normative provisions, while (iii) this discontinuation 
may not relate to base salary. Upon termination of the after-effects, the 
employment conditions that were introduced to the employees on the basis 
of the previous collective labour agreement automatically lapse, and cannot, 
therefore, be considered a right of the employee anymore.2133
2132  Such as periodical salary, thirteenth month and holiday allowance.
2133  For this reason this construction is technically not an exception to the principle 
of favour. Once the after-effects of individual normative provisions lapse, these 
provisions automatically become undone, and are not employment conditions 
anymore. 
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5.2.4 Conclusion
Given the above, individual normative provisions of a transnational 
collective labour agreement have after-effects, unless specifically stipulated 
otherwise in the agreement. These after-effects self-evidently terminate once 
the employment conditions acquired by the employee due to these after-
effects are adapted, in accordance with the law that applies to the individual 
employment agreement, but also once a subsequent minimum transnational 
collective labour agreement applies that (i) is concluded with all employees’ 
organisations that also concluded the previous transnational collective labour 
agreement, (ii) explicitly states valid reasons justifying the discontinuation 
of the after-effects of specific individual normative provisions, while (iii) this 
discontinuation may not relate to base salary. 
5.3 Collective normative provisions
Collective normative provisions have after-effects in Germany, but not the 
Netherlands or Great Britain. Collective normative provisions that also apply 
individually do have after-effects in Belgium. Again, the signatory parties are 
entitled to stipulate in the collective labour agreement that the terms do not 
have after-effects.2134
In my view, there are sound reasons to also attribute after-effects to collective 
normative norms of transnational collective labour agreements. Many 
of the arguments that gave rise to attributing after-effects to individual 
normative provisions also apply to collective normative provisions. In other 
words, collective normative provisions retain their force upon expiry of the 
transnational collective labour agreement, unless stipulated otherwise in the 
collective labour agreement. These after-effects can obviously be terminated 
in accordance with the law that applies to these provisions. In line with what 
has been argued above, the after-effects can also be discontinued once a 
subsequent minimum transnational collective labour agreement applies that 
(i) is concluded with all employees’ organisations that also concluded the 
previous transnational collective labour agreement and (ii) explicitly states 
valid reasons justifying the discontinuation of the after-effects. In my view, 
these reasons should relatively easily be considered sufficient, as collective 
normative provisions have, as a rule, less of an impact on the individual 
employees.
2134  Reference is made to chapter 13, section 8.8.
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6. Mandatory alternative dispute resolution?
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms play a part in collective labour 
law in all Researched Countries, but also in many other Member States.2135 In 
some Member States alternative dispute resolution is even compulsory. Given 
the importance that the proposed system attaches to the social partners’ 
autonomy, and therefore to their freedom of choice, it should be up to the 
social partners to decide whether or not to enter into alternative dispute 
resolution.2136 In other words: a voluntary system rather than a mandatory 
system of alternative dispute resolution is pursued. This voluntary character 
notwithstanding, easily accessible alternative dispute resolution should be 
made possible. I would suggest that, as per Member State, a specific body 
is appointed the task of rendering alternative dispute resolution services, 
including services in the field of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. It 
would be at the discretion of the contracting parties of the transnational 
collective labour agreement whether or not to use the services of these bodies, 
and to choose between the different types of alternative dispute resolution. 
7. The reach of the social partners in 
transnational collective bargaining
As mentioned before, the law on collective labour agreements in most 
Member States respects, to quite an extent, the collective autonomy of the 
social partners. This means that, in principle, it is at the social partners’ 
discretion what they wish to arrange in the collective labour agreement. This 
is not different at transnational level, as also in that system the autonomy of 
the social partners is pursued. Of course, the social partners involved in the 
conclusion of transnational collective labour agreements must operate within 
the limits of what constitutes a transnational collective labour agreement, as 
defined in chapter 14. This collective autonomy notwithstanding, the parties 
drafting the collective labour agreement must obviously also abide by the 
hierarchy of legal norms. This is the case in Member States, and should not 
be different with regard to transnational collective labour agreements. 
2135  See chapter 13, section 8.9.
2136  This is in line with the suggestions forwarded in the Report. Reference is made to: 
E. Ales, S. Engblom, T. jaspers, S. Laulom, S. Sciarra, A. Sobczak, F. Valdés dal-
Ré, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, page 40. This is 
also in line of the predominant favour of autonomous and voluntarist alternative 
dispute resolution procedures in the Member States. See F. Valdés dal-Ré, 
Synthesis Report on conciliation, mediation and arbitration in the European Union 
Countries, page 17.
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It is self-evident that transnational collective labour agreements may not 
contravene European and other applicable mandatory international law. 
These agreements should furthermore respect the national law of the Member 
State in which they apply, including that country’s constitution. This can in 
certain jurisdictions mean that specific provisions of a transnational collective 
labour agreement may not be enforced should they contravene reasonableness 
and fairness.2137 This may especially be the case with regard to transnational 
collective labour agreements that are not minimum in nature. Member States 
should, however, reticently apply these national stipulations with regard to 
the reasonableness and fairness, provisions which can in effect undermine 
the proper execution of the European system on transnational collective 
bargaining.
The above obviously concerns mandatory law; it is logical that variations of 
directory law in transnational collective labour agreements are permitted. As 
already explained in chapter 15, transnational collective labour agreements 
may vary from national ¾ mandatory law, provided that they satisfy the 
requirements in place of the countries in which they apply.2138 
Another matter is the relation of the transnational collective labour agreement 
with national collective labour agreements. In my view transnational collective 
labour agreements should be ranked higher in hierarchy than national collective 
labour agreements. This is in line with the general rule that international 
(European) law supersedes national law.2139 Besides, there are good arguments 
for such a ranking. An important goal of the transnational collective labour 
agreements is to create as much uniformity in the Member States as possible 
with regard to the consequences of the transnational collective labour 
agreement. It would be at odds with this goal to allow national collective labour 
agreements to deviate from the transnational collective labour agreement. 
This is not to say that national collective labour agreements cannot vary from 
transnational collective labour agreements. When it concerns a minimum 
transnational collective labour agreement, that agreement allows variation at 
national level in favour of the employee. National collective labour agreements 
that contain more favourable clauses than the transnational collective labour 
agreement in such a case still may apply as that national agreement does in 
such a case not deviate from the transnational agreement. When it concerns 
2137  This is, for instance, the case in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
2138  See chapter 15, section 5.1.4.
2139  Also Schiek argues that European collective labour agreements should be ranked 
higher than national collective labour agreements. See d. Schiek, Autonomous 
Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Device in European Labour Law: How to read 
Article 139 EC, pages 55 and 56.
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transnational collective labour agreements also containing maximum and/or 
standard provisions, national collective labour agreements cannot introduce 
more favourable provisions (unless permitted through an opening clause in the 
transnational collective labour agreement), but such transnational collective 
labour agreements are required to satisfy strict demands, as set out in section 
5.2.2 in chapter 15 hereof. The fact that such transnational collective labour 
agreements outrank national collective labour agreements is therefore in my 
view sufficiently legitimised.
8. Summary
Transnational collective labour agreements can, contrary to national 
collective labour agreements, not be embedded in a uniform system of law as a 
European civil code is lacking. This means that private international law must 
play a role, establishing the law applicable to the different terms (obligatory, 
individual normative and collective normative) of the transnational collective 
labour agreement. This applicable law is important for the enforcement of the 
transnational collective labour agreement. This transnational agreement is 
enforced as if  it were a national collective labour agreement. Should, however, 
a national system have insufficient means for the proper enforcement of 
the terms of the transnational collective labour agreement, or should these 
national means be insufficiently clear and legally certain, the Member State 
concerned is obliged to introduce minimum means for effective enforcement. 
The contracting parties are obliged to make an explicit choice on the law 
applicable to the obligatory provisions of the transnational collective labour 
agreement. The chosen law must be of one of the Member States in which the 
transnational collective labour agreement applies. In the proposed European 
system on transnational collective bargaining, the party that is in breach 
of an obligatory provision of the transnational collective labour agreement 
is in principle liable for the losses resulting from such a breach towards 
its counterparty or counterparties. A potential claim on breach of such 
obligatory provisions needs to be assessed applying the chosen national law, 
which has to fill in procedural and material lacunas of the European system. 
The applicable national law should, in brief, provide the tools for enforcement 
of the obligatory provisions of the transnational collective labour agreement. 
Should, in a Member State in which jurisdiction the transnational collective 
labour agreement applies, other techniques be in place to enforce obligatory 
provisions of a national collective labour agreement, these techniques should 
equally be applied to the transnational collective labour agreement.
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The individual normative provisions of the transnational collective labour 
agreement in the current proposal become part of the individual employment 
agreement as they have direct normative effect. As a consequence, these 
provisions (as automatically incorporated in the individual employment 
agreement) need to be assessed on the basis of the law that applies to that 
employment agreement. This means that the individual employer and 
employee should turn to the same enforcement tools as would apply were these 
normative provisions incorporated in the individual employment agreement 
on the basis of an applicable national collective labour agreement: all 
national remedies following a breach of employment contract at the disposal 
of the employer and employee apply. It also implies that all other parties that 
have, on the basis of national law, a right to enforce normative provisions of 
applicable national collective labour agreements should also have the same 
rights to enforce individual normative provisions of applicable transnational 
collective labour agreements. 
There are two important constructions when it concerns collective normative 
provisions. First, collective normative provisions may provide for rights and 
obligations that arrange the relation between the employer and (i) its employee 
representative body or (ii) its “entire personnel”. National legislation may 
oblige the employer to establish an employee representative body. That 
national law subsequently applies to the relation between the employer and 
the employee representative body. If  the same employer is active in several 
countries, and it is obliged to establish employee representative bodies in more 
than one country because of its branch offices in the several countries, the law 
applicable to the collective normative provisions will vary per branch office. The 
law that applies between the employer and its entire personnel runs parallel, 
as it is the law of the country in which the employer is resident and active (the 
“country of residence”). If  the employer is active in several countries and 
has branch offices situated in these countries, the law of the country in which 
the branch office is situated should apply to the relation between that branch 
office and the employees working for that branch office. The party that is to 
enforce these collective normative provisions is the employee representative 
body. That body is either the body to which these rights are directed, or the 
proper institution to defend the collective interests of the employees working 
in the company (or as the case may be: branch office) for which the body is 
established. The employee representative body should be entitled to enforce 
the collective normative provisions with all means that are available to it, 
on the basis of the applicable national law, as if  these provisions were the 
collective normative provisions of a national collective labour agreement. 
In the event that the employee representative body is not established, the 
individual employees themselves should be entitled to call on these collective 
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normative provisions; if  they are ultimately addressed by these provisions. 
These employees should also be entitled to enforce these provisions with 
all the means attributed to them on the basis of national law. Furthermore, 
the contracting trade unions should be empowered to enforce the collective 
normative provisions as against the individual employer (or as the case may 
be: branch office). Should the aforementioned three enforcement techniques 
not be available, or be insufficiently clear and legally certain, the Member 
States concerned should again be obliged on the basis of the proposed system 
to introduce minimum rights for such an enforcement of collective normative 
provisions. Finally, if  national law provides for other (national) enforcement 
methods following a breach of the collective normative provisions, these 
methods may also be applied mutatis mutandis to transnational collective 
labour agreements in force in that jurisdiction.
Second, the transnational collective labour agreement may provide for rights 
and obligations that arrange the relation between the employer and the 
employees vis-à-vis third parties. With regard to applicable law, the same line 
of arguing as above is applied. Should (i) the employer be active in one country, 
the law of that country applies to the relation between the third collective entity 
on the one hand and the employer and its employees on the other. Should (ii) 
the employer be active in several countries and should it have branch offices 
situated in these countries, the law of the country in which the branch office 
is situated should apply to the relation between the third collective entity on 
the one hand and the branch office and the employees working in that branch 
office on the other. Should (iii) the employer be situated in one country, while 
it employs employees in different countries, without having branch offices in 
these different countries, the relation between the third collective entity on the 
one hand and the employer and its employees on the other should be governed 
by the law of the country in which the employer is factually situated and 
primarily active (the country of residence). The enforcement of these types 
of collective normative provisions is rather complicated. For that reason, 
each third collective entity is obliged to establish a national representative in 
each Member State in which the transnational collective labour agreement 
concerned applies. These national representatives are entitled to directly 
demand performance on the basis of the collective normative provisions of the 
transnational collective labour agreement from the employer or the employee 
in the country of residence of the employer. Likewise, the employee or the 
employer is entitled to demand performance from the third collective party 
through this party’s national representative in the country of residence of 
the employer by whom he is employed. Furthermore, the signatory parties to 
the transnational collective labour agreement are entitled to demand specific 
performance of these collective normative provisions from the parties bound 
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by the collective normative provisions of the transnational collective labour 
agreement (the employers and employees) against the third collective party, 
as well as performance from the third collective party against these employers 
or employees entitled to such a performance. Finally, if  national law provides 
for other (national) enforcement methods following a breach of the collective 
normative provisions, these methods may also be applied mutatis mutandis to 
transnational collective labour agreements in force in that jurisdiction.
When determining term and termination of the transnational collective labour 
agreement, the freedom of contract and the autonomy of the social partners 
are the leading principles. Consequently, the contracting parties are free to 
establish the date on which their collective labour agreement enters into force 
and to attribute retro-effect to the transnational collective labour agreement. 
The signatory parties are furthermore entitled to establish the duration of the 
transnational collective labour agreement. This includes the choice for either 
an agreement for a definite or an indefinite period of time. A transnational 
collective labour agreement entered into for an indefinite period of time 
can be terminated by notice by each party, observing the applicable notice 
period. For clarity, notice should be served in writing. A transnational 
collective labour agreement concluded for a fixed period of time terminates 
by operation of law and cannot be terminated prematurely, unless specifically 
stipulated otherwise in the agreement. The signatory parties can also arrange 
that the transnational collective labour agreement entered into for a fixed 
period of time is automatically tacitly renewed, if  they explicitly stipulate 
this in the agreement. In that situation the agreement does not lapse at the 
end of the term, unless terminated by one of the parties at such term’s end. 
Besides termination by giving notice, the contracting parties are also able to 
terminate the agreement by other means if  and in as far as permitted by the 
law governing the transnational collective labour agreement. 
The obligatory provisions of the transnational collective labour agreement lose 
force upon expiry of that agreement. This is different with regard to individual 
normative provisions. These provisions have after-effects, unless specifically 
stipulated otherwise in the agreement. These after-effects obviously terminate 
once the employment conditions acquired by the employee due to these after-
effects are adapted in accordance with the law that applies to the individual 
employment agreement, but also once a subsequent minimum transnational 
collective labour agreement applies that (i) is concluded with all employees’ 
organisations that also concluded the previous transnational collective labour 
agreement, (ii) explicitly states valid reasons justifying the discontinuation 
of the after-effects of specific individual normative provisions, while (iii) this 
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discontinuation may not relate to base salary. A similar system is suggested 
for collective normative provisions.
The social partners are free to decide whether or not to enter into alternative 
dispute resolution in case of a dispute. Easily accessible alternative dispute 
resolution should be made possible. Every Member State should appoint a 
specific body to this task. 
The social partners’ are free to decide what they wish to arrange in the 
transnational collective labour agreement, provided that they operate within 
the limits of what constitutes a transnational collective labour agreement. 
Obviously, they must also abide by the hierarchy of legal norms. Transnational 
collective labour agreements may not contravene European and other 
applicable international law. They should furthermore respect the national 
law of the Member State in which they apply. They may vary from national 
¾ mandatory law, provided that they satisfy the requirements in place of the 
countries in which they apply. 
Transnational collective labour agreements are ranked higher in hierarchy 
than national collective labour agreements. This is in line with the general 
rule that international (European) law supersedes national law and with a 
goal of transnational collective labour agreements (the creation of a level 
of uniformity in the Member States). National collective labour agreements 
can, however, vary from transnational collective labour agreements. When it 
concerns a minimum transnational collective labour agreement, that agreement 
allows variation at national level in favour of the employee. When it concerns 
transnational collective labour agreements also containing maximum and/or 
standard provisions, national collective labour agreements cannot introduce 
more favourable provisions (unless permitted through an opening clause in 
the transnational collective labour agreement).
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ChAPTER 17
SUMMARY ANd FINAL REMARKS 
1. Introduction
The previous three chapters presented a general outline on what European 
legislation on transnational collective bargaining might look like. This chapter 
concludes this thesis. As is good practice when it concerns final chapters, it 
will summarise the thoughts and the rationale behind these thoughts, as set 
out in this thesis. First, the answer on the preliminary question whether there 
is a need or demand for transnational collective labour agreements in Europe 
is explained (section 2). Subsequently, the answer on the second preliminary 
question – is there a need for a new legal framework on transnational collective 
labour agreement – will be set out (section 3). The general steps leading to a 
new European system on transnational collective bargaining, based on the 
European traditions will be discussed in section 4, followed by a summary of 
the actual proposal in section 5. This chapter will end with a number of final 
remarks in section 6.
2. Is there a need or demand for transnational 
collective labour agreements in Europe? 
2.1 Changing challenges for and role of the (European) 
social partners leading to, among other things, 
autonomous transnational collective bargaining2140
The (European) social partners used to play a very modest role at European 
level. Only since the mid nineteen eighties has their role gradually enhanced. 
Since about the year 2000, however, both the challenges for and the role of the 
social partners within the EU have changed significantly:
•	 In	2000	the	Lisbon Strategy was introduced, aiming to bring about eco-
nomic, social and environmental renewal in the EU, resulting in making 
2140  Chapters 3 and 4.
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the EU the world’s most dynamic and competitive economy. The social 
partners are to play an important role in this strategy.
•	 In	2001	 the	Commission noted in its White Paper “European Gover-
nance” that on the one hand Europeans feel alienated from the Union’s 
work, while on the other hand they still expect European-wide action 
in many domains. The Commission decided to reform European gover-
nance. One of the methods to achieve this is to better use different policy 
tools, including the European social dialogue.
•	 Since	the	beginning	of	2000,	the	EU	was	on	the	brink	of	enlargement.	
The social partners were to play an important role in this process. They 
needed to “smooth out” the enlargement, mainly by assisting the so-
cial partners in the then (in 2000) candidate countries. That role would 
remain relevant even after the accession of said countries.
•	 The	social	partners	are	faced	with	the	“new”	challenges	of	globalisation,	
economic and monetary union, technological change and the transition 
to a knowledge based economy, changing employment and labour mar-
kets, demographic change and new balances between family, work and 
education. 
As a consequence of these changes, the cross-industry social partners have, 
following their december 2001 Laeken declaration, decided to reposition. 
They deemed it necessary, among other things, to develop a more autonomous 
social dialogue. To that effect, they concluded two successive work 
programmes, jointly covering the period 2003 – 2008, setting out their course 
of action independently from Community institutions. They also chose, in 
deviation from the past, to implement European collective agreements reached 
within the European social dialogue autonomously, therefore not involving 
the Community institutions in this process. In 2007, ETUC adopted an 
“offensive” strategy and action plan, to strengthen European trade unionism, 
i.a. by strengthening itself  and its members. ETUC seems keen on gaining a 
more prominent role in Europe.
This repositioning is well received by Community institutions and bodies. 
Both the Commission and the high Level Group Industrial Relations and 
Change of the European Union wish to further strengthen the position of 
the European social partners. The Commission, in particular, has been very 
active to support the European social partners. It wholeheartedly involves 
the European social partners on the main Community initiatives having 
social repercussions and generously interprets article 138.2 of the EC Treaty. 
It furthermore established Sectoral Social dialogue Committees (SSd 
Committees) in 1998, in order to enhance the sectoral social dialogue.
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Recently, plans have been made to further enhance the position of the European 
social partners. The European Constitution had a specific role in mind for 
the social partners within the EU in terms of participatory democracy. As 
is known, the European Constitution is not ratified. That, however, does not 
affect the fact that the Community institutions and the Member States wished 
to award an important role to the European social partners with regard to 
the democracy of the Union. But also the Treaty of Lisbon, that is to take 
the place of the European Constitution, emphasises the importance of the 
European social partners. Article 11 of the amended Treaty on European 
Union repeats the principle of participatory democracy. Although it is not 
certain that the Treaty of Lisbon will be ratified, the continuing importance 
of the European social partners is clearly recognised in this Treaty. 
2.2 Europeanisation of collective bargaining already exists2141
Europeanisation of collective bargaining and negotiations already is a fact. This 
Europeanisation can be witnessed at national level, but also at transnational 
level. At European company-level, quite a number of transnational collective 
labour agreements have been concluded. Partially this has been done with the 
European Works Council, but more importantly with European sectoral trade 
unions also, sometimes combined with national trade unions. The topics of 
corporate social responsibility and restructuring especially attract the interest 
of multinational companies. Furthermore, a relatively vivid European sectoral 
social dialogue exists. Since the establishment of the SSd Committees in 1998 
until the middle of 2002, the social partners involved concluded approximately 
230 commitments of different types and scale, such as opinions and common 
positions, declarations, guidelines and codes of conduct, charters, agreements 
etc. Finally, at European cross-industry level, between 1986 and August 2002 
the European social partners involved have issued joint statements or entered 
into framework agreements 40 times in the European social dialogue.
2.3 Transnational collective bargaining in Europe seems to 
have advantages, outweighing the disadvantages2142
Transnational collective bargaining offers certain advantages, which can be 
divided into institutional advantages and advantages for the parties and their 
members involved.
2141  Chapter 4.
2142  Chapter 7.
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On an institutional level, transnational collective bargaining has at least five 
advantages. Transnational collective bargaining, especially on a European-
wide level, may: (i) prove useful in case Community institutions are unable 
to make decisions; (ii) help to overcome regulatory shortcomings; (iii) help 
to overcome the democratic deficit; (iv) prove to be an important tool for 
proper European Governance; and (v) be a proper method for horizontal 
subsidiarity.
Apart from these institutional advantages, transnational collective bargaining 
may also benefit the social partners themselves, and ultimately the employers 
and employees. Transnational collective bargaining may i.a.:
•	 be	a	proper	response	to	the	Europeanisation and internationalisation of 
markets, simplifying cross-border labour and enabling the “European 
Social State” to better compete with the rest of the world;
•	 prevent	social	dumping	and	can	be	a	proper	tool	to	maintain	a	social	
Europe;
•	 prove	a	necessity	in	order	to	cope	with	the	consequences	of	the	EMU;
•	 form	a	good,	broad	basis	to	deal	witch	common	problems	at	the	appro-
priate level;
•	 have	specific	advantages	for	European	multinationals;
•	 enable	the	European	social	partners	to	take	matters	in	their	own	hands	
instead of leaving it up to the European legislator; and
•	 help	create	a	power	equilibrium	between	trade	unions	on	the	one	hand	
and employers and employers’ organisations on the other.
Naturally, there are also (potential and real) disadvantages attached to 
(European) transnational collective bargaining. These can be divided into 
three categories: (i) fundamental arguments against collective bargaining 
in general, (ii) fundamental arguments against (European) transnational 
collective bargaining and (iii) practical arguments against (European) 
transnational collective bargaining.
First, from an economical point of view, scholars have argued that trade unions 
and collective bargaining hinder economic development and lead to higher 
unemployment. These scholars favour a fully free market. They fundamentally 
object to any kind of collective bargaining. Since assessing these arguments 
in depth is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is simply assumed that, given 
the European-wide practice of collective bargaining, collective bargaining, 
in general, has advantages outweighing its disadvantages. Another potential 
fundamental objection against collective bargaining in general, which problem 
may even be clearer at transnational level than at national level, is the declining 
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representativity level of the social partners. If  (trade union) membership 
density continues to decline and drops under a critical level upon which the 
social partners cannot be considered representative anymore for the employers 
and the employees they are supposed to represent, or if  for any other reason 
the same happens, collective bargaining as we know it will fail, both at national 
and transnational level. It is therefore imperative, when drafting a system on 
collective bargaining, to ascertain that there is an important material link 
between the social partners and the employers and employees they represent 
(representativity demands). Second, some authors consider that European 
collective bargaining has inherent, fundamental disadvantages. They argue 
that European collective bargaining adversely affects competition in Europe, 
since it leads to common employment conditions throughout Europe, resulting 
in a weakened economy that creates fewer jobs. This argument is based on a 
false assumption, since the goal of European-level collective bargaining is 
not fully levelling out employment conditions throughout Europe. Instead, it 
recognises the differences in Europe and only interferes when needed. Last, 
there are many practical arguments raised against transnational (European) 
collective bargaining, such as:
•	 differences	in	the	organisation,	ideology	and	interest	of	Europe’s	natio-
nal trade unions;
•	 limits	of	international	solidarity	of	workers	if 	strikes	are	needed;
•	 trade	unions weaknesses to establish an autonomous transnational sys-
tem of industrial relations;
•	 a	lack	of	interest	of	employers	and	employers’	organisations;
•	 the	risks	and	costs	of	coming	to	European	collective	bargaining;	and
•	 differences	in	the	legal	systems	of	the	different	countries.
Although (some of) these practical disadvantages are real and not at all easily 
overcome, they do not fundamentally obstruct (European) transnational 
collective bargaining. All of these disadvantages are of a practical nature and 
are therefore potentially temporary. Especially when trade union membership 
remains on acceptable levels, the practical issues facing transnational 
collective bargaining can be tackled. Meaningful transnational collective 
bargaining may even give a boost to trade union membership, which could 
lead to stronger trade unions and more employees’ solidarity when needed. In 
consequence, transnational collective bargaining seems worthwhile, provided 
that representativity of the social partners remains within acceptable levels. 
This conclusion is, as set out above, supported by practice, as transnational 
collective bargaining already exists. The answer to the first preliminary 
question, whether there is a need or demand for transnational collective 
labour agreements, should therefore be answered with: yes.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 17
776
3. Is there a need for a new legal framework on 
transnational collective labour agreements?
Given the above conclusion, the second preliminary question becomes relevant: 
is a (new) system on transnational collective bargaining needed? A new system 
is obviously only needed if  the current possibilities are inadequate. There 
are two existing means of concluding (European) transnational collective 
agreements, being by bargaining within the institutionalised European social 
dialogue and “outside” the institutionalised European social dialogue. do 
these means for (European) transnational collective bargaining suffice?
3.1 Bargaining within the European social dialogue2143
3.1.1 An explanation of bargaining within the European social dialogue
Pursuant to article 138.2 of the EC Treaty, the Commission must consult 
the social partners before submitting proposals in the social policy field. The 
social partners that are consulted must meet three criteria. They must: (a) be 
cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised at 
European level, (b) consist of organisations which are themselves an integral 
and recognised part of Member State social partner structures and with the 
capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are representative of all Member 
States, as far as possible, and (c) have adequate structures to ensure their 
effective participation in the consultation process. Based on these criteria, 
the Commission has drafted a list of organisations that are to be consulted, 
which list is reviewed regularly. 
On the occasion of the consultation, the social partners are entitled to inform 
the Commission of their wish to enter into a collective agreement. The social 
partners that can participate in the negotiations have to be, according to the 
ruling of the Court of First Instance in the UEAPME case, (1) among those 
parties consulted by the Commission and (2) admitted to the negotiation 
table by the other social partners involved. Alternatively, the social partners 
may enter into negotiations without prior consultation being required. The 
same social partners, as defined by the Court of First Instance, are entitled to 
participate in the negotiations leading to agreements as referred to in article 
139 of the EC Treaty. If  the social partners have reached an agreement they 
can either request it to be implemented by a Council decision or implement 
2143  Chapters 5 and 6.
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it themselves in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to 
management and labour and to the Member States.
Should the social partners choose the first option, they must jointly request 
that the agreement be implemented by a Council decision on a proposal from 
the Commission (article 139.2 of the EC Treaty). In such case, the agreement 
must meet seven conditions:
•	 the	agreement	must	concern	matters	covered	by	article	137	of	 the	EC	
Treaty; 
•	 the	contracting	parties	must	have	a	sufficiently	representative	status;	
•	 the	contracting	parties	must	have	a	mandate	of	their members;
•	 the	content	of	the	agreement	may	not	contravene	Community	law	(lega-
lity);
•	 the	agreement	must	avoid	 imposing	administrative,	financial	and	 legal	
constraints that holds back the creation and development of small and 
medium-sized undertakings;
•	 the	agreement	must	pass	a	general	(political)	test	on	its	content;	and
•	 the	objectives	of	the	proposed	implementation	must	not	sufficiently	be	
achieved by the Member States and should therefore be achieved by the 
Community (principle of subsidiarity).
If  these conditions are met, the Commission will not alter the agreement 
upon its proposal for its implementation. The Commission does not allow 
the Council to amend the agreement either. The European Parliament does 
not play an official role in this procedure, but is informed on the proposed 
implementation of the agreement. The choice of legal instrument (directive, 
regulation or decision) for the implementation depends on the content of 
the agreement at hand, but to date all agreements have been implemented 
through a directive.
The social partners could also choose to implement the agreement in 
accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour and the Member States. The content of the European collective 
agreement is, in such a case, transposed, by means of national procedures, in 
each Member State. The formal rules of implementation at national level thus 
depend on the national law of each Member State. The European collective 
agreement has no direct normative effect. 
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3.1.2 A critical analysis of  bargaining within the European social dialogue
The setting of articles 136 – 139 of the EC Treaty seems to strongly deviate from 
the “usual” situation in the Member States concerning collective employment 
law. It is said that, in supranational context, legislation supporting collective 
bargaining has preceded the actual collective bargaining itself. This “reversal 
of action” seems to suggest that European collective bargaining is radically 
different to national collective bargaining. This difference could be explained 
when scrutinising the function of the European social dialogue which is, 
according to Lo Faro, not so much promoting the European social partners’ 
interests, but “no more than one of providing support for Community 
regulation and legitimacy”. The current institutionalised European Social 
dialogue must accordingly be seen as a regulatory technique. This might 
explain some flaws in the current European system. I have divided these flaws 
into three categories: flaws relating to the articles 136 – 139 in general, those 
relating to agreements implemented by national mechanisms and practices 
and those relating to agreements implemented by a Council decision.
The general remarks relate to (1) the absence of important constitutional rights 
(freedom of association, right to collective bargaining and the right to strike), 
(2) the participants of the European social dialogue (who are “management 
and labour”, are they representative and do they have full autonomy) and 
(3) the lack of direct normative effect of the European agreements reached, 
which leads to the lack of uniform applicability of the European collective 
labour agreements.
With regard to implementation of agreements by national mechanisms and 
practices, it must be concluded that this introduces nothing new. Moreover, 
it can be argued that this manner of implementation is “weak” and even 
“inconsequential” as it has little Community relevance. Partly as a consequence 
of this, there are a number of important flaws attached to this implementation 
method: (1) there is an unclear binding effect of the agreement reached, (2) 
there are insufficient rules with regard to the requirements the European 
social partners have to meet, (3) potential difficulties exist with regard to the 
implementation of the agreement and (4) difficulties are in place concerning 
the effects, follow-up and enforcement of the agreement.
Obviously, implementation of agreements by a Council decision is something 
that did not exist prior to its institutional introduction. Although this method 
of implementation has Community relevance, there are still disadvantages. 
Basically, these disadvantages can be divided into (1) limitations concerning 
the content of the agreement and (2) limitations imposed on the agreement 
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by the implementation procedure. The content of the agreement must be 
covered by article 137 of the EC Treaty and is subject to the exception of 
article 137.5 of the EC Treaty, which limits the European social partners’ 
autonomy. Furthermore, the criteria on representativity, small and medium-
sized undertakings, the political general approval and subsidiarity limit the 
social partners in their collective autonomy as well. 
The above explains that the institutionalised European social dialogue seems 
not the proper forum in which to develop transnational collective bargaining. 
It simply has too many flaws.
3.2 Bargaining “outside” the European social dialogue
The (European) social partners may opt to conclude collective agreements 
“outside” articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty in order to escape these 
articles’ flaws. This, however, is not helpful: the distinction between concluding 
agreements “within” or “outside” the scope of these articles seems artificial 
for organisations that qualify as “labour” and “management” as referred to in 
said articles. Collective agreements concluded by these organisations simply 
fall within the scope of these articles, which merely gives them additional 
rights which they are free to use or not.
If  organisations do not meet the above-mentioned qualification “labour” 
and “management”, they can still enter into collective agreements that are 
subsequently implemented by themselves or by their members in jurisdictions, 
in accordance with the rules of those jurisdictions. These organisations are, 
however, not entitled to the additional rights set out in articles 138 and 139 of 
the EC Treaty. The types of collective agreements referred to in this paragraph 
consequently have merely national effects as opposed to Community effects 
and should be regarded as “national” transnational collective labour 
agreements.2144 These national agreements are different when compared 
to transnational collective labour agreements that do have Community 
effects, the European transnational collective agreements, such as collective 
agreements reached within the European social dialogue and implemented by 
a Council decision.
National transnational collective labour agreements are agreements that 
satisfy the national requirements that collective labour agreements need to 
satisfy for that country concerned, having a scope of application covering 
several jurisdictions. This is, however, a practical definition of a national 
2144  See besides chapter 6, section 6, also chapter 1, section 2.1.
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transnational collective labour agreement, since from a purely legal stance 
there is no such thing (yet) as a “transnational collective labour agreement”. 
There are no specific rules on subjects like the procedure, the negotiating 
agents and the binding powers of a transnational collective labour agreement: 
a transnational collective labour agreement simply has no specific legal status, 
and certainly no Community status. Its actual (national) status and effects must, 
in consequence, be determined by national law on a case-by-case scenario, in 
accordance with the principles of private international law. This may bring 
about specific (and undesired) difficulties, that are comparable to the flaws 
European agreements implemented by national mechanisms and practices 
have. Transnational collective labour agreements concluded “outside” articles 
138-139 of the EC Treaty do therefore not form a proper foundation to base 
transnational collective labour agreements on.
3.3 Conclusion: the existing legal bases are inadequate 
for proper transnational collective bargaining
The above shows that there are insufficient legal means to base proper 
transnational collective bargaining on. This analysis is shared by the 
possible participants of transnational collective bargaining (European and 
national trade unions, European and national employers’ organisations and 
multinational companies). Among these possible participants there is a shared 
opinion that, should transnational collective bargaining be promoted, proper 
rules on transnational collective bargaining will have to be introduced.2145 
Said analysis is also shared by the Commission and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, as the Commission proposes to introduce European 
legislation on transnational collective bargaining, a proposal which is 
supported by the European Economic and Social Committee. 
4. Towards a European system on 
transnational collective bargaining
4.1 How should a European system on transnational 
collective bargaining be shaped?2146
An expert group led by Ales was invited by the Commission to make suggestions 
for a new system on transnational collective bargaining. This group drafted 
the report “Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future”. 
It proposed to create joint negotiating bodies within which transnational 
2145  Chapter 7, section 5.
2146  Chapter 7.
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collective labour agreements can be concluded. The agreements themselves 
would not have a legally binding effect, but acquire such effect through 
implementation by managerial decision adopted by all national companies 
in the relevant sector (or the national company involved in company-level 
collective bargaining). The system should be set out in a directive providing 
for an optional framework for transnational collective bargaining.
I have doubts about this proposal. It “copies” many of the flaws of 
institutionalised collective bargaining into the new system of bargaining in 
joint negotiating bodies. The joint negotiating bodies are comprised of the 
same European social partners that are active in the European social dialogue. 
All the comments forwarded on the position of “management and labour” 
in collective bargaining within the European social dialogue therefore apply 
mutatis mutandis to the proposed transnational collective bargaining system. 
Moreover, the facts that (i) the collective agreement concluded within the 
joint negotiating bodies has to be implemented by managerial decision and 
(ii) lacks uniform effect as it is binding “according to the national laws or 
practices”, which differ from country to country, are peculiar and at odds with 
one of the principles that the authors of the Report hold dear: a direct and 
homogeneous impact of agreements. The reason that these flaws are copied 
in is, in my view, because the authors of the report wished to stick as close 
to the European social dialogue as possible. I consider this a mistake. A new 
system of transnational collective bargaining should not be based on a new 
form of the European social dialogue but should instead be more comparable 
to “classical” collective bargaining as is in place in the Member States. 
In order to be able to develop a European system that is based on collective 
bargaining, as is in place in the Member States, national laws should be 
analysed. In general terms, it is useful to compare national laws when drafting 
new legislation.2147 Comparative law can be used as an aid to the legislator 
and as a means to unify law. It should not only be used by national legislators, 
but also by the European legislator. Comparing different national law models 
could lead to the conclusion that one of those models, that which fits best the 
aim of the European Community, should be used as a basis for European 
legislation. Such a comparison could also lead to a new model, based on 
processes that exist in most of the countries, or a model that applies best to all 
countries. This European model may well be an identification of a “common 
law” within the different countries involved, which is a more or less virtual law 
that thus does not actually exist in any one of those countries. Obviously, this 
European model should take into account Europe’s own rules and dynamics. 
2147  Chapter 1, section 3.
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When taking this into consideration, it is peculiar that the expert group 
referred to above did not compare national laws when proposing the optional 
framework for transnational collective bargaining. 
In most Member States, three classical rights are of crucial importance in 
their respective laws on concluding collective agreements: (1) the freedom of 
association, (2) the right to collective bargaining and (3) the right to strike. For 
this reason, it would appear logical that transnational collective bargaining 
could not exist without these rights. In any event, many scholars argue that 
transnational collective bargaining must be based on these three rights. 
however, neither collective bargaining within the European social dialogue, 
nor transnational collective bargaining in the proposed new system touch on 
these classical rights. Both systems are therefore not comparable to national 
collective bargaining. This is a weakness: a European system on transnational 
collective labour agreements should be closer akin to the traditions of the 
Member States than it is to day, and than proposed by the expert group. 
That is the only way to tackle the problems surrounding collective bargaining 
within the European social dialogue, flaws which are also “copied in” to the 
proposals of the expert group.
4.2 Collective labour law in the Researched 
Countries and other Member States
The analyses above gives rise to conduct research on the national laws on 
collective bargaining in the Member States. I especially scrutinised the laws of 
the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Great Britain.2148 The results of that 
research were subsequently placed in a wider, European perspective.2149 
4.2.1 Collective labour law in the Member States
Today, there is no single or even dominant model of European industrial 
relations, which largely applies to the individual Member States. Each Member 
State has a more or less unique system on collective bargaining, varying 
widely in terms of level, coverage, content and nature. Notwithstanding these 
differences, almost all Member States have a rather detailed legal framework 
on collective bargaining that contains basic provisions on: (i) the parties that 
are entitled to conclude collective labour agreements; (ii) the possible levels of 
collective bargaining; (iii) the hierarchy of different bargaining levels; (iv) the 
legal coverage of collective labour agreements; and (v) the procedural rules 
2148  Chapters 9 through 12.
2149  Chapter 13.
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for collective bargaining. In each Member State collective bargaining takes 
place at more than one of the following levels: (a) national (or inter-sectoral), 
(b) sectoral and (c) company. It depends on the Member State at hand which 
level of collective bargaining is dominant. 
4.2.2 The collective labour agreement 
The definition of a collective labour agreement in the Researched Countries 
and its different provisions bear great resemblance. This appears to be the 
same in other Member States. In all Researched Countries there are at 
least three requirements an agreement must satisfy in order to be regarded 
a collective labour agreement. First, there must be an agreement, typically 
a written contract. Second, only specific parties are entitled to conclude a 
collective labour agreement. On the one hand there should be employers or 
employers’ organisations and on the other trade unions. Third, the collective 
labour agreement should concern employment conditions. This is normally 
broadly defined. A fourth requirement is in place in some of the Member 
States, which means that the collective labour agreement is to be registered. 
All Researched Countries distinguish (sometimes for practical purposes only) 
between obligatory and normative provisions in a collective labour agreement. 
The obligatory provisions lay down the rights and obligations between the 
parties concluding the collective labour agreement. The normative provisions 
can be divided into individual and collective normative provisions. Individual 
normative provisions create rights and obligations between the contracting 
parties to an individual employment agreement (the employers and employees). 
These provisions are the quintessence of collective labour agreements. 
Collective normative provisions are recognised in the Netherlands, Germany 
and Belgium. These provisions basically arrange the collective employment 
relations. Some terms in a British collective labour agreement, however, could 
be compared with some of the collective normative provisions in the other 
Researched Countries.
4.2.3 The social partners
Trade unions in Europe are generally independent associations of employees, 
who have united to represent and defend their interests in the workplace, 
but also at the general level of the economy and politics. They usually (i) 
have a centralised structure and a division of work between a network of 
volunteers and a professional apparatus; (ii) are recognised in the Member 
States and have a quasi public status; (iii) have a distributive function in the 
economy (they settle wages) and also have a normative function (they are 
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 17
784
actively involved in setting labour regulations); and (iv) represent and mobilise 
their members. In all Member States trade unions are entitled to enter into 
collective labour agreements. however, these trade unions are usually subject 
to a number of requirements in order to do so. Some of these requirements 
are basically the same in all Researched Countries. A trade union must, in all 
Researched Countries, be an organisation and must pursue the advancement 
of employment relations and conditions. In the Netherlands and in Germany 
the trade union’s articles of associations must specifically stipulate the 
unions’ power to enter into collective labour agreements. There are important 
differences in the Researched Countries when it comes to representativeness 
of trade unions. The only country that requires representative trade unions in 
order to conclude a collective labour agreement is Belgium. In the Netherlands 
and Germany there are no strict representativity demands that the trade 
unions must meet in order to conclude valid collective labour agreements. In 
Germany mild representativity demands do apply. Representativity plays only 
a limited role in British collective bargaining, as there are no representativity 
demands in place to entitle a trade union to conclude a collective labour 
agreement. Representativity does play a role in (statutory) recognition. This 
diverse situation can be seen in all Member States. Research established that 
the diversity of practice in the different Member States is such that there is 
no single model as to representativeness that could be replicated at European 
level. In the Researched Countries there are also differences with regard to 
the independence of trade unions. In Germany and in Great Britain strict 
independence demands apply to trade unions. In Belgium there are no statutory 
requirements on the level of independence of trade unions. however, as only 
a limited number of representative trade unions may enter into collective 
labour agreements, which are strong and independent unions, the issue of 
representativity is actually a non-issue. The only deviating country is the 
Netherlands, a country in which there are no demands on the independence 
of trade unions and yellow trade unions, in fact, concluded valid collective 
labour agreements. Viewed from an international perspective, the dutch 
situation is out of tune as ILO Convention C98 and Recommendation R169 
simply require free and independent employers’ and workers’ organisations.
Employers’ organisations are in many ways the counterparts of trade unions. 
Broadly spoken, employers’ organisations are bodies designed to organise and 
advance the collective interests that employers have in the labour market and 
industrial relations. Employers’ organisations tend to be of importance for 
the existence of multi-employer collective bargaining and statutory provisions 
for extending collective labour agreements. Employers’ organisations differ 
widely in terms of structure, membership basis and tasks across Europe. 
Basically, employers’ organisations in the Researched Countries should satisfy 
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the same additional requirements as trade unions do in order to be eligible 
to participate in collective bargaining and to conclude collective labour 
agreements. however, generally the test whether the employers’ organisations 
satisfy the relevant requirements seems to be applied a bit less strictly when 
compared to trade unions. 
4.2.4 The consequences of a collective labour agreement
Once a collective labour agreement is concluded, it should be established to 
whom it applies, what its consequences are and how the rights arising from it 
can be enforced.
4.2.4.1 The contracting parties
In the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, the contracting parties are 
bound to each other by the (obligatory provisions of the) collective labour 
agreement. All parties need by law to oblige these provisions. This is typically 
the situation in the other continental European countries as well. Things are 
different in Great Britain and Ireland, as collective labour agreements in these 
jurisdictions are considered a mere gentleman’s agreement, unless specifically 
stated otherwise in the agreement. As collective labour agreements are, in 
principle, not binding upon the signatory parties in these countries, there is 
no remedy by law if  one of the parties fails to comply with the collective 
labour agreement. The ultimate sanction for a breach of the collective labour 
agreement is industrial action. 
4.2.4.2 The members of the contracting associations
In the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium the (individual normative) 
legal norms of the collective labour agreement should be applied to those 
employers and employees who both (i) are bound by and (ii) fall within 
the scope of applicability of said agreement. Employers in said countries 
are bound by a collective labour agreement if  they are (a) member of one 
of the contracting employers’ association or (b) entered into the collective 
labour agreement themselves. Employees in Germany and the Netherlands 
are bound by the collective labour agreement if  they are member of the 
contracting trade union; in Belgium all employees of bound employers are 
automatically bound by the collective labour agreement, regardless of their 
possible trade union membership. In all Researched Countries, the social 
partners themselves determine the scope of application of the collective 
labour agreement in that agreement. The (individual normative) provisions 
of the collective labour agreement apply directly and with mandatory effect to 
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the individual employment agreement of the bound employer and the bound 
employee in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. The situation in Great 
Britain is entirely different. Neither common law nor statutory law awards 
direct normative effect to collective labour agreements. The terms that are 
of an individual nature of the collective labour agreement (comparable to 
individual normative provisions) only apply to the relationship between the 
employer and the employee if  they have been incorporated into the individual 
employment agreement, regardless of whether both the employer and the 
employee are bound by the collective labour agreement or not. Variations to 
the collective labour agreement incorporated into the individual employment 
agreement in principle automatically vary the terms of employment. 
In the Netherlands and in Belgium it is important to distinguish between 
different sorts of normative provisions of the collective labour agreement, 
which can be standard, minimum or maximum. In Germany all provisions 
are, by law, minimum provisions. This “principle of favour” is not unusual 
when compared to other Member States. In Great Britain, there is no relevant 
difference between provisions of a minimum, maximum or fixed nature. The 
employer and employee may freely decide to deviate from a term deriving 
from a collective labour agreement that is incorporated into the employment 
agreement.
In the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany the (individual normative) terms 
of the applicable collective labour agreement become part of the individual 
employment agreement due to the aforementioned direct normative effect. 
In Great Britain, this is only the case if  the collective labour agreement is 
incorporated into this individual employment contract. In all Researched 
Countries, once the collective labour applies, both the employer and the 
employee must abide by its content or risk being in breach of contract. 
Should a party breach the contract, the aggrieved party can claim specific 
performance and/or damages. 
4.2.4.3 Members vs. non-members
If  the employer is not bound by the collective labour agreement while the 
employee is, the collective labour agreement does not apply on the basis of 
statute in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. This is also the case in Great 
Britain, as the collective labour agreement is not legally binding anyhow. If  
the employer is bound by the collective labour agreement while the employee 
is not, the collective labour agreement does not apply automatically in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain. however, in all three countries 
it is possible and common to arrange in the individual employment agreement 
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through a reference clause that a specific collective labour agreement applies 
to an employee who is not bound. This situation is quite different in Belgium. 
In Belgium, merely the position of the employer is relevant when determining 
whether the collective labour agreement applies directly in the relation between 
the employer and the employee. A collective labour agreement applies to an 
employment agreement in the situation that the employer is bound, regardless 
of whether the employee is bound or not. This system of collective labour 
agreements with erga omnes effects is dominant in the EU. 
4.2.4.4 The collectivities
In the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, collective normative provisions 
play an important role. In these countries there are basically two constructions 
with regard to collective normative provisions: (i) collective labour agreement 
may provide for rights and obligations arranging the relation between the 
employer and its entire personnel (most explicit in Germany) or an employee 
representative body (the Works Council or even, in Belgium, a union 
delegation), and (ii) a collective labour agreement may provide for rights and 
obligations arranging the relation between the employer and the employees 
vis-à-vis third collective parties, most notably funds. Although British law 
merely distinguishes between terms of an individual and terms of a collective 
nature, some terms could be compared with the first mentioned group of 
collective normative provisions. 
4.2.5 Deviation by collective labour agreement
The laws of all Researched Counties contain provisions that can be set aside 
by a collective labour agreement, as opposed to by “just” an individual 
employment agreement (provisions of ¾ mandatory law). This system of 
¾ mandatory law sits well in a European context, as it is not unusual for 
directives to stipulate that collective labour agreements may deviate from 
standard norms. Especially with regard to working time, fixed-time and part-
time work it is becoming increasingly usual that derogations from the law are 
arranged in collective labour agreements.
4.2.6 Term and termination
In all Researched Countries the freedom of contract plays an important role 
when it comes to term and termination of the collective labour agreement. 
The contracting parties are free to establish the date on which their collective 
labour agreement enters into force and whether the legal norms of the 
collective labour agreement have retro-effect. The signatory parties are also 
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free to establish the duration of the collective labour agreement, although 
social partners in the Netherlands may not conclude a collective labour 
agreement with a duration exceeding 5 years. Termination of a collective 
labour agreement is easy in Great Britain, as a (non binding) collective labour 
agreement can be terminated at any time, with or without notice given. In the 
Netherlands, collective labour agreements can be terminated by notice at the 
end of their term. Should a collective labour agreement not be terminated 
by notice, the agreement is normally considered to be (tacitly) renewed after 
termination of its original term for the same term. In Belgium and Germany 
a collective labour agreement entered into for a fixed period of time ends, by 
operation of law, at the end of its term. A collective labour agreement entered 
into for an indefinite period of time can be terminated by notice. 
4.2.7 After-effects
In all Researched Countries the obligatory provisions of a collective labour 
agreement lose force after the collective labour agreement has expired. The 
individual normative provisions, however, have after-effects in all these 
countries once a collective labour agreement applies to the employment 
agreement (in Great Britain by incorporating the collective labour agreement 
into the employment agreement). That means that these provisions retain their 
force after expiry of that collective labour agreement. This is only different if  
the collective labour agreement specifically stipulates otherwise. The employer 
and employee are, however, after expiry of the collective labour agreement, 
entitled to change the content of the individual employment contract should 
they wish so, observing the rules applicable for such change in the different 
countries, in fact terminating the collective labour agreement’s after-effects. 
The introduction of a new collective labour agreement also terminates 
the after-effects of the individual normative provisions in all Researched 
Countries. The situation is more diverse when it comes to collective normative 
provisions. In Germany these provisions have after-effects. This is not the 
case in the Netherlands, Belgium and in Great Britain. Collective normative 
provisions that also apply individually do have after-effects in Belgium.
4.2.8 The role of alternative dispute resolution in collective bargaining
In all Researched Countries alternative dispute resolution mechanisms play a 
part in collective labour law, including collective labour agreements. In variable 
degrees this holds true for all Member States. Basically, three mechanisms are 
often applied within the EU: conciliation, mediation and arbitration. In some 
Member States dispute resolution is free and autonomous; while in others 
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compulsory dispute resolution exists. As a rule, alternative dispute resolution 
is mostly applied to disputes of interest (as opposed to disputes of law).
4.2.9 Extending collective labour agreements
In the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium a collective labour agreement can 
be extended as a result whereof it applies to all employers and employees 
falling within the scope of applicability of that agreement. In Great Britain 
this possibility does not exist. The extension techniques in the first three 
countries are rather similar. 
First, the collective labour agreement that is to be extended should meet 
specific demands: it should be a proper collective labour agreement with 
a clear scope of application. Briefly put, only normative and collective 
normative provisions of a collective labour agreement can be extended. In 
Germany and the Netherlands the collective labour agreement should already 
apply to a majority of employees falling with the scope of applicability of 
the collective labour agreement in order for it to be extended. The extension 
should furthermore serve the public interest, or at least not violate it. 
Second, procedural demands and safeguards need to be satisfied. This means 
that there should be a request for extension, which needs to be published. 
Third parties may subsequently oppose to such request. In the Netherlands a 
specific institution may and in Germany a specific institution must be involved 
in the extension-process. The actual decision to extend (parts of) the collective 
labour agreement, needs to be published.
Third, there are statutory limitations in place on the duration of the binding 
collective labour agreement. In all three countries there is either no or a 
limited possibility for retro-effect of the extended collective labour agreement. 
The extension may not outlast the duration of the actual collective labour 
agreement. 
Once declared binding, the collective labour agreement applies to all 
employment agreements concluded or to be concluded within the term of 
the extension decree that fall within the scope of applicability of that binding 
agreement. The provisions of the extended collective labour agreement have 
direct normative effect. Unlike the Netherlands, in Germany and Belgium the 
extended collective labour agreements have after-effects.
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Extension of collective labour agreements is not uncommon in the EU. There 
are basically three different manners to extend collective labour agreements: 
(i) extension in the narrow sense (erga omnes), making a collective agreement 
binding within its field of application by explicitly binding all those employees 
and employers which are not members of the parties to the agreement; (ii) 
enlargement, providing for a collective agreement to apply in sectors or areas 
where it did not apply yet and where no union and/or employers’ association 
capable of collective bargaining exists; and (iii) functional equivalents, 
including compulsory membership of the bargaining parties’ organisations or 
legal provisions requiring government contractors to comply with the terms 
of a relevant collective agreement. 
The most frequently used extension method is “extension in the narrow sense”. 
Most of the time, this type of extension requires: (i) a public act or decree, 
issued by the government authority in charge of labour matters; (ii) a request 
of one of the social partners to the collective labour agreement or another 
social partner; and (iii) a minimum requirement for extension, most notably 
minimum rates for coverage of the relevant agreement prior to extension.
4.3 The reach of the social partners in national laws and EU law2150
In Europe, there is a tradition of “autonomy of collective bargaining”. This 
has given social partners in the Member States ample room to determine the 
content of their collective labour agreements. Collective labour agreements in 
the Researched Countries should, besides setting out the rights and obligations 
of the contracting parties, concern employment conditions, which is normally 
defined broadly. Collective labour agreements may not contravene norms 
“higher in hierarchy”, such as national and international laws and regulations. 
But there are also Community rules that may limit the social partners in the 
field of collective employment law.
Collective labour agreements limit competition between the different 
companies that (are required to) participate. After all, collective labour 
agreements set minimum and sometimes even maximum standards. Therefore, 
the content of a collective labour agreement can clash with the Community 
rules on competition. The European Court of justice had to decide on 
the validity of extended collective labour agreements in specific branches, 
obliging all employers falling within their scope of applicability to participate 
in a compulsory pension scheme. The companies opposing these collective 
labour agreements argued that the extension of these agreements violated 
2150  Chapter 8.
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the Community’s rules on freedom of competition. however, the European 
Court of justice, referring to the social policy objectives that are pursued 
by collective labour agreements, ruled that collective labour agreements 
concluded in pursuit of such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and 
purpose, be regarded as falling outside the scope of European competition 
law.
Collective labour agreements might also violate the highly developed European 
equal treatment legislation. The EC Treaty directly prohibits discrimination 
on the ground of pay for male and female workers. The EC Treaty furthermore 
entitles the Council to take appropriate action to combat discrimination 
based on racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. The European Court of justice has held several stipulations in 
collective labour agreements to contravene European equality law.
Free movement of goods, persons, capital and services – the market freedoms 
– may also limit collective labour law.
Free movement of persons encompasses both the freedom of movement of 
workers and the right of establishment. Employees deriving from one Member 
State may not be hindered within the territory of another Member State to pick 
up an activity as an employed person. This prohibition also affects collective 
labour agreements. The right of establishment blocks protective stipulations 
prohibiting foreign companies to deploy certain activities and may, given the 
Viking case, even limit the right to strike in specific circumstances. 
Free movement of goods has not (yet) clashed with fundamental employment 
rights, but very well could have. The free movement of goods has clashed with 
the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. The European Court 
of justice subsequently balanced the rights involved. It is easy to imagine a 
situation in which collective actions could be at odds with the free movement 
of goods, for example due to road blocks. This possibility was explicitly taken 
into account when drafting the Regulation on the functioning of the internal 
market in relation to the free movement of goods among the Member States, 
which states that the Regulation may not be interpreted as affecting the 
exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in Member States, including the 
right or freedom to strike.
The free movement of capital and, in particular, of services may be on bad 
terms with collective labour law. Service providers may temporarily pursue 
their activities in the Member State where the service is provided, under the 
same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals. Restrictive 
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conditions of the host state are not allowed, unless these conditions can 
be justified by overriding requirements relating to the public interest, most 
notably on the grounds of protection of the posted worker. If  that is the case, 
the European Court of justice will verify whether this protection is already 
granted in the state of establishment and whether the steps that are taken are 
proportionate. The freedom to provide services may, given the Laval case, 
even limit the right to strike. 
 
Free movement of services involves the danger of social dumping. These 
two topics – the abolition between Member States of obstacles to the free 
movement of persons and services and a climate of fair competition and 
measures guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers – have led to the 
adoption of the Posted Workers directive. The potential clash between, on 
the one hand these market freedoms, and on the other the European social 
model led to heated discussions in relation to the Service directive. The 
Service directive has been adapted in such manner that all interests are served 
as much as possible.
5. A proposal for a European system on 
transnational collective bargaining
5.1 Demarcation of the proposed system of 
transnational collective bargaining2151
Before discussing the proposed Community system on transnational 
collective bargaining, it should be assessed what the legal basis for such a 
system could and should be. Articles 94 and 137 of the EC Treaty give bases 
for Community legislation on transnational collective labour agreements. On 
these bases, a directive on this subject can be issued. Article 308 of the EC 
Treaty may, however, be used as a more general basis. That article permits the 
use of regulations. As regulations have important advantages over directives, 
especially given the direct applicability of regulations, I would be inclined to 
choose article 308 of the EC Treaty as the most appropriate basis for drafting 
legislation on transnational collective labour agreements. Moreover, the use 
of a regulation on the basis of article 308 of the EC Treaty may possibly 
circumvent the applicability of the exceptions stipulated in article 137.5 of the 
EC Treaty. drafting a regulation on transnational collective labour agreements 
will in my opinion pass the subsidiarity test of article 5 of the EC Treaty, 
while reverting to horizontal subsidiarity by letting the (European) social 
partners draft an equivalent of such an act will not work. That means that the 
2151  Chapter 14.
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Council can, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, and 
after consulting the European Parliament, issue a regulation. 
Collective bargaining, as embedded in the European social dialogue, leading 
to the implementation of European collective agreements by a Council 
decision, bears great resemblance to the extension of collective labour 
agreements as is in place in many Member States. A European “extension 
mechanism” is thus already in place. That gave reason to focus in the previous 
chapters on the effects of a normal, i.e. non-extended, transnational collective 
labour agreement under a new collective bargaining system, and not on the 
extension of such agreements. The proposed system may, however, be applied 
as a new implementation method, as a means for the (direct) implementation 
of European collective agreements agreed on in the sectoral European 
social dialogue. Such a new “implementation system” can be useful, as 
implementation of European collective labour agreements in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the 
Member States suffers from flaws, which may be overcome by the proposed 
system of transnational collective bargaining. 
Transnational collective bargaining, as proposed in this thesis, may play a 
role at company and sectoral level. Transnational collective bargaining at 
cross-industry level seems insufficiently appropriate. As for the scope of 
transnational collective bargaining, the agreement should at least apply within 
the jurisdictions of two Member States, and at a maximum in all Member 
States. 
5.2 The fundamentals of transnational collective 
bargaining: active protection of classical rights 
resulting in free and voluntary bargaining2152
The above gives an idea on the scope of the proposed transnational collective 
bargaining system. Let us now turn to the fundamentals of such a system. 
What was already made clear is that the proposed system will rely on the 
three classical rights: (1) the freedom of association, (2) the right to collective 
bargaining and (3) the right to strike. These rights are already protected by 
international instruments, but, until recently, not always evidently in the 
European Community.
Many international treaties acknowledge and promote the freedom of 
association. This freedom includes the right of workers and employers to 
2152  Chapters 8 and 14.
TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EUROPE CHAPTER 17
794
organise themselves free of intervention, as well as the right not being forced 
to join or to remain in such an association. These treaties did, until recently, 
not have a formal legal status in the European Community. There was no 
formal acknowledgement of the freedom of association for the European 
Community; at least not set out in any of the Community treaties, and the 
freedom of association is (at least to a certain extent) even excluded from 
the scope of the EC Treaty given article 137.5. This notwithstanding, the 
European Court of justice recognises the (positive and negative) freedom of 
association and considers it a fundamental right which is protected in the 
Community legal order.
The right to collective bargaining is difficult to define. In any event it 
encompasses the freedom for the social partners to enter into negotiations 
in order to reach a binding agreement on employment topics. A broader 
interpretation of this concept would include the obligatory and normative 
effects a collective agreement may have, and possibly even the direct normative 
effects of the agreement. The mere right to enter into negotiations and to 
conclude collective labour agreements is recognised in many international 
instruments. These treaties did, until recently, not have a formal legal status 
in the European Community. however, articles 138.4 and 139 of the EC 
Treaty also award these rights to a specific group of European social partners. 
The freedom of contract seems to protect exactly the same rights to other 
(European) social partners and employers as well. This part of collective 
bargaining – a narrow sense of collective bargaining – is therefore protected 
at a European level. In this narrow sense the social partners also have a right 
to collective autonomy. Some of the international instruments also arrange 
for the (normative and obligatory) effects of the collective labour agreement. 
ILO Recommendation R91 even arranges for the direct normative effects of 
a collective labour agreement. There are no indications that these parts of 
the right to collective bargaining – in its broad sense – are recognised on a 
European level. Collective autonomy is also not fully recognised in this broad 
sense. On the contrary, since European agreements lack direct normative effect 
and the European social partners depend on third parties to implement these 
agreements, their autonomy is less evolved than that of the national social 
partners in the Member States. The European social partners’ autonomy is 
(at least to a certain extent) limited by law, should they wish to have their 
agreement implemented by a Council decision.
The right to strike is also recognised in many international instruments. These 
treaties dit, until recently, not have a formal legal status in the European 
Community. The right to strike is (at least to a certain extent) explicitly excluded 
from the scope of the EC Treaty given article 137.5. This notwithstanding, 
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the European Court of justice conformed that the right to strike forms an 
integral part of the general principles of Community law the observance of 
which the Court ensures.
The three classical rights are, given the above, at least partially recognised 
at EU level. This recognition has become stronger recently and may even 
continue to grow stronger in the near future. The EU charter has been given 
legally binding force. Should the Treaty of Lisbon be ratified and enter into 
force, the Union shall also accede to the Convention. In consequence, the 
institutions of the Union must respect the rights written into the Charter 
and the Convention, including the right on the freedom of association, the 
right to collective bargaining and the right to strike. The same obligations 
will be incumbent upon the Member States when they implement the Union’s 
legislation. Unfortunately, a protocol exempts Poland and the United 
Kingdom from important obligations deriving from the EU Charter.
The above three classical rights should, in the proposed system, be fully 
and actively recognised in the European Community. A simple laissez-faire 
attitude should not suffice. Besides fully respecting the three classical rights, 
the transnational collective bargaining process should furthermore be free 
and voluntary. The social partners should be free to choose whether or not to 
bargain and whether or not to conclude a collective labour agreement. The 
social partners should furthermore be free to choose with whom they wish 
to bargain, although transnational collective labour agreements concluded 
with clearly representative trade unions have a stronger effect in the proposed 
system. All social partners should meet specific “mild” representativity 
demands in order to be entitled to participate in transnational collective 
bargaining.
5.3 Proposed definition of transnational collective labour agreement2153
The above gives a rough outline on what the proposed regulation on 
transnational collective bargaining may encompass and which fundamentals 
are deemed crucial. In order to further narrow down the subject at hand, 
a definition of a transnational collective labour agreement should be given, 
which includes a reference to the parties whom the agreement may concern. 
Transnational collective labour agreements should contain five components. 
First, there should be an agreement, being an act whereby two or more parties 
reach sufficient consent as to do or omit from doing something that affects 
their and, in case of organisations, their members’, legal relation. Second, 
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that agreement should be concluded between, on the one hand, employers or 
employers’ organisations, and, on the other, trade unions. Third, transnational 
collective labour agreements should be able to deal with individual 
normative, collective normative and obligatory provisions. The scope of 
content of transnational collective labour agreements should be broad. The 
transnational collective labour agreement should furthermore be registered 
and meet a number of specific formalities. Finally, the agreement should be 
truly transnational, meaning that the normative provisions of the collective 
agreement should have an impact in at least two different Member States. 
Given these components, a definition of a transnational collective labour 
agreement could read as follows: “a transnational collective labour agreement 
is an agreement in writing which is registered at the designated authorities, 
meeting the required minimum formalities and concluded between one or 
more employees’ organisations and one or more employers’ organisations or 
one or more employers, in which individual and collective relations between 
employers and employees in enterprises or in a sector are set out, having an 
impact in at least two Member States, and which can deal with the rights 
and obligations of the contracting parties. These collective relations may also 
concern the relation between employers and employees vis-à-vis third parties, 
established for the well-being of the employers and employees.”
5.4 The binding power of the transnational collective 
agreement and the signatory parties2154
An important part of developing a system of transnational collective 
bargaining is establishing the binding power of the transnational collective 
labour agreement and the requirements that the signatory parties should 
satisfy in order to be involved in its conclusion. Research of the laws of the 
Researched Countries shows that these two topics are very much intertwined. 
The binding power of a collective labour agreement may depend on the 
requirements the social partners involved must meet (the representativity 
of the social partners), but also on the coverage rate of a collective labour 
agreement (the representativity of the collective labour agreement). These two 
observations give reason to further explore the concept representativity.
5.4.1 Representativity in the key of legitimacy and its consequences
Representativity can be viewed as (i) the demands that the contracting social 
partners should meet with regard to (a) minimum size (including a minimum 
number of members), (b) a certain level of power or (c) a specific status in 
2154  Chapter 15.
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order to be qualified to represent the parties to whom the collective labour 
agreement should apply (representativity of the social partners), or (ii) the 
demands that the collective labour agreement itself  should satisfy on the same 
topics in order to apply to a large group of individuals (representativity of the 
collective labour agreement). In other words, representativity can be placed 
in the key of recognition of the legitimacy of  social partners to negotiate 
collective labour agreements, and a collective labour agreement to apply to 
a large group of individuals. When representativity within this meaning in 
the Researched Countries is scrutinised, in relation to the binding powers a 
collective labour agreement has, the following conclusions can be drawn:
•	 If 	only	employers	and	employees	 that	are	 involved	with	 the	collective	
labour agreement – either by signing the collective agreement or by being 
a member of the contracting organisations, or by agreeing to follow that 
agreement via a reference clause – are bound by that agreement, there 
is little need for representative parties to conclude that collective labour 
agreement.
•	 The	above	is	different	(i)	if 	the	collective	labour	agreement	permits	devi-
ation from ¾ mandatory law and (ii) for employees who are not bound 
by a collective labour agreement through membership of a contracting 
trade union, but are instead bound by it though a reference clause, in 
case the renewed collective labour agreement is concluded by different 
parties than the ones that concluded the original collective labour agree-
ment.
•	 If 	 all	 employees	 are	 directly	 bound	 by	 a	 collective	 labour	 agreement,	
there should be a justification, such as the demand that the contracting 
trade unions should be representative.
•	 If 	 all	 employers	 and	 employees	 that	 fall	within	 the	 scope of applica-
tion of a collective labour agreement are bound by that agreement, there 
should be a justification for that, a justification which could include that 
the agreement should, prior to be extended, already apply to a majority 
of the employees that fall within the scope of application of that agree-
ment. 
5.4.2 What is representativity in collective bargaining / when and why is it 
relevant? 
In the context of collective bargaining two forms of representation should 
be distinguished. First, there is institutional representativity: an organisation 
(social partner) is representative if  a government recognises or appoints that 
organisation as a discussion partner or as a party that can act on behalf  of 
third parties. Second, there is sociological representativity: an organisation can 
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be considered representative if  it is a trustworthy spokesperson for a group of 
individuals whose interests it claims to represent. Institutional and sociological 
representativity do not rule each other out and can coincide. Both forms of 
representativity are normally related to factual representativity, meaning that 
an organisation has a sufficient number of members amongst the group of 
employees whose interests it claims to represent. Regardless of which form of 
representativity is used, the core of representativity in collective bargaining 
is that representative organisations are organisations that are recognised in a 
legal system to act legitimately on behalf  of and bind others.
Representativity is of particular importance when organisations represent a 
larger group than merely their members. This occurs especially with regard 
to trade unions: they often have to serve the interests of all employees, and 
not just of their members, as collective labour agreements often apply to 
all employees of a company or in a specific branch. Member States are far 
more hesitant to apply collective labour agreements to employers who are not 
directly bound by the collective labour agreement. Representativity demands 
in collective bargaining are therefore especially important with regard to trade 
unions, and much less with regard to employers’ organisations.
Representativity of trade unions is important because:
•	 Not	every party is entitled to act on behalf  of a large group of employ-
ees for the purpose of setting employment conditions; many countries 
awarded this entitlement exclusively to trade unions, which in turn play 
an important role in the “participatory democracy”. Trade unions can 
better fulfil this task once they are representative.
•	 Representative	trade	unions	are	best	able	to	arrange	optimum	employ-
ment conditions for the employees. 
•	 Trade	 unions	 that	 have	 a	 sufficient	 number	 of	members	 amongst	 the	
relevant group of employees (representative trade unions) can benefit 
from these members’ knowledge, experience and manpower necessary to 
conduct proper collective bargaining.
•	 Trade	unions	with	a	significant	number	of	members	(representative	trade	
unions) have a steady flow of income due to the membership contributi-
ons, which ensures their independence.
Factual representativity of the trade union is also relevant. however, factual 
representativity alone does not suffice in collective bargaining in order for 
trade unions to be trustworthy spokespersons for the employees whose 
interests they claim to represent. Other requirements are of importance as 
well, such as:
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•	 being	independent;
•	 surpassing	company	level;	
•	 focussing	on	a	specific	area	of	expertise,	a	specific	sector;
•	 having	an	efficient	and	proper	organisation	in	which	members	have	an	
influence on the decision-making process;
•	 possessing	real	powers;
•	 having	a	strong	past	performance;	and
•	 having	a	strong	status.
The above focuses on the position of the trade unions rather than on the 
collective labour agreement itself. The coverage of the collective labour 
agreement is often taken into account in Member States when it concerns 
the extension of that agreement: a collective labour agreement that is to be 
extended must sometimes have a minimum coverage rate, possibly exceeding 
50% of the employees in the relevant sector. This minimum coverage is seen 
as a reason, or justification, to apply the agreement to a greater group than 
the original group. The reason for this is that a majority can model the 
employment conditions of a minority (a “democratic” principle) and that 
the content of the collective labour agreement is apparently reasonable as it 
applies to a majority. These arguments, however, should be reticently applied. 
After all, it is not always reasonable that a majority binds a minority. 
5.5 Binding powers of the proposed transnational 
collective labour agreement2155
Collective labour agreements can have two types of binding power: they can 
be binding by law or in honour only. Because most Member States favour a 
system in which collective labour agreements are binding by law, and there 
are no fundamental objections against such system, a system on transnational 
collective bargaining providing for legally binding agreements seems logical. 
This is especially the case as legally binding transnational collective labour 
agreements can better attain important goals such as (i) to arrange in a 
uniform fashion the employment conditions between the employers and 
employees to which the collective labour agreement applies and (ii) to secure 
peace and tranquillity within the company or sector to which the collective 
labour agreement applies.
2155  Chapter 15.
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5.5.1 The parties to the collective labour agreement
Given the above-mentioned choice, it is logical that the contracting parties 
are, by law, obliged to abide by the obligatory provisions of the collective 
labour agreement. The signatory parties are responsible by law for the proper 
execution of the collective labour agreement. Should they fail to fulfil this 
obligation, their counterparties should be entitled to start proceedings and 
claim specific performance, payment of damages or even dissolution of the 
collective labour agreement. This should only be different if  the contracting 
parties explicitly stipulate otherwise. In the proposed system on transnational 
collective bargaining the contracting parties should observe the implied 
principle of good faith: they need by law to take adequate measures to ensure 
that their members abide by the collective labour agreement; they do not have 
to guarantee this with regard to the individual employers and employees. 
The contracting association is, however, liable for the performance of the 
collective labour agreement of its members, should these members also be 
organisations, and these members are likewise responsible for the proper 
execution on their part of the transnational collective labour agreement, if  
any. I would not choose for the new system to incorporate an implied peace 
obligation at this moment.
5.5.2 The employers and employees
Many Member States have introduced a system that I call institutional: a 
system which has, as a consequence, that the collective labour agreement applies 
to all individuals that operate within the agreement’s scope of applicability, 
regardless of whether or not they are bound to the agreement by contract. 
Other Member States have chosen for a system that I call contractual: a 
system which has, as a consequence, that collective labour agreements only 
apply to individuals that are bound by that agreement by contract. Choosing 
for either an institutional or a contractual system has at least three major 
consequences:
1. In the contractual system individualism and voluntarism prevail over 
collectivism and non-voluntarism (the individual freely chooses the em-
ployment conditions) while this is the other way around in the instituti-
onal system (the individual can be confronted with employment conditi-
ons which it has to accept as the signatory parties collectivity agreed on 
these conditions). Collectivism and non-voluntarism should be approa-
ched carefully: a number of Member States fiercely disputed extension 
of collective labour agreements to unbound employers and employees. 
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Extension of collective labour agreements should be applied reticently 
and requires strong justification. 
2. The institutional system requires strong social partners or a high cover-
age rate of the collective labour agreement while the contractual system 
does not. These strong (representative) social partners respectively this 
high coverage rate justify the erga omnes effect of the collective labour 
agreement in an institutional system. The strong social partners should 
meet clear and unambiguous rules, that must be drafted in advance and 
apply generally, if  an institutional system such as the one that is in place 
in Belgium is chosen. In a contractual system, collective labour agree-
ments can also be applied to companies or sectors if  they are concluded 
by weaker social partners, or in situations in which there is a less signifi-
cant coverage ratio, since only those parties that chose to are covered by 
the collective labour agreement. The social partners must also meet clear 
and unambiguous rules, which can be tested on a case-by-case scenario 
and can therefore be more lenient.
3. The institutional system is much more inclusive than the contractual 
system. In its pure form, it includes all employees and employers that fall 
within the scope of applicability of the collective labour agreement. This 
has advantages. The first advantage is of a fundamental nature: most 
employers wish to treat their employees equally, a goal which is better 
attained if  the agreement applies to all employees. The second advantage 
is of a practical nature: from an EU law perspective it is difficult to diffe-
rentiate between employees who are a contracting trade union’s member 
and those who are not given the Privacy directive.
Taking into consideration these three consequences the following observations 
can be made:
•	 Extension	of	collective	labour	agreements	should	be	applied	reticently	
and requires strong justification;
•	 The	institutional	system	requires	strong	social	partners	or	a	high	cover-
age rate of the collective labour agreement, while the contractual system 
does not. The aforementioned strong social partners should, in princi-
ple, meet clear and unambiguous rules, that, in an institutional system 
as is in place in Belgium, must be drafted in advance and apply generally 
(as opposed to in a specific situation, in relation to a specific collective 
labour agreement);
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•	 Extension	of	collective	labour	agreements	to	all	employees	has	impor-
tant advantages as all employees are treated equally and potential dif-
ficulties on privacy issues can easily be tackled. 
While the first two observations would favour a contractual system, the 
third observation points at an institutional system. This is not necessarily 
troublesome. After all, a system does not have to be purely contractual or 
purely institutional. 
5.5.2.1 The position of the employers
The institutional system does not apply to employers in the Researched 
Countries with regard to normal, non-extended collective labour agreements. 
Therefore, it seems logical to follow the contractual system with respect to 
employers. 
5.5.2.2 The position of the employees
Things are different when it comes to the position of the employees. In most 
Member States a collective labour agreement applies to all employees of the 
bound employer (who fall within the scope of application of the collective 
labour agreement). Such general binding effect has important advantages, 
as all employees are treated equally and no problems occur with regard to 
privacy issues. however, such a system requires justification, as employees 
can be bound by terms that were not of their choosing. The best method of 
justification would, in my opinion, be the principle of favour. This allows 
departure from the terms of the collective labour agreement in the individual 
employment contract in favour of the employee (for difficulties concerning 
this principle of favour in relation to after-effects I refer to section 5.7.3). This 
principle of favour is also commonly used in Member States. however, all 
national laws that apply the principle of favour have exceptions to this rule. This 
will also be the case in the proposed system for transnational collective labour 
agreements. These exceptions require justification, which can among others, 
be found in mild representativity demands on the side of the trade unions. 
If  the contracting parties wish to fully depart from the principle of favour, 
for example because times of economic distress warrant a cut back in wages, 
there must be sufficient justification to apply the collective labour agreement 
to all employees. If  such justification is lacking, the contractual system should 
be taken as a starting point. Only if  a sufficient level of justification is in 
place, a collective labour agreement (also) containing maximum or standard 
provisions may apply to all employees working for the bound employer. This 
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leads to the following system with regard to the position of the employees of 
the bound employer: 
1. A transnational collective labour agreement that merely contains mini-
mum provisions automatically applies to and has mandatory effects on 
all employees of the bound employer who fall within the scope of ap-
plicability of that agreement. By way of exception, however, the trans-
national collective labour agreement may (i) allow the employer and em-
ployee to deviate from ¾ mandatory law if  either permitted at European 
or relevant national level, (ii) oblige each employee to pay a reasonable 
compensation to the contracting trade union(s) and (iii) provide for an 
opening clause that can be filled in by social partners at national level. 
2. A transnational collective labour agreement that (also) contains standard 
and/or maximum provisions only applies to and has mandatory effects 
on bound employees who fall within the scope of applicability of that 
agreement. It, however, also applies to and has mandatory effects on 
employees who are not bound by it but do fall within the scope of ap-
plicability of that agreement if:
a. the contracting trade union(s) has (have) sufficient members amongst (i) 
all employees (the bargaining group) and (ii) each individual group of 
employees (the bargaining units) to which the transnational collective 
labour agreement applies; or
b. the contracting trade union is or trade unions are recognised by the em-
ployees of each relevant bargaining unit; or
c. the individual employee accepts the collective labour agreement; or
d. it already applies to an important majority of the employees in the rele-
vant bargaining group, and to a sufficient number of employees in each 
individual bargaining unit.
5.5.3 Third parties
With regard to collective normative provisions, there are two important 
constructions. First, these provisions may provide for rights and obligation 
that arrange the relation between the employer and its entire personnel or an 
employee representative body. The employer who is bound by the collective 
labour agreement should apply these collective normative provisions. There 
is no reason to oppose to a system that allows the contracting parties to a 
transnational collective labour agreement to give additional rights to the entire 
personnel or to an employee representative body. The principle of favour must 
be observed. If  this is not the case (while obviously the content of the collective 
normative provisions does not violate any laws) the limitation of rights should 
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be justified. This justification should be found in representativity, in which 
case the same criteria apply as are in place for collective labour agreements 
that depart from the principle of favour with regard to individual normative 
provisions. Another matter is that the contracting parties should be allowed 
to discontinue the additional rights granted to the entire personnel or to an 
employee representative body in order to prevent a static system. Second, 
the transnational collective labour agreement may provide for rights and 
obligations that arrange the relation between the employer and the employees 
vis-à-vis third parties. If  the transnational collective labour agreement arranges 
for payment to these third parties by the employer, while the employees can 
enjoy the benefits, there are no real arguments against this system. This would 
be different if  the employees were obliged to pay a contribution to the third 
parties. In such a case, the employee is confronted with obligations, which 
should be justified in the same manner (representativity) as set out above. 
As the collective labour agreement is intended to bind by law, the collective 
normative provisions apply directly and with mandatory effect to the parties 
concerned.
5.6 The signatory parties
5.6.1 The employers
The position of employers in transnational collective bargaining is not overly 
complicated: as long as they are truly employers based on the rules of the 
Member State in which they are situated, they should be deemed capable of 
participating in the conclusion of transnational collective labour agreements 
applying to their own organisation. It seems practical for groups of companies 
to entitle the controlling undertaking to conclude the transnational collective 
labour agreement, an agreement which should subsequently apply to all 
undertakings within that group. 
5.6.2 Organisational demands for organisations 
Organisations that participate in transnational collective bargaining should 
satisfy the following organisational requirements:
•	 Both	 organisations	 that	 are	 structured	 nationally	 and	 those	 that	 are	
structured internationally should be permitted to participate in trans-
national bargaining. National organisations need to satisfy the national 
demands as applicable in their jurisdiction in order to qualify as a social 
partner that is entitled to negotiate collective agreements. The same ap-
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plies to national members of participating transnational organisations. 
Participating transnational organisations that are truly international, i.e. 
that are not build up from national members, should not be required to 
meet national demands, but should satisfy all of the requirements stated 
below.
•	 The	signatory	organisations	should	have	coverage	in	all	jurisdictions	in	
which the agreement applies. 
•	 Organisations	must	make	 sufficiently	 clear	whose	 interests	 they	 claim	
to represent. National organisations need to satisfy the national requi-
rements in this respect. All organisations must place their members in a 
position that they can materially influence the decision-making process 
of their organisation.
•	 Organisations	should	not	necessarily	have	legal	personality.
5.6.3 Mild representativity demands applicable to labour
The proposed system requires mild representativity demands on the side 
of labour. Employees’ organisations involved in transnational collective 
bargaining should, as a whole, meet the following representativity demands 
at all times:
•	 they	must	be	fully	independent	from	the	other	side	of	industry,	manage-
ment, and should surpass company level;
•	 they	should	possess	real	powers	towards	management;	and
•	 they	should	only	be	competent	to	conclude	collective	labour	agreements	
in the sector of their expertise.
5.7 Important technicalities of the proposed 
transnational collective bargaining2156
5.7.1 Applicable law
Transnational collective labour agreements cannot, contrary to national 
collective labour agreements, be embedded in a uniform system of law as a 
European civil code is lacking. This means that private international law must 
play a role, establishing the law applicable to the different terms (obligatory, 
individual normative and collective normative) of the transnational collective 
labour agreement. This applicable law is important for the enforcement 
of the transnational collective labour agreement too. This transnational 
2156  Chapter 16.
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agreement is enforced as if  it were a national collective labour agreement. 
Should, however, a national system have insufficient means for the proper 
enforcement of the terms of the transnational collective labour agreement, 
or should these national means be insufficiently clear and legally certain, 
the Member States concerned are obliged to introduce minimum means for 
effective enforcement. 
5.7.1.1 Obligatory provisions
The contracting parties are obliged to make an explicit choice on the law 
applicable to the obligatory provisions of the transnational collective labour 
agreement. The chosen law must be of one of the Member States in which the 
transnational collective labour agreement applies. In the proposed European 
system on transnational collective bargaining, the party that is in breach 
of an obligatory provision of the transnational collective labour agreement 
is in principle liable for the losses resulting from such a breach towards 
its counterparty or counterparties. A potential claim on breach of such 
obligatory provisions needs to be assessed applying the chosen national law, 
which has to fill in procedural and material lacunas of the European system. 
The applicable national law should, in brief, provide the tools for enforcement 
of the obligatory provisions of the transnational collective labour agreement. 
Should, in a Member State in which jurisdiction the transnational collective 
labour agreement applies, other techniques be in place to enforce obligatory 
provisions of a national collective labour agreement, these techniques should 
equally be applied to the transnational collective labour agreement.
5.7.1.2 Normative provisions
The individual normative provisions of the transnational collective labour 
agreement in the current proposal become part of the individual employment 
agreement as they have direct normative effect. As a consequence, these 
provisions (as automatically incorporated in the individual employment 
agreement) need to be assessed on the basis of the law that applies to that 
employment agreement. This means that the individual employer and 
employee should turn to the same enforcement tools as would apply were these 
normative provisions incorporated in the individual employment agreement 
on the basis of an applicable national collective labour agreement: all 
national remedies following a breach of employment contract at the disposal 
of the employer and employee apply. It also means that all other parties that 
have, on the basis of national law, a right to enforce normative provisions of 
applicable national collective labour agreements should also have the same 
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rights to enforce individual normative provisions of applicable transnational 
collective labour agreements. 
5.7.1.3 Collective normative provisions
There are two important constructions when it concerns collective normative 
provisions. First, collective normative provisions may provide for rights and 
obligations that arrange the relation between the employer and (i) its employee 
representative body or (ii) its “entire personnel”. National legislation may 
oblige the employer to establish an employee representative body. That 
national law subsequently applies to the relation between the employer and 
the employee representative body. If  the same employer is active in several 
countries, and it is obliged to establish employee representative bodies in 
more than one country because of its branch offices in the several countries, 
the law applicable to the collective normative provisions will vary per branch 
office. The law that applies between the employer active in one country and 
its entire personnel runs parallel, as it is the law of the country in which the 
employer is resident and active (the “country of residence”). If  the employer 
is active in several countries and has branch offices situated in these countries, 
the law of the country in which the branch office is situated should apply to 
the relation between that branch office and the employees working for that 
branch office. The party that is to enforce these collective normative provisions 
is the employee representative body. That body is either the body to which 
these rights are directed, or the proper institution to defend the collective 
interests of the employees working in the company (or as the case may be: 
branch office) for which the body is established. The employee representative 
body should be entitled to enforce the collective normative provisions with 
all means that are available to it, on the basis of the applicable national law, 
as if  these were provisions of the transnational collective labour agreement, 
collective normative provisions of a national collective labour agreement. 
In the event that the employee representative body is not established, the 
individual employees themselves should be entitled to call on these collective 
normative provisions, if  they are ultimately addressed by these provisions. 
These employees should also be entitled to enforce these provisions with 
all the means attributed to them on the basis of national law. Furthermore, 
the contracting trade unions should be empowered to enforce the collective 
normative provisions as against the individual employer (or as the case may 
be: branch office). Should the aforementioned three enforcement techniques 
not be available, or be insufficiently clear and legally certain, the Member 
States concerned should again be obliged, on the basis of the proposed system, 
to introduce minimum rights for such enforcement of collective normative 
provisions. Finally, if  national law provides for other (national) enforcement 
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methods following a breach of the collective normative provisions, these 
methods may also be applied mutatis mutandis to transnational collective 
labour agreements in force in that jurisdiction.
Second, the transnational collective labour agreement may provide for rights 
and obligations that arrange the relation between the employer and the 
employees vis-à-vis third parties. With regard to applicable law, the same line 
of arguing as above is applied. Should (i) the employer be active in one country, 
the law of that country applies to the relation between the third collective entity 
on the one hand and the employer and its employees on the other. Should (ii) 
the employer be active in several countries and should it have branch offices 
situated in these countries, the law of the country in which the branch office 
is situated should apply to the relation between the third collective entity on 
the one hand and the branch office and the employees working in that branch 
office on the other. Should (iii) the employer be situated in one country, while 
it employs employees in different countries, without having branch offices in 
these different countries, the relation between the third collective entity on 
the one hand and the employer and its employees on the other should be 
governed by the law of the country in which the employer is factually situated 
and primarily active (the country of residence). The enforcement of these 
types of collective normative provisions is rather complicated. For that reason 
each third collective entity is obliged to establish a national representative in 
each Member State in which the transnational collective labour agreement 
concerned applies. These national representatives are entitled to directly 
demand performance on the basis of the collective normative provisions of the 
transnational collective labour agreement from the employer or the employee 
in the country of residence of the employer. Likewise, the employee or the 
employer is entitled to demand performance from the third collective party 
through this party’s national representative in the country of residence of 
the employer by whom he is employed. Furthermore, the signatory parties to 
the transnational collective labour agreement are entitled to demand specific 
performance of these collective normative provisions from the parties bound 
by the collective normative provisions of the transnational collective labour 
agreement (the employers and employees) as against the third collective 
party, as well as performance from the third collective party as against these 
employers or employees entitled to such performance. Finally, if  national 
law provides for other (national) enforcement methods following a breach 
of the collective normative provisions, these methods may also be applied 
mutatis mutandis to transnational collective labour agreements in force in that 
jurisdiction.
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5.7.2 Term and termination
When determining term and termination of the transnational collective 
labour agreement, the freedom of contract and the autonomy of the social 
partners are the leading principles. Consequently, the contracting parties are 
free to establish the date on which their collective labour agreement enters 
into force and to attribute retro-effect to the transnational collective labour 
agreement. The signatory parties are furthermore entitled to establish the 
duration of the transnational collective labour agreement. This includes the 
choice for either an agreement for a definite or an indefinite period of time. A 
transnational collective labour agreement entered into for an indefinite period 
of time can be terminated by notice by each party, observing the applicable 
notice period. For clarity, notice should be served in writing. A transnational 
collective labour agreement concluded for a fixed period of time terminates 
by operation of law and can not be terminated prematurely, unless specifically 
stipulated otherwise in the agreement. The signatory parties can also arrange 
that the transnational collective labour agreement entered into for a fixed 
period of time is automatically tacitly renewed, if  they explicitly stipulate 
this in the agreement. In that situation the agreement does not lapse at the 
end of the term, unless terminated by one of the parties at such term’s end. 
Besides termination by giving notice, the contracting parties are also able to 
terminate that agreement by other means if  and in as far as permitted by the 
law governing the transnational collective labour agreement. 
5.7.3 After-effects
The obligatory provisions of the transnational collective labour agreement lose 
force upon expiry of that agreement. This is different with regard to individual 
normative provisions. These provisions have after-effects, unless specifically 
stipulated otherwise in the agreement. These after-effects obviously terminate 
once the employment conditions acquired by the employee due to these after-
effects are adapted, in accordance with the law that applies to the individual 
employment agreement, but also once a subsequent minimum transnational 
collective labour agreement applies that (i) is concluded with all employees’ 
organisations that also concluded the previous transnational collective labour 
agreement, (ii) explicitly states valid reasons justifying the discontinuation 
of the after-effects of specific individual normative provisions, while (iii) this 
discontinuation may not relate to base salary. A similar system is suggested 
for collective normative provisions.
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5.7.4 Dispute resolution
The social partners are free to decide whether or not to enter into alternative 
dispute resolution in case of a dispute. Easily accessible alternative dispute 
resolution should be made possible. Every Member State should appoint a 
specific body to this task. 
5.7.5 Reach of the social partners
The social partners’ are free to decide what they wish to arrange in the 
transnational collective labour agreement, provided that they operate within 
the limits of what constitutes a transnational collective labour agreement. 
Obviously, they must also abide by the hierarchy of legal norms. Transnational 
collective labour agreements may not contravene European and other 
applicable international law. They should furthermore respect the national 
law of the Member State in which they apply. They may vary from national ¾ 
mandatory law, provided that they satisfy the requirements that are in place 
in the countries in which they apply. 
Transnational collective labour agreements are ranked higher in the hierarchy 
than national collective labour agreements. This is in line with the general 
rule that international (European) law supersedes national law and with a 
goal of transnational collective labour agreements (the creation of a level 
of uniformity in the Member States). National collective labour agreements 
can, however, vary from transnational collective labour agreements. When it 
concerns a minimum transnational collective labour agreement, that agreement 
allows variation at national level in favour of the employee. When it concerns 
transnational collective labour agreements that also contain maximum and/or 
standard provisions, national collective labour agreements cannot introduce 
more favourable provisions (unless permitted through an opening clause in 
the transnational collective labour agreement).
6.  Final remarks
I realise that the proposed system does not cover all aspects and details to 
make it a “ready made” proposal for a regulation on transnational collective 
labour agreements. Still, it is detailed enough to point to a direction that 
transnational collective labour agreements could – and perhaps should – go. 
It also provides for an alternative for the system on transnational collective 
bargaining forwarded by the expert group led by Ales. 
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The proposal under consideration has sufficient reference points with 
industrial relations systems of multiple Member States. They should be able 
to recognise at least a part of their own national bargaining system in this 
proposal. This may lead to an easier acceptance. Also the voluntary nature 
of bargaining within the proposed system – nobody is obliged to enter into 
collective bargaining – may help Member States to accept this system. 
The above notwithstanding, I realise that it will be far from easy to 
convince every Member State to embrace the described European system 
on transnational collective bargaining in the current, or even in an adapted 
form. The mere fact that it is based on the three classical rights may give 
some Member States cold feet, as also can be witnessed when the proposed 
implementation at European level of fundamental rights is concerned. Besides 
the recognition of the classical rights, also the legally binding force, the relation 
to national collective bargaining and the suggested representativity demands 
for the social partners involved in transnational collective bargaining to meet 
may turn out to be insurmountable obstacles. 
And even if  the regulation on transnational collective bargaining were to 
be accepted and implemented, in the proposed or amended form, we are 
still miles away from a more or less vivid climate of proper transnational 
bargaining. Employers’ organisations seem to be not overly keen on 
transnational collective bargaining (and at least some of them are likely to 
reject this proposal), practical obstacles have to be overcome and national 
laws may prove difficult when trying to reach a transnational collective labour 
agreement that is effective and embraced in several jurisdictions. The first 
transnational collective labour agreements are likely to arrange only fairly 
“easy” topics and keep appropriate distance from “hard core” employment 
conditions that are normally arranged nationally. It will, without doubt, take 
years before transnational collective bargaining may truly develop and reach 
maturity. 
Still, giving the potential participants a legal framework will at least increase 
the chances for transnational collective bargaining to develop, bringing 
about its potential advantages in due time. The possibility of bargaining 
beyond borders, on topics that truly matter, will, in my view, improve over 
years, not only because the social partners may get acquainted with the new 
tool, but also because European legislation is likely to bring the laws of the 
different Member States closer together, making it easier for a transnational 
collective labour agreement to arrange matters in several jurisdictions at once. 
Transnational collective bargaining could furthermore be supported by other 
European legislation, for example by permitting transnational collective 
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labour agreements to deviate from certain provisions set out in such European 
legislation (¾ mandatory law). This may be especially promising in cross-
border regions, where it can be imagined that transnational collective labour 
agreements can arrange subjects such as applicable law, competent courts 
and perhaps even applicable social security regulations, provided of course, 
that the relevant European legislation allows such arrangements. This could 
improve workers’ mobility, enhance the economy and protect employees.
All in all, a proper system on transnational collective bargaining may help 
bring Europe further into the future, at first opening new paths for willing 
and perhaps adventurous parties, and in time maybe providing a proper and 
valuable tool for many multinational companies, employers’ and employees’ 
organisations. Transnational collective bargaining can help to improve social 
conditions on the one hand, while furthering economic progress on the other. 
And that is what the EU is all about. 
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